SUDAN: ETHIOPIAN STATE MINISTER TEKEDA DISCUSSES

C O N F I D E N T I A L ADDIS ABABA 003521

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF AND AF/E, AF/SPG, AND INR/AA
LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHER
CJTF-HOA AND USCENTCOM FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/11/2017
TAGS: PREL KPKO ET ER SU
SUBJECT: SUDAN: ETHIOPIAN STATE MINISTER TEKEDA DISCUSSES
CPA AND DARFUR


Classified By: Ambassador Donald Yamamoto for Reasons 1.4 (b)(d).


1. (C//NF) SUMMARY. On December 5, Ambassador, visiting
Sudan Program Group officials, and PolOff met with Ethiopian
State Minister of Foreign Affairs Dr. Tekeda Alemu to discuss
Ethiopia's views on Sudan's Comprehensive Peace Agreement
(CPA) and Darfur. Tekeda explained that Ethiopia's foreign
policy objective in Sudan was to balance relations between
the northern and southern governments. He said that the
failure of the CPA would have detrimental consequences for
Ethiopia and stated that Ethiopia preferred Sudanese unity if
given the choice. Tekeda opined that Khartoum would be more
cooperative with the international community if the United
States made it clear that it was not seeking regime change in
Sudan. Tekeda added that Prime Minister Meles would use a
December 5 visit to Khartoum to inquire whether there was a
role for Ethiopia as an interlocutor between the north and
south. He warned, however, that Eritrea was already
attempting to drive a wedge between Ethiopia and the southern
Sudanese and would attempt to interfere with any Ethiopian
led initiatives in Sudan. Finally, Tekeda reaffirmed
Ethiopia's intent to send peacekeeping troops to Darfur, but
cautioned that Ethiopia needed to see modest political
progress between Khartoum and the rebels before sending the
first troops. END SUMMARY.

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ETHIOPIA ATTEMPTING TO BALANCE NORTH-SOUTH RELATIONS
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2. (C//NF) Tekeda opened by stating Ethiopia's goal
regarding Sudan was to balance relations between Khartoum and
Juba and highlighted that Ethiopia was the only country that
bordered both the north and the south. He said that
maintaining good relations with both governments often put
his government in a difficult spot, but that Ethiopia had
little choice but to maintain the relationships. Tekeda
further remarked that Ethiopia had kept its distance from the
Darfur issue in order to uphold the balance.

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CPA FAILURE HOLDS SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES FOR ETHIOPIA
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3. (C//NF) Tekeda said that the unraveling of the CPA would
have serious consequences for Ethiopia. He said that if
Ethiopia's western border became a problem, Ethiopia would be
surrounded on all corners by instability and threats
including Eritrea to the north and Somalia to the south and
east. This was a scenario Ethiopia eagerly wanted to avoid.


4. (C//NF) Tekeda assessed that the major problem of the
CPA was the lack of confidence between the northern National
Congress Party (NCP) and the southern Sudan People's
Liberation Movement (SPLM). He said the southerners needed
to be treated as equals and the consensus in the south was
that Khartoum was not taking them seriously. He commented
that if this issue was not addressed, any talk of maintaining
the unity of Sudan would be vacuous.


5. (C//NF) Tekeda made it clear that no matter the outcome
of the CPA, whether unity or separation, the process must be
carried out peacefully. He said if given a choice Ethiopia
would prefer a unified Sudan, but that peace was paramount.
He commented that southern independence would be difficult
and that there would be no guarantee of stability or that
there would be only one southern Sudanese state.


6. (C//NF) When queried whether international pressure
would move Khartoum to cooperate more fully with CPA
implementation, Tekeda responded that pressure combined with
actions designed to enhance confidence between Khartoum and
the international community would be effective. He said
Khartoum suspects the United States is attempting to use the
CPA to seek regime change. Tekeda postulated that if
Khartoum was confident that regime change was not the
objective, then Khartoum would cooperate and many of the
current problems would be alleviated.

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PM MELES SEEKING ROLE AS NORTH-SOUTH INTERLOCUTOR
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7. (C//NF) According to Tekeda, PM Meles planned to
approach Sudanese President Bashir on December 5 during a
visit to Khartoum to inaugurate the opening of a new
Ethiopian-Sudanese road about the possibility of Ethiopia
serving as an interlocutor between the NCP and the SPLM.
Tekeda said Meles would not press the issue if Meles received
pushback from Bashir. Tekeda added that Meles had called
both Bashir and SPLM leader Salva Kiir immediately after the
SPLM threatened to withdraw from the CPA in November, but
that because the NCP and SPLM resolved the recent crisis
bilaterally Meles did not have the opportunity to fully
engage. Tekeda added that Meles would want strong assurances
from the United States that his efforts in Sudan would be
supported.

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ERITREA A POTENTIAL SPOILER
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8. (C//NF) Tekeda warned that Ethiopia's entry into
north-south negotiations would be complicated by Eritrea
which was already attempting to drive a wedge between Addis
Ababa and Juba. Tekeda said that although Ethiopia
cooperated with the SPLM in many sensitive areas, the SPLM
was careful not to appear close to Addis Ababa in order to
maintain its relationship with Asmara. He also observed that
Kiir had yet to visit Ethiopia and that there were Eritreans
in Juba but he did not know what they were doing there.
Tekeda speculated that Asmara would attempt to derail
Ethiopian involvement in north-south negotiations.

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DARFUR: POLITICAL PROGRESS NEEDED BEFORE WE SEND TROOPS
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9. (C//NF) On the issue of Darfur, Tekeda said the
Ethiopian government had made a careful deliberate decision
to send troops to the region that would be fulfilled, but
that there needed to be some modest improvement in the
political situation before deployment would begin. He
reiterated that the speed of Ethiopian troop deployment would
depend on political progress between Khartoum and the many
rebel factions. He emphasized that Ethiopia had not set an
unrealistic benchmark of a full political settlement for
deployment, but that his government was looking for some
progress beyond the current, "complete stalemate." He also
commented that Khartoum needs to resolve its problems with
the UN.

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COMMENT
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10. (C//NF) In recent months the Ethiopian government has
displayed a greater sense of concern regarding developments
in Sudan and Post recommends Washington consider how to best
leverage Ethiopia's desire to become engaged in the CPA
process. Post's interactions with the host government
confirm that the Ethiopian military's preparations to send
troops to Darfur are progressing and Post anticipates the
first Ethiopian battalion will be ready for deployment early
in the new year. Prime Minister Meles speaks frequently with
President Bashir and visited Khartoum prior to the Lisbon
EU-AU meeting to engage Bashir to send NCP members to the
upcoming IGAD summit on Sudan. Meles had tried in vain to
get a NCP person to participate in the Secretary's hosted
Sudan meeting in Addis Ababa on December 5. Meles has often
told us that he is concerned about the 2009 Sudan elections
and the potential for problems if the CPA is not pushed
vigorously now. Meles firmly believes that strong
international support for the CPA is critical to its success.
END COMMENT.
YAMAMOTO