Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07ADDISABABA1558
2007-05-23 07:24:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Addis Ababa
Cable title:  

ETHIOPIA: MELES TELLS ADMIRAL FALLON "TIDE HAS

Tags:  PREL MOPS PTER ET SO ER 
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VZCZCXRO3562
PP RUEHDE RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHDS #1558/01 1430724
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 230724Z MAY 07
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6242
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNSOM/SOMALIA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA PRIORITY
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 001558 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF A/S FRAZER AND AF/E
LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHER
CJTF-HOA AND USCENTCOM FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/23/2017
TAGS: PREL MOPS PTER ET SO ER
SUBJECT: ETHIOPIA: MELES TELLS ADMIRAL FALLON "TIDE HAS
TURNED" IN SOMALIA

REF: ADDIS ABABA 1534 (NOTAL)

Classified By: POL/ECON COUNSELOR KEVIN K. SULLIVAN. REASON: 1.4 (b) a
nd (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 001558

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF A/S FRAZER AND AF/E
LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHER
CJTF-HOA AND USCENTCOM FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/23/2017
TAGS: PREL MOPS PTER ET SO ER
SUBJECT: ETHIOPIA: MELES TELLS ADMIRAL FALLON "TIDE HAS
TURNED" IN SOMALIA

REF: ADDIS ABABA 1534 (NOTAL)

Classified By: POL/ECON COUNSELOR KEVIN K. SULLIVAN. REASON: 1.4 (b) a
nd (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY. PM Meles told visiting CENTCOM Commander
Admiral William J. Fallon on May 11 that after a "second
round" of fighting in Somalia in mid-April, the "tide had
turned" against "jihadist insurgents" and in favor of the
Transitional Federal Government (TFG). Meles acknowledged
that the GOE had been overly optimistic initially about the
commitment to peace of some Hawiye sub-clans. He argued that
those same sub-clans had miscalculated the military
situation, expecting that a rapid Ethiopian pull-out would
allow them to intimidate African Union Mission in Somalia
(AMISOM) peacekeepers. Following the successful
Ethiopian-led effort to drive insurgents from Mogadishu,
however, all clan leaders, according to Meles, now recognize
that backing the insurgency will not get them what they want.
To bolster his contention, Meles said that civilians in the
Somali capital have begun to point out mines and arms caches
to Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) and AMISOM troops.
Furthermore, formerly reluctant clan leaders have now asked
that some 700-800 of their militia be integrated into the
national police and armed forces. Insurgents, meanwhile have
retreated to the marshy area around Ras Komboni and to remote
areas in north central Somalia, where they can do less
damage. Meles hoped that Ethiopia could withdraw most of its
troops from Somalia following the upcoming national
reconciliation conference, but said he would keep the ENDF
vigilant from just across the border. The Prime Minister
thanked Admiral Fallon for the "first-rate" intelligence
shared with the ENDF during both phases of the battle in
Somalia and asked that such cooperation continue, along with
more military assistance for capacity building and equipment.
He expressed stark pessimism about prospects for improving

relations with Eritrea, but firmly downplayed any Ethiopian
intention to initiate a full-scale war. Meles also urged
that the USG not hastily abandon Iraq; he expressed concern
about the consequences for Ethiopia of further instability in
the Gulf, as well as a potential "explosion" in Sudan in the
coming years. END SUMMARY.


2. (SBU) CENTCOM Commander, Admiral William J. Fallon;
CJTF-HOA Commander Rear Admiral James Hart; and Ambassador
Yamamoto called on Prime Minister Meles May 11. CENTCOM
staff members, DATT and Pol/Econ Counselor (note-taker) also
participated in the meeting, along with the Prime Minister's
Advisor Gebretensai Gebremichael.

-------------- --------------
MISCALCULATIONS FORCE SECOND ROUND OF FIGHTING IN SOMALIA
-------------- --------------


3. (C) After welcoming Admiral Fallon, the Prime Minister
briefed him on the situation in Somalia. He claimed that the
ENDF's recent offensive in Mogadishu drove most insurgents
from the capital to shelters in remote areas in the southwest
of the country, near their traditional base in the marshes of
Ras Komboni, and in north central Somalia, near the Ethiopian
border. While terrorist cells still existed, he claimed that
the insurgency's military structure had been broken. This
successful "second round" in the Somalia conflict had now
created an opportunity to consolidate peace.


4. (C) The second round had been necessary, Meles said,
because some Hawiye sub-clan leaders had made a military
miscalculation. They believed that since the Ethiopian
military was planning to pull out, the insurgents would be
able to intimidate African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)
peacekeepers and increase their power. They also assumed
that they would have a significant advantage fighting in the
urban setting of Mogadishu. The GOE had, for its part,
miscalculated the level of commitment among these leaders to
peaceful negotiations with the TFG. In fact, sub-clans who
had accumulated property in and around Mogadishu in the last
ten years remained concerned that they would lose it under
TFG rule, and had instead focused on weakening the TFG,

ADDIS ABAB 00001558 002 OF 003


rather than cooperating.

