SOMALIA: PM MELES AFFIRMS NEED FOR ETHIOPIAN

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ADDIS ABABA 000040

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF AND AF/E
LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHER
CJTF-HOA FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/05/2017
TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV MOPS KPKO ET SO XA
SUBJECT: SOMALIA: PM MELES AFFIRMS NEED FOR ETHIOPIAN
TROOPS TO WITHDRAW


Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES, A.I. JANET WILGUS. REASONS: 1.4 (A),
(B),(D).


1. (S) SUMMARY. In a 90-minute meeting on January 4 with A/S
Frazer, Prime Minister Meles said that Ethiopia sought to
withdraw its forces from Somalia as soon as possible, as
their prolonged presence would only serve to make them a
target of possible terrorist attacks from remaining CIC
fighters. Meles called for the rapid deployment of a neutral
peacekeeping force, possibly comprised of troops from Rwanda,
Uganda, and Yemen. Meles appealed for international
humanitarian assistance to foster security sector reform in
Somalia, and agreed that the TFG needed to foster political
dialogue among all Somali clans immediately, in order to
combat the influence of warlords and establish broadbased
grassroots support. Meles hailed bilateral military
cooperation with the United States, and called for continuing
and improved joint intelligence operations to target
terrorists. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) AF A/S Jendayi Frazer met January 4 with Prime
Minister Meles Zenawi, who was accompanied by Personal
Assistant to the PM Gebretensai Gebremichael. Charge, Amb.
Michael Ranneberger, Amb. John Yates, CJTF-HOA Commander Rear
Admiral Richard Hunt, CJTF-HOA POLAD Fred Cook, AF Special
Assistant Fatuma Sanneh, AF/E Somalia Desk Officer Nole
Garey, and deputy pol-econ counselor (note-taker) accompanied
A/S Frazer. A/S Frazer noted that she would co-chair the
January 5 meeting of the International Contact Group on
Somalia, discuss IGASOM deployment with President Museveni,
and visit Djibouti and Yemen Frazer said she hoped to travel
to Mogadishu with Kenyan FM Tuju and UN SRSG Francois Fall,
to consult with PM Ghedi, Somali civil society, and clan
leaders. The United States would provide significant
assistance to underscore that its interest in Somalia was not
limited to searching for high-value targets but also included
supporting the Somali people, she added.


3. (C) PM Meles welcomed support from the United States and
called for continued cooperation to capitalize on the
situation on the ground. He called for "a new division of
labor" to stabilize Somalia, and identified three priorities
for the international community:
-- Support the quick introduction of peacekeepers, under a
Burundi model (i.e., an initial African operation leading
to a UN PKO),as the AU lacks resources;
-- Provide a "quick injection" of humanitarian assistance
(e.g., financial assistance to provide compensation for
those surrendering weapons, as they currently received only
an assurance of possible hiring preference for the police
or army);
-- Insist that the Somali Transitional Federal Government
(TFG) foster an internal political process with Somali
stakeholders, to establish an inclusive government. As the
majority of ethnic Somalis in Ethiopia were Darod, and the
principal clash in Somalia was between Darod and Hawiye,
Ethiopia would support such a process, but would have to
minimize its involvement, Meles explained.

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REMAINING CIC MAY ENGAGE IN TERRORISM, NOT GUERRILLA WARFARE
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4. (C) Discussing the current security situation, Meles said
terrorism, not guerrilla warfare, was a concern. The GOE
anticipated "mopping up military operations quickly," as
Ethiopian forces now had "military momentum." However,
remaining Council of Islamic Courts (CIC) fighters could
regroup and conduct terrorist attacks. Ethiopia therefore
sought to withdraw its troops from Somalia as soon as
possible, not only due to the economic burden of their
continued deployment, but also because their prolonged
presence only served to provide a "quasi-legitimate" target
for CIC fighters. Citing signs of "sleeper cells" being
organized in Mogadishu, Meles said the GOE lacked adequate
intelligence on such cells, which could be targeted only
through enhanced intelligence operations, not military
operations.


