SOMALIA: PM MELES HIGHLIGHTS LAND REFORM AS KEY TO

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ADDIS ABABA 000311

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF AND AF/E
LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHER
CJTF-HOA FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2017
TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV MOPS KPKO ET SO YE
SUBJECT: SOMALIA: PM MELES HIGHLIGHTS LAND REFORM AS KEY TO
CLAN RECONCILIATION AND POLITICAL STABILITY IN SOMALIA

REF: ADDIS ABABA 40

Classified By: AMBASSADOR DONALD YAMAMOTO. REASONS: 1.4 (B),(D).


1. (C) SUMMARY. In a 90-minute meeting on January 27 with
A/S Frazer, Prime Minister Meles highlighted that Somalia's
primary clans generally supported the Transitional Federal
Government (TFG). Only the Hawiye/Habr-Gedir/Ayr sub-clan,
the primary political base of the deposed Council of Islamic
Courts (CIC),posed a potential challenge to political
reconciliation. While the TFG was engaging the other clans,
land ownership was the main stumbling block to
reconciliation. The Ayr, the most critical clan to
reconciliation in Mogadishu, had confiscated land during the
Siad Barre regime, and feared initiatives to strip them of
this property, Meles said. Ethiopia considered such
restitution "counter-productive," and advocated compensation
of former owners instead, despite opposition from President
Yusuf who believed it would signal tacit approval of Hawiye
confiscation of other clan's land-holdings. Due to their
clan affiliations, political engagement of either impeached
Parliamentary Speaker Sharif Hassan Sheikh Adan (a
Rahanweyne) or CIC Executive Council Chairman Sheikh Sharif
Sheikh Ahmed (an Abgaal) would not have addressed the key
challenge of accommodating the Ayr. Meles hailed Yemen as
the "only Arab country we can broadly trust," and identified
Rwanda, Uganda, and Nigeria as the most critical potential
troop contributors for an international peacekeeping mission
in Somalia. While hailing the effectiveness of
U.S.-Ethiopian counter-terrorism cooperation, Meles said
political fallout from publicity surrounding leaked U.S.
military strikes required that certain operations be "wound
down." Calling for strengthening of intelligence operations
in Somalia, Meles said deployment of HUMINT assets would help
the long-term tracking of terrorist cells and high-value
targets. (PM Meles's comments on Sudan will be reported
septel.) END SUMMARY.


2. (U) AF A/S Jendayi Frazer met January 27 with Prime
Minister Meles Zenawi, who was accompanied by Personal
Assistant to the PM, Gebretensai Gebremichael, and MFA acting
Director General for Europe and America Almaz Ameha.
Ambassador and deputy pol-econ counselor (note-taker)
accompanied A/S Frazer.

-------------- ---
EXCEPT FOR AYR SUB-CLAN, GENERAL SUPPORT FOR TFG
-------------- ---


3. (C) Underscoring the central role of clans to politics and
economics of Somalia, PM Meles assessed that of the three
major clans who dominated Somalia (as opposed to Somaliland),
only the Hawiye/Habr-Gedir/Ayr sub-clan posed a problem:

-- The Darod (of President Abdullahi Yusuf) generally
supported Somalia's Transitional Federal Government (TFG).

-- The Rahanweyn (or Digle-Mirifle) were pastoralists who,
not being militarily disposed, were often subjugated by other
clans, and whose farmlands had been confiscated. The
Rahanweyn were thus a "swing factor" in Somali politics,
allying themselves with either the Darod or Hawiye, but were
not a politically significant force by themselves. No
terrorists were believed to have infiltrated Rahanweyn
territory around Baidoa, Meles added.

-- The Hawiye: the Hawiye's largest sub-clan, the Abgaal,
were "more or less firmly behind the TFG." The Abgaal had
been "instrumental" in effecting the collapse of the CIC in
Mogadishu: by not only coordinating with the Ethiopian
military (ENDF) and the TFG to clear CIC forces from northern
Mogadishu three days prior to the Ethiopian army's advance,
but also giving a political ultimatum to CIC leaders and
establishing the council of 15 Mogadishu community leaders.
TFG Prime Minister Ghedi was Abgaal, but was not influential,
Meles said. Former warlord Mohamed Dheere's fighting against
the CIC also showed evidence of Abgaal support for the TFG,
he added.


4. (C) The Hawiye/Habr-Gedir sub-clan, not Abgaal and other

ADDIS ABAB 00000311 002 OF 004


Hawiye sub-clans such as the Hawadle or Murusade, posed the
main problem, Meles said. Originally from central Somalia,
the Habr-Gedir were not indigenous to Mogadishu, but had
occupied property belonging to Darod and Abgaal, as well as
prime land near the Shebelle River. Citing the role of TFG
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior Hussein
Mohammed Aideed, Meles said the Hawiye/Habr-Gedir/ Saad
sub-clan generally supported the TFG, but that the
Hawiye/Habr-Gedir/Ayr sub-clan served as the social base of
the CIC. Political reconciliation ultimately was a question
of how to accommodate the Ayr sub-clan, Meles concluded.

