ETHIOPIA'S NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS MAKE IT A

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ADDIS ABABA 000446

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

AF FOR A/S FRAZER AND DAS SWAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/12/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS KISL KPKO ET SO
SUBJECT: ETHIOPIA'S NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS MAKE IT A
MAJOR FACTOR IN RESOLVING SOMALIA'S FUTURE


Classified By: Ambassador Donald Yamamoto for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (S/NF) Summary: Ethiopia,s December 2006 military
incursion into Somalia clearly shows that the GOE was willing
to undertake serious risks to advance its national security
interests in Somalia. Ethiopia is committed to playing a
significant military and diplomatic role in advancing its
two-pronged objectives of eliminating extremists, including
HVT/HVI, and establishing a government capable of securing
the support of the other clans and ensuring that extremists
will have no role in Somalia society and government affairs.
Further, Ethiopia wants to eliminate safe havens in Somalia
for Ethiopia,s domestic rebel groups, such as the ONLF and
OLF. With Muslims soon to comprise over 50% of the
population, Ethiopia,s senior leadership views extremism
from Somalia as a threat to the balanced and harmonious
relationship between the Christian and Muslim communities.


2. (S/NF) In defense of its interests, Ethiopia will continue
to maintain troops in Somalia, albeit low profile and
relatively low numbers, for the foreseeable future to counter
extremist elements. Ethiopia will continue to play a
significant role mediating among the various clan elders and
pushing the TFG towards reconciliation beyond its Darood
clan, especially with the Hawiye/Haber Gedir/Ayr clans and
subclans, which the Ethiopians see as key to reaching
stability in Somalia and particularly in Mogadishu.
Finally, the Ethiopians will try to maintain control of
interrogations of foreign fighters and extremists captured in
Somalia or deported from Kenya.


3. (S/NF) U.S. and Ethiopian interests overlap with our
shared commitment to pursue HVT/HVI, eliminate extremist
elements, and interrogate foreign fighters. The Ethiopian
military needs U.S. intelligence and technology to pursue
extremists and the Ethiopian leadership needs U.S. political
sway to secure an AU military force for Somalia and to
coordinate the international community to finance
reconstruction in Somalia and resolve property disputes among
the clans, a major point of contention in the reconciliation
process. Ethiopia will remain a dominate force in what
happens in Somalia. The AU, UN and international community
must understand and deal with Ethiopia,s position in
Somalia. We must also be cautious that our shared interests
do not divert our attention from our priority goals of
advancing political reform and conflict resolution among
various groups within Ethiopia. End Summary.

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Evolving Posture in Somalia
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4. (S/NF) We have seen in our private discussions with Prime
Minister Meles and other members of his ruling TPLF hierarchy
that their thinking on how to achieve stability in Somalia
evolved significantly over the past several months. While
analysts in Washington viewed Meles as seeking a divided
Somalia, weak and ineffectual, it was clear through our
several private conversations with the Prime Minister and
TPLF leadership that they felt it was in Ethiopia,s interest
to advance two goals. First, it was essential to have a
Somalia free of extremists and, second, to establish a
leadership capable of influencing the other clans, through
strength or persuasion, to ensure that extremists would have
no place in Somali society or government affairs.
International support, particularly U.S. backing, would be
critical. In addition, Ethiopia would need to be fully
committed militarily and diplomatically in Somalia for the
long-term.

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Be Mindful of Ethiopians in Somalia
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5. (S/NF) Ethiopia committed three divisions (15,000) of
troops to Somalia operations. Their unexpected success in
disbanding the CIC and pursuit of extremists and HVT/HVI, led
the ENDF to adjust and expand their operations. Skeptical at
first, the GOE has embraced IGASOM/AMISOM as essential in
securing international support for the stabilization and
reconstruction of Somalia. Foreign Minister Seyoum and Prime
Minister Meles made it a diplomatic priority to engage the EU

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and Arab League as well as AU members on the merits of a
peacekeeping mission to Somalia. Meles was so focused on
diplomatic efforts that he cautioned the U.S. not to
under-take any prominent, headline-making military operations
in Somalia, such as AC 130 gunship strikes.


6. (S/NF) Further, Meles believed that AMISOM would enable
Ethiopia to reduce its military presence and allow it to take
a lower, though no less significant, profile in its
operations in Somalia. With the anticipated arrival of
Ugandan and other AU troops, Ethiopia has removed over one
division from Somalia and will soon have two full divisions
back in Ethiopia. But its plans call for keeping a division
of troops in Somalia to pursue extremists, protect the TFG
and advance stabilization through reconciliation of the
clans. It will also have troops embedded in the TFG forces,
particularly as clans join the TFG force to form a national
military force. The Ethiopians would provide training and
assistance. Prime Minister Meles has consistently told us
that the process of stabilizing Somalia will take time and
that Ethiopia will be involved throughout the process.


7. (S/NF) Kenya,s announcement that it has handed over to
the TFG some two dozen foreign fighters and persons captured
crossing the Somalia border means that Ethiopians will be
very much involved in the interrogation and ultimate
disposition of these persons. Further, Ethiopian
intelligence and military will take control of materials
obtained in Somalia and be a source of information on foreign
and extremist activities in Somalia. Our shared interests
with the GOE and Ethiopia,s need for U.S. intelligence and
technical skills will advance our cooperation and enable us
to share with the Ethiopians the information obtained in
Somalia. We must be mindful of Ethiopia,s strategic
interests in Somalia and that Ethiopia will remain a dominant
force, playing a significant role in Somalia,s security,
political dialogue, and national reconciliation efforts.

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Don,t Lose Sight of Objectives
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8. (S/NF) The U.S. must also remain mindful of core
objectives in continuing to move forward on political reforms
in Ethiopia. Significant progress has been made in
establishing more open and transparent procedures in the
Parliament, advancing new reforms in the electoral board and
media law, and in addressing the detention of opposition
leaders. In addition, we must get Ethiopia focused on
reconciliation with the Oromo and Somali populations. They
cannot use the war on terrorism or our shared interests in
Somalia to avoid reaching out to these groups. The OLF and
ONLF pose serious threats to the GOE, but reconciliation will
help undercut support for these militant rebel groups and
encourage a dialogue between the GOE and Oromo/Somali
populations. The successes in Somalia have surprisingly
given Prime Minister Meles more political space within his
ruling TPLF and greater freedom to act. Meles has in turn
been supportive of our private requests to open up political
dialogue and to resolve the detainee issue. We need to
encourage these actions.
YAMAMOTO