Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07ADDISABABA312
2007-02-01 16:18:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Addis Ababa
Cable title:  

A/S FRAZER MEETING WITH UGANDAN PRESIDENT MUSEVENI

Tags:  PREL MOPS KPKO KISL UG SO SU CD AU 
pdf how-to read a cable
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ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 011618Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4400
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNSOM/SOMALIA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ADDIS ABABA 000312 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF/FO AND AF/E
LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHER
CJTF-HOA FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2017
TAGS: PREL MOPS KPKO KISL UG SO SU CD AU
SUBJECT: A/S FRAZER MEETING WITH UGANDAN PRESIDENT MUSEVENI
FOCUSES ON SOMALIA, DARFUR, AND CHAD

Classified By: AMBASSADOR DONALD YAMAMOTO. REASON: 1.4 (B),(D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ADDIS ABABA 000312

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF/FO AND AF/E
LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHER
CJTF-HOA FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2017
TAGS: PREL MOPS KPKO KISL UG SO SU CD AU
SUBJECT: A/S FRAZER MEETING WITH UGANDAN PRESIDENT MUSEVENI
FOCUSES ON SOMALIA, DARFUR, AND CHAD

Classified By: AMBASSADOR DONALD YAMAMOTO. REASON: 1.4 (B),(D).


1. (C) SUMMARY. President Museveni confirmed that he had
appointed a force commander to lead Ugandan peace-keeping
troops who were ready to deploy to Somalia as soon as
February 1, immediately after obtaining parliamentary
approval. Their mission would be to support Somalia's
Transitional Federal Government and to provide training, but
not to disarm Somalis, which was best left to the Somalis
themselves. Discussing domestic affairs, Museveni dismissed
the Lord's Resistance Army's (LRA) call for a new mediator to
replace Riek Machar, and said Uganda would continue military
operations against the LRA in order to maintain "pressure"
for political dialogue. Criticizing Sudan's Government of
National Unity as "Arab chauvinists" bent on the
"extermination" of the people of Darfur, Museveni appealed
for greater international assistance to Darfur, as well as
greater U.S. engagement with both Chad and the Central
African Republic. He affirmed Uganda's opposition to
Sudanese President Bashir's candidacy for AU Assembly
Chairman, and indicated support for an East African
alternative, possibly Tanzanian President Kikwete. END
SUMMARY.


2. (U) On January 28 on the margins of the African Union
Summit, A/S Frazer met with Ugandan President Yoweri
Museveni, who was accompanied by Ugandan Ambassador to
Ethiopia and PermRep to the African Union Edith Grace
Ssempala and Ugandan embassy staff. U.S. PermRep to the AU
(USAU) Ambassador Courville, USAU Military Advisor Colonel
Timothy Rainey, AF/SPG Director Lauren Landis, AF Special
Assistant Fatuma Sanneh, and deputy pol-econ counselor Eric
Wong (note-taker) accompanied A/S Frazer.

--------------
UGANDA READY TO DEPLOY TO SOMALIA WITHIN DAYS
--------------


3. (C) President Museveni said Ugandan troops were ready to

deploy to Somalia (as part of the AU Mission in Somalia, or
AMISOM) as soon as February 1 or 2, immediately following
parliamentary approval anticipated on January 30. Their
primary mission would be to support Somalia's Transitional
Federal Government (TFG),as well as to provide training to
Somalis. Amb. Ssempala observed that the AU, IGAD, TFG, and
potential troop contributing countries planned to meet the
following week; Museveni said he hoped Uganda would have
deployed by then.


4. (C) Disarmament was a delicate task best left to the
Somalis themselves, not to outside parties, Museveni said,
observing that even women fighters would have to be disarmed.
While Ugandan troops could counter an isolated insurgency
"in the bush," a general insurgency would be more
challenging. Museveni recalled that as OAU chair, he had
visited warlord Mohammed Farah Aideed in Mogadishu, and had
advised then-President George H.W. Bush to focus on
humanitarian delivery of food and thus generate goodwill,
rather than to pursue Aideed. Somalis, under the "Mad
Mullah," had fought against the UK for 20 years, Museveni
added. He highlighted that Ugandan troops had experience in
Somalia, having fought there twice: against Italy in the
Second World War, and as one of the contingents of the UK's
colonial-era King's African Rifles.


5. (C) A/S Frazer noted that the USG was providing USD 19
million to support AMISOM, and that a stabilization force
would help create conditions conducive to dialogue. The USG
was also pushing the EU to release funds earmarked for
Somalia from the EU's African Peace Facility, despite
opposition from EU Development Commissioner Louis Michel, who
sought to condition their release on political dialogue and
the restoration of impeached TFG Parliamentary Speaker Sharif
Hassan Sheikh Adan. Italy also sought conditionality, but
had offered humanitarian support for the TFG. While attacks
on Ethiopian forces had occurred, Somali community leaders,
including the Hawiye/Habr-Gedir/Ayr sub-clan, had said they
would welcome peace-keepers. The Somali people appreciated

ADDIS ABAB 00000312 002 OF 004


the role Uganda played in the past as IGAD chair, she added.


