Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07ADDISABABA2343
2007-07-25 07:42:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Addis Ababa
Cable title:  

(C-AL7-01035) ETHIOPIA: EMERGENCY FOOD RELIEF

Tags:  PREF PGOV PINS PHUM EAGR EAID ET 
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VZCZCXRO1704
PP RUEHDE RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHDS #2343/01 2060742
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 250742Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7157
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNSOM/SOMALIA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ADDIS ABABA 002343 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/E, AND INR/AA
USAID FOR AFR, FFP, AND OFDA
LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHER
ROME FOR USUN ROME
CJTF-HOA AND USCENTCOM FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/24/2017
TAGS: PREF PGOV PINS PHUM EAGR EAID ET
SUBJECT: (C-AL7-01035) ETHIOPIA: EMERGENCY FOOD RELIEF
DELIVERED ONLY TO ZONES OUTSIDE OGADEN

REF: A. STATE 102381 (NOTAL)


B. STATE 83346 (NOTAL)

C. ADDIS ABABA 2285 (AND PREVIOUS)

Classified By: ERIC WONG, ACTING DCM. REASON: 1.4 (D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ADDIS ABABA 002343

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/E, AND INR/AA
USAID FOR AFR, FFP, AND OFDA
LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHER
ROME FOR USUN ROME
CJTF-HOA AND USCENTCOM FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/24/2017
TAGS: PREF PGOV PINS PHUM EAGR EAID ET
SUBJECT: (C-AL7-01035) ETHIOPIA: EMERGENCY FOOD RELIEF
DELIVERED ONLY TO ZONES OUTSIDE OGADEN

REF: A. STATE 102381 (NOTAL)


B. STATE 83346 (NOTAL)

C. ADDIS ABABA 2285 (AND PREVIOUS)

Classified By: ERIC WONG, ACTING DCM. REASON: 1.4 (D).


1. (C) SUMMARY. UNOCHA Head of Office Paul Hebert reported
that government officials had decided on July 21 to allow
emergency food relief to be delivered to the 5 zones in the
Ogaden area of the Somali Region where military operations
against the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) were
ongoing. However, the exact modalities of such distribution
(e.g., distribution points, and whether convoys would be
required to have military escort) remained to be determined.
The food relief currently approved for the Somali Region is
only a one-month ration (15 kg per person),and targets only
one-eighth of the region's population of 4 million, over half
of whom are in the security-restricted zones; thus, lifting
government restrictions on commercial food deliveries is
critical to alleviating a crisis in the Ogaden. In addition
to food insecurity, UNOCHA officials highlighted concerns
about the Ethiopian military restricting access to water,
about the outbreak of cholera, and internal displacement.
UNOCHA officials could not/not confirm reports of cantonment
camps, and noted that some IDPs were "moving of their own
volition," due to insecurity and lack of food. According to
UNOCHA, the GOE ordered the International Committee of the
Red Cross (ICRC) on July 23 to leave its offices in the
Somali Region; also, heavy fighting following an ONLF attack
on a military installation has reportedly prompted
MSF-Belgium to withdraw from Warder, one of the 5 zones where
military operations continue. Separately on July 24, Prime
Minister Meles informed Ambassador that humanitarian

deliveries to all 8 zones requiring food aid, including those
in the Ogaden, would be allowed, but primarily with military
escort. Meles further added that commercial food shipments
would be allowed, but not to those areas were insurgents were
moving from Somalia, which would remain temporarily
"off-limits." END SUMMARY.


2. (SBU) On July 24, Ambassador, A/DCM, poloff and REFCOORD
Pickering Fellow met with UNOCHA Head of Office and Deputy to
the Humanitarian Coordinator, Paul Hebert, and with UNOCHA
Information and Advocacy officer Gregory Beals. UN agencies
sought approval from the GOE for enhanced access to the
Ogaden, in order to monitor food distribution, assess
humanitarian conditions, and to provide direct assistance in
non-food areas, Hebert said. Hebert was due to depart on
July 25 for Jijiga, capital of the Somali Region, to discuss
modalities for the resumption of humanitarian food deliveries
to the region's Ogaden area, with Somali Regional President
Abdullahi Hassan and other regional state authorities.
Hassan had recently completed consultations in Addis Ababa
with federal officials, including the PM's National Security
Advisor Abay Tsehaye.

