(C-AL7-01035) ETHIOPIA: WFP OFFICIAL DISCUSSES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ADDIS ABABA 002197

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/E, AND INR/AA
LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHER
CJTF-HOA AND USCENTCOM FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/13/2017
TAGS: PINS PGOV MOPS EAID EAGR ET
SUBJECT: (C-AL7-01035) ETHIOPIA: WFP OFFICIAL DISCUSSES
ONLF AND COUNTERINSURGENCY IN OGADEN

REF: A. STATE 88346 (NOTAL)

B. ADDIS ABABA 2196

C. ADDIS ABABA 2027

D. ADDIS ABABA 1308

Classified By: ERIC WONG, ACTING DCM. REASON: 1.4 (B),(D).


1. (C) SUMMARY. An American security coordinator for the
World Food Programme (WFP),who has traveled extensively in
the Ogaden area of Ethiopia's Somali Region to coordinate WFP
airdrops, assesses that the Ogaden National Liberation Front
(ONLF) does not seek to target Americans or humanitarian
organizations, despite a large-scale attack on Chinese oil
workers in April (ref D). The WFP official reports that the
Ethiopian military launched its latest counterinsurgency
campaign against the ONLF in the Ogaden following the May 28
attempted assassination of the Somali Region's President;
since then, all commercial food deliveries to the Somali
Region have been halted by the military. Suspension of
commercial deliveries exacerbates food insecurity in the
Region, according to the WFP official, as emergency food
relief for 500,000 beneficiaries has not been delivered since
the beginning of 2007. The GOE has not explicitly banned WFP
from delivering emergency food, but states it cannot
guarantee the security of convoys; WFP typically uses
commercial trucks and does not use military escort. The WFP
official reported that Ethiopian troops are being flown to
Gode on commercial flights, and have restricted all vehicular
traffic from departing Gode. The WFP official identified
traditional ONLF strongholds, and noted that "several
hundred" ONLF forces with vehicle-mounted weapons briefly
seized the town of Kelafo in May. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) On June 28, A/DCM, REFCOORD, and ORA analysts met with
Peter Van Orden (STRICTLY PROTECT),Addis Ababa-based Field
Security Officer for the WFP, in order to discuss WFP
operations in the Ogaden area of Ethiopia's Somali Region.
Van Orden is an Amcit former U.S. Marine who has worked for
UN agencies for nearly 20 years, including 4 years for WFP in
Ethiopia. He traveled extensively throughout the Somali
Region (from Jijiga to Shilabo),including ONLF strongholds,
in 2004 in order to open humanitarian corridors; Van Orden
also met with ONLF representatives in the Ogaden in late 2006
to coordinate WFP airdrops of food relief.


3. (C) Ethiopia's Somali Region had long been "totally
neglected," with no paved roads beyond Jijiga (in the
northern part of the Region),and little economic development
by the Addis Ababa-based federal government, prompting the
local population to feel marginalized, Van Orden said. Lack
of infrastructure, particularly roads, was possibly a
deliberate measure, he said, as the Somali Region served as a
buffer between Ethiopia and neighboring Somalia, from which
he said 50,000 refugees had entered the Somali Region but had
moved to Kenya. Since the December 2006 Ethiopian military
intervention in Somalia, there had been more banditry in the
Somali Region, as well as an upsurge in violence. The UN
traditionally reported insecurity in Fik, Warder, and
Kebridehar, he added.


4. (C) Van Orden assessed that the Ethiopian National Defense
Force's (ENDF) current counterinsurgency campaign in the
Ogaden was prompted by the May 28 attempted assassination of
Somali Regional State President Abdullahi Hassan, who was
wounded while giving a speech in Jijiga at a public
celebration of the 16th anniversary of the ruling Ethiopian
People's Revolutionary Democratic Front's (EPRDF) victory
over the previous Derg regime. GOE officials have attributed
the attack to the ONLF, although the ONLF has publicly denied
responsibility (in contrast, the ONLF publicly claimed
responsibility for the April 24 attack on a Chinese oil
facility in the Ogaden).

