Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07ADDISABABA60
2007-01-09 10:42:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Addis Ababa
Cable title:  

SOMALILAND FOREIGN MINISTER APPEALS FOR

Tags:  PREL PBTS PTER EAID KISL SO ET RW AU XA 
pdf how-to read a cable
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ZNY CCCCC ZZH
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FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3974
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNSOM/SOMALIA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 000060 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF AND AF/E
LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHER
CJTF-HOA FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/09/2017
TAGS: PREL PBTS PTER EAID KISL SO ET RW AU XA
SUBJECT: SOMALILAND FOREIGN MINISTER APPEALS FOR
RECOGNITION AND AID

REF: 06 ADDIS 3114 (NOTAL)

Classified By: POL-ECON COUNSELOR KEVIN SULLIVAN. REASON: 1.4 (B),(D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 000060

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF AND AF/E
LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHER
CJTF-HOA FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/09/2017
TAGS: PREL PBTS PTER EAID KISL SO ET RW AU XA
SUBJECT: SOMALILAND FOREIGN MINISTER APPEALS FOR
RECOGNITION AND AID

REF: 06 ADDIS 3114 (NOTAL)

Classified By: POL-ECON COUNSELOR KEVIN SULLIVAN. REASON: 1.4 (B),(D).


1. (C) SUMMARY. In a December 14 meeting with Charge a.i.
Wilgus and deputy pol-econ counselor, Somaliland Foreign
Minister Abdillahi M. Duale expressed interest in
establishing a closer strategic relationship with the United
States, and appealed for both humanitarian and military
assistance to counter the regional threat posed by Council of
Islamic Courts extremists. Saying he was reiterating points
made in previous discussions in Nairobi, FM Duale requested
that the USG provide financial and technical support for
2007-2008 elections in Somaliland; financial support for
Somaliland's formal education system, to provide an
alternative to radical Islamic schools; capacity-building for
Somaliland's security services (military, police, coast
guard, and immigration); and ammunition and military
training, to counter possible preemptive moves by Somalia's
Council of Islamic Courts (CIC). FM Duale asked that the
USG support Somaliland's bid for recognition by the African
Union, as some African countries had indicated they would.
Duale reviewed regional cooperation between Somaliland and
Yemen, Ethiopia, and Kenya, to counter the CIC threat, but
said he had rejected AU Chairperson Konare's recommendation
to meet with Somali TFG President Yusuf, as such a meeting
would constitute "high treason." While Somaliland clearly
supports Ethiopian intervention against a perceived CIC
threat to the Horn of Africa, Duale's observations underscore
that significant political tensions remain between Somaliland
authorities and Somalia's TFG. END SUMMARY.

-------------- --------------
SEEKING CLOSER STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP WITH THE U.S.
-------------- --------------


2. (C) In response to the observation by Charge Wilgus that
Embassy Nairobi took the USG lead on Somalia issues, Duale
said he was reiterating points he had made recently in "very
fruitful" discussions with Amb. Ranneberger in Nairobi.
Somaliland sought a closer strategic relationship with the
United States, Duale said, in order to promote democracy,
governance, and counter-terrorism in the Horn of Africa.
Duale expressed gratitude for USG engagement in Somalia and
Somaliland, saying the United States had a critical role to
play in the region. He thanked the United States for the
humanitarian assistance it provided indirectly to Somaliland
through projects and international organizations, saying such
assistance was crucial to support 2007 elections that would
strengthen democracy in Somaliland. He noted that the United
States had been among the first in 1960 to recognize
Somaliland, had later sheltered many Somalilanders as
refugees, and had opposed Siad Barre during the 1988
"genocide."


3. (C) FM Duale requested both humanitarian and military
assistance from the United States, as "democracy (alone) will
not defend us." Noting USG support of teacher training in
Hargeisa, Charge Wilgus took note of FM Duale's requests, but
reiterated Embassy Nairobi's lead on Somalia issues.
Asserting that Somaliland was a "de facto partner of peace in
the region," Duale asked that Somaliland receive any
assistance for which the Transitional Federal Government of
Somalia (TFG) qualified. Duale made specific requests for:
-- financial and technical support for the 2007-2008 election
cycle;
-- financial support (and/or scholarships or international
visit programs) for Somaliland's formal education system, to
provide an alternative to radical Islamic schools;
-- capacity-building for Somaliland's security services
(military, police, coast guard, and immigration);
-- ammunition and military training, which were especially
needed to counter preemptive moves by Somalia's Council of
Islamic Courts (CIC),if the CIC succeeded in taking over
Puntland and Baidoa.

--------------
"AGGRESSIVELY" SEEKING AU RECOGNITION...
--------------


ADDIS ABAB 00000060 002 OF 003



4. (C) Despite not being involved in any Somalia
reconciliation processes since its "reconstitution" in 1991,
Duale said Somaliland could play a significant role in
fostering peace in Somalia and the Horn, as the only
functioning constitutional Islamic state in the region. He
noted that Somaliland had information-sharing agreements with
Yemen, Kenya, and Ethiopia. Citing Somaliland's
constitutional clause rejecting terrorism, Duale asserted
that in face of the CIC threat, recognition of Somaliland was
"the best defense," as it could help unify mullahs, diaspora,
and other elements of Somali civil society. As a former
British protectorate, Somaliland's borders were accepted
internationally, he claimed, in contrast to the undemarcated
southern borders of Somalia.


