Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07ADDISABABA18
2007-01-04 07:09:00
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Embassy Addis Ababa
Cable title:  

ETHIOPIA: PM MELES REPORTS TO PARLIAMENT ON

Tags:  MOPS PREL PGOV PTER SO ET 
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DE RUEHDS #0018/01 0040709
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O 040709Z JAN 07
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3919
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
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RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 ADDIS ABABA 000018 

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

NAIROBI FOR AF A/S FRAZER AND DAS SWAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/03/2017
TAGS: MOPS PREL PGOV PTER SO ET
SUBJECT: ETHIOPIA: PM MELES REPORTS TO PARLIAMENT ON
SUCCESSFUL SOMALIA OPERATION

REF: ADDIS 3115

Classified By: A/DCM Kevin Sullivan for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 ADDIS ABABA 000018

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

NAIROBI FOR AF A/S FRAZER AND DAS SWAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/03/2017
TAGS: MOPS PREL PGOV PTER SO ET
SUBJECT: ETHIOPIA: PM MELES REPORTS TO PARLIAMENT ON
SUCCESSFUL SOMALIA OPERATION

REF: ADDIS 3115

Classified By: A/DCM Kevin Sullivan for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).


1. (SBU) SUMMARY: PM Meles told the Ethiopian Parliament
Jan. 2 that Ethiopian military forces, along with TFG and
Puntland militias, had defeated and dispersed Council of
Islamic Courts (CIC) extremists. He highlighted the warm
welcome and full cooperation Ethiopian forces had received
from Somali clan elders and much of the Somali population.
Meles said that the GOE's ability to distinguish between
enemies and friends in Somali had been key to its success
both in winning the conflict and in minimizing civilian
casualties. Ethiopia planned to continue its pursuit of
fleeing CIC leaders near Ras Kamboni in Somalia. The GOE had
also succeeded on the diplomatic front, where the
international community -- including the African Union and
UNSC -- had largely accepted the rationale for Ethiopian
intervention. Meles indicated that the GOE would work with
the TFG to establish security in the coming weeks, but hoped
to begin a military pullout from Somalia as soon as possible.
The PM underscored the urgency of deploying an international
peacekeeping mission to support stabilization. He minimized
the CIC's prospects for successfully prosecuting a guerrilla
insurgency without the support of clan elders. Ethiopian
opposition leaders, most of whom had voted against
authorizing the war, reacted cautiously to the speech but
generally welcomed the military victory. Meles called the
opposition's "no" votes "a historic mistake" but expressed
willingness to continue engaging opposition leaders. He took
pleasure in explaining the numerous ways in which dark
predictions from international experts had been proven wrong.
A resolution congratulating the Ethiopian military and the
TFG, and thanking the international community for support,
will be put to a vote on Jan. 4. COMMENT: The GOE's decisive
military victory sends a strong message to those who believed

confronting the CIC might be a fatal mistake for the EPRDF.
The opposition's lukewarm reaction to the military victory
reflects continuing distrust of the GOE, rather than sympathy
for the CIC. End Summary.


2. (SBU) PM Meles Zenawi gave an upbeat report January 2
concerning the Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF)
successful military intervention in Somalia. Nearly all MPs
as well as many diplomats and media reps attended the
session. The PM's report followed up on a Nov. 23 appearance
before Parliament in which he had sought authorization to use
"any means necessary" to counter the threat of the Council of
Islamic Courts in Somalia (Ref A).

--------------
REMOVING A THORN, CLEARING WAY FOR PEACE
--------------


3. (SBU) PM Meles told MPs that after exhausting all
possibility of resolving the conflict with the CIC through
negotiations, including last ditch attempts in Djibouti and
Dubai in December, and after the CIC had initiated a
two-front offensive against the TFG and Puntland authorities,
the ENDF had launched a military counter-offensive against
the CIC. Meles declared triumphantly that "we have routed
the forces that stuck to our back like a thorn, removing it
in good time (before it caused significant damage) with a
proportional response. Our major aim was protecting
ourselves, but we also envisioned supporting Somalis' desire
for peace. In the end we made a decisive contribution and
have created the best of opportunities for peace and
stability in Somalia." The PM noted that the GOE had neither
requested nor received any assistance from other governments
for its operation.

