Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07ADDISABABA207
2007-01-24 14:38:00
SECRET
Embassy Addis Ababa
Cable title:  

ETHIOPIA: USG ASSISTANCE NEEDED TO MEET BURDEN OF

Tags:  EAID PREL MASS KDEM ET SO 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO7017
PP RUEHDE RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHDS #0207/01 0241438
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 241438Z JAN 07 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4217
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNSOM/SOMALIA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ADDIS ABABA 000207 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF/FO AND AF/E
LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHER
CJTF-HOA FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/24/2017
TAGS: EAID PREL MASS KDEM ET SO
SUBJECT: ETHIOPIA: USG ASSISTANCE NEEDED TO MEET BURDEN OF
WAR

REF: A. ADDIS ABABA 115 (NOTAL)

B. ADDIS ABABA 105 (NOTAL)

C. ADDIS ABABA 80

D. ADDIS ABABA 40

Classified By: AMBASSADOR DONALD YAMAMOTO. REASON: 1.4 (B),(D).

FOR AF A/S FRAZER FROM AMBASSADOR YAMAMOTO.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ADDIS ABABA 000207

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF/FO AND AF/E
LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHER
CJTF-HOA FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/24/2017
TAGS: EAID PREL MASS KDEM ET SO
SUBJECT: ETHIOPIA: USG ASSISTANCE NEEDED TO MEET BURDEN OF
WAR

REF: A. ADDIS ABABA 115 (NOTAL)

B. ADDIS ABABA 105 (NOTAL)

C. ADDIS ABABA 80

D. ADDIS ABABA 40

Classified By: AMBASSADOR DONALD YAMAMOTO. REASON: 1.4 (B),(D).

FOR AF A/S FRAZER FROM AMBASSADOR YAMAMOTO.


1. (S/NF) SUMMARY. Ethiopia's announcement that it will
begin withdrawing troops from Somalia highlight the GOE's
assessment that it has largely met its strategic objectives.
While active engagement by the USG and others in the
international community will be required to mobilize and
support an IGASOM deterrent force to replace the departing
Ethiopian forces (ENDF),USG assistance is also critical to
enable the Ethiopian government to address serious domestic
challenges: 20 per cent inflation, chronic unemployment, and
food insecurity affecting urban as well as rural poor. In
addition to continuing robust security cooperation and
intelligence-sharing with the GOE, the USG must help advance
Ethiopia's political and economic reform: leveraging the
latitude for policy reform that Ethiopia's military success
in Somalia has afforded Prime Minister Meles within his
ruling TPLF party, and building on recent progress the GOE
has made toward WTO accession. A positive response to the
Prime Minister's request for food aid would not only
alleviate food insecurity but also help advance political and
economic reform, by allowing highly conservative TPLF
supporters to ease their tight grip on food reserves, thus
lowering consumer prices. Training and material support for
the ENDF would also underscore our support for further
developing Ethiopia's role in international peacekeeping,
currently the world's sixth-largest troop contributor to UN
peacekeeping. This would entail expanding our meager FMF
(USD 2.4 million) and IMET (USD 600,000) to accommodate DOD
efforts to support the ENDF,s priorities of C-130 aircraft
maintenance and training. END SUMMARY.


2. (S/NF) The feeling among many Ethiopians, and shared

within the GOE, is that Ethiopia is bearing a heavy burden
for Somalia and paying the cost in terms of casualties. For
the general populace, the concern is, "Why Somalia?" The
bigger concern is domestic issues: a 20 per cent rise in
food and fuel costs; unemployment; and the plight of the
urban and rural poor.


3. (S/NF) The GOE is deeply sensitive to outside criticism,
from conditioning assistance to progress indicators on human
rights and political reform under the Smith-Payne bill, to
possible U.S. action against Ethiopia in response to the
military importation of 3 million Euros worth of spare parts
from North Korea (ref B) for their old Soviet-style factories
producing critical military supplies for the war effort in
Somalia.