-------------- --
FOOD RELIEF DELIVERED TO 3 ZONES OUTSIDE OGADEN
-------------- --


3. (SBU) According to Hebert, on July 21, President Hassan
had ordered that humanitarian food relief be released from
warehouses for distribution to the Ogaden. Two weeks
earlier, the GOE had agreed to the distribution of a
one-month emergency food ration to a total of 530,000
beneficiaries in the entire Somali Region, who had been
identified during a March 2007 assessment. Eight of the
region's 9 zones were thus to receive food relief (all except
Jijiga Zone, which had not been assessed as requiring food
aid this year): 5 zones where military operations by
Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) continued, and 3
zones outside the conflict area. Emergency food distribution
had begun 10 days ago--and was now completed--in Shinile and
Afder Zones, and was ongoing in Liben Zone (southwestern
Somali Region). Food aid to Afder and Shinile came from WFP
warehouses in Nazret (near Addis Ababa) and Dire Dawa
respectively. However, food had not/not yet been delivered
to approximately 290,000 beneficiaries in the 5 conflict

ADDIS ABAB 00002343 002 OF 004


zones (i.e., Fik, Degehabur, Gode, Korahe, and Warder Zones).
Hebert noted that there was no shortage of food in WFP
warehouses, as (until 10 days ago) no distribution of
emergency food relief had been distributed in the Somali
Region--WFP's largest recipient area--since the beginning of
the year.

--------------
UN OPPOSES MILITARY ESCORT OF FOOD CONVOYS
--------------


4. (SBU) The federal government's Disaster Prevention and
Preparedness Agency (DPPA),the regional-level Disaster
Prevention and Prevention Bureau (DPPB),the World Food
Program (WFP),and the ENDF were to discuss the modalities of
delivering food relief to the 5 zones where military
operations continued, UNOCHA said. Issues included selecting
distribution points (to ensure rural populations, as well as
those in towns, received food),and whether the GOE would
require military escort of humanitarian convoys. Normally,
food relief was distributed only by GOE officials (the DPPA
and DPPB),with the UN's role limited to monitoring.


5. (C) Hebert said he had requested a meeting with the ENDF
military commander in Harar, but did not anticipate approval
of his request. The ENDF stated that it was not restricting
international agencies' access to the Somali Region; however,
ICRC representatives had been required to provide the ENDF
command in Harar with 3-days advance notification of any
movement. Hebert underscored that UN agencies needed to be
allowed to enter the Ogaden without any military escort; the
UN assessed that the ONLF would welcome, not target, UN
agencies.

-------------- --------------
ONLF ATTACK PROMPTS DEPARTURE OF MSF; ICRC EXPELLED
-------------- --------------


6. (C) Security was also an issue; Hebert noted that the UN
Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) would likely permit
the temporary presence of UN officials at Kebridehar or
Degehabur.

-- Hebert reported that the ONLF had attacked the garrison
town of Warder in the middle of the night, and had withdrawn
by the morning of July 24; while casualties were unknown,
heavy fighting had prompted Medecins Sans Frontieres-Holland
(Doctors Without Borders) to decide independently to withdraw
its 3-person international team from a health facility in
Warder.

-- Separately, UNOCHA reported that ICRC had been asked by
the GOE on July 23 to leave the Somali Region; ICRC had been
located at Gode and Jijiga.

-------------- --------------
FOOD AID TARGETS ONLY ONE-EIGHTH OF REGION'S POPULATION
-------------- --------------


7. (C) Hebert underscored that the provision of humanitarian
food relief would not/not alleviate a crisis in the Ogaden,
and that lifting restrictions against the resumption of
commercial food deliveries was critical. Sources on the
ground reported that the ENDF's counterinsurgency would
continue for at least 3 additional months, which risked
turning the population to support the ONLF. While there was
no immediate crisis, he noted the danger that would be posed
"within weeks" by "coping mechanisms breaking down,"
especially to children under age 5.

