(C-AL7-01035) ETHIOPIA: SOMALI REGION SUPREME

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 002203

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/E, AND INR/AA
LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHER
CJTF-HOA AND USCENTCOM FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/13/2017
TAGS: PGOV KJUS PINS MOPS ET
SUBJECT: (C-AL7-01035) ETHIOPIA: SOMALI REGION SUPREME
COURT'S HEAD JUDGE PROVIDES GOE PERSPECTIVE ON OGADEN
COUNTERINSURGENCY

REF: A. STATE 88346 (NOTAL)

B. ADDIS ABABA 2197

C. ADDIS ABABA 2196 (AND PREVIOUS)

Classified By: ERIC WONG, ACTING DCM. REASON: 1.4 (D).


1. (C/REL UK) SUMMARY. The acting President of the Supreme
Court for Ethiopia's Somali Region, Abdurahman Rega, denies
any increase in detentions resulting from the GOE's ongoing
counterinsurgency campaign against suspected Ogaden National
Liberation Front (ONLF) rebels in the Ogaden. A former
police commissioner for the entire Somali Region, as well as
a member of the ruling coalition, Rega also downplayed
concerns about food insecurity arising from restrictions
imposed by Ethiopian security officials (contrary to
representatives of UN and humanitarian agencies),and
asserted that the GOE's Disaster Prevention and Preparedness
Agency (DPPA) was providing food to every local woreda. He
reiterated assertions in state-run media that the ONLF was
responsible for a May 28 attempted assassination of the
Somali Region's President, and that it was working with armed
groups in the Ogaden. As Rega's observations likely reflect
"the party line," his assertion that the GOE sought dialogue
with the ONLF and prefers "secret negotiations by peaceful
means" merits attention. END SUMMARY.


2. (SBU) On June 27, Acting DCM, ORA analyst, USAID Democracy
and Governance staff, and UK poloff met with Abdurahman Rega,
acting President of the 18-judge Supreme Court for Ethiopia's
Somali Region. Rega, a member of the SPDP party associated
with the ruling Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic
Front (EPRDF) coalition, formerly served as Police
Commissioner for the Somali Region, as well as a member of
the regional parliament.

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TRADITIONAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION THE NORM IN SOMALI REGION
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3. (U) Rega explained that 80 percent of legal cases in the
Somali Region were heard by traditional or sharia courts;
e.g., 100 camels was the traditional compensation for
homicide. Pastoralists in rural areas preferred traditional
dispute resolution; arbitration by a mediator (e.g., elders)
was possible with the joint agreement of both parties. With
courthouses in only three districts in the entire Region, the
Somali Regional courts needed assistance with
capacity-building, including the establishment of a judicial
training center, logistical support, and even the provision
of vehicles. Asked the ethnic composition of the Region's
judicial personnel, Rega said it was mostly Somali,
especially high courts at the local woreda level.
Woreda-level judges received training from the federal
government's Ministry of Justice; the law faculty at Alemayu
University in Dire Dawa provided summer training.


4. (U) Rega highlighted the regional government's lack of
institutional capacity in the Somali Region, citing
understaffing in the Somali Regional Police, compared to
similar forces in Amhara and Oromiya Regions. The Somali
Regional Police numbered only 2,000-3,000, with approximately
20 police vehicles for the entire Region. As the police were
so few in number, the regional government's "office for
militia" worked with the heads of 53 woredas (local
administrative units) in order to arm kebele-level militia.
Asked whether the GOE dispatched Federal Police to supplement
the regional police, Rega noted only that the regional and
federal governments "support each other."

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ONLF: REPORTEDLY FEW AND DISPERSED IN NUMBER
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5. (SBU) Rega denied that there had been any mass detentions
in the Somali Region, as a result of the Ethiopian National
Defense Force's (ENDF) counterinsurgency against the ONLF.

-- The Somali Region's Supreme Court dealt with criminal and
commercial disputes, and also served as the high court in the

ADDIS ABAB 00002203 002 OF 003


federal court system, while the Federal Court in Dire Dawa
traveled to Jijiga (i.e., within the Somali Region) to hear
primarily criminal cases (e.g., murder, theft, rape),some
civil dispute, and "crimes against the constitution." Rega
asserted that the Federal Court in Dire Dawa was currently
dealing with only 21 cases.

-- Judges in the regional courts, not federal judges, were
remanding suspects to custody, Rega said, but there had not
been any increase in the number of detentions. Arrests were
by local police; suspects were then brought to Somali
Regional courts, he said. Rega maintained that local police
were in charge, in the Somali Region, but acknowledged that
Federal Police were present in Jijiga.

-- Prisoners were held at existing prisons in Jijiga and Dire
Dawa only, not transferred elsewhere out of the Somali
Region; many were remanded and held in custody at local
police stations, he said.