5. (S) Meles called for changing the framework of

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intelligence cooperation from "passive collection" to a more
operational stance: while the USG and GOE shared
intelligence, there was now a greater need to act on it, he
said. The main focus for the upcoming week should be
cooperation on intelligence operations in order to disrupt
terrorists, Meles said.


6. (C) Mogadishu was now stable, he said, with Ethiopian
forces at the airport. Following consultations with
Mogadishu clan leaders, Ethiopian troops had been deployed to
static locations and were not conducting patrols, he said.
Ethiopia was now trying to pursue "a significant number" of
"hard-core elements" remaining in southwestern Somalia near
the border with Kenya, and hoped "to neutralize them" within
days. Somali Ogadeni clan leaders from Ethiopia would hold
talks with Ogadeni clan leaders representing areas around
Kismayo, he added. Ethiopian Ogaden National Liberation
Front (ONLF) and Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) insurgents were
suspected to be in central Somalia, but were not highly
sought-after targets, Meles said.


7. (C) Asked about Ethiopia's cooperation with Kenya, Meles
replied that while there was not a "serious lack of will"
among Kenyan authorities, Kenyan activities were often
"unwieldy." Meles noted that Kenya had erroneously accused
ENDF helicopters of attacking a Kenyan border outpost, and
that Kenya's susceptibility to "financial inducements"
threatened to jeopardize Ethiopia's operations. Meles called
for the USG to highlight to Kenyan authorities the need to
capture extremists.

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NEUTRAL DETERRENT FORCE MUST BE DEPLOYED URGENTLY
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8. (S) Questioned about a timetable for withdrawal, Meles
said that he hoped Ethiopian troops could withdraw within two
weeks, following one week of "mopping up." While ENDF needed
to withdraw visibly, before terrorists had the opportunity to
regroup and target them, Meles noted that some ethnic Somali
Ethiopians could change uniforms but remain embedded within
Somali TFG units for command and control, and Ethiopian
trainers could remain in Baidoa. Meles noted that
significant ENDF forces would remain at the Ethiopia-Somalia
border, from which re-entry into Somalia would be easy, if
required, due to the end of the rainy season.


9. (C) Meles highlighted the need for urgent deployment of a
neutral deterrent force "to back up clan leaders, not to
replace them." Ethiopia would prefer Rwanda, Uganda, and
Yemen as troop-contributors, he said. As such a neutral
force required troops who had not been previously involved in
the fighting, Ethiopia would not visibly play a role in
supporting such a force, Meles said. "The real peacekeeping
must be done by the Somalis," he observed, "and should be
responsible for day-to-day policing."

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SOMALI-OWNED POLITICAL PROCESS NEEDED TO COUNTER WARLORDS
-------------- --------------


10. (C) Noting that ultimately, "war against terrorists will
be won or lost on the political front," Meles underscored the
need for the expedient launch of a "prolonged political
process" among Somali clans. The key to eliminating
warlords' influence was not their individual removal, but
rather disbanding their militias, Meles said. Co-opting
warlords by providing them with government or diplomatic
posts was preferable to detaining them. A national political
process, which could require months of talks, would also help
eliminate warlords' control of specific geographic areas, he
added. Meles hailed the stability of Puntland and Somaliland
and their use of traditional Somali structures: relying on
business and religious leaders, rather than on warlords.
Observing that "warlordism is the biggest enemy of the
Somalis," Meles recommended a phased process that would
include dialogue at both the clan and national levels:
-- Establishing provincial authorities, with clan backing,
especially in Mogadishu and Benadir, to provide an
alternative to warlords.

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-- Reconfiguring parliament, possibly to include CIC
moderates, to ensure clan representatives were not warlords.
-- Having the TFG take control of all sources of national
revenue, in order to avoid fiefdoms.