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FOOD AID ALLOCATED FOR 500,000 NOT DISTRIBUTED
-------------- -


5. (C) Van Orden expressed concern of possible famine
conditions evolving in the Ogaden, due to the suspension of
both emergency food aid and commercial food deliveries:

ADDIS ABAB 00002197 002 OF 004



-- He confirmed that WFP had identified 500,000 beneficiaries
in the Somali Region (for emergency food relief),but that
food aid allocated for them remained in WFP's primary
stockpile at a warehouse in Dire Dawa, as it could not be
distributed. WFP food was typically distributed to schools,
food for work programs, and others, through the federal
government's Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Agency
(DPPA) and monitored by WFP.

-- Whereas WFP convoys previously delivered food to the
Ogaden at least weekly, the last such "regular" delivery had
occurred six weeks earlier (i.e., in May),due to the launch
of the ENDF's counterinsurgency campaign. (NOTE: In a
separate July 3 meeting, the WFP Country Director reported
that food aid for targeted supplementary feeding had last
been delivered to the Somali Region in May 2007, but that
emergency food aid had been suspended since January 2007; see
ref B. END NOTE.)

-- Neither the GOE nor the DPPA had explicitly forbidden WFP
food deliveries, but authorities had declared that travel to
the Ogaden was now at the UN's own risk, and that the
security of UN personnel could not be guaranteed. WFP
typically hired commercial trucks, not UN-marked vehicles, to
deliver food, and did not travel with armed escorts; they had
traveled under Ethiopian military escort only under the
previous Communist Derg regime (prior to 1991). Van Orden
asserted that the ENDF general in Harar had ordered
commercial deliveries halted.

-- As mid-July to August was the rainy season in the Somali
Region, failure to resume food delivery soon could create
difficulties for distribution, Van Orden said, requiring that
food be delivered by air. Even if humanitarian corridors
were allowed, the current suspension of all commercial food
delivery was a significant concern; Somali pastoralists
traditionally needed to stock food as a buffer in preparation
for the rainy season, Van Orden said. All commercially
available food was reportedly going only to the ENDF.

-- Van Orden was not aware of any ongoing UNOCHA assessments
in the Somali Region (as of June 28),nor of any in the
previous six weeks. ICRC (based in Gode) was conducting an
assessment, which he commented would likely be the most
credible. The WFP Country Representative had raised concerns
about food insecurity in the Ogaden the previous week with
the DPPA. Van Orden suggested engaging Deputy Prime Minister
Addisu Legesse, or pushing for political discussions with the
ONLF outside Ethiopia. (NOTE: The UNDP Resident
Representative subsequently raised concerns with Deputy PM
Addisu; see ref B. END NOTE.)

--------------
ENDF REINFORCEMENTS FLYING TO GODE
--------------


6. (C) According to Van Orden, the ENDF maintained
headquarters in Gode, Warder, Kebridehar, and Degehabur, and
was using regularly scheduled commercial Ethiopian Airlines
flights to Gode, in order to deploy additional troops to the
Ogaden. (NOTE: Ethiopian Airlines, a state-owned monopoly,
flies 50-seat "Fokker 50" turboprops to Gode. END NOTE.)
Van Orden collaborated reports from other UN and humanitarian
NGO contacts that Gode town had been "locked down" for the
last six weeks, suspending all commercial vehicular traffic,
which he assessed as likely having a more significant impact
than the lack of humanitarian corridors.


7. (C) Van Orden said the Ethiopian military had arrested,
beaten, and then released two UNDP local staff at Degehabur
(i.e., between Jijiga and Gode Zones),suspecting them of
assisting three Amcit New York Times reporters who had been
detained (and subsequently released) by the ENDF in the
Ogaden. (NOTE: In an earlier, separate meeting with emboffs,
foreign expat UNDP representative in Jijiga reported local
staff detained and beaten by Ethiopian authorities. END
NOTE.)