-------------- ---
SOMALIS WELCOME ENDF TROOPS, AID IN REMOVING CIC
-------------- ---


4. (SBU) One of the recurrent themes of Meles' remarks was
that both Somali elders and ordinary people had welcomed the
ENDF and TFG with open arms and had actually assisted in
rooting out remaining CIC fighters and locating weapons
caches. He explained that ENDF units had avoided entering
towns in order to avoid civilian casualties and

ADDIS ABAB 00000018 002 OF 005


confrontations. Meles reported that clan-based militia had
dispersed as soon as the defeat of the CIC became evident,
and the ENDF had not pursued them. The Prime Minister
emphasized that the key to Ethiopia's victory had been its
reliance on information from allies in Somali, and the GOE's
ability to distinguish friends from foes. Once isolated,
then CIC's extremist leadership had fled, first to Mogadishu,
then to Kismayo and eventually to the remote area around Ras
Kamboni. The PM highlighted the efforts of Somali elders in
facilitating the ouster of the CIC and the peaceful entry of
TFG forces into key towns of Jowhar, Mogadishu and Kismayo.
Although Ethiopian commanders had not intended to enter the
Somali capital, a committee of 15 elders from Mogadishu
insisted that ENDF/TFG forces enter the city in order to
bring looting under control and reestablish public security.
Elders from Kismayo had also met the ENDF outside the town in
order to welcome and escort them peacefully into the urban
area. In each case, elders and ENDF commanders had agreed on
where ENDF troops would encamp. After pausing operations in
honor of the Muslim holiday of Eid al Atah, the ENDF was now
pursuing CIC extremists in the area of Ras Kamboni. The PM
heartily congratulated and thanked the ENDF as well as the
TFG militia for their successful campaign.

--------------
AU, INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY SUPPORTIVE
--------------


5. (SBU) Meles also highlighted the GOE's success on making
the case for its intervention to the international community.
He expressed particular appreciation to the African Union
for its strong support of Ethiopia's right to self-defense.
He argued that the AU's call for the ENDF to leave Somalia
expeditiously was fully in accordance with the GOE's
intentions. The PM noted that efforts at the UN to issue a
PRST condemning Ethiopia's action had been defeated. Meles
indicated that the GOE had sent two separate diplomatic
missions to Arab Gulf states to explain Ethiopia's
intentions. The one major exception to the general support
for Ethiopia in the international community was Eritrea.
When questioned subsequently about support from the United
States for the intervention in Somalia, Meles replied that a
senior US military officer (note: referring to CENTCOM
Commander Gen. Abizaid) had visited Addis shortly before the
operation commenced and warned that entering a quagmire in
Somali could divide Ethiopians. The PM added that no foreign
government had told the GOE to "go and fight," and none had
offered a penny to support the operation.

--------------
PUNDITS GOT IT ALL WRONG
--------------


6. (SBU) Meles took considerable pleasure in pointing out a
number of key areas where the predictions of international
"experts" on Somalia had proven to be wrong. Among the
mistaken assumptions he cited were that Somalia would prove
to be a "quagmire" for the ENDF, and that Somalis were by
nature "blood enemies" of Ethiopians and would fiercely
resist any Ethiopian incursion. Many analysts believed that
two previous wars between Somalia and Ethiopia had been
between the respective peoples, when in fact they were
conflicts between the respective governments. In fact, Meles
said, events had shown that Ethiopians and Somalis were
brothers who shared important bonds. In addition, Ethiopians
of Somali descent had already been given a right to
self-determination and most were willing to fight alongside
their fellow Ethiopians against the CIC.