-------------- --------------
HAWIYE CLAN LEADERS NOW SEE NO ALTERNATIVE TO TALKS
-------------- --------------


5. (C) Following the military defeat of the insurgency in the
capital, leaders of the Hawiye had seen that their property
had suffered significant damage in the fighting, that there
was significant risk they would lose control of it, and that
their militia had suffered heavy losses. "The sub-clans
riding the jihadist horse are now convinced that it won't
take them where they want to go," Meles said. The Prime
Minister told Admiral Fallon that there were several clear
signs that Hawiye sub-clans had discarded their alliance with
extremist insurgents. One was that they had requested that
700-800 of their remaining militia be integrated into the
national police and armed forces. Another was that civilians
in the city were now pointing out arms caches to ENDF and
AMISOM patrols; only one landmine had exploded in recent
days, while 17 had been located and disarmed. Meles also
referred to positive meetings between the Hawiye elders and
the TFG in recent days, in which the former had received
assurances that there would be no restitution of "their"
property to the original owners, and that they would be
allowed to participate fully in the government along with
other clans. While the prime minister acknowledged that
there was much left to do, he stated confidently that "the
tide is turning" away from the insurgency and toward the TFG.


--------------
ENDF TO PULL OUT AFTER NRC, BUT STAY NEAR
--------------


6. (C) Admiral Fallon asked whether the TFG could provide the
strong leadership needed to stabilize Somalia. Meles
paused, then admitted that Somalia was so fractured that any
government would be forced to "make compromises every
day" in order to survive. There was as yet no social basis
for a truly strong government; nonetheless, the TFG could
provide improved stability and security and a reduction in
violence.


7. (C) Meles also told Admiral Fallon that he hoped to
withdraw most ENDF troops following the National
Reconciliation Conference (NRC). The GOE would continue to
assist in building the capacity of TFG military forces, and
would also try to counter the threat of insurgent activities
in north central Somalia from its own side of the border.
The Prime Minister noted that Mogadishu was only 100
kilometers from the Ethiopian border, making it possible for
the ENDF to remain a military factor in Somalia even while
based in Ethiopian territory, particularly if AMISOM could be
"beefed up." Admiral Fallon remarked that the PM was the
first person to express any real confidence to him about
prospects for peace and stability in Somalia.

--------------
PESSIMISM ON ERITREA, BUT WAR UNLIKELY
--------------


8. (C) When asked about Eritrea, Meles replied that President
Isaias remained bent on undermining Ethiopia by 1) unraveling
the Sanaa Forum for regional cooperation; and 2) supporting
both external and internal enemies of the GOE, including the
Somali insurgency and domestic rebel groups like the Oromo
Liberation Front (OLF) and the Ogaden National Liberation
Front (ONLF). The PM observed that Eritrea was often a
conduit for support coming from outside the Horn of Africa; a
number of other countries were involved, he said. The
Eritrean Government was confident that Ethiopia would not
respond militarily to the provocations that it was
conducting, and so it could comfortably continue this
campaign. While Ethiopia would have the upper hand in
full-scale war, the GOE had no desire to pursue this avenue.
Eritrea, for its part, did not have the means to wage war on
Ethiopia, Meles asserted.

ADDIS ABAB 00001558 003 OF 003




9. (C) Meles expressed pessimism about prospects for
mediation between the two countries, arguing that the
leadership in Asmara had based its legitimacy on
confrontation with Ethiopia. Furthermore, a number of senior
officials had been imprisoned for treason for allegedly
advocating negotiations with Ethiopia. Although he had
nurtured some hope for political reconciliation with Eritrea
until "quite recently," Meles said he had now concluded that
political conditions were not right for political dialogue
between the two countries.

--------------
MELES PRAISES COOPERATION, ASKS FOR MORE
--------------


10. (u) The Prime Minister praised the support and
cooperation the GOE had been receiving from the USG in fields
such as Parliamentary and judicial reform and police
training. We need more of the same, he said. Such
cooperation would help Ethiopia make progress on its top
priorities: alleviating poverty and achieving the UN
Millennium Development Goals.


11. (C) When Admiral Fallon asked about what help CJTF-HOA
could provide, the Prime Minister expressed his appreciation
for the intelligence-sharing HOA had provided during both
phases of the military campaign in Somalia. The ENDF could
not have accomplished its objectives in Somalia without this
assistance, he added. Meles urged that whatever changes were
implemented under the new structure of an U.S. Africa
Command, he hoped that "these benefits" would not be lost.
Admiral Fallon mentioned that he had earlier agreed with ENDF
Chief of General Staff (CHOD) Lieutenant General Samora Yonus
to undertake a complete review of U.S. military training and
capacity-building programs for the ENDF. The PM welcomed the
review and expressed particular interest in USG help with
ENDF "institutional arrangements and organization."

--------------
FUTURE THREATS FROM SUDAN AND GULF
--------------


12. (C) PM Meles expressed concern about two other security
threats facing Ethiopia. One came from the potential
unraveling of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between
north and south Sudan, which he said could lead to an
"explosion." The other threat stemmed from the evolution of
the situation in the Persian Gulf, where the tide might turn
in favor of fundamentalism and against Ethiopia. Meles said
that he had been following the debate in Washington
concerning the future of U.S. involvement in Iraq; he hoped
that domestic U.S. sentiment would not lead to a total
abandonment of the "struggle in the Gulf."


13. (C) Admiral Fallon said the level of sectarian killings
had declined measurably and security in substantial areas of
both Baghdad and Anbar Province had improved since the
"surge" of U.S. military personnel in Iraq. Local leaders in
Anbar and some areas of Baghdad were now turning against Al
Qaeda operatives. Suicide bombings remained one of the
greatest security challenges, Admiral Fallon concluded.


14. (C) At the end of this portion of the meeting with PM
Meles, Admiral Fallon and the Ambassador remained behind to
discuss a sensitive bilateral issue (reftel).


15. (U) Admiral William J. Fallon has reviewed this message.
YAMAMOTO