-------------- --------------

ADDIS ABAB 00002197 003 OF 004


ONLF: COOPERATION WITH WFP TO ALLOW HUMANITARIAN RELIEF
-------------- --------------


8. (C) WFP had not/not encountered difficulties with the
ONLF. On the contrary, Van Orden said that WFP had consulted
closely with ONLF leaders in both East Imi and West Imi
woredas (in Gode and Afder Zones, respectively),as well as
in Kelafo (in Gode Zone) in order to coordinate WFP airdrops
of food during November-December 2006, following floods in
those areas. According to Van Orden, ONLF strongholds
included East Imi, part of Gode, Fik, Korahe, and Degehabur.
Insurgent activity was common along the axis between Warder
and Shilabo (in eastern Somali Region). ONLF representatives
in the Somali Region appeared to have a coherent hierarchy,
although that could derive in part from the ethnic Ogadeni
clan structure, Van Orden noted. The ONLF representatives
used Thuraya satellite phones, had weapons and vehicles, and
resupplied itself through Somaliland, he added.


9. (C) Questioned about the likelihood of ONLF cooperation
with the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF),Van Orden said such
collaboration would likely be limited to areas near Oromiya
Region, such as East Imi and West Imi woredas, or Fik Zone.


10. (C) Van Orden assessed that other elements from Somalia,
but not/not the ONLF, likely posed the greatest threat to
Americans. A vehicle belonging the NGO, GOAL, had been shot
at and burnt in the area in December 2006. Van Orden noted
that the non-Ogadeni Shekash clan, dominant in West Imi,
clashed with the Ogadeni in East Imi. Reports of the
presence of the United Western Somali Liberation Front
(UWSLF) began to surface a year ago, following the supposed
expulsion of al-Itihaad al-Islamiya (AIAI) from Ethiopia to
Somalia several years earlier. Popular sentiment expressed
during his 2004 visit suggested lack of popular support in
the Ogaden for the AIAI; local residents wanted the conflict
to "stay in Somalia," he said.


11. (C) Van Orden observed that an aircraft operated by
Abyssinian Flight Services, a private charter company under
contract to the UN, had crashed in the Somali Region, but
not/not as a result of hostile fire.

-------------- --
"SEVERAL HUNDRED" ONLF FORCES SURROUNDED KELAFO
-------------- --


12. (C) Van Orden corroborated reports from other contacts
that five weeks earlier the ONLF had surrounded the entire
town of Kelafo (in Gode Zone),using a force of "several
hundred" with "technicals" (vehicles with mounted weapons),
in an attempt to kill the town administrator, suspected of
corruption. An Italian Muslim residing in Kelafo was not
touched. (NOTE: Italian Charge confirmed this in a separate
meeting; see ref B. END NOTE.)


13. (C) Van Orden reported that Chinese workers had withdrawn
from the oil exploration facility attacked on April 24 by the
ONLF (ref D),which he noted was north of Degehabur. (NOTE:
Chinese charge, in separate meeting on July 3, confirmed the
Chinese company's withdrawal from the Ogaden, stating they
had "completed their work." END NOTE.) Van Orden said
Ethiopian casualties of the ONLF's attack had all been
"highlanders" (i.e., ethnic Tigrayans or Amhara, whom the
ONLF believe have exploited the Ogaden).


14. (SBU) According to Van Orden, WFP's presence in the
Somali Region consisted of offices in Jijiga (23 local staff
and 1 international) and Gode (27 local staff and 1
international). Other humanitarian agencies at Jijiga
included: FAO, WFP, UNHCR, UNICEF, and UNDP. Those at Gode
included: UNHCR (4 international staff),UNICEF, WFP, and
ICRC. Adjacent to the Somali Zone, WFP had 24 local staff
and 1 international at its warehouse in Dire Dawa.


15. (C) COMMENT. Van Orden's observations about the
suspension of food deliveries, both commercial and emergency
relief, and the subsequent possibility of future famine, were
echoed by senior UN officials, including the UNDP Resident
Representative and the WFP Country Director for Ethiopia, on

ADDIS ABAB 00002197 004 OF 004


July 3 (ref B). Van Orden did not have additional
information either to corroborate or refute allegations of
serious human rights abuses by Ethiopian security forces.
Van Orden's personal contacts with ONLF leaders in the Ogaden
in both 2004 and late 2006 lend credibility to his assessment
that the ONLF does not seek to target Americans or
humanitarian agencies. END COMMENT.
YAMAMOTO