Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07ADDISABABA2863
2007-09-20 06:45:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Addis Ababa
Cable title:  

ETHIOPIA: MOVING FORWARD ON BORDER IMPASSE TO

Tags:  PREL PBTS MOPS KPKO ET ER 
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7886
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
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RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 002863 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF AND AF/E
LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHER
CJTF-HOA AND USCENTCOM FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/18/2017
TAGS: PREL PBTS MOPS KPKO ET ER
SUBJECT: ETHIOPIA: MOVING FORWARD ON BORDER IMPASSE TO
AVOID CONFLICT

Classified By: Political Officer Ted Harkema for Reasons 1.4 (b)(d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 002863

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF AND AF/E
LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHER
CJTF-HOA AND USCENTCOM FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/18/2017
TAGS: PREL PBTS MOPS KPKO ET ER
SUBJECT: ETHIOPIA: MOVING FORWARD ON BORDER IMPASSE TO
AVOID CONFLICT

Classified By: Political Officer Ted Harkema for Reasons 1.4 (b)(d).


1. (C) SUMMARY. This is an action request message see para

8. On September 17 Ambassador and Poloff attended a Friends
of United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE)
meeting at UNMEE HQ. Acting Special Representative of the
Secretary General Azouz Ennifar reported there had been no

SIPDIS
major troop movements along the Ethiopian-Eritrean border
since July and the border was quiet for now. He also
reminded the group UNMEE's ability to monitor troop movements
in Sector West and Sector East was limited. UNMEE Addis
Ababa Head of Office Joseph Stefanides briefed the September
6-7 Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC) meeting in
the Hague had produced no basis for consensus between the
parties on border demarcation. Lastly, Ennifar raised the
possibility Ethiopia may be considering withdrawing from the
EEBC in protest of the EEBC's decision to demarcate the
border by coordinates on November 27. See para 8 for
actions. Post recommends urging the parties to avoid conflict
and re-engage the two parties to talk about implementation
and the impact of demarcation. END SUMMARY.

-------------- --------------
UNMEE: BORDER QUIET BUT ABILITY TO MONITOR LIMITED
-------------- --------------


2. (C) Ambassador and Poloff attended a Friends of UNMEE
meeting on September 17 during which senior UNMEE officials
Acting Special Representative of the Secretary General Azouz
Ennifar and Head of UNMEE Office Addis Ababa Joseph
Stefanides briefed the group on the military situation along
the border and gave a readout of the September 6-7
Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC) meeting in the
Hague. Ennifar briefed there had been no major troop
movements on either side since July which he attributed
largely to movement restrictions caused by heavy rains. He
reported in the previous two days approximately 250-300

Eritrean troops had entered Sector Center marking an increase
in Eritrean troop presence inside the Temporary Security Zone
(TSZ). Ennifar cautioned, however, UNMEE's ability to
observe Eritrean troop movements in Sector West and Sector
East were limited because the terrain allowed troop movement
outside the main lines of communication. On the other side
of the border, most Ethiopian troops were positioned outside
of the adjacent zone where UNMEE was not permitted to patrol.
He noted both Eritrean and Ethiopian forces were continuing
to build defensive positions along the border.

-------------- --------------
SEPTEMBER 6-7 EEBC MEETING BATTLE OF DUELING LEGAL ADVISORS
-------------- --------------


3. (C) Stephanides briefed the September 6-7 EEBC meeting
had ended with no basis for consensus between the two
parties. He commented the meeting was primarily a battle
between each side's American legal advisors who traded shots
back and forth. Eritrea offered to take whatever steps
required to facilitate border demarcation on the ground, but
Ethiopia insisted Eritrea withdraw fully from the TSZ before
further discussions could occur. Stefanides noted the
positions of the two parties had not changed as Eritrea was
demanding demarcation prior to normalization, whereas
Ethiopia demanded broader discussions of normalization first
and Eritrean withdrawal from the TSZ. Ennifar noted despite
the positions of the parties, the EEBC was determined to
follow through with demarcation by coordinates on November 27.

--------------
ETHIOPIA CONSIDERING WITHDRAWAL FROM EEBC?
--------------


4. (C) Ennifar urged the international community and the
witnesses to take whatever steps they could to help move the
political process forward and avoid conflict. Ennifar
highlighted an excerpt from a September 17 press interview
with Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles as evidence the Ethiopian
government may be looking to withdraw from the EEBC process.
He quoted Meles saying, "They (EEBC) may delimitate the
border on maps but demarcation can only be viable if
implemented on the ground. There might be a need for another
body in the future..." When asked what Ethiopia might do in

ADDIS ABAB 00002863 002 OF 003


response to the EEBC decision, Ennifar speculated Ethiopia
might pre-denounce the decision before November 27.


