Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07ADDISABABA2185
2007-07-13 08:18:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Addis Ababa
Cable title:  

SOMALI TFG AMBASSADOR REVIEWS SOMALILAND, AMISOM,

Tags:  PREL PGOV MOPS KPKO SO ET ER AU BN 
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VZCZCXRO1553
PP RUEHDE RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHDS #2185/01 1940818
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 130818Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6970
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNSOM/SOMALIA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHUJA/AMEMBASSY ABUJA PRIORITY 0685
RUEHAR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA PRIORITY 0377
RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA PRIORITY 0017
RUEHCO/AMEMBASSY COTONOU PRIORITY 0217
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 002185 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF AND AF/E
LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHER
CJTF-HOA AND USCENTCOM FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/13/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS KPKO SO ET ER AU BN
SUBJECT: SOMALI TFG AMBASSADOR REVIEWS SOMALILAND, AMISOM,
AND RECONCILIATION PROCESS

REF: ADDIS ABABA 1507 (NOTAL)

Classified By: ERIC WONG, ACTING DCM. REASON: 1.4 (D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 002185

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF AND AF/E
LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHER
CJTF-HOA AND USCENTCOM FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/13/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS KPKO SO ET ER AU BN
SUBJECT: SOMALI TFG AMBASSADOR REVIEWS SOMALILAND, AMISOM,
AND RECONCILIATION PROCESS

REF: ADDIS ABABA 1507 (NOTAL)

Classified By: ERIC WONG, ACTING DCM. REASON: 1.4 (D).


1. (C) SUMMARY. According to Ambassador Abdulkarim Farah,
the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia's (TFG)
Ambassador to Ethiopia and PermRep to the African Union,
African foreign ministers meeting in Accra unanimously
rejected a Ghanaian motion to establish an AU committee to
examine Somaliland issues. Kenya, as IGAD chair, objected to
such a proposal being raised before the AU Council of
Ministers, prior to being discussed at the sub-regional
level. Citing sanctions on Eritrea for unpaid arrears,
ministers also denied the Eritrean foreign minister the right
to address the Council, when he attempted to castigate
Ethiopia and the United States for "destroying" Somalia.
Stating that Ethiopia needed to withdraw troops soon from
Somalia, Amb. Farah said Benin was ready to contribute two
battalions to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM),
and that Nigeria had provided USD 2 million to AMISOM. The
TFG will propose that the AU PSC endorse a six-month
extension of AMISOM's mandate to December 2006. On the
political front, Farah asserted that Somalia's
long-anticipated National Reconciliation Conference would
begin July 15, albeit "slowly," but criticized TFG leadership
for disproportionate appointments of ethnic Darood and weak
commitment to transition in 2009. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) On July 7, visiting AF DAS James Swan, accompanied by
Ambassador and A/DCM, met with TFG Ambassador Abdulkarim
Farah. Farah had just returned from the semi-annual AU
Summit in Accra, and was due to travel with TFG Prime
Minister Ghedi to Jeddah for a visit with Saudi King
Abdullah. According to Farah, Ghedi would seek direct
financial assistance for the TFG from Saudi Arabia; Riyadh's

previous interest in hosting a meeting on Somali
reconciliation, and its engagement of Council of Islamic
Courts (CIC) representatives, were other possible topics.
Commenting on the AU Summit, Farah said that while Senegalese
President Wade had backed Libya's Qadhafi, South African
President Mbeki had joined with Ethiopian PM Meles and
Ugandan President Museveni to urge a slow approach to African
political integration; the compromise declaration adopted
highlighted the need for economic harmonization, with
political integration as an ultimate goal, Farah said.

-------------- --------------
MINISTERS REJECT SOMALILAND MOTION; REBUT ERITREA
-------------- --------------


3. (C) Amb. Farah reviewed discussions on Somalia among the
AU Council of Ministers in Accra. At the conclusion of
prolonged deliberations on unrelated topics, the Ghanaian
Foreign Minister had unexpectedly introduced a motion to
establish a ministerial committee to examine Somaliland
issues and to report to the next AU Summit in January 2008,
Farah said. Farah had objected, observing that while peace
in Somaliland was encouraging, establishing such a committee
risked setting a precedent for Puntland, Jubaland, and
possible future entities, while challenging Somalia's
sovereignty. As Somalia's Transitional Charter had called
for a weak federal government and strong regional government,
Somaliland could be an entity in accordance with such an
arrangement.


