Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07ADDISABABA325
2007-02-03 09:51:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Addis Ababa
Cable title:  

A/S FRAZER AND ETHIOPIAN PRIME MINISTER DISCUSS

Tags:  PREL ET SU AU ER 
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P 030951Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4422
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ADDIS ABABA 000325 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF/E AND AF/SPG
LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHER
CJTF-HOA FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/03/2017
TAGS: PREL ET SU AU ER
SUBJECT: A/S FRAZER AND ETHIOPIAN PRIME MINISTER DISCUSS
FUTURE OF SUDAN

REF: A. ADDIS ABABA 311 (NOTAL)


B. ADDIS ABABA 232 (NOTAL)

Classified By: ERIC WONG, DEPUTY POL-ECON COUNSELOR. REASON: 1.4 (B),
(D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ADDIS ABABA 000325

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF/E AND AF/SPG
LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHER
CJTF-HOA FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/03/2017
TAGS: PREL ET SU AU ER
SUBJECT: A/S FRAZER AND ETHIOPIAN PRIME MINISTER DISCUSS
FUTURE OF SUDAN

REF: A. ADDIS ABABA 311 (NOTAL)


B. ADDIS ABABA 232 (NOTAL)

Classified By: ERIC WONG, DEPUTY POL-ECON COUNSELOR. REASON: 1.4 (B),
(D).


1. (C) SUMMARY. Just prior to hosting the January 29-30
African Union Summit, at which the potential candidacy of
Sudanese President Bashir to become AU Assembly Chairman
likely dominated debate, Prime Minister Meles expressed
concern about Sudan's future, particularly after authorities
in southern Sudan conduct a referendum on independence.
Meles attributed Khartoum's intransigence to its desire to
frustrate the Government of Southern Sudan's likely
secession. Meles observed that as Anglophone African
countries were united in opposition to Bashir's candidacy for
AU Chairmanship, targeting north African and Francophone
countries was key. On Darfur, Meles expressed concerns about
Eritrea's role in facilitating talks about Sudanese rebels.
END SUMMARY.


2. (U) AF A/S Jendayi Frazer met January 27 with Prime
Minister Meles Zenawi, who was accompanied by Personal
Assistant to the PM, Gebretensai Gebremichael, and MFA acting
Director General for Europe and America Almaz Ameha.
Ambassador and deputy pol-econ counselor (note-taker)
accompanied A/S Frazer. (NOTE: PM Meles Zenawi's comments on
Somalia have been reported septel (ref A). END NOTE.)

--------------
KHARTOUM FEARS SOUTH'S SECESSION
--------------


3. (C) PM Meles expressed concern about the future of Sudan,
once a referendum was held to determine the status of
southern Sudan. Khartoum's Government of National Unity
(GNU) recognized that the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS)
would likely seek independence, and therefore sought to make
secession "as messy as possible," Meles said. Southern Sudan
could become a crisis, threatening to unravel progress made
in Darfur. Meles said he sought U.S. perspectives on
scenarios for Sudan 2-3 years in the future, involving either
secession or unity with Khartoum.


4. (C) Frazer responded that Khartoum's support for militias
in Darfur showed it was not honorably committed to the

Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). She noted that GoSS
President Salva Kiir had said that Khartoum would not accept
an SPLM government, even if the SPLM won national elections.
A recent Congressional hearing on policy toward Sudan had
challenged the assumption that the GNU, having signed the
CPA, could be engaged successfully. The U.S. position on
southern Sudan would depend on the outcome of the situation
in Darfur. GNU President Bashir was seeking a military
solution: building up military forces in southern Darfur, and
acknowledging bombing in northern Darfur, she said. The USG
had revised economic sanctions affecting southern Sudan, in
order to help it build capacity and promote trade southward
through Kenya, rather than northward through Port Sudan. The
USG was also assisting the GoSS with security sector reform
and training, she said. Frazer noted the possibility of
having the Director of National Intelligence conduct an
assessment of Sudan's future.

-------------- --------------
FRANCOPHONE AFRICA KEY TO SELECTING AU ASSEMBLY CHAIRMAN
-------------- --------------


5. (C) Outlining U.S. concerns about the possibility of
President Bashir serving as African Union Assembly Chairman,
Frazer said the USG remained strongly opposed to his
candidacy, but publicly had stated that it was up to the AU
to decide its leadership. While Congolese President
Sassou-Nguesso had not played a strong role as AU Assembly
Chair, Nigerian President Obasanjo had, (i.e., leadership of
the AU matters). The USG had no confidence in Bashir's
leadership, and had asked former Sudanese Foreign Minister
Mustafa Ismail to advise Bashir not to seek the Chairmanship.
The east African bloc needed to voice its objection and
select an alternate (perhaps Tanzanian President Kikwete),or

ADDIS ABAB 00000325 002 OF 002


allow another regional bloc to assume the Chairmanship (such
as Ghanaian President Kufuor for west Africa). Frazer said
an Egyptian official had approached her to argue that Bashir
should be given the Chairmanship in order to ensure the
implementation of the November 2006 Addis Ababa agreement (on
establishing a hybrid UN-AU peacekeeping force in Darfur);
however, giving Bashir the Chairmanship would give Sudan
control of two parts of the tripartite (Sudan-AU-UN)
implementation mechanism.


6. (C) PM Meles said it was wise to avoid embarrassing
President Bashir, and recommended that the USG work with
France. As Anglophone Africa was united in opposition to
Bashir, Francophone African states were key. France, due to
its concern about Chad, may seek a quid pro quo with Bashir,
Meles postulated. If united, defeating a combination of
League of Arab States members and Francophone states could be
a problem; targeting North African and Francophone countries
was thus critical. Noting that the January 2006 AU Summit
had decided that Bashir would assume the Assembly
Chairmanship in 2007, Meles observed that it was thus
necessary to reverse a previous Summit decision, which could
prove more difficult than making a new decision.

--------------
CONCERN ABOUT ERITREA'S ROLE
--------------


7. (C) Meles recommended dissuading Eritrea from playing a
role in Darfur, noting that while some Sudanese rebels
remained in Asmara, they were "not eager" to be handed over
to President Bashir by Eritrean President Isaias. Frazer
responded that she had informed Norwegian Deputy Foreign
Minister Raymond Johansen that Asmara-based talks with
Sudanese rebels had no visibility or transparency, due to the
exclusion of the international community. Talks under UN-AU
auspices, led by AU Darfur mediator Salim Ahmed Salim and the
new UN Special Envoy Jan Eliasson, were more desirable, she
said, but Johansen had questioned whether rebels would accept
Salim. Frazer noted that the jointly appointed Special
Representative of both the UN SYG and the AU would have
overall responsibility for the political talks and
peacekeeping force. She added that Eritrea opening a
parallel track is undesirable but should feed into the AU-UN
implementation structure.


8. (C) COMMENT: PM Meles's interest in the future of Sudan
is likely motivated by strategic concerns, as Sudan is not
only Ethiopia's neighbor but also one of its key suppliers of
oil. Ethiopia's concern that it not alienate Bashir, for
fear of driving Sudan politically closer to Eritrea, has been
voiced by some of Meles's key advisors, such as State
Minister of Foreign Affairs Tekeda (ref B). END COMMENT.


9. (U) A/S Frazer cleared this cable.
YAMAMOTO