7. (SBU) Another fallacy promoted by international pundits
was that the CIC had achieved widespread popular support and
was therefore invincible. According to Meles, these experts
had failed to see that following their successful efforts to
establish improved security in Mogadishu, the CIC extremists
had imposed Taliban-like rules that alienated the population.
Furthermore, the CIC did not adequately represent the
broader clan structure in Somalia society. As a result, the
CIC collapsed even faster than it rose to power. Experts had
also sought to pit "Christian Ethiopia" against "Muslim
Somalia," overlooking the fact that the ENDF, like Ethiopia,
was made up of Muslims as well as Christians. The real war,

ADDIS ABAB 00000018 003 OF 005


Meles said, was between those who espoused extremism and
those who believed in religious tolerance. The PM declared
proudly that the military campaign had "broken the back of
the extremists."


8. (SBU) The final misperception that Meles highlighted was
the belief that "war would consume the Horn of Africa" if
Ethiopia intervened in Somalia. The key assumption of this
assessment, the PM said, was that Eritrea would join the
fight once the GOE was engaged with the CIC. In fact, Meles
said, the Eritrean government was only prepared to fight
"until the last drop of Somali blood." Even when Eritrea's
own troops were routed and forced to flee, the GSE had not
lifted a finger to help them. Most Somalis, for their part,
were not prepared to fight to realize the GSE's objective of
destabilizing Ethiopia.

--------------
ENDF HOPES TO WITHDRAW WITHIN WEEKS
--------------


10. (SBU) While trumpeting Ethiopian military successes,
Meles admitted that "durable peace has not yet been achieved"
and that the threat of suicide terrorist attacks remained.
Meles pledged to keep a close watch on the "forces of
destruction," since peace in Somalia could only be achieved
when Somalis negotiated among themselves without foreign
interference. Nonetheless, the PM made clear that the ENDF
could not stay in Somalia for the long-term, primarily due to
resource constraints. He hoped that Ethiopian forces could
be withdrawn within a few weeks, but made clear that he would
not allow a gap in guaranteeing security. "We will not let
the hyenas eat" the TFG, he said. The GOE would assist the
TFG in steadily increasing its capacity to establish
effective control in the areas it had taken over, and would
continue to provide training to TFG forces even after
withdrawing ENDF combat forces. Meles also called for the
deployment of a peacekeeping force consistent with UN and AU
resolutions as well as the provision of international
humanitarian assistance in Somalia. He said Ethiopia could
carry an "appropriate burden," but that others with more
resources were also concerned about the future of Somalia.
He also noted the upcoming visits of Ugandan President
Museveni and "a senior US official responsible for Africa"
(note: referring to A/S Frazer).


11. (SBU) Meles downplayed the risk of a widespread CIC
insurgency, saying that guerrilla warfare in Somalia is only
possible if clan leaders supported it. The TFG's job is win
support from clan elders for its agenda. This was
essentially a political issue, rather than military. The PM
pledged not to interfere in negotiations over key government
posts, nor those over the status of Somaliland or Puntland.
The GOE would offer no directives, just support for the
process.

--------------
MIXED REACTION AMONG OPPOSITION LEADERS
--------------


12. (C) Ethiopian opposition leaders generally voted against
or abstained on the ruling party's November resolution
authorizing the use of any means necessary against the CIC.
During the January 2 session, most found themselves in the
uncomfortable position of welcoming the military victory
against extremists without giving too much credit to the GOE.
Beyene Petros of the UEDF had the most difficulty, admitting
that "many would think we made a mistake on the Somali
issue." He claimed he had never doubted the ENDF's
capability and was relieved by the campaign's outcome, but
predicted that the CIC would not give up its efforts. He,
along with other opposition leaders, asked for an accounting
of "the price paid in money and lives" for the victory.
Temesgen Zewde of the CUDP was more positive, expressing
great happiness at the ENDF's military success and
recognizing that the dangers he feared had not materialized.
He urged the GOE to bring troops home as soon as possible and
fully engage the international community, since "terrorism
cannot be fought alone" by Ethiopia. Bulcha Demeksa of the
Oromo-based OFDM asked the PM pointedly whether any hard
evidence had been uncovered that the Oromo Liberation Front

ADDIS ABAB 00000018 004 OF 005


(OLF) and Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) had really
been fighting alongside the CIC. PM Meles subsequently
replied that both ONLF and OLF had fought the ENDF in
Bendayle, near Puntland. Some of these insurgents had been
killed, while others were fleeing toward Ras Kamboni with the
CIC leadership. Some ONLF fighters had simply blended back
into the Somali population.