4. (C) Farah said AU ministers unanimously opposed Ghana's
pro-Somaliland motion. South Africa had supported the TFG's
objection, noting that Somaliland had hired a consulting firm
that the South African government had accused of organizing
secessionist meetings. Kenya, as chair of IGAD, had argued
that the issue should be raised first at the regional level,
prior to the AU Council of Ministers, and that the motion
risked "sabotaging" the TFG. Even Egypt had argued for
respecting Somalia's sovereignty, Farah said.


5. (C) According to Farah, the only reference to the United

ADDIS ABAB 00002185 002 OF 003


States arose when Eritrea's Foreign Minister had complained
at the AU ministerial that Ethiopia and the United States
were "destroying the life of Somalia." The Eritrean FM was
then denied the floor, when AU legal advisors agreed with
Farah's point of order that Eritrea was under sanction (due
to arrears),and therefore should not be recognized. Farah
had responded that there was not a single U.S. soldier in
Somalia, and that only Eritrea was destabilizing the country,
by shipping arms to Somalia and by harboring terrorists.
Somalia was participating in the global war on terrorism,
while Eritrea was providing safehaven. Ethiopian FM Seyoum
had also rebutted Eritrea, Farah added.

--------------
BENIN, BURUNDI, NIGERIA AMONG TCCS FOR AMISOM
--------------


6. (C) The TFG did not seek to discuss extending AMISOM's
mandate at the recently concluded AU Summit, Farah said.
Instead, Farah said he planned to propose to Nigeria (holding
the monthly chair of the AU Peace and Security Council) that
the AU PSC endorse a six-month extension of AMISOM's mandate
to December 2006. TFG PM Ghedi had sought only a two-month
extension, assuming that a July 18 UNSC meeting on Somalia
indicated the UN would soon assume control of the operation.
Citing the recent UNSC PRST, Swan said the USG had
consistently called for UN planning on Somalia, but agreed
that two months was too short for the UN to assume control:
logistical and administrative preparations, identification of
TCCs for a force that UN DPKO has indicated would number
approximately 20,000 troops, and a UNSCR mandate for a UN
operation would be needed. Moreover, a short extension of
AMISOM, particularly if coupled with another postponement of
the National Reconciliation Congress, could signal lack of
progress in Somalia.


7. (C) Ethiopian troops now needed to withdraw from Somalia,
Farah said. Potential troop-contributing countries (TCCs)
for AMISOM included Benin, Burundi, Ghana, and Nigeria, who
had no objection to immediate deployment. According to
Farah, Benin had complained that the TFG had not consulted
its government earlier, but was now ready to deploy two
battalions after completing final training. (COMMENT: We
have not heard previously of this purported commitment from
Benin and are verifying Farah's report. END COMMENT.)
Burundi only awaited logistics support and equipment (some of
which had been provided by France) to deploy French-trained
troops, and could deploy within two weeks, if provided
strategic lift. Nigeria's president had said his defense
minister would approve deployment, but was awaiting the
formation of a new government; Nigeria had also provided USD
2 million to the AU to support AMISOM.


8. (C) Swan noted that the USG has some funding available for
equipping TCCs. Deploying AMISOM or even UN troops
alone-whQe important--would be insufficient to assure
security in Somalia, Swan added. Seeking a political
solution was the necessary element, as was training and
improving the capabilities of TFG forces (through Ugandan,
Ethiopian, or Tanzanian trainers). Farah questioned why the
USG did not provide direct support to the TFG police and
military, choosing instead to use third parties; Swan replied
that the USG recognized the importance of improving TFG
security forces but sought to have the AU and neighboring
African governments play the leading role.

