Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07ADDISABABA418
2007-02-09 09:24:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Addis Ababa
Cable title:
UNMEE SRSG REPORTS ETHIOPIAN-ERITREAN BORDER
how-toVZCZCXRO2823 PP RUEHROV DE RUEHDS #0418/01 0400924 ZNR UUUUU ZZH P 090924Z FEB 07 FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4551 INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY RHMFISS/CJTF HOA PRIORITY RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 ADDIS ABABA 000418
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR AF AND AF/E
LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHER
CJTF-HOA FOR POLAD
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL PBTS KPKO KHDP MOPS ET ER
SUBJECT: UNMEE SRSG REPORTS ETHIOPIAN-ERITREAN BORDER
REMAINS TENSE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 ADDIS ABABA 000418
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR AF AND AF/E
LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHER
CJTF-HOA FOR POLAD
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL PBTS KPKO KHDP MOPS ET ER
SUBJECT: UNMEE SRSG REPORTS ETHIOPIAN-ERITREAN BORDER
REMAINS TENSE
1. (SBU) SUMMARY. In a 90-minute briefing to diplomatic
corps representatives on February 8, Special Representative
of the UN Secretary-General (SRSG) for Ethiopia and Eritrea,
Ambassador Azouz Ennifar, reported that the situation along
with the Ethiopia-Eritrea border remained "tense and
volatile," due to the presence of 1,700 Eritrean troops and
12-16 tanks in Sector West of the formerly demilitarized
Temporary Security Zone (TSZ). In addition, the UN Mission
in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) had observed 12 Ethiopian
tanks "in camouflaged positions" in Bure (within striking
distance of the Eritrean port of Assab),but could not
determine when they had been moved there. UNMEE was unable
to verify recent alleged cross-border incidents, Ennifar
said, adding that Ethiopia may be intentionally suppressing
reports of cross-border incidents involving incursions from
Eritrea, so as not to raise public concern about Ethiopia's
northern border when its troops are preoccupied with Somalia.
Ethiopian and Eritrean military commanders have not met with
each other since July 2006, and Eritrea has refused to
recognize Ambassador Ennifar as SRSG since November 2006.
The UNSC's decision to downsize UNMEE from 2,300 to 1,700
troops will lead to curtailing some humanitarian activities
conducted by individual contingents, but will not affect the
number of UNMEE Military Observers or demining activities.
Visiting Norwegian deputy FM underscored the need for active
engagement of both parties, prior to the November 2007
deadline for demarcation by coordinates announced by the
Ethiopia-Eritrea Boundary Commission. END SUMMARY.
2. (SBU) Many changes had occurred over the 16 months since
Eritrea's imposition of a flight ban on UNMEE in October
2005, Ennifar said, recalling that Eritrea had subsequently
expelled 170 international staff and increased restrictions
on those remaining. There was peace and respect for the
ceasefire, but a deadlock in demarcation of the border.
UNSCR 1741, adopted in January 2007, had therefore called for
downsizing UNMEE, as well as having Eritrea lift restrictions
imposed on UNMEE and on the SRSG. Ennifar highlighted that
OP 9 of UNSCR 1741 called for efforts to normalize relations
between Ethiopia and Eritrea, "without prejudice" to border
demarcation. However, for Eritrea, demarcation appeared to
be a precondition for normalization talks, he said.
--------------
MILITARY SITUATION: "TENSE AND VOLATILE"
--------------
3. (SBU) Ennifar assessed that neither party voluntarily
sought war, and noted that recent public statements by
Eritrea's President Isaias now emphasized "legality" rather
than threats to take unilateral action. However, citing the
presence of 1,700 Eritrean troops and 16 tanks in Sector West
of the formerly demilitarized Temporary Security Zone (TSZ),
Ennifar said their proximity (coupled with recent alleged
cross-border incidents) indicated possible future
instability. Opposing forces previously 25km apart now faced
each other: Eritrean tanks at Om Hajer were now only 200m
from the Ethiopian town of Humera; and, since October,
Eritrean forces had controlled the sole bridge linking the
two towns, denying passage to an UNMEE contingent split
between them. The most recent UN SYG report (S/2007/33 of
January 22) thus characterized the situation as "tense and
volatile," he said.