5. (C) When queried whether the EEBC had the right to
demarcate by coordinates, Ennifar responded the UN had no
standing upon which to express a legal opinion on the matter.
The EEBC was an independent body set up by the two parties.
Ennifar relayed EEBC President Elihu Lauterpacht admitted
this was not the EEBC's mandate, but Lauterpacht maintained
it was the best possible solution given the continuing lack
of cooperation by Ethiopia and Eritrea. Ambassador
reaffirmed demarcation was an issue between the parties
themselves and only the two in agreement could reject the
EEBC's actions. Stefanides noted Ethiopia may have grounds
to reject the decision because Eritrean restrictions on UNMEE
and militarization of the TSZ are in violation of the
cease-fire agreement.

--------------
COMMENT
--------------


6. (C) Ennifar opined privately to us there are deep fears
within the international community that there is a higher
potential for renewed fighting as a result of the impasse on
resolution of the border demarcation after the September 6
EEBC meeting at the Hague. During meetings at UNMEE and
among Ambassadors in Addis, it is strongly felt within the
international community that both parties lack the resolve to
settle the border dispute and, more important, the more
critical point of resolving the fundamental issues that
divide both countries. While both militaries are
disciplined, Eritrean encroachment into the TSZ places both
militaries within meters of each other. Both parties do not
favor renewed hostilities but the risk of a minor mistake
escalating into widespread military action is real. Both
sides appears ready to respond to any attack, real or assumed.


7. (C) COMMENT CONTINUED. Meles faces tough opposition
with the powerful Central Committee, particularly with the
hard-core Tigray leaders who wield authority within the
committee. Meles has always indicated in very private
meetings that he is willing to compromise on Badme if it
would bring sustainable peace, but it would cost him his
prime ministership. Until there are signs of compromise from
Eritrea towards an Ethiopian solution (normalization of
relations in conjunction with demarcation),Meles is stuck in
the current impasse.


8. (C) COMMENT CONTINUED. Despite the fact that neither
side appears ready to resolve their problems, Post believes
as a result of the continued seriousness of the border
impasse, actions must be taken to avoid war. Bilateral
relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea are deeply interwoven,
adversely affecting the demarcation process. Resolution of
the bilateral problems must be addressed as part of the
resolution of the demarcation impasse. Demarcation of the
border will not sustain peace and will exacerbate divisions
unless a comprehensive package dealing with the fundamental
differences of the two countries are also addressed.
Ethiopia,s position of bilateral (normalization talks)
discussions and Eritrea,s expansion of the battlefield to
include arms sales in Somalia to undermine Ethiopian security
have made the demarcation process complex. Post views the
current situation as serious and recommends following actions
be taken to avoid conflict and re-engage parties.

Part I: Immediate Action:

- U.S. privately urges the UN to call immediately a meeting
of the witnesses to reaffirm UNSC resolutions supporting
peaceful demarcation of the border

- Witnesses reaffirm the Algiers Accord which calls on the
affirmation of the sanctity of the TSZ and UNSC 1640 which
calls on Eritrea to respect the TSZ and lift restrictions on
UNMEE operations; and for both parties to withdraw troops to
their positions prior to December 2004

- Witnesses reaffirm importance of UNMEE and support to
continue UNMEE for another three months minimum into May 2008

ADDIS ABAB 00002863 003 OF 003



- Witnesses issue a statement calling on both sides to avoid
war and to declare their commitment to resolving their
bilateral differences

- The UNSC issues a resolution/statement supporting the
statement of the witnesses

- Both Witnesses and UNSC declare firm commitment to a
demarcation process and recognizes the EEBC process and its
decision to demarcate by map coordinates. However, the
Witnesses and UNSC must not/not take any action to enforce
such a decision and must clearly and unequivocally declare
that both parties ultimately must resolve their differences
directly and demarcate the border

Part II: Private Initiatives:

- Privately urge U/SYG Amb Pascoe to push forward his desire
for private discussions between the Eritreans and Ethiopians
at UNGA

- Privately urge the UN to meet with political
representatives, not the American lawyers, of both parties

- Private meetings with the parties should include clear
indication that the international community is prepared to
host normalization talks in a country of choice by the
parties; full backing for peaceful demarcation process; and
commitment to work on consequences of the demarcation process
including refugees and economic dislocation as a result of
demarcation.

- Privately approach both parties (U.S., UK and UN with
Ethiopia, EU and UN with Eritrea) on reaffirmation by both
parties to &open borders8 after demarcation and respect for
"territorial sovereignty." Further, privately pressure both
parties not/not to go to war. END COMMENT.
YAMAMOTO