-------------- --------------
DAROOD APPOINTMENTS DISCOURAGE HAWIYE; 2009 ELECTIONS KEY
-------------- --------------


9. (C) On internal Somali political issues, Farah asserted
that the National Reconciliation Congress (NRC) would finally
proceed on July 15, albeit "slowly." Farah underscored his
personal commitment to forming a viable Somali government,
citing his three years of service as TFG PermRep, despite a
recent USD 5 million bounty on his head by the CIC. Farah

ADDIS ABAB 00002185 003 OF 003


complained that the TFG leadership's inability to formulate
policy was a "serious problem," citing power struggles among
President Yusuf, Prime Minister Ghedi, and Parliamentary
Speaker Sheikh Adan Mohamed Nurr. Yusuf's Majertain sub-clan
and Marehan sub-clan members were struggling with each other
in Kismayo, he added. Yusuf was likely too old to be a
candidate for office in 2009, but had suggested extending the
TFG's mandate beyond 2009. Citing the need for a multi-party
system, Farah said such an extension would be "political
suicide." PM Ghedi may seek to delay the current political
process in order to position himself better for 2009
elections, Farah said. High illiteracy among MPs made it
difficult to identify a suitable ministerial candidate from
Parliament; the Transitional Federal Charter's requirement
that cabinet ministers be selected from MPs also discouraged
Somali professionals from the diaspora from participating in
the TFG.


10. (C) Disproportionate appointments of members of President
Yusuf's Darood clan discouraged the Hawiye clan, Farah said;
the first five generals appointed were Darood, as were 21 of
34 ambassadorial appointments that would soon be announced
(including key appointments to Addis Ababa, Washington, the
League of Arab States, Brussels, and London). (NOTE: Farah
said he was slated to transfer to South Africa, but that
Ethiopian PM Meles and FM Seyoum had approached Yusuf about
his remaining in Addis. The TFG would likely seek agrement
soon for a Darod appointee to Washington, he added. END
NOTE.) PM Ghedi was not supported by his own Hawiye clan,
nor did he have the full confidence of President Yusuf.
While pressure on the TFG had led to Hawiye being appointed
as National Police Commander and as Governor of Benadir, they
were former warlords, Farah said. Farah expressed
appreciation for USG support of the TFG, as well as for
pressure on the TFG to promote inclusiveness. Swan responded
that failure to accommodate disaffected Hawiye, via the NRC
or another mechanism, risked driving them to seek other
alternatives, such as supporting Somali dissidents in Asmara
or those condoning violent attacks.


11. (C) Farah noted that three distinct groups were united in
their opposition to the TFG but were driven by different
interests:
-- Some Hawiye/Habr-Gedir/Ayr with business interests in
illicit trade or occupied properties were "not interested at
all" in the NRC or in establishing a Somali government.
-- Others (including some in the Ayr sub-clan) had a genuine
interest in power-sharing, and needed to be encouraged by the
TFG. The Ayr community would be represented in
power-sharing, Farah said.
-- Former CIC leaders such as Adan Hashi Ayro and Sheikh
Hassan Dahir Aweys were extremists who supported Usama
bin-Laden and Al-Qaida. The Somali people would not allow
them to return to Somalia to form a political party, Farah
said; instead, they would support their own clan leaders.

Farah agreed that the TFG would make little progress until it
focused on engaging political leaders, rather than stressing
the "social reconciliation" favored by PM Ghedi. A "sensible
political program" needed to be discussed along with the NRC,
to include a census and establishment of a national electoral
commission for 2009 elections. Those who asserted they were
alternatives to the TFG needed to campaign for that, Farah
said.


12. (C) COMMENT. As Somalia's PermRep to the African Union
(and Ambassador to Ethiopia),Amb. Farah has been one of the
most visible proponents of the TFG, as well as of Ethiopia's
military intervention in Somalia. His frank comments on
internal divisions within TFG leadership, and on the
disproportionate nature of TFG appointments, echo those made
in earlier meetings with USG officials (reftel). END COMMENT.


13. (U) AF DAS Swan cleared this cable.
YAMAMOTO