-- The one-month ration approved by the GOE comprised only
15 kg per person; furthermore, the 530,000 beneficiaries
identified by the March 2007 assessment in the entire region
(of which over half--200,000--are in security-restricted
areas) represented a fraction of the 1.1 - 1.3 million
beneficiaries in the Somali Region who previously received
food aid. (NOTE: The total population of the Somali Region
is estimated at 4 million. END NOTE.) Due to lack of food

ADDIS ABAB 00002343 003 OF 004


and trade, individuals were subsisting only on milk and tea.
Very little food was reaching rural areas, and the normal
trade of cattle or livestock was not occurring. MSF-Holland
was reporting that the military was restricting acess to
water points.

-- Any additional food aid would be determined by seasonal
assessment teams in the region. Whereas UN agencies and
humanitarian NGOs participated in teams that visited the 3
zones outside where ongoing military operations continued,
the teams currently permitted to enter the 5 conflict zones
were comprised primarily of GOE officials (e.g., DPPA, DPPB,
and officials from local health, agriculture, and water
bureaus); the only external representatives were from Save
the Children-UK. In Degehabur Zone, the assessment team was
comprised entirely of GOE officials, Hebert said.

-- GOE officials asserted that they were not restricting food
per se, only illegal trade. During the previous week, 8
trucks had been allowed to deliver food to Fik; however,
individuals trying to leave Fik with food had had their food
confiscated at military checkpoints.

-- Beals reported that authorities had confiscated livestock
from pastoralists and given them lists of suspected ONLF
members; if no response was given to the lists, the livestock
was kept. Hebert asserted that such policies led local
officials to protest, especially the regional assembly's
proposal to divert funds for development assistance to peace
and security, which had been pushed strongly by federal
officials.


8. (U) Acute watery diarrhea (AWD),or cholera, was also a
concern: whereas AWD had been reported in all 5 zones prior
to the ENDF's current counterinsurgency campaign, the UN had
not been able to receive any reports all for the last two
months. Deaths in Jijiga from AWD now reached an alarming 3
per cent, Hebert said.

-------------- --------------
INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT: CANTONMENT CAMPS UNCONFIRMED
-------------- --------------


9. (C) International humanitarian law was "being violated by
both sides," Hebert said. Reports of cantonment camps had
been received from relatives of UN staff, Hebert said, but
remained unconfirmed. The military were moving people to
certain areas where they could be controlled; however, people
were also "moving of their own volition". Some men moved
"into the bush" with their livestock; women and children were
moving to towns. Displaced men and boys were congregating in
Jijiga, despite reports of mass arrests in towns of those
suspected of being either ONLF collaborators or sympathizers.
There had been some population movement reported from the
Ogaden to neighboring Somaliland, but specific numbers were
not available.


10. (C) Hebert said reports had been received of foreign
fighters "in some areas," but that the ONLF did not support
them, and had, in fact, ousted them to Somalia. Beals
attributed fighting in the Boreni and Guji Zones of
neighboring Oromiya Region to conflict between the ONLF and
others.


11. (C) Hebert noted the ONLF's "real willingness" to engage
in negotiations with the GOE. Ambassador responded that the
ONLF's refusal to renounce violence or to abandon targeting
civilians remained a concern.


12. (C) COMMENT. Whether to deliver emergency food aid with
military escort will likely be the focus of discussions
between UNOCHA officials and the GOE. Separately on July 24,
Prime Minister Meles informed Ambassador that humanitarian
deliveries to all 8 zones requiring food aid, including those
in the Ogaden, would be allowed, but primarily with military
escort. While naming no specific organizations, Meles
asserted that the GOE was gathering evidence that certain
NGOs and international groups were assisting the ONLF, and

ADDIS ABAB 00002343 004 OF 004


that alleged abuses in the Ogaden were exaggerated. Meles
further added that commercial food shipments would be
allowed, but not to those areas were insurgents were moving
from Somalia, which would remain temporarily "off-limits."
END COMMENT.
YAMAMOTO