ETHIOPIA/ERITREA: UNMEE AND EPRDF OFFICIAL COMMENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 002952

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/E, AND INR/AA
LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHER
CJTF-HOA AND USCENTCOM FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/01/2017
TAGS: PREL PBTS KPKO ET ER SO IR
SUBJECT: ETHIOPIA/ERITREA: UNMEE AND EPRDF OFFICIAL COMMENT
SEPARATELY ON GSE AND GOE INTENTIONS

REF: A. ADDIS ABABA 2864


B. ADDIS ABABA 2863

C. ASMARA 746

Classified By: ERIC WONG, POLITICAL OFFICER. REASON: 1.4 (D).


1. (C) SUMMARY. In a September 21 meeting with poloffs,
United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) Addis
Ababa Head of Office Joseph Stephanides said that Eritrea's
"fear" of being designated by the USG as a state sponsor of
terror had prompted President Isaias to meet recently with
senior UN officials. Eritrea reportedly sought to "wait out"
Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles, and was thus pursuing a
"long-term" strategy with regard to its disputed border.
According to Stephanides, senior Ethiopian military officials
believed that Eritrea could "not be changed from within,"
therefore prompting Ethiopia to refrain from providing
material support to Eritrean dissidents, even in the face of
Eritrean support for insurgents in Ethiopia. In the event
that Eritrea sought to expel UNMEE from Eritrea and the
Temporary Security Zone, Ethiopia would likely accept
retaining UNMEE on Ethiopia's side of the border, believing
it to serve as a useful tripwire. Such a "tripwire" function
could be preserved even while downsizing UNMEE further, so
long as military observers were kept intact, Stephanides
concluded. In a separate meeting with poloffs, a senior
EPRDF official explained that Ethiopia continued to believe
that peace was essential for economic development, and that
therefore Ethiopia would "not to go war by our own
initiative," despite the September 24 declaration that
Eritrea was now in "material breach" of the Algiers Accords.
END SUMMARY.

-------------- --------------
ERITREA REPORTEDLY FOLLOWING "LONG-TERM" STRATEGY
-------------- --------------


2. (C) Stephanides asserted that Eritrean President Isaias's
"fear" of being designated by the USG as a state sponsor of
terror had prompted Isaias to meet recently with senior UN
officials, including two prominent Americans: visiting UN
DPKO Assistant Secretary-General for Mission Support Jane
Holl Lute and Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs

B. Lynn Pascoe. Observing that Iran had recently established
an embassy in Asmara, Stephanides cautioned that USG
designation of Eritrea as "a pariah" risked greater
"radicalization" of the GSE, and would encourage broader
Eritrean engagement with Iran. (NOTE: Stephanides formerly
headed the UN SYG's office in Iran, following the end of the
Iran-Iraq war in 1987. Iran has an existing embassy in Addis
Ababa. END NOTE.)


3. (C) Stephanides reported that on the margins of the
September 5-6 Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC)
meeting, Amcit Lea Brilmayer, Legal Advisor to President
Isaias, explained that Eritrea was pursuing a "long-term"
strategy, by which it awaited the downfall of Ethiopian Prime
Minister Meles Zenawi. Moreover, Isaias reportedly believed
he would have better relations with the United States once a
new U.S. administration came to power, Stephanides said.

-------------- --------------
ETHIOPIA: ERITREA CANNOT BE CHANGED "FROM WITHIN"
-------------- --------------


4. (C) While the regimes in Ethiopia and Eritrea each
considered the other to be on the verge of collapse, Ethiopia
was not actively assisting Eritrean rebels, Stephanides said.
While GOE officials had asserted that the GSE was
undermining Ethiopian sovereignty by arming or supporting
Ethiopian insurgent groups, such as the Oromo Liberation
Front (OLF) or the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF),
UNMEE lacked information that Ethiopia was shipping arms or
other material support to Eritrean dissidents in Eritrea.
Stephanides said that ENDF Major General Yohannes Gebremeskel
(who represented Ethiopia at UN-chaired Military Coordination
Commission meetings with Eritrea held until May 2006) had
assessed that Eritrea could "not be changed from within."
For this reason, according to Stephanides, Yohannes had
informed him that the GOE was not/not providing material
support to Eritrean opposition groups.