11. (C) Meles complained that the TFG was "moving too slow"
on political engagement. Whereas TFG PM Ghedi, representing
Abgaal interests, had been able to rally support earlier
among clan leaders in north Mogadishu, the non-Abgaal in the
south now had growing concerns. Amb. Ranneberger, noting
that 48 TFG parliamentarians resided in Kenya, underscored
the need for the TFG to engage in an inclusive dialogue that
occurred in Somalia. Meles agreed with the need to address
as many Somali clan leaders as soon as possible, and stated
that consistent with the United States position, Ethiopia was
not backing a specific clan or individual, but rather a
political process supported by the Somali people. A/S Frazer
noted the shared vision of an inclusive political process,
but emphasized the USG concern that Somalia could revert to
warlordism. It is important that the TFG follow positive
statements with positive action, and A/S Frazer urged PM
Meles to use his influence with the TFG to do the right
things and be held accountable for their actions.


12. (C) Questioned about CIC leaders, Meles observed that
with its defeat, the CIC had now lost its "aura of continued
victory." Whereas the Ayr sub-clan had been the CIC's
primary backer, CIC Executive Committee Chairman Sheikh
Sharif Ahmed was Abgaal and now wielded little influence.
Ayr leaders were now acting in the name of the Ayr, not in
the name of the Islamic Courts. Meles added that while the
Union of Islamic Courts no longer existed, individual Islamic
courts could continue to operate in co-existence with the
government, just as they did in Ethiopia.


13. (C) Asked about the future role of TFG Parliamentary
Speaker Sharif Hassan Sheikh Adan, who had opposed Ethiopian
intervention but supported an international peacekeeping
operation in Somalia, Meles said that Adan, as a Rahanweyn
clan member, had held an important position but lacked
personal influence. The key political issue in Somalia
involved balancing Darod and Hawiye clan interests, Meles
said. It was unimportant who replaced Adan as Speaker,
although the position should be held by a Rahanweyn.
Rahanweyn controlled the Baidoa region, and therefore needed
to be included, Meles said. Meles noted that Baidoa was part
of Ethiopia's "buffer zone," as it had traditionally been
"friendly" to Ethiopian interests.

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BILATERAL COOPERATION WITH USG HAILED
--------------


14. (S) In response to a query by CJTF-HOA Commander RADM
Hunt, Meles highlighted the "excellent" working relationship
between Ethiopia and the United States, and said ENDF Chief
of General Staff Lieutenant General Samora Yonus had been
given "very clear guidelines" to cooperate with the USG,
including on identification of foreign fighters in Somalia.


15. (C) Following A/S Frazer's introduction of Amb. Yates,
Meles noted that Ethiopia had had an "excellent working
relationship" in the past with then-Special Envoy to Somalia
Amb. Robert Oakley. Meles concluded by noting that he was
"extremely delighted" with USG support, and cited cooperation
with CJTF-HOA as an example. RADM Hunt acknowledged the
important strategic relationship between the United States
and Ethiopia.


16. (C) In a subsequent private meeting with A/S Frazer, PM
Meles appealed for 3,000-4,000 tons of Title I food
assistance, in order to help address the needs of urban poor
in Ethiopia. (NOTE: USAID is awaiting a reply to its formal
request made in late 2006 for approximately USD 5 million in
such aid. END NOTE.)


17. (C) COMMENT: Meles' remarks underscore that following the
military defeat of the CIC, Ethiopia now seeks to diminish
the public role it is playing in Somalia, and acknowledges
the key role of political engagement of Somali stakeholders

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by the TFG. Concurrent with the TFG launching a broad-based
political dialogue to consolidate grassroots support, urgent
deployment of a stabilization force to Somalia is desperately
needed, in order to facilitate the withdrawal of Ethiopian
forces. END COMMENT.


18. (U) This message was cleared by A/S Frazer.
YAMAMOTO