-------------- --------------
OPPOSING PROPERTY RESTITUTION IS AYR'S MAIN CONCERN
-------------- --------------


5. (C) According to Meles, Ayr leaders in Mogadishu had told
Ethiopian Foreign Minister Seyoum "in no uncertain terms"
that addressing the issue of property claims was critical to
stability in Mogadishu and throughout Somalia. Seyoum had
found the Ayr's principal concern to be fear of losing
property (in southern Mogadishu and the Juba and Shebelle
valleys) that the Ayr had occupied from others, principally
businessmen from Somaliland, during the end of the Siad Barre
regime. The Ayr were concerned about a provision in the
Transitional Federal Charter calling for a commission to
examine claims of land appropriation. Meles noted that CIC
security chief Yusuf Siad Inda'ade had principally been a
farmer/landowner controlling banana plantations with
commercial ties to Italy, rather than an ideologically
motivated Islamicist. Meles cited Osman Atto's (Habr-Gedir)
occupation of former Aideed rival Ali Mahdi's (Abgaal) former
house in southern Mogadishu as a prime example of the
confiscated property that Ayr were afraid to lose.


6. (C) While Abgaal felt "robbed" by Habr-Gedir, especially
by the Ayr sub-clan, Ethiopia believed restitution, although
just, would be counter-productive, Meles said. Instead, the
GOE supported tenants retaining control of their property,
and providing compensation to former owners, particularly in
urban areas. In rural areas, many occupants had since fled
Somalia, so farmland could be restored to original owners.
Meles appealed for international financial assistance to
provide such compensation and allow Ayr to retain their
property. Meles acknowledged, however, opposition from TFG
President Yusuf, who believed compensation indicated tacit
approval of Hawiye confiscation of land. Accommodating the
Habr-Gedir would help weaken support for CIC Islamicists and
marginalize extremists, Meles countered, who said he would
discuss the issue with Yusuf on the margins of the African
Union Summit. A/S Frazer responded that a formula for
compensation, differentiating between urban and rural areas,
appeared fair, and suggested Meles exercise his leverage over
Yusuf.


7. (C) Another Ayr concern was poor political representation
within the TFG, Meles said. While President Yusuf agreed
that individual Ayr reps now in the TFG may not be
"adequate," Yusuf did not accept the Ayr's argument that they
constituted the largest sub-group within the
Hawiye/Habr-Gedir, and believed representation was an issue
the Habr-Gedir had to address internally. Ethiopia had
invited Ayr leaders to consultations in Addis Ababa after the
AU Summit, Meles added.

-------------- --------------
NEED TO ACCOMMODATE AYR, NOT TFG SPEAKER OR CIC CHAIR
-------------- --------------


8. (C) Ethiopia had unsuccessfully pushed TFG President
Abdullahi Yusuf to delay the impeachment of Parliamentary
Speaker Sharif Hassan Sheikh Adan, Meles said, adding that
even Ethiopia sometimes found Yusuf "difficult" to deal with.
Meles noted, however that as the Speaker was Rahanweyn but
did not represent majority Rahanweyn interests, he had little
political influence; his inclusion would not have
significantly promoted reconciliation within Somalia.
Similarly, Meles argued, engaging CIC Executive Council
Chairman Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, an Abgaal, would have
been fruitless, as Abgaal already supported the TFG, and he

ADDIS ABAB 00000311 003 OF 004


would not have brought any other clans on board.


9. (C) A/S Frazer responded that as some CIC leaders appeared
to be "devoted to chaos," it was preferable to co-opt a weak
Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, to prevent hard-liners from
rallying around him. Ambassador Ranneberger had met him in
Nairobi to urge him to renounce violence and participate in
reconciliation. A/S Frazer expressed concern about
reconstitution of the CIC, were Sheikh Sharif to leave Kenya
for asylum in Yemen, and join CIC foreign secretary Ibrahim
Addow. Political dialogue among multiple parties, within
Somalia, not in Yemen or Sudan, was key. Ex-CIC leaders
could participate as individuals, but not as any
reconstituted form of the CIC, she said.


10. (C) Meles noted that EU Development Commissioner Louis
Michel continued to consider inclusion of Sheikh Sharif
crucial. However, while Sheikh Sharif (a
Hawiye/Habr-Gedir/Abgaal) was perceived as more important
than Addow, as an Ayr, Addow was more influential. Meles
observed that political dialogue required participation by
power-brokers such as the Ayr and traditional business
leaders, not by "a front" just as the CIC. Meles noted that
whereas the international community considered Sheikh Sharif
a CIC leader, Somalis considered him an ex-associate of
Mohammed Dheere, who had fought against the CIC. Asserting
Ayr responsibility for the January 19 mortar attack on the
TFG presidential villa, Meles said accommodating the Ayr
would result in a "dramatic reduction" of instability within
Somalia. Instability would not be eliminated, but would
remain at a tolerable level.