ADDIS ABAB 00002952 002 OF 003



--------------
ETHIOPIA VALUES UNMEE AS "TRIPWIRE"
--------------


5. (C) Discussing future scenarios for UNMEE in anticipation
of the EEBC's 2006 decision to declare the disputed border
demarcated "by coordinates" by the end of November 2007,
Stephanides said that Ethiopia would likely welcome UNMEE
continuing operations from along the Ethiopian side of the
border, in the event that Eritrea sought to expel UNMEE
entirely from Eritrea and the Temporary Security Zone (TSZ).
According to Stephanides, Ethiopian National Defense Forces
(ENDF) Chief of General Staff (CHOD) General Samora Yonus had
recently informed UN ASG Lute that Ethiopia would accept
UNMEE operating primarily along the Ethiopian side of the
border, if Eritrea expelled UNMEE from Eritrea. Ethiopia
valued UNMEE's presence as a tripwire, Stephanides said,
despite UNMEE's limited monitoring capabilities arising from
GSE-imposed restrictions on freedom of movement.


6. (C) Stephanides recommended that the USG and others
dissuade the EEBC from implementing its decision to declare
the border "demarcated" in November 2007; the UNSC should
also highlight the "unhelpful" role Eritrea was playing in
Somalia, he said, consistent with reports from the UN
Monitoring Group on Somalia.

--------------
AS TRIPWIRE, UNMEE COULD BE DOWNSIZED FURTHER
--------------


7. (C) Stephanides acknowledged that UNMEE could be downsized
even further--removing infantry battalions but keeping the
relatively small number of military observers (MILOBs)
intact--and still fulfill a "tripwire" function. However,
India and Jordan, as major troop contributing countries to
UNMEE, would likely oppose such downsizing, he said, as they
benefited economically from maintaining large contingents and
associated equipment in the region.


8. (C) Questioned about possible successors to Acting UNMEE
SRSG Azouz Ennifar, Stephanides said UN SYG Ban Ki-Moon
sought to increase the number of women serving as UN envoys,
and had therefore initially tapped a Jordanian woman as SRSG,
but she was unavailable. A Swiss woman was the latest
contender, but, as a European, she would have to confront the
GSE's ban on European, U.S., and Canadian UNMEE staff serving
in Eritrea.

--------------
EPRDF RULING PARTY DOWNPLAYS THREAT OF WAR
--------------


9. (C) In a separate September 26 meeting with poloffs and
visiting Special Envoy for Somalia Amb. John Yates to discuss
Somalia (septel),Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic
Front (EPRDF) Foreign Relations Officer Sekature Getachew
explained that the GOE's September 24 letter to the UN
Security Council asserting that Eritrea was in "material
breach" of the Algiers Accords was a "purely political
statement" that was not/not intended to provoke war or
highlight a causis belli. Ethiopia believed that peace was
essential for its economic development; "we will not go to
war by our own initiative," Sekature stated. Ethiopia's
declaration to the UNSC was not/not a statement that "the
ceasefire is over," but was rather intended to highlight
Eritrean "transgression," Sekature added. Eritrean support
for the Council of Islamic Courts (CIC) and for Sheikh Hassan
Dahir Aweys highlighted the GSE's role in seeking to
destabilize the Horn of Africa, Sekature said.


10. (C) COMMENT. While Stephanides' assertion that UNMEE
could be downsized even further preceded Ethiopia's September
24 announcement that Eritrea had violated the Algiers
Accords, senior UNMEE officials have long asserted that its
most crucial role is monitoring the main north-south axes in
Sector Central of the TSZ, where the relatively flat terrain
permits the movement of tanks and heavy armor between the two
countries. MILOBs could continue to play this "tripwire"
function, were UNMEE force levels cut further so that UNMEE

ADDIS ABAB 00002952 003 OF 003


transformed to purely an observer mission. While public
statements by GOE civilian leaders (e.g., by FM Seyoum) since
2006 have been more strident, going so far as to assert that
UNMEE could be abandoned, General Samora's private support
for UNMEE to remain as a tripwire is consistent with previous
statements he has made to USG officials advocating UNMEE's
continued operation. Prof. Brilmayer's statement that the
GSE seeks to "wait out" Meles, coupled with the EPRDF's
explanation that Ethiopia does not seek war, suggest that the
status quo political stalemate between Ethiopia and Eritrea
will likely continue, despite concerns about recent troop
movements near the border (septel). Post continues to
advocate immediate action by the USG and other Witnesses to
avoid conflict and re-engage both parties politically (ref
B.) END COMMENT.
YAMAMOTO