ETHIOPIAN-U.S. MIL TO MIL RELATIONS: SHIFTING

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ADDIS ABABA 000751

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF/E

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/09/2017
TAGS: PREL MOPS MASS ET SO
SUBJECT: ETHIOPIAN-U.S. MIL TO MIL RELATIONS: SHIFTING
SANDS, CHALLENGES AHEAD

Classified By: AMBASSADOR DONALD YAMAMOTO FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)

--------------
Summary
--------------


1. (S/NF) Ethiopian Chief of Staff Lt. General Samora made it
clear to the Ambassador and DATT March 8 that Ethiopia wants
U.S. support in specific areas, namely logistical support
(repair of two C-130 aircraft, a request pending for over
seven years, and delivery of two additional C-130s promised
eleven years ago),support for upgrading their command and
staff college, training at U.S. war colleges, and equipment
procurement. While appreciative of CJTF infantry training
programs at Bilate and Hurso, Samora said these programs do
not meet Ethiopia,s needs, and that an advanced special
forces training program would be more suitable. Humanitarian
projects by CJTF can be discussed separately, he added.
Samora made it clear that he personally will decide which
programs his troops will attend, which equipment will be
procured and future direction of training for his force. It
was clear that Samora wants to redefine our mil to mil
relations.


2. (S/NF) Samora affirmed the Prime Minister,s acceptance of
re-establishing ties between his troops and U.S. teams in
support of Somalia operations. This would be discussed later
in greater detail, he said. Samora stated that the ENDF
would be out of Somalia completely within 6 weeks. It has
been speculated that cost is the major factor driving their
decision to leave Somalia as soon as Ugandan troops have been
deployed in Mogadishu. End Summary

--------------
A Redefined Relationship
--------------


3. (S/NF) After ruling party meetings concluded this week,
Ethiopian Chief of Staff General Samora finally met with
Ambassador (notetaker),DATT and a DOD representative on
March 8. Samora underscored the importance of the U.S. to
Ethiopia,s security and praised the bilateral relationship.
He stated that he would determine personally which training
would be suitable for his troops, which equipment to procure
and which international programs ENDF officers would
participate in. He said basic infantry and marksmanship
training programs provided by CJTF-HOA at Hurso and Bilate
did not meet his needs. He said he had made this clear to
AFCENT commander LTG Whitcomb and former CJTF commander
Admiral Hunt. He suggested that a more advanced special
forces training program would be more useful. He said that
the U.S. soldiers at Hurso and Bilate can relocate to another
camp nearby.


4. (S/NF) Samora clarified that what he really wants from the
U.S. is the repair of the two C-130s that were provided to
Ethiopia by the U.S. eleven years ago. (NOTE: The Defense
Department agreed to help meet maintenance requests about
seven years ago. It was only recently that a DOD team was
able to assess the cost of repair and maintenance. The cost
of USD 13 million cannot be currently met. Efforts will be
made, however, to repair just one of the C-130s, but payment
would come from the State Department,s FMF program. DOD has
no funding to meet the ENDF request. END NOTE.)


5. (S/NF) General Samora also requested delivery of two
additional C-130s promised by the U.S. eleven years ago.
Only two of the four were ever delivered, he said. He
understood that the Eritrea-Ethiopia border war resulted in
forgoing delivery of the final two C-130 aircraft. But
Samora said that four C-130s were essential for Ethiopia to
carry out its peacekeeping operations as well as its other
requirements. He added that Ethiopia would be willing to
look into procurement of two C-130 aircraft.


6. (S/NF) Samora wanted U.S. assistance in upgrading and
professionalizing Ethiopia,s command and staff college by
bring in U.S. military experts to help train Ethiopia,s
future officers. Further, he liked and wanted to expand IMET
funding for war college training.


7. (S/NF) An upset Samora complained that invitations for

ADDIS ABAB 00000751 002 OF 002


Ethiopian participation in U.S. training programs often
dictated whom he could invite. He made it clear that he will
determine if Ethiopia will participate and who will attend.

--------------
A Mature Relationship
--------------


8. (S/NF) General Samora said that he has a good wo2f-YwCQQ5ded to LTG Whitcomb.


9. (S/NF) For the General, it was clear that he appreciated
CJTF operations. On CJTF-HOA humanitarian programs, he noted
that this could be discussed separately.

--------------
Somalia: Departure Soon
--------------


10. (S/NF) In a surprise, the General informed us that all
Ethiopian troops would depart Somalia within six weeks as
soon as Ugandan troops are deployed. Troops that recently
were deployed to Somalia would soon be withdrawn. He did not
wish to explain the reasons for this action, but noted that
with Uganda in Somalia, the ENDF,s mission was complete.


11. (S/NF) He confirmed, however, Prime Minister Meles,
agreement to re-establish relations between the ENDF and U.S.
special teams in support of Somalia operations. They could
work together, but noted that it could be shortlived since
the ENDF would pull out of Somalia.

--------------
Comment
--------------


12. (S/NF) The ruling EPRDF's leadership met for several days
to discuss policy issues just prior to our meeting with
Samora, who was a part of these meetings. Somalia was
certainly a focal point. Samora has complained bitterly in
the past at the huge cost of Somalia operations and expressed
his desire to get troops out. If we want the ENDF to
continue operations in Somalia, particularly with force
protection for Amisom, support for the TFG, and security at
the airport and port areas, then we will need to engage the
ENDF and also address the issue of expenses. We find
Samora's comments odd since the Prime Minister has indicated
that he wants ENDF troops embedded with the TFG to ensure
security in Mogadishu. Further, the Prime Minister views
some limited but extended ENDF presence in Somalia as
essential to advancing stability in Somalia, keeping
extremists out and avoiding a significant return of Ethiopian
engagement, an expensive proposition.


13. (S/NF) Samora's redefining mil to mil priorities has
taken us by surprise. We will discuss how this will affect
CJTF-HOA and its training schedule. We will look at
operations at Bilate and Hurso. It is clear that in addition
to the Ambassador, senior U.S. military officials will also
need to engage Samora. The Ambassador plans to try to meet
regularly with General Samora and is working with other
Ethiopian officials close to Samora on improving U.S.-ENDF
dialogue. Finally, Ambassador will discuss Samora's "new
direction" with the Prime Minister in the coming weeks.
End comment.
YAMAMOTO