ETHIOPIA: (C-AL7-01035) SOME COMMERCIAL FOOD

C O N F I D E N T I A L ADDIS ABABA 002523

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/E, PRM/AFR AND INR/AA
LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHER
CJTF-HOA AND USCENTCOM FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/10/2017
TAGS: PREF PHUM PGOV MOPS EAGR EAID ET
SUBJECT: ETHIOPIA: (C-AL7-01035) SOME COMMERCIAL FOOD
ALLOWED TO ENTER OGADEN BUT EMERGENCY FOOD RELIEF ON HOLD

Classified By: REFCOORD KENT HEALY. REASON: 1.4 (B),(D).


1. (SBU) SUMMARY. On August 9, the UN Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) reported that
World Food Program (WFP) emergency food relief is now finally
en route to the Ogaden area of Ethiopia's Somali Region, with
4 trucks making deliveries, and 32 other trucks anticipated
to deliver food to four of the five zones where military
operations against Ogadeni insurgents continue.
Additionally, limited commercial food is reportedly now
available in Degehabur, following the military's escort of
trucks delivering food from neighboring Somaliland.


2. (C) SUMMARY CONTINUED: In a separate meeting on August 10
with Ambassador and USAID Mission Director, the Deputy Prime
Minister affirmed that the GOE sought to deliver emergency
food where security conditions permitted, and welcomed the
suggestion that WFP food monitors accompany such convoys.
The Deputy PM expressed reservations about any USG "disaster
declaration" for the Ogaden, noting the need for a careful
assessment, and highlighting concerns "negative elements"
could exploit such a declaration for political ends. END
SUMMARY.

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EMERGENCY FOOD FOR OGADEN HELD IN JIJIGA
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3. (SBU) An August 9 meeting of UNOCHA, UN agencies, and NGOs
provided a mixed picture of the humanitarian situation in
Ethiopia's Somali Region. Information from different sources
reported a tightening of the ban on commercial vehicular
traffic in the last few days, which has directly affected
food availability in the region. According to UNOCHA, very
limited food was reaching the 5 zones where the Ethiopian
National Defense Force (ENDF) is conducting an ongoing
counterinsurgency against suspected supporters of the Ogaden
National Liberation Front (ONLF).

-- WFP reported that humanitarian food destined for the
region had been held by the military at Kebribeyah (45 km
south of the regional capital, Jijiga, and just outside the
area of military operations). Some 10 trucks had arrived at
Kebribeyah, but only 4 had been allowed to proceed further
toward the Ogaden (Warder). The ENDF was holding the other 6
trucks until the arrival of an additional 27 trucks from WFP
food warehouses in Dire Dawa, so that all the trucks could
travel as a single convoy.

-- According to WFP, the emergency food distribution underway
totaled 1,900 metric tons and consisted of 4 trucks for
Warder, 17 trucks for Korahe, 17 for Degehabur, and 5 to
Gode. WFP reiterated its concern that 1,900 metric tons of
emergency food being distributed only represented a stopgap
measure, and that significant tonnage was required for the
Ogaden. Preliminary estimates from the WFP and the
federal-level Disaster Preparedness and Prevention Agency
(DPPA) indicate that 30,000 MT of commodities per month would
be required to meet the food needs of the 1.5 million people
in the affected zones. While WFP said that it was discussing
increasing humanitarian food with the GOE, if needed, there
was consensus among UN agencies and humanitarian partners
that the continued ban on commercial food remains a key cause
of food insecurity. (NOTE: On August 10, USAID/DCHA/OFDA's
East and Central Africa office issued an internal Level 2
Alert on the food security crisis in the Somali Region;
alerts range from Levels 1 to 4, with "4" being the most
severe. END NOTE.)

-- New health problems had been reported in Jijiga and Fik.
UNICEF was following a dual approach: addressing health needs
of populations near the perimeter of zones where military
operations continued, in an attempt to support populations
moving out of those zones; and mobilizing mobile health,
nutrition, and hygiene teams to assist the regional health
bureau and increase access. WHO announced the continuation
of an anti-polio campaign in early October.


4. (SBU) Following a visit by Abay Tsehaye, National Security
Advisor to the Prime Minister, to Jijiga for consultations
with Somali Region authorities, the Somali Region government


had reportedly re-allocated additional funds for security:
increasing defense and military spending from 15 million to
55 million birr (approximately USD 6 million),and doubling
the overall budget for the Somali Region from 500 million to
one billion birr.


5. (SBU) UNOCHA Head of Office and Deputy to the Humanitarian
Coordinator Paul Hebert reported that he had raised concerns
about the Ogaden with foreign ministry officials on August 3,
and had underscored the vulnerability of women and children.
Hebert appealed for international partners to engage the
Prime Minister or the Deputy Prime Minister to discuss
intervention to maintain the movement of food supplies to the
Somali Region.