11. (C) Meles affirmed the strength of bilateral ties between
Ethiopia and Yemen, noting that their security chiefs had met
recently in Sanaa: "The only Arab country we can broadly
trust is Yemen." In contrast, while Kenyan leaders showed
political will to cooperate with Ethiopia, their "capacity to
deliver is unreliable." Meles stated that he was more
comfortable with Sheikh Sharif going to Yemen than remaining
in Kenya, where he might be released without warning or
surveillance.

-------------- --------------
SOMALIA NEEDS SECURITY ASSISTANCE, ROADS, AND CAPACITY
-------------- --------------


12. (C) Deployment of AU peacekeepers had value and was
needed "to give space and time to the TFG to sort out its
political and security problems," Meles said. Ethiopia was
helping the TFG train its police and reorganize its military.
The police had sufficient small arms: "Weaponry is not the
main problem; it's organization and skills." Even after the
ENDF's withdrawal, Ethiopia would embed troops in Somali
brigades now being organized, in order to build their
capacity, Meles said.


13. (U) Meles also appealed for emergency assistance to
repair roads in Somalia, to reduce time needed to travel the
350km distance to the Ethiopian border from several days to
4-6 hours, and thus spur commerce and economic stability.
Ethiopia was providing technical experts to Somalia but
lacked the necessary machinery.

-------------- --------------
RWANDA, UGANDA, NIGERIA: KEY TROOP CONTRIBUTORS FOR AMISOM
-------------- --------------


14. (C) Citing USD 19 million in support for international
peacekeeping in Somalia (AMISOM),A/S Frazer noted Malawi had
agreed to contribute troops, and Rwanda would provide
training. USG planners were working with Uganda to help it
deploy immediately after the anticipated January 30
parliamentary approval. The USG had discussed possible
transition to a UN peacekeeping operation with Germany, as EU
president, but recognized reluctance by an overstretched UN
DPKO. If political progress were sufficient, a UN mission
could focus on reconstruction and development, rather than
peace-making. With the UK, Norway, and Sweden, the USG was
also pushing the EU to release African Peace Facility funds
earmarked for peacekeeping in Somalia, despite opposition

ADDIS ABAB 00000311 004 OF 004


from Italy.


15. (C) A minimum of two to four thousand troops would be
needed, Meles said, citing Rwanda, Uganda, and Nigeria as
key troop contributors. Meles expressed great confidence in
the Rwandan military, and said he would discuss the GOE's
request for Rwanda to deploy with President Kagame, although
President Yusuf had recently traveled to Kigali. Having a
Ugandan battalion was "critical." As for Nigeria, Meles said
President Obasanjo supported deployment, but his military
staff did not. Asked whether Ethiopia could assist the AU
Commission with mission planning, Meles said planning by
individual TCCs was preferable to planning by the AU, whose
role could be coordination. Uganda's military chief of staff
was coordinating with the ENDF, he said.

-------------- --------------
MEDIA LEAKS REQUIRE CURTAILING USG MILITARY STRIKES
-------------- --------------


16. (S) Despite the effectiveness of U.S.-Ethiopian
counter-terrorism cooperation, political fallout from
publicity surrounding leaked U.S. military strikes required
that certain operations be "wound down," Meles said. The
diplomatic costs of leaks to the media required that Ethiopia
"forgo" the benefits of such cooperation. Deployment of
HUMINT assets on the ground would compensate for the
resulting lack of precision, and would also help the
long-term tracking of terrorist cells, he said. Engagement
of high-value targets may require waiting until "clutter" had
been removed. Intelligence operations in Somalia needed to
be strengthened: Sudan had sought greater intelligence
cooperation with Somalia, but had been told to focus on
provision of equipment, Meles added. A/S Frazer concluded by
noting that the USG was reviewing the PM's January 4 request
for food aid (reftel),and had made it a priority.


17. (U) PM Meles's observations on Darfur, the prospects for
southern Sudan, and President Bashir's candidacy for AU
Assembly Chair will be reported septel.


18. (C) COMMENT: Prime Minister Meles's extensive remarks on
clan dynamics and land reform issues highlight the
significance Ethiopia accords to ensuring that the TFG
accommodate Ayr interests, which it views as necessary to
undermine the political base of the Council of Islamic
Courts. Addressing land issues comprehensively now will
ensure a stable and united Somalia, thus denying a foothold
by extremist elements. Foreign Minister Seyoum's
consultations with Ayr sub-clan representatives in
Mogadishu, and the subsequent invitation of Ayr leaders to
come to Addis Ababa for further consultations, indicate the
GOE's high level of political engagement to ensure that its
military operation in support of the TFG, launched just one
month ago, succeeds in bringing long-term political stability
to Somalia. END COMMENT.


19. (U) A/S Frazer cleared this cable.
YAMAMOTO