6. (C) In response to Museveni's comment that AU Commission
Chairperson Alpha Oumar Konare appeared to have doubts about
deployment in Somalia, Frazer noted that AU Peace and
Security Commissioner Djinnit had formally requested support
for AMISOM from both AU member states and partners. Nigeria
and Malawi were ready to deploy, and Burundi would provide a
battalion; South Africa would provide financing and possibly
planners, although the USG was pushing for equipment;
Mozambique was a possible troop contributor; and Tanzania had
not yet responded. Amb. Courville observed that Egypt and
Algeria may provide funds; Algeria may provide airlift, as it
was constitutionally prohibited from deploying. Museveni
noted that the Ugandan force commander appointed to lead
Uganda's contingent could lead other national contingents as
well.


7. (C) Despite having five million Somalis among its
population, Ethiopia had a history of "mishandling" its
relationship with Somalia, Museveni said. Discussing the
four major African language groups (Afro-Asiatic,
Niger-Congo, Nilo-Saharan, and Khoi-San),Museveni observed
that Somalis, Oromos, ancient Egyptians, and peoples of both
southern Sudan and southern Ethiopia all belonged to the
Nilo-Saharan group; while west and central African peoples,
including Bantus, belonged to the Niger-Congo. Uganda was
thus a "bridge" between the Niger-Congo and Nilo-Saharan
groups, he concluded. Uganda's "pan-African" polity
differentiated only between "Africans and non-Africans," not
among Africans themselves, Museveni added, explaining that
this was why Uganda provided refuge to Rwandan expatriates.

-------------- --------------
UGANDA TO CONTINUE MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST LRA
-------------- --------------


8. (C) Museveni dismissed the Lord's Resistance Army's (LRA)
call for a new mediator in Kenya as a delaying tactic, as a
new mediator would require time for instruction. It was
preferable to reinforce efforts by Sudanese mediator Riek
Machar, who knew the issues well, Museveni said. Museveni
added that he had told UN Special Envoy Joaquim Chissano that
if the LRA sought an infusion of new representatives or
mediators, then Uganda would resume military operations
against the LRA. Continued military operations, in
conjunction with political dialogue, was necessary to place
pressure on the LRA, Museveni said; dialogue "without
pressure" was useless.


9. (C) Museveni rejected direct talks with Vincent Otti,
asserting that the LRA was "not serious," and had been misled
by the NGO Pax Christi. LRA leaders needed to decide whether
they valued their life as much as the funding they received
from NGOs, he said. Uganda was pursuing a "concept of
operations plus talks, not operations plus holiday," Museveni
declared, adding that he had dispatched a military commander
to consult with one of DRC President Kabila's.

-------------- --------------
DARFUR FACES "EXTERMINATION" BY "ARAB CHAUVINISTS"
-------------- --------------


10. (C) Museveni strongly criticized the Government of Sudan
as "Arab chauvinists" responsible for "ethnic cleansing" in
Darfur, who sought to "clean out the blacks and replace them
with Arabs." Citing 1948 census results that found Sudan to
be an "Afro-Arab" country comprised of a 69 per cent African
majority, and a 31 per cent Arab minority, he said "Nilotics
in the north," who were "Muslim but not Arab," were "being
butchered." Uganda had intervened on behalf of blacks in
southern Sudan, resulting in Khartoum's agreement to the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA),he said, but the people
of Darfur lacked the same international support. "Something
should be done, or else they will be exterminated," Museveni
said. He noted that he had asked Nigerian President Obasanjo
to intervene to defend Darfurians, but that Obasanjo had been
too pre-occupied with domestic politics to engage in

ADDIS ABAB 00000312 003 OF 004


"extra-curricular activities." Museveni appealed for USG
assistance for the people of Darfur, so they could decide
themselves whether to join the Government of Southern Sudan
or support authorities in Khartoum.


11. (C) Museveni expressed regret that Sudanese Government of
National Unity (GNU) First Vice President Salva Kiir lacked
the dynamism of the late John Garang. Whereas Garang had
believed himself capable of winning national elections and
transforming Sudan, current SPLM leaders were only "southern
separatists." Bemoaning that under the CPA, the GNU in
Khartoum retained control over Sudan's foreign affairs,
Museveni stressed the importance of getting southern Sudan
"out of Arab control," in order to shift "the front line
between blacks and Arabs" north, away from Sudan's border
with Uganda.