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LANDMINES POSE SAFETY CONCERNS
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6. (SBU) According to UNOCHA, there has been little fighting
in the Somali Region over the last month, but unconfirmed
reports of additional landmines placed on roads. Concerns
about the safety of humanitarian access has increased,
following the July 29 landmine incident between the towns of
Degehamedo and Degehabur (in the Fafen River valley of
Degehabur Zone) that killed three local NGO staff. An
increased number of landmines have reportedly been planted on
main roads within the last 2 weeks, in areas where the
military is active. NGOs noted that due to ongoing military
operations, very few organizations are currently operating in
the Ogaden; those that remain face sharp restrictions in
their freedom of movement and access to communities. If the
GOE permits such NGOs and other humanitarian agencies wider
latitude in the near future, concern about safety (e.g., due
to landmines) may continue to limit their movement and
operations.

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SOME FOOD FROM SOMALILAND REACHING DEGEHABUR
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7. (SBU) In an August 10 update to A/DCM, Hebert reported
that while "severe food shortages persisted" west of
Degehabur, i.e., Degehamedo Woreda, bordering Fik Zone),the
situation in Degahabur woreda appeared to be "stabilizing,"
as the military had escorted trucks carrying commercial food
from Somaliland via Kebribeyah (in Jijiga Zone) to Degahabur
town. Notably, those supplying food were reportedly
non-Somali and selling food at "monopolistic" prices: 25
percent above the normal price increase of basic staple
foods, but an improvement over the 100-200 percent increases
in June and July. In addition, trucks had managed to skirt
the ban on commercial food and deliver to some rural areas in
Degehabur, where prices were lower than those in town.

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THREATS OF FORCED RELOCATION IN REPORTED ONLF STRONGHOLD
-------------- --------------


8. (SBU) In its August 9 weekly briefing, UNOCHA reported
that in 2 of the 5 zones where military operations continue
(Degehabur and Kebridehar Zones),the military had
"requested" that elders direct pastoralists to move their
livestock to four designated areas (not identified) within a
week, or else they would be considered "hostiles." Elders in
Kebridehar reportedly refused to force pastoralists into
these designated areas. UNOCHA considers these actions as
"voluntary movements," in contrast to reports of the military
forcing villagers in the Warder Zone to move to selected
sites.


9. (C) In an August 10 update to A/DCM, Hebert reported that
the military was "backing off" from earlier threats of forced
concentration in Degehabur, as the threats were driving
pastoralists to disperse even more widely into the bush. The
army had reportedly asked elders to ensure that villagers
return to their original locations. Degehabur's population
was reportedly one-third of its normal size, with most
residents fleeing to Jijiga.


10. (C) Hebert noted that indiscriminate detention and

killings had been observed in Degehabur (including the
killings of at least 10 people in July and August, presumably
by GOE security forces),and that the presence of ONLF in
Degehabur Woreda was "confirmed". According to Hebert, the
ONLF's strategy was to avoid major confrontations and to
concentrate instead on hit-and-run attacks targeting army
convoys. Major roads were reportedly safe for movement and
not mined, as food was managing to come through (see below)
and civilian traffic was not targeted by the ONLF.

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DEPUTY PM: FOOD TO BE DELIVERED WHERE SECURITY PERMITS
-------------- --------------


11. (C) Ambassador, USAID Mission Direction, and A/DCM
(note-taker) subsequently raised concerns about the Somali
Region with Deputy Prime Minister Addisu Legesse on August
10, and noted the possibility of a USG disaster declaration,
in order to facilitate the release of additional emergency
food (for the Somali Region) as well as flood relief supplies
(for flooding in southern Ethiopia). While pledging to
discuss the matter further with GOE principals, Addisu
expressed reservations about an emergency declaration,
stressing the need for a careful assessment, and cautioning
against "negative elements" exploiting the "political impact"
of such a declaration prior to Ethiopia's Millennium
celebration in early September. Addisu asserted that the
weakness of the Somali Region's government exacerbated the
situation there, and that half the food allocated for the
region was not being used. Addisu cautioned against "a
single clan monopolizing" food aid to the Somali Region, as
he asserted had occurred in 2003, and noted that the ONLF was
backed by insurgents from Somalia. Bilateral institutions
received their information on the Somali Region from UNOCHA,
he said, which he asserted exaggerated conditions in order to
obtain more emergency resources.


12. (C) Deputy PM Addisu said that the GOE had directed that
emergency food be delivered where security conditions
permitted, and that secure zones and woredas had been
identified in consultations with ENDF Chief of General Staff
Lieutenant General Samora Yonus. Noting that security
conditions dictated the ability to deliver food relief,
Addisu stated that military units on the ground could best
assess whether security was sufficient. While the GOE sought
to assist the "truly needy," the ONLF "hijacks" food relief,
he said. "They are fighting us with food (intended) for the
communities." Addisu further asserted that the ONLF had
infiltrated the Somali Region government, but that the GOE
could not raise this publicly. Addisu agreed that having WFP
food monitors accompany food convoys could be helpful. The
GOE was not ignoring the problems of the Somali Region,
Addisu concluded.


13. (C) COMMENT. As the UN and NGOs have limited access to
the Ogaden, much of the information available on humanitarian
and security conditions there, including on alleged human
rights abuses, remains anecdotal and subject to confirmation.
The resumption of commercial food deliveries to Degehabur,
while limited to a single woreda, is a positive development;
WFP emergency food is expected to reach additional areas
within the Ogaden in the next week. END COMMENT.
YAMAMOTO