--------------
ETHIOPIAN TANKS ACROSS FROM PORT OF ASSAB
--------------
4. (SBU) Whereas UNMEE previously had relied on eight
helicopters, Eritrea's continued flight ban on UNMEE hampered
UNMEE's ability to monitor the TSZ, especially Sector East,
Ennifar said, where areas 150-200km beyond Bure remained
inaccessible. In recent days, UNMEE had observed 12
Ethiopian tanks "in camouflaged positions" in Bure, but could
not determine when they had been moved there.
--------------
ERITREAN TROOPS IN "DEFENSIVE POSITIONS"
--------------
ADDIS ABAB 00000418 002 OF 004
5. (SBU) While expressing concern about the increasing number
of Eritrean troops in Sectors West and Center of the TSZ,
Ennifar said UNMEE assessed they were in "defensive
positions." Aged 20-22 years old, the Eritrean forces were
assessed to be army troops, not older militia, but often
carried multiple identification indicating they were police,
militia, and Eritrean Defense Forces. When challenged by
UNMEE MILOBs to present identification, the suspected troops
often demanded to see UNMEE peacekeepers' identification, to
determine whether they belonged to western nationalities that
Eritrea had expelled, Ennifar said.
6. (SBU) Movements of Eritrean troops were difficult to
monitor, due to Eritrean restrictions on UNMEE's freedom of
movement, Ennifar said. Citing Eritrean harassment of UNMEE
peacekeepers, including an incident in which peacekeepers
were temporarily held at gunpoint and their vehicle
impounded, he noted that UNMEE's Chapter VI mandate rendered
resistance futile.
--------------
ETHIOPIA DOWNPLAYING TENSIONS WITH ERITREA
--------------
7. (SBU) UNMEE had been unable to verify recent alleged
cross-border incidents, Ennifar explained, due to
contradictory statements by Ethiopian and Eritrean
authorities. For example, Ethiopian officials had denied
that Eritrean forces had crossed the TSZ and fired at them,
despite reports to the contrary. Ennifar postulated that
whereas Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles had publicly cited the
threat of 10,000 Eritrean troops in the TSZ during a November
2006 address to parliament, Ethiopia intentionally sought to
downplay tensions with Eritrea (and suppress reports of
cross-border incidents) so as not to raise public concern
when Ethiopian troops were preoccupied with Somalia, in
December 2006.
-------------- -
ETHIOPIA-ERITREA MEETINGS SUSPENDED SINCE JULY
-------------- -
8. (SBU) Meetings between Ethiopian and Eritrean military
commanders, chaired by UNMEE under the auspices of the
Military Coordination Committee (MCC),had been suspended
since July 29, 2006, when both parties last met in Nairobi,
Ennifar said. As Eritrea had cited the expense of meeting in
Nairobi, Ethiopia had proposed alternating between Addis
Ababa and Asmara. Rejecting meetings in capitals, Eritrea
counter-proposed meeting at the border, but Ethiopia had
objected. UNMEE proposals to meet in Sanaa, Djibouti,
Khartoum, or Dubai had also been rejected. Ethiopia had then
protested that the October 16, 2006, introduction of Eritrea
troops and tanks into the TSZ had violated the sanctity of
the TSZ, and that MCC meetings were not possible so long as
Eritrean tanks remained in the TSZ. Eritrea had also decided
to suspend participation in the MCC, Ennifar said.
9. (SBU) Questioned about UNMEE's interaction with Eritrean
officials, Ennifar said the Force Commander and Asmara-based
Deputy SRSG met regularly with Eritrea's Commissioner to
discuss operational details, but that raising political
developments was limited to Amb. Girma, of the Eritrean MFA's
North America and International Organizations department.
Ennifar noted that, ironically, Girma had been a former
roommate of Ethiopia State Minister of Foreign Affairs Tekeda
Alemu, and had been one of Ethiopia's foremost soccer
players, prior to Eritrea's independence.