5. (C) Duale appealed for the USG to support Somaliland's
effort to obtain recognition by the African Union, or at
least to inform African states that the United States had no
objection. Somaliland was "aggressively pursuing recognition
in the African Union," Duale said, which would require an
incremental approach to build support first among
representatives of the 15-member AU Peace and Security
Council (PSC) and then at the ministerial level. Duale said
he had met recently with representatives of key AU member
states, and would soon meet with Ethiopian Foreign Minister
Seyoum (January chair of the PSC) before traveling to west
Africa. (NOTE: On January 7, FM Duale was to leave for
Ghana. END NOTE.) Rwandan President Kagame supported
recognition of Somaliland, as did Zambia and Tanzania; South
Africa was "sympathetic" but was waiting for others to take
the lead, Duale said. He noted that Ethiopia had an
ambassadorial-level attache in Hargeisa, and was using part
of Bosasso port. Somaliland had sought to court Algeria and
Sudan, but many Somali fundamentalists in Mogadishu had been
trained in Sudan, he said.

-------------- --------------
BUT TENSIONS CONTINUE WITH TFG PRES. YUSUF OVER PUNTLAND
-------------- --------------


6. (C) Duale noted that while discussions with AU Commission
Chairperson Konare had been "useful," Duale had rejected
Konare's recommendation to engage TFG President Abdullahi
Yusuf, as Yusuf had always maintained that the unity of
Somalia was sacrosanct. Duale criticized the establishment
of Puntland as "outrageous," asserting that Puntland was
solely "an entity based on clan." In contrast, Duale said,
Somaliland was composed of multiple tribes: its president was
a former member of Siad Barre's security force and hailed
from a minority. Duale said he told Konare that meeting with
TFG President Yusuf would be "high treason," as Yusuf refused
to make any statements on self-determination or respecting
the will of the people, as had been done previously in
Croatia or prior to the formation of Bangladesh.

-------------- --------------
REGIONAL COOPERATION TO COMBAT ISLAMICIST EXTREMISTS
-------------- --------------


7. (C) Duale contrasted the "terribly dangerous, frightening"
situation in Somalia with peace and stability in Somaliland.
Somaliland played an integral part in promoting regional
stability, he said, with its emphasis on institution-building
and good governance, based on a "viable, secular"
constitutional state. Duale expressed concern about the
regional impact of unrest within Somalia, noting that
Somaliland authorities had long predicted that the CIC would
seek to establish an Islamic state in region. Duale reviewed
Somaliland's regional initiatives:
-- Duale said he had met with IGAD authorities, and also
sought to address the International Contact Group on Somalia
in order to discuss security in Somalia.
-- Somaliland assessed that the CIC was taking advantage of a
"ripe environment" to target Ethiopia, due to its contiguous
border with Somalia. Duale noted that Somaliland's Interior
Minister was currently in Ethiopia for consultations with the
GOE on cross-border security arrangements, including ensuring
that Eritrean-trained insurgents did not use Somaliland as a
base from which to destabilize Ethiopia.
-- In addition to Ethiopia, Somaliland had

ADDIS ABAB 00000060 003 OF 003


intelligence-sharing agreements with Yemen and Kenya.
-- Duale noted that he had discussed with Kenyan FM Tuju the
need to engage ethnic Somalis and other members of the Muslim
community, prompting Kenya to organize a town hall event.
Somaliland's "liaison officer" in Kenya had also been
instructed to reach out to Somalis.
-- On the other hand, Duale added, Djibouti had made a
"geo-political mistake" in allying itself with the CIC.


8. (C) Somaliland was monitoring the fighting in southern
Somalia closely, Duale said. Somaliland also feared a long,
protracted crisis and was concerned about CIC attempts to
infiltrate Somaliland through bribery. Somaliland had no
interaction with the CIC other than receiving threats, Duale
added.


9. (C) Citing 2003-2004 killings of four Italian aid workers
and the 2005 attempted bombing of a polling station, Duale
said the Somaliland security service was closely monitoring
CIC activities in Somaliland. The CIC considered
Somaliland's constitutional order anathema to its vision of
"peace and tranquillity" under Allah. Somaliland authorities
had imprisoned one sheikh for advocating support of the ICU,
while another sheikh, who at Friday prayers had called for
supporting extremists against Ethiopia, had reportedly had
his microphone seized by a worshipper who said it was absurd
to support fanatics. Somaliland was the only country in the
region who had apprehended terrorists, Duale said, and had
recently sentenced two to 20-25 years imprisonment, despite
threats from CIC Executive Committee Chairman Sheikh Hassan
Dahir Aweys to free them. To counter CIC influence,
Somaliland authorities were engaging moderate traditional
leaders, dispatching representatives to six regions, and
sensitizing the populace about the CIC's dangers through
several government committees, Duale said.


10. (C) Asked about IGASOM deployment to Somalia, Duale
underscored the importance of establishing a technical
committee comprised of Kenya, Rwanda, and Ethiopia to discuss
peacekeeping options.


11. (SBU) BIO-NOTE: Duale, who attended the last AU Summit
in July 2006 as Somaliland's Minister of Information,
replaces Edna Adan Ismail as foreign minister. Duale proudly
referred to having resided previously in Long Island, New
York, as a refugee.


12. (C) COMMENT: Somaliland formally requested recognition
by the AU in a 13-page missive submitted to the AU in
December 2005. Ethiopia's deputy foreign minister has
privately advocated recognition of Somaliland as a bulwark
against the CIC or others seeking to establish a "greater
Somalia" by force (reftel). While it is clear that
Somaliland FM Duale supports Ethiopian intervention in
Somalia and shares Ethiopia's concern about the regional
threat posed by CIC extremists, his continued rejection of
dialogue with TFG President Yusuf highlights that the
relationship between Somaliland and the Somali TFG remains
strained and must be addressed by future efforts at political
reconciliation. END COMMENT.
YAMAMOTO