4. (S/NF) The Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF)
continues military operations against extremist elements,
with U.S. guidance and intelligence support. Cooperation
remains strong, and our intelligence-sharing relationship is
robust. While the ENDF has redeployed to Kismayo and other
centers, it is clear that the war effort is too expensive for
the ENDF to remain constantly deployed in the field. There
are also concerns that they are becoming targets of Somali
attacks. The ENDF is tough and has a high threshold of pain
to meet military objectives. Many ENDF casualties were
preventable, but with limited helicopter support focused on
operations, the wounded were being carried by truck to the
backlines, a hard and arduous trip, which meant a higher
death rate for wounded. The ENDF consistently asked us for
helicopter lift in the early stages of the war.


5. (S/NF) In numerous discussions with PM Meles, both in
private and in company with visitors, the PM has remained
consistent on his themes that Ethiopia's actions in Somalia
will bring peace and stability to the region. While the
Council of Islamic Courts (CIC) has been disbanded and
extremist elements weakened, Meles looks to the international
community to follow-up with IGASOM and, more important, to
assist in helping stabilize and develop Somalia. Concerns

ADDIS ABAB 00000207 002 OF 002


remain that extremists will make their way to Mogadishu, but
senior Ethiopian leaders note that the rest of Somalia is
relatively stable and that the extremists have been weakened.
In recent consultations, senior GOE officials downplay the
likelihood of a robust insurgency emerging in Mogadishu in
the near term. (NOTE: While PM Meles had urged TFG President
Yusuf to delay the impeachment of TFG Parliamentary Speaker
Sharif Hassan Sheikh Adan, GOE leadership consider it
unacceptable for former leaders of the CIC to participate on
an equal basis with TFG principals in any national dialogue
on Somalia. The GOE views the TFG as the only acceptable
entity to push for national reconciliation. In this context,
PM Meles has pushed the TFG hard to engage other clan
leaders, especially representatives of the
Hawiye/Habr-Gedir/Ayr sub-clan, in addition to Hawiye clan
leaders. END NOTE.)

-------------- --------------
SUCCESS IN SOMALIA PROVIDES POLITICAL SPACE AT HOME
-------------- --------------


6. (S/NF) The unexpected success in neutralizing the CIC has
given the PM political space within his own ruling TPLF party
to address the more pressing and critical problem of
political reform. We are close to a deal that would see the
release of the primary opposition leaders, who have now been
political detainees for over 14 months. Political
reform--from parliamentary and electoral board reforms, to
media openness--are making progress, albeit slowly. Economic
reform will also be slow, but steady. The Prime Minister has
committed his government to accession to the WTO, which
should eventually force the TPLF away from monopolistic
holdings to a more open private-sector-led growth.


7. (S/NF) What does Meles want? He and the Ethiopian
leadership welcome international support to create a new
order in Somalia. While critics will argue that Ethiopia
wants a weak and divided Somalia, this is clearly "old
think". Meles and his government see a stable and friendly
government in Somalia, or at least not a sponsor of
extremism, as more important. The experience and the high
cost of operations in Somalia underscore for the GOE the need
for international commitment to stabilize and develop
Somalia.

-------------- --
ETHIOPIA SEEKS FOOD AID AND SECURITY ASSISTANCE
-------------- --


8. (S/NF) Meles also would welcome more public
acknowledgement of things he is doing right, rather than what
he feels is an overly critical view of his government. A
statement of acknowledgement from us at the highest level
once the detainees are released would help support Meles,
policy and give him room to maneuver within the TPLF.
Putting to rest the Smith-Payne bill on Ethiopia would also
add much to ease Meles, sensitivities.


9. (S/NF) The Prime Minister's request for food aid for the
urban poor (ref A) would help him in the urban areas, but,
more importantly, would help push his highly conservative
TPLF supporters to ease their tight grip on food reserves.
This will help bring consumer prices down, already hitting 20
per cent increases this year. Training and materials for
the ENDF would also underscore our support. This would
entail expanding our meager FMF (USD 2.4 million) and IMET
(USD 600,000) to accommodate DOD efforts to support the
ENDF,s priorities of C-130 aircraft maintenance and training.


10. (S/NF) What we get: These efforts will also help us
dialogue more constructively with the Prime Minister on human
rights and political reform, which in the end will help
strengthen Ethiopia's political structure and strengthen our
relationship. He would be more receptive knowing that we
have helped him loosen the reigns of the TPLF, and we will
benefit by persuading Meles and his government to be more
open to reform and human rights.
YAMAMOTO