--------------
GSE FAILS TO RECOGNIZE SRSG
--------------
10. (SBU) Discussing Eritrea's refusal to recognize him as
SRSG since November 2006, Ennifar explained that he had been
proposed as SRSG in May 2006, two weeks after Ethiopia had
rejected the previous candidate to replace outgoing SRSG
Legwaila. Following Eritrea's subsequent refusal to approve
Ennifar as SRSG, he was appointed interim "acting" SRSG.
However, Eritrea had informed Ennifar in November 2006 that
ADDIS ABAB 00000418 003 OF 004
he would no longer be recognized as a member of UNMEE, and
protested Ennifar's attendance of meetings at The Hague.
Eritrea had subsequently protested UNSCR 1741's call to lift
restrictions on the SRSG, via a February 1, 2007, letter to
the UN SYG and the UNSC President. Ennifar noted that
Eritrea had stated that it found the January 2007 UN SYG's
report "unbalanced"--despite the report's explicit reference
to Ethiopia's failure to observe the final and binding
decision of the Ethiopia-Eritrea Boundary Commission (EEBC).
11. (SBU) Ennifar noted that with the exception of visits to
Libya and Cairo, Isaias had little interaction with the
international community; until his farewell call, previous
SRSG Ambassador Legwaila had not seen Isaias for three years.
Italian PM Prodi had characterized President Isaias's trip
two months earlier to Italy as "difficult," Ennifar said. He
said he had not received a readout of EC Development
Commissioner Louis Michel's recent meeting with Isaias in
Asmara.
12. (SBU) Visiting Norwegian Deputy Foreign Minister Jonas
Store stressed the importance on engaging both parties,
particularly as MCC meetings had been suspended, and the
United States had "stopped its initiative." He advocated
stronger engagement by UN Headquarters, and the need for
prompt action prior to July.
--------------
UNMEE'S FUTURE: END IN NOVEMBER 2007?
--------------
13. (SBU) Questioned by the French Ambassador about the
EEBC's recent decision to declare the boundary demarcated by
coordinates, if not by physically pillar, Ennifar responded
that the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO)
regarded the EEBC as an independent body. Since April 2002,
the EEBC had stated it could not wait forever for physical
demarcation. However, a decision to demarcate could only be
taken by the two parties. Ethiopian Foreign Minister Seyoum
had protested the EEBC's announcement of demarcation by
coordinates; Eritrea had also rejected it. Whether UNMEE had
any reason to remain in place after the EEBC's November 2007
deadline would be a political decision of the UNSC, Ennifar
said.
14. (SBU) Asked by Algerian poloff about the parties'
reactions to the most recent UN SYG report, Ennifar responded
that Ethiopia likely wanted UNMEE to remain, noting that
prior to the latest UNSCR, Ethiopian PM Meles had called for
the UNSC to convince Eritrea to withdraw troops from the TSZ.
Eritrea had consistently asserted it was indifferent to
UNMEE's size and composition, Ennifar said.
--------------
DOWNSIZING TO AFFECT HUMANITARIAN ACTIVITIES
--------------
15. (SBU) Reviewing UNMEE's mandate, Ennifar noted that the
UNSC had cut UNMEE's force strength by nearly one-half: from
a high of 4,000, UNMEE had been reduced from 3,200 to 2,300
in May 2006; and most recently to 1,700 in January 2007,
through the adoption of UNSCR 1741. Troop contingents, not
the 230 military observers (MILOBs),would be downsized.
February 7 consultations with the UNMEE Force Commander had
resulted in the decision to cut 200 troops each from the
Indian and Jordanian contingents (currently at 850 and 750
troops, respectively) by mid-March, when rotations postponed
from January would occur. The Force Commander was committed
to maintaining existing military group and team sites,
Ennifar added.
16. (SBU) Downsizing would affect some humanitarian
activities conducted by UNMEE, Ennifar said, including road
construction by Indian and Bangladeshi engineers, and "quick
impact" medical and veterinary projects. Eritrean
restrictions (such as suspending the Indians' distribution of
medicine) had already made such projects difficult to
implement and monitor, he added. UNMEE had no independent
budget for continuing humanitarian activities conducted by
ADDIS ABAB 00000418 004 OF 004
individual contingents, he added.
