SOMALIA: AF DAS SWAN CONSULTATIONS WITH EU ENVOY

C O N F I D E N T I A L ADDIS ABABA 001549

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF AND AF/E
LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHER
CJTF-HOA AND USCENTCOM FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/22/2017
TAGS: PREL KISL ET SO
SUBJECT: SOMALIA: AF DAS SWAN CONSULTATIONS WITH EU ENVOY
JEAN-CHRISTOPHE BELLIARD

REF: A. ADDIS ABABA 1531

B. ADDIS ABABA 1457

C. NAIROBI 2098 (NOTAL)

Classified By: ERIC WONG, DEPUTY POL-ECON COUNSELOR. REASON: 1.4 (B) A
ND (D).


1. (C) SUMMARY. On May 11, Jean-Christophe Belliard,
Personal Envoy for Somalia of EU High Representative for
Foreign and Defense Policy Javier Solana, informed visiting
AF DAS Jim Swan and Special Envoy to Somalia-designate
Ambassador John Yates of recent consultations held separately
with Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles and with former Council
of Islamic Courts Consultative Committee Chairman Sheikh
Hassan Dahir Aweys. According to Belliard, Meles believed
that Transitional Federal Government of Somalia (TFG)
President Abdullahi Yusuf was committed to political
engagement of Somali leaders from Hawiye sub-clans, but that
TFG Prime Minister Ghedi lacked the necessary political
skills to foster support among his own Hawiye clan. Belliard
said Meles strongly objected to the possible participation in
the upcoming National Reconciliation Conference of Sheikh
Hassan Dahir Aweys, Adan Hashi Ayro, al-Itihaad al-Islamiya
(AIAI) leader Hassan Abdullah Hersi al-Turki, and hard-core
al-Shabaab elements of the CIC. In contrast, however, the
League of Arab States and Egypt were actively promoting
political engagement with Aweys, who remained in Somalia.
Belliard commented that within the EU, Italy exercised the de
facto lead on Somalia issues, just as the UK did on Sudan,
and that EC Development Commissioner Louis Michel was a "free
agent." END SUMMARY.


2. (C) DAS Swan reviewed the aims of his consultations with
GOE officials (ref B),and the need to urge Yusuf to take
concrete actions within the next 10-14 days to further
political accommodation of Hawiye clan leaders prior to the
upcoming June 14 National Reconciliation Conference (NRC).
The approach to Yusuf was intended to reinforce messages
delivered earlier during AF A/S Frazer's meeting with Yusuf
in Baidoa. The GOE agreed that Somali reconciliation
required a political solution but could push harder, Swan
said, noting that while the GOE had initiated its own talks
with Hawiye leaders, it had defended the recent appointment
of warlords (ref B). Amb. Yates observed that interlocutors
from the Somali "Horn Afrique" broadcasting company
considered Hawiye leaders involved in talks with the TFG to
be representative of the Hawiye.


3. (C) The issue of property rights (especially for
Hawiye/Habr-Gedir/Ayr sub-clan members who had occupied
property formerly belonging to others) could be addressed as
part of a longer-term process during the transition, Swan
said. Belliard responded that the Habr-Gedir sub-clan had
been a "spoiler" for the last decade; its clan structure
comprised numerous elders but no clear leader, Belliard said.
Belliard noted that while Yusuf was a member of the Darod
clan, he hailed from Somalia's Mudug region were the
Hawiye/Habr-Gedir sub-clan had been dominant, and therefore
should have some understanding of Habr-Gedir dynamics.

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MELES BACKS TFG PRESIDENT YUSUF, BUT NOT PM GHEDI
-------------- --------------


4. (C) Belliard discussed his two-hour-long meeting on
Somalia and Eritrea earlier in the day with Ethiopian Prime
Minister Meles Zenawi. Belliard said Meles assessed that TFG
President Yusuf was committed to the "4.5" formula of Somali
representation (i.e., Darod, Dir, Hawiye, and Rahanweyne,
with the remainder held by minority constituencies),and that
Yusuf was actively engaging Hawiye and Hawiye/Habr-Gedir/Ayr
clan leaders in political consultations. In contrast, Meles
had complained that TFG Prime Minister Ali Mohammed Ghedi
"has not delivered" and lacked any political following; if
the upcoming NRC aimed to provide new leadership, Ghedi was
not the appropriate individual.


5. (C) While the TFG had accepted the "4.5" formula, it was
necessary to identify the appropriate representatives,
Belliard said. He agreed that PM Ghedi lacked necessary
political skills, and that one of Ghedi's key advisors was a
French veterinarian, Daniel Bourzat, whom Ghedi had

befriended when he too had been a professional veterinarian.
Ghedi had written to the President of France proposing that
Bourzat be named French ambassador to Somalia, Belliard
added, but Bourzat was not qualified. Nevertheless, France
continued to fund Bourzat. Belliard said he recognized how
Ghedi found it politically expedient to appoint Mohamed Dhere
as mayor of Mogadishu, as Dhere had delivered security in
Jowhar, but that Dhere had to be replaced.