12. (C) A/S Frazer detailed USG efforts to strengthen
capacity and military capability of the 7,000-strong AU
Mission in Sudan (AMIS),adding that AU Commission
Chairperson Konare and UN SYG Moon had recently sent a joint
letter to Sudanese President Bashir regarding the UN heavy
support package (HSP) agreed to during November 2006
AU-UN-GOS consultations in Addis Ababa. Frazer highlighted
the need to push for immediate deployment of UN enablers to
link up with AMIS battalions; the UN's assertion that 480
days were needed before deployment was unacceptable. The USG
had long ago proposed NATO support for AMIS, but had met
resistance from the AU. The USG advocated a hybrid UN-AU
force for Darfur, and sought to provide AMIS with as much
capability as possible; the USG was also pushing the UN to
develop a force in Chad, she said.

-------------- --------------
EAST AFRICA, NOT BASHIR, SHOULD HOLD AU CHAIRMANSHIP
-------------- --------------


13. (C) A/S Frazer said that Charge Hume had been instructed
to suggest to Sudanese Presidential Advisor Mustafa Osman
Ismail that he advise President Bashir not to seek to become
AU Assembly Chairman; and noted that were Bashir to become AU
Chairman, then Sudan would hold two positions in the
UN-AU-GOS tripartite mechanism on transition to a hybrid
peacekeeping force in Darfur. Amb. Ssempala confirmed that
Tanzanian President Kikwete had accepted serving as an
alternate candidate, but was being intimidated by Sudan;
someone would also have to object explicitly to Bashir's
candidacy. Remarking, "It's East Africa's turn," Museveni
declared his opposition to Bashir and instructed Ssempala to
object at the AU.

--------------
SUSPICION OF ARAB STATES' INTENT
--------------


14. (C) Museveni said that "Arabs" were the "so-called member
states" who objected to more robust action in Darfur. With
only a few exceptions, AU member states were either "puppets
of Europeans or Arabs." Egypt was "always creating
confusion," he said. Even Libyan leader Qaddafi's "African
revolution" was only "Arab chauvinism". "We are friends but
at loggerheads," Museveni said. Eritrea, despite its
problems, was "not a puppet," but had made a mistake in
seeking independence from Ethiopia; Museveni said he had
counseled President Isiais against independence, as "it was
not necessary." Observing that President Bush was a good
ally but "diverted by Iraq," Museveni questioned why
Sunni-Shia dialogue was not being promoted to encourage
power-sharing. A/S Frazer responded that in addition to
intimidation by domestic opponents, Iraqis seeking to
participate in the political process also had to contend with
foreign fighters and international terrorists.

-------------- --------------
URGING STRONGER U.S. ENGAGEMENT WITH CHAD AND C.A.R.
-------------- --------------


15. (C) Museveni urged "direct action" by the United States

ADDIS ABAB 00000312 004 OF 004


in Chad, as well as more robust political engagement in the
Central African Republic. Both Chad and the C.A.R. suffered
from a "vacuum filled by Sudanese intimidation and Qaddafi,"
he said. Chadian President Deby's Zagawa tribe was present
in both Chad and Darfur, and Sudan sought to "intimidate"
both Chad and Uganda. Chad suffered from a weak state
structure, as France did not allow it to develop independent
capacity, he added. Deby was not secure enough to "defy"
Qaddafi, and therefore needed to be emboldened by greater
engagement by the United States. A/S Frazer responded that
the USG sought such engagement: the Secretary had met with
the Chadian foreign minister in November, and Presidential
Envoy Natsios had recently met Deby in Chad. The USG was
already providing counter-terrorism training to Chad, and may
consider a JCET exercise in eastern Chad. Noting that UNSCR
1706 authorized the deployment of protection forces in Chad
for refugees from Sudan, Frazer observed that such forces
could also help train francophone gendarmes in Chad.
Museveni responded by proposing a presidential visit by Deby
to Washington, saying it was important to meet with Deby
himself, not his "Arab" foreign minister. Museveni also
offered to dispatch a ministerial delegation to consult with
Deby about closer engagement with the United States.


16. (C) Museveni asserted that French military intervention
on behalf of the C.A.R. government occurred only after Uganda
offered to intervene against Sudan-sponsored insurgents.
Museveni said President Chirac had initially agreed to Uganda
deploying to the C.A.R., with French financial support, but
later changed his mind, on the margins of the December 2006
Forum on Sino-African Cooperation in Beijing.


17. (C) COMMENT: President Museveni's extended remarks on
the struggle between "Arabs" and "Africans" underscore the
cultural fault lines dividing African states on the issue of
Darfur, President Bashir's candidacy for AU Chairman, and
whether to intervene in Somalia. Museveni's arguments for
continuing military operations against the LRA, as well his
determination to deploy against the remnants of the Council
of Islamic Courts in Somalia, suggest that he subscribes to
Clausewitz's conviction that "war is the extension of
diplomacy by other means." END COMMENT.


18. (U) A/S Frazer cleared this cable.
YAMAMOTO