17. (SBU) Demining, currently conducted by MACC contractors
in limited areas, would not be affected by downsizing,
Ennifar said. He noted that new landmines had been placed in
Sector Center of the TSZ and near Badme; civilian vehicles
had struck several mines recently.
18. (SBU) COMMENT: SRSG Ennifar's observations on Eritrea,
made in a separate meeting with U.S. officials, will be
reported septel. END COMMENT.
YAMAMOTO
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR AF AND AF/E
LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHER
CJTF-HOA FOR POLAD
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL PBTS KPKO KHDP MOPS ET ER
SUBJECT: UNMEE SRSG REPORTS ETHIOPIAN-ERITREAN BORDER
REMAINS TENSE
1. (SBU) SUMMARY. In a 90-minute briefing to diplomatic
corps representatives on February 8, Special Representative
of the UN Secretary-General (SRSG) for Ethiopia and Eritrea,
Ambassador Azouz Ennifar, reported that the situation along
with the Ethiopia-Eritrea border remained "tense and
volatile," due to the presence of 1,700 Eritrean troops and
12-16 tanks in Sector West of the formerly demilitarized
Temporary Security Zone (TSZ). In addition, the UN Mission
in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) had observed 12 Ethiopian
tanks "in camouflaged positions" in Bure (within striking
distance of the Eritrean port of Assab),but could not
determine when they had been moved there. UNMEE was unable
to verify recent alleged cross-border incidents, Ennifar
said, adding that Ethiopia may be intentionally suppressing
reports of cross-border incidents involving incursions from
Eritrea, so as not to raise public concern about Ethiopia's
northern border when its troops are preoccupied with Somalia.
Ethiopian and Eritrean military commanders have not met with
each other since July 2006, and Eritrea has refused to
recognize Ambassador Ennifar as SRSG since November 2006.
The UNSC's decision to downsize UNMEE from 2,300 to 1,700
troops will lead to curtailing some humanitarian activities
conducted by individual contingents, but will not affect the
number of UNMEE Military Observers or demining activities.
Visiting Norwegian deputy FM underscored the need for active
engagement of both parties, prior to the November 2007
deadline for demarcation by coordinates announced by the
Ethiopia-Eritrea Boundary Commission. END SUMMARY.
2. (SBU) Many changes had occurred over the 16 months since
Eritrea's imposition of a flight ban on UNMEE in October
2005, Ennifar said, recalling that Eritrea had subsequently
expelled 170 international staff and increased restrictions
on those remaining. There was peace and respect for the
ceasefire, but a deadlock in demarcation of the border.
UNSCR 1741, adopted in January 2007, had therefore called for
downsizing UNMEE, as well as having Eritrea lift restrictions
imposed on UNMEE and on the SRSG. Ennifar highlighted that
OP 9 of UNSCR 1741 called for efforts to normalize relations
between Ethiopia and Eritrea, "without prejudice" to border
demarcation. However, for Eritrea, demarcation appeared to
be a precondition for normalization talks, he said.
--------------
MILITARY SITUATION: "TENSE AND VOLATILE"
--------------
3. (SBU) Ennifar assessed that neither party voluntarily
sought war, and noted that recent public statements by
Eritrea's President Isaias now emphasized "legality" rather
than threats to take unilateral action. However, citing the
presence of 1,700 Eritrean troops and 16 tanks in Sector West
of the formerly demilitarized Temporary Security Zone (TSZ),
Ennifar said their proximity (coupled with recent alleged
cross-border incidents) indicated possible future
instability. Opposing forces previously 25km apart now faced
each other: Eritrean tanks at Om Hajer were now only 200m
from the Ethiopian town of Humera; and, since October,
Eritrean forces had controlled the sole bridge linking the
two towns, denying passage to an UNMEE contingent split
between them. The most recent UN SYG report (S/2007/33 of
January 22) thus characterized the situation as "tense and
volatile," he said.
--------------
ETHIOPIAN TANKS ACROSS FROM PORT OF ASSAB
--------------
4. (SBU) Whereas UNMEE previously had relied on eight
helicopters, Eritrea's continued flight ban on UNMEE hampered
UNMEE's ability to monitor the TSZ, especially Sector East,
Ennifar said, where areas 150-200km beyond Bure remained
inaccessible. In recent days, UNMEE had observed 12
Ethiopian tanks "in camouflaged positions" in Bure, but could
not determine when they had been moved there.