6. (C) Belliard said Meles strongly objected to the possible
participation in the NRC of former Council of Islamic Courts
(CIC) Consultative Committee Chairman Sheikh Hassan Dahir
Aweys, Adan Hashi Ayro, al-Itihaad al-Islamiya (AIAI) leader
Hassan Abdullah Hersi al-Turki, and hard-core al-Shabaab
elements of the CIC. Belliard commented that "Meles'
red-line is Aweys." Meles had underscored that the CIC had
been defeated, but that Aweys had others continually sought
to re-open the political process, which was now unacceptable.
Meles did not consider CIC representatives in Asmara
representative of the Somali people, Belliard added. On the
other hand, according to Belliard, Meles did not object to
former CIC security chief Sheikh Yusuf Mohamed Siad
Indho-Adde participating in the NRC.

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ARAB LEAGUE BACKING FORMER CIC LEADER SHEIKH AWEYS
-------------- --------------


7. (C) Belliard noted that the League of Arab States was not
only in contact with Aweys, but was also (with Egypt)
actively promoting political engagement with Aweys, who was
not a member of the al-Shabaab but influenced them. Belliard
related that within minutes of concluding a meeting with
League of Arab States representatives, he had received a
phone call from Aweys, who was in Somalia. During their
telcon in Arabic, Aweys had objected to the presence of both
Ethiopian troops and African Union Mission in Somalia
(AMISOM) forces, considering them to be equivalent, but
welcomed the Jeddah initiative (i.e., the initiative adopted
by the Arab League Summit in Riyadh to "boost the national
reconciliation process in Somalia in conformity with the
national reconciliation plan of the TFG", as referenced by
the April 13 IGAD ministerial communique). Arab states
sought to arrange a meeting or political process between the
TFG and Aweys (and others),Belliard said. Belliard said he
planned to meet the Saudi ambassador in Nairobi, to discuss
whether Saudi Arabia could deliver CIC moderates or provide
financial assistance to AMISOM.


8. (C) Amb. Yates observed that the International Contact
Group on Somalia would meet soon to discuss the inclusion of
Egypt and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) as
members; Canada, the Netherlands, and South Africa also
wanted to join. Belliard responded that the Contact Group
should be kept small; if the OIC, Egypt, and others were
allowed to join, why not include Ethiopia? According to
Belliard, Meles had asserted that Egypt was using the Somalia
issue to counter Ethiopia because of tensions over disputed
Nile water resources.


9. (C) Commenting on other external actors seeking to play a
role in Somalia, Belliard said that he planned to meet with
AU Commission Chairperson Alpha Oumar Konare, who had
participated in the Arab League Summit. Within the EU,
Belliard said Italy took the de facto lead on Somalia issues,
just as the UK did on Sudan, while EC Commissioner for
Development and Humanitarian Aid Louis Michel was "a free
agent." Special Representative of the UN SYG (SRSG) for
Somalia, Francois Fall, had been extended for one year. DAS
Swan observed that neither the AU Special Envoy Mohamed Ali
Foum nor UN SRSG Fall had been as active on Somalia as they
should be.


10. (C) On Eritrea, Belliard said that PM Meles had not
objected to EC Commissioner Michel meeting with Eritrean
President Isaias, but did object to Michel's public remarks
welcoming Isaias as a partner, especially given Eritrea's
destabilizing role in Somalia. Belliard said he believed
that Michel did raise Somalia with Isaias privately, but not
Eritrea's internal situation. Eritrea was an "absolutist
state," Belliard said, and Isaias had "not delivered" on
eastern Sudan (despite harboring Sudanese rebels in Asmara).

DAS Swan noted that in terms of addressing Ethiopia-Eritrea
border tensions, the U.S. was now taking the approach of
letting other parties who had better relations with Isaias
engage him.


11. (C) COMMENT. Jean-Christophe Belliard's observations
highlight his active consultations on Somalia with PM Meles
and others, as well the divergence of views (e.g., on the
role of Ethiopia and Eritrea in Somalia) between EU High
Representative Solana and the more outspoken EC Commissioner
Louis Michel. PM Meles's remark that Egypt uses differences
in Somalia policy to counter Ethiopia may explain, to some
degree, the AU's limited role in fostering political
engagement of Somali actors, as both Ethiopia and Sudan are
members of the AU's 15-member Peace and Security Council (AU
PSC). Meles' support for TFG President Yusuf, but criticism
of TFG Prime Minister Ghedi, is consistent with the GOE
non-paper subsequently presented on May 15 to Ambassador
Yates (ref A) and Ethiopian State Minister for Foreign
Affairs Tekeda Alemu's observation that except for Yusuf,
there were no "sacred cows" among the TFG leadership. END
COMMENT.


12. (U) AF DAS Swan cleared this cable.
YAMAMOTO