-------------- -
MELES: OPPOSITION TO WAR "A HISTORIC MISTAKE"
-------------- -


13. (SBU) Though he had held his fire in his initial
presentation, PM Meles called the opposition's failure to
support the November resolution on Somalia "a historic
mistake." Recalling opposition leaders' refusal to accept
language referring to the OLF and ONLF in the resolution, he
criticized their failure to defend Ethiopia's constitutional
order while taking advantage of its freedoms. Nonetheless,
he took a considerably more conciliatory line than other
ruling party MPs who chided opposition leaders for welcoming
the military victory they would not support beforehand. "We
are happy to celebrate our victory together with them," he
concluded, and added that he would continue engaging with
opposition leaders despite their lack of support on Somalia.
He urged opposition parties to learn from their mistakes,
which he said was the true measure of any organization.


14. (SBU) The ruling coalition introduced a new resolution to
express appreciation and congratulations to the ENDF and the
TFG militia for their successful campaign, thank the
international community for its support and reiterate key
Ethiopian positions with respect to Somalia contained in the
PM's report. Opposition MPs objected, however, arguing that
they had no opportunity to review the resolution prior to the
session. PM Meles agreed to postpone the vote until Jan. 4
to permit a more thorough review.

--------------
THE "AWEYS" IN ASMARA MISCALCULATES AGAIN
--------------


15. (SBU) A ruling party MP asked the PM what should be done
about Eritrea's ceaseless efforts to destabilize Ethiopia,
which appeared to be "the source of all our problems." Meles
replied that the people of Eritrea were not enemies of
Ethiopia. Even Eritrea's armed forces were not really
enemies, but rather had no choice but to follow orders. The
problem in Eritrea was simply the "Aweys-like figure" in
Asmara (note: referring to President Isaias.) Meles said
that the GSE plan was to use Somalia to weaken Ethiopia "to
the point of death, then strike the final blow." He added
that elements of the leadership of the CUD, the OLF and
others cooperated in this effort, which was ultimately
unsuccessful. Meles remarked that the Eritrean government
had been prone to miscalculations, and this was simply one
more. He nonetheless promised to continue the "search for
peace through dialogue" with the GSE.

-------------- --------------
COMMENT: TRIUMPHANT MELES BATTLES DISTRUST AT HOME
-------------- --------------


16. (C) The GOE's decisive military victory in Somalia sends
a strong message for those, both inside and outside Ethiopia,
who believed that confronting the CIC might reveal be a fatal
mistake for the EPRDF. In spite of continuing doubts about
morale and loyalty in the ENDF, the ruling party was able to
direct a successful military campaign against a determined
adversary. Meles used the Parliamentary session to drive
home this message to Eritrean President Isaias as well as to
opposition leaders in the Diaspora, while showing somewhat
more magnanimity to opponents in Parliament. He also sought
to dispel any concerns in the international community that
Ethiopia intended to stay indefinitely in Somalia.


17. (C) While domestic opposition parties have no sympathy
for religious extremists in Somalia, they also do not wish to
position themselves too close to the ruling party. They
suspect that the GOE was using its war in Somalia to justify
a broader military campaign against domestic insurgencies

ADDIS ABAB 00000018 005 OF 005


like the OLF and ONLF, whom most government opponents believe
must be brought into the political system through
negotiations. Opposition leaders are also responding to
public opinion in Ethiopia, where widespread distrust of the
GOE encourages many to believe that PM Meles undertook
operations in Somalia to win continued political support from
the United States.
WILGUS