--------------
ERITREAN TROOPS IN "DEFENSIVE POSITIONS"
--------------
ADDIS ABAB 00000418 002 OF 004
5. (SBU) While expressing concern about the increasing number
of Eritrean troops in Sectors West and Center of the TSZ,
Ennifar said UNMEE assessed they were in "defensive
positions." Aged 20-22 years old, the Eritrean forces were
assessed to be army troops, not older militia, but often
carried multiple identification indicating they were police,
militia, and Eritrean Defense Forces. When challenged by
UNMEE MILOBs to present identification, the suspected troops
often demanded to see UNMEE peacekeepers' identification, to
determine whether they belonged to western nationalities that
Eritrea had expelled, Ennifar said.
6. (SBU) Movements of Eritrean troops were difficult to
monitor, due to Eritrean restrictions on UNMEE's freedom of
movement, Ennifar said. Citing Eritrean harassment of UNMEE
peacekeepers, including an incident in which peacekeepers
were temporarily held at gunpoint and their vehicle
impounded, he noted that UNMEE's Chapter VI mandate rendered
resistance futile.
--------------
ETHIOPIA DOWNPLAYING TENSIONS WITH ERITREA
--------------
7. (SBU) UNMEE had been unable to verify recent alleged
cross-border incidents, Ennifar explained, due to
contradictory statements by Ethiopian and Eritrean
authorities. For example, Ethiopian officials had denied
that Eritrean forces had crossed the TSZ and fired at them,
despite reports to the contrary. Ennifar postulated that
whereas Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles had publicly cited the
threat of 10,000 Eritrean troops in the TSZ during a November
2006 address to parliament, Ethiopia intentionally sought to
downplay tensions with Eritrea (and suppress reports of
cross-border incidents) so as not to raise public concern
when Ethiopian troops were preoccupied with Somalia, in
December 2006.
-------------- -
ETHIOPIA-ERITREA MEETINGS SUSPENDED SINCE JULY
-------------- -
8. (SBU) Meetings between Ethiopian and Eritrean military
commanders, chaired by UNMEE under the auspices of the
Military Coordination Committee (MCC),had been suspended
since July 29, 2006, when both parties last met in Nairobi,
Ennifar said. As Eritrea had cited the expense of meeting in
Nairobi, Ethiopia had proposed alternating between Addis
Ababa and Asmara. Rejecting meetings in capitals, Eritrea
counter-proposed meeting at the border, but Ethiopia had
objected. UNMEE proposals to meet in Sanaa, Djibouti,
Khartoum, or Dubai had also been rejected. Ethiopia had then
protested that the October 16, 2006, introduction of Eritrea
troops and tanks into the TSZ had violated the sanctity of
the TSZ, and that MCC meetings were not possible so long as
Eritrean tanks remained in the TSZ. Eritrea had also decided
to suspend participation in the MCC, Ennifar said.
9. (SBU) Questioned about UNMEE's interaction with Eritrean
officials, Ennifar said the Force Commander and Asmara-based
Deputy SRSG met regularly with Eritrea's Commissioner to
discuss operational details, but that raising political
developments was limited to Amb. Girma, of the Eritrean MFA's
North America and International Organizations department.
Ennifar noted that, ironically, Girma had been a former
roommate of Ethiopia State Minister of Foreign Affairs Tekeda
Alemu, and had been one of Ethiopia's foremost soccer
players, prior to Eritrea's independence.
--------------
GSE FAILS TO RECOGNIZE SRSG
--------------
10. (SBU) Discussing Eritrea's refusal to recognize him as
SRSG since November 2006, Ennifar explained that he had been
proposed as SRSG in May 2006, two weeks after Ethiopia had
rejected the previous candidate to replace outgoing SRSG
Legwaila. Following Eritrea's subsequent refusal to approve
Ennifar as SRSG, he was appointed interim "acting" SRSG.
