ERITREAN OPPOSITION GROUP SEEKING NEW OPPOSITION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ADDIS ABABA 003016

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/E, AND INR/AA
LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHER
CJTF-HOA AND USCENTCOM FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/04/2017
TAGS: PREL PBTS MOPS KPKO ET ER SU
SUBJECT: ERITREAN OPPOSITION GROUP SEEKING NEW OPPOSITION
ALLIANCE

Classified By: Political Officer Ted Harkema for Reason 1.4 (b)


1. (C) SUMMARY. On October 3, Polcouns and Poloffs met
with Eritrean National Salvation Front (ENSF) Chairman Amb.
Abdella Adem and ENSF Foreign Relations Director Dr. Beyene
Kidane to discuss issues related to the Eritrean political
opposition. Both leaders emphasized that their priority was
to see the Eritrean Democratic Alliance (EDA),the umbrella
organization for Eritrean opposition groups, reformed after
it broke apart in February 2007. Abdella hoped a new
congress of all Eritrean opposition groups could be held
later this year. The leaders also reported that EDA military
training camps in Sudan had been closed at the request of the
Sudanese government and moved into northern Ethiopia where
they received limited training from the Ethiopian military.
Abdella characterized the Ethiopian government as an advisor
to the Eritrean opposition and asserted the groups received
only limited financial support from Prime Minister Meles.
Adbella speculated that, in the event of a change in the
Eritrean regime in the near term, Eritrea would fall into
chaos as the current disarray within Eritrean opposition
groups leaves no functioning alternative to govern the
country. Lastly, Abdella reported that Meles had told him on
October 2 that Ethiopia did not want war with Eritrea unless
provoked, but that in all practicality the Algiers Agreement
no longer existed. END SUMMARY.

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EDA FRACTURED, NEEDS RESTRUCTURING
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2. (C) Abdella reported the ENSF's priority was to help
restructure the EDA after it fractured in February 2007 when
the EDA members were unable to agree on a common political
program. Abdella expressed his hope that an EDA congress
could be held later this year and that various parties
support the idea in principle, but noted no one was doing any
planning for such a meeting. Beyene added that due to
differences among groups, the foundation of a new alliance
would have to be based on the minimum common denominators
among the parties. He noted a minimum program of four key
points: 1) the members should be committed to peaceful
democratic competition between themselves while jointly
struggling to oppose the Isaias regime, 2) the members should
be committed to the establishment of a democratic Eritrean
government, 3) the members should be committed to free and
fair elections, and 4) the members should agree to abide by
the decision of the Eritrean people.

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EDA TRAINING CAMPS CLOSED IN SUDAN, OPENED IN ETHIOPIA
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4. (C) When queried about military training camps, Abdella
replied that the EDA had closed their training camps in Sudan
at the request of the Sudanese Government and moved them into
Ethiopia. Abdella said he had recently met with Salah Gosh,
the head of the Sudanese National Intelligence Security
Service, in Khartoum and that because of the improved ties
between Sudan and Eritrea, Gosh instructed the EDA to close
their camps and told them to keep a low profile in Sudan.
The EDA member organizations have not been expelled from the
country, the ENSF still maintains four offices in different
parts of Sudan, as do other Eritrean opposition parties.


5. (C) Abdella said the EDA groups now received instruction
from Ethiopian military personnel in two military training
camps in Tigray located in close proximity to Ethiopian
military camps. The ENSF, Eritrean Revolutionary Democratic
Front, and an Afar group trained at a camp in eastern Tigray
near Adigrat, while a number of other groups trained at a
camp in western Tigray near Adi Hageray. He said the
training was part-time for only 3-4 weeks at a time.
Approximately 40 ENSF fighters participated. He
characterized activity at the camps as refresher training for
existing Eritrean military opposition units. Abdella
asserted ENSF fighters regularly conducted cross-border
intelligence gathering missions in Eritrea within the
Temporary Security Zone usually in groups of two or three
fighters, but they avoided engaging Eritrean army units
whenever possible. Abdella noted that due to limited support

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networks within Eritrea, such reconnaissance missions were
unable to go much beyond 30 kilometers from the Ethiopian
border.

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GOE AN "ADVISOR" TO ERITREAN OPPOSITION
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6. (C) Abdella remarked that on the political front the
government of Ethiopia served as an advisor to the Eritrean
opposition, but the Ethiopians did not interfere in internal
opposition politics. Beyene asserted the Ethiopian
government did not give substantial financial support to the
EDA, but only provided housing in Addis Ababa and assistance
with other living expenses. Abdella commented that Meles had
given the EDA access to one radio station in Ethiopia that
broadcast into Eritrea and divided the airtime between
opposition groups. Ethiopia had also recently offered an
additional radio station to Eritrean opposition groups to
broadcast all-day into Eritrea, but it was not yet
operational.

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MELES TELLS ENSF ETHIOPIA WILL NOT START WAR WITH ERITREA
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7. (C) Abdella stated he had met with Meles for more than
two hours on October 2 and that Meles told him he does not
want war unless attacked. Meles further remarked that
Ethiopia would not repeat past mistakes unless provoked by
Asmara. Abdella claimed Meles recognizes that while Isaias
is certainly working to provoke conflict, Meles does not yet
believe that Eritrea would start a war. Abdella noted that
Ethiopia can survive the status quo. Meles also stated that
in all practicality the Algiers Agreement no longer exists,
but Meles did not know what would happen next. Meles told
Abdella that the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and
Eritrea (UNMEE) probably would remain beyond the November
2007 boundary demarcation by geographical coordinates and the
January 2008 mandate renewal, although the mission might be
downsized. Meles underscored that if UNMEE were to leave,
the chances for war would greatly increase. Meles also told
Abdella that UNMEE's presence does not preclude war, but only
reduces its possibility. When asked what might happen in
Asmara if Isaias' regime should fall in the near term,
Abdella was clear that the resulting power void would result
in chaos as no one within the current regime would be able to
retain control as Isaias has and the opposition currently
remains too fractured to adequately provide a functional
alternate for governance.

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COMMENT
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8. (C) The ENSF appears to be a small and impotent
opposition force and Abdella is almost certainly down playing
the difficulty of creating a political consensus among the
more than dozen Eritrean opposition groups. Abdella and
Beyene declined to discuss Meles' plans and intentions for
the Eritrean opposition in detail, but it is apparent that
Meles is attempting to facilitate the emergence of a unified
political opposition that could possibly be projected into
Eritrea in a post-Isaias government. If the Eritrean
opposition groups are able to organize a new congress,
Washington may want to consider supporting it with funding or
possibly sending representation. END COMMENT.
MALAC