6. (SBU) Contrary to representatives of UN and humanitarian
agencies (refs B-C),Rega also downplayed concerns about food
insecurity arising from restrictions imposed by Ethiopian
security officials:

-- Rega said he "had heard" of restrictions on emergency and
commercial food deliveries to the Ogaden (refs B-C),but
responded that the federal government sought to respond to
the ONLF's "terrorist acts." He asserted that the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) was still
providing food, and that regional authorities working with
the GOE's Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Agency (DPPA)
were providing food to every woreda. (NOTE: ICRC Deputy Head
of Delegation reported on July 3 that ICRC maintained access
to areas in the Somali Region--so long as pre-notification
was given to the Ethiopian military; see ref C. END NOTE.)
Rega said he was not aware of any restrictions on NGOs in
Gode.

-- Social and ethnic ties linked residents of Ethiopia's
Somali Region to neighboring Somalia, he added; pastoralists
grazed livestock in both countries. As the border was
porous, goods could also be smuggled from Somalia, he
asserted.

-- Questioned about media reports of aerial bombardment in
the Ogaden by the Ethiopian military, Rega responded that as
the ONLF were dispersed and few in number, it was not logical
to bomb ONLF sites.


7. (SBU) Rega reiterated assertions in state-run media that
the ONLF was responsible for a May 28 attack with hand
grenades that resulted in the wounding of the Somali Regional
President, Abdullahi Hassan, during his participation in a
public ceremony commemorating the ruling coalition's victory
over the previous Derg regime. (NOTE: The ONLF has publicly
denied responsibility for this May 28 attack, although it did
claim responsibility for a larger-scale attack on a Chinese
oil facility in the Ogaden in April. END NOTE.) Rega said
police had recovered three live, unused grenades from the May
28 attack, and that the ONLF may have been collaborating with
Eritrea, Somalia's ousted Council of Islamic Courts (CIC),
and the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF). Rega said he was
unclear about the specific injuries sustained by President
Hassan during the May 28 attack, but maintained that Hassan
was wounded in the leg. (NOTE: There have been conflicting
(but unconfirmed) reports that Hassan was wounded in the
chest, as a result of federal security officers returning
fire on Hassan's suspected assailants. END NOTE.) As a
result of the April and May attacks, attributed to the ONLF,
the government required that NGOs operating in the Ogaden had
police escorts "for their own protection," he said.


8. (SBU) Questioned about other armed groups in the Ogaden,
Rega asserted that the ONLF, the United Western Somali
Liberation Front (UWSLF),and Al-Itihaad al-Islamiya (AIAI)
all supported each other, but had different ideologies. He
said the UWSLF "may exist in the region," but was not active;
he denied that it was distinct from the ONLF. AIAI was "not

ADDIS ABAB 00002203 003 OF 003


as strong" as the ONLF, but sought to establish a separate
Islamic state. Questioned about alleged ties between the
ONLF and OLF, Rega said the OLF supported ONLF activities
against the GOE. Asked whether the Somali judicial system
therefore saw an increase in the number of Oromos arrested,
Rega noted that Oromos would be dealt with by the Federal
Court, not the Somali Regional courts.

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EXCEPT FOR ONLF AREAS, SOMALI REGION READY FOR LOCAL ELECTIONS
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9. (C/REL UK) The GOE sought dialogue with the ONLF, and
Prime Minister Meles had previously sent elders to mediate
with the ONLF, Rega said. "Secret negotiations by peaceful
means" was the preferred mechanism for dealing with the ONLF;
however, the ONLF "has no good leadership," Rega said.


10. (SBU) Acknowledging the need for the GOE to "win hearts
and minds," Rega said the Somali Region was politically ready
to conduct local elections. "At this stage, elections can be
done" in non-ONLF areas, he said. Given its vast
geographical area, Rega asserted that 80 percent of the
region had "no problem in their areas;" only woredas in Fik
and Kebridehar presented difficulties. Rega acknowledged
some popular support for the ONLF, attributing it to support
from ethnic clans, despite opposition to "terrorist acts."


11. (U) Lack of infrastructure, however, could hamper ability
to conduct elections. Ballots would have to brought in some
areas by camel, Rega said. Additionally, with animals now
grazing, it was preferable to wait for pastoralists to return
to their traditional domiciles (i.e., after the July-August
rainy season); even the current national census in Ethiopia
had been delayed in the Somali Region to September.


12. (C/REL UK) COMMENT. As a former police commissioner for
the Somali Region, as well as a regional parliamentarian
representing the SPDP party, Rega has clearly aligned himself
with the ruling EPRDF coalition, and thus hews to the party
line. His denial of mass arrests in the Ogaden, travel
restrictions affecting Gode, or of severe restrictions on
food delivery, contradict recent observations made by senior
UN agency officials and by NGOs operating in the Ogaden (refs
B-C). On the other hand, his assertion that the GOE prefers
"secret negotiations" with the ONLF is significant, if it
indeed reflects current thinking among GOE principals. END
COMMENT.
YAMAMOTO