However, Eritrea had informed Ennifar in November 2006 that
ADDIS ABAB 00000418 003 OF 004
he would no longer be recognized as a member of UNMEE, and
protested Ennifar's attendance of meetings at The Hague.
Eritrea had subsequently protested UNSCR 1741's call to lift
restrictions on the SRSG, via a February 1, 2007, letter to
the UN SYG and the UNSC President. Ennifar noted that
Eritrea had stated that it found the January 2007 UN SYG's
report "unbalanced"--despite the report's explicit reference
to Ethiopia's failure to observe the final and binding
decision of the Ethiopia-Eritrea Boundary Commission (EEBC).
11. (SBU) Ennifar noted that with the exception of visits to
Libya and Cairo, Isaias had little interaction with the
international community; until his farewell call, previous
SRSG Ambassador Legwaila had not seen Isaias for three years.
Italian PM Prodi had characterized President Isaias's trip
two months earlier to Italy as "difficult," Ennifar said. He
said he had not received a readout of EC Development
Commissioner Louis Michel's recent meeting with Isaias in
Asmara.
12. (SBU) Visiting Norwegian Deputy Foreign Minister Jonas
Store stressed the importance on engaging both parties,
particularly as MCC meetings had been suspended, and the
United States had "stopped its initiative." He advocated
stronger engagement by UN Headquarters, and the need for
prompt action prior to July.
--------------
UNMEE'S FUTURE: END IN NOVEMBER 2007?
--------------
13. (SBU) Questioned by the French Ambassador about the
EEBC's recent decision to declare the boundary demarcated by
coordinates, if not by physically pillar, Ennifar responded
that the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO)
regarded the EEBC as an independent body. Since April 2002,
the EEBC had stated it could not wait forever for physical
demarcation. However, a decision to demarcate could only be
taken by the two parties. Ethiopian Foreign Minister Seyoum
had protested the EEBC's announcement of demarcation by
coordinates; Eritrea had also rejected it. Whether UNMEE had
any reason to remain in place after the EEBC's November 2007
deadline would be a political decision of the UNSC, Ennifar
said.
14. (SBU) Asked by Algerian poloff about the parties'
reactions to the most recent UN SYG report, Ennifar responded
that Ethiopia likely wanted UNMEE to remain, noting that
prior to the latest UNSCR, Ethiopian PM Meles had called for
the UNSC to convince Eritrea to withdraw troops from the TSZ.
Eritrea had consistently asserted it was indifferent to
UNMEE's size and composition, Ennifar said.
--------------
DOWNSIZING TO AFFECT HUMANITARIAN ACTIVITIES
--------------
15. (SBU) Reviewing UNMEE's mandate, Ennifar noted that the
UNSC had cut UNMEE's force strength by nearly one-half: from
a high of 4,000, UNMEE had been reduced from 3,200 to 2,300
in May 2006; and most recently to 1,700 in January 2007,
through the adoption of UNSCR 1741. Troop contingents, not
the 230 military observers (MILOBs),would be downsized.
February 7 consultations with the UNMEE Force Commander had
resulted in the decision to cut 200 troops each from the
Indian and Jordanian contingents (currently at 850 and 750
troops, respectively) by mid-March, when rotations postponed
from January would occur. The Force Commander was committed
to maintaining existing military group and team sites,
Ennifar added.
16. (SBU) Downsizing would affect some humanitarian
activities conducted by UNMEE, Ennifar said, including road
construction by Indian and Bangladeshi engineers, and "quick
impact" medical and veterinary projects. Eritrean
restrictions (such as suspending the Indians' distribution of
medicine) had already made such projects difficult to
implement and monitor, he added. UNMEE had no independent
budget for continuing humanitarian activities conducted by
ADDIS ABAB 00000418 004 OF 004
individual contingents, he added.
17. (SBU) Demining, currently conducted by MACC contractors
in limited areas, would not be affected by downsizing,
Ennifar said. He noted that new landmines had been placed in
Sector Center of the TSZ and near Badme; civilian vehicles
had struck several mines recently.
18. (SBU) COMMENT: SRSG Ennifar's observations on Eritrea,
made in a separate meeting with U.S. officials, will be
reported septel. END COMMENT.
YAMAMOTO