SOMALIA: ETHIOPIAN STATE MINISTER TEKEDA DISCUSSES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 001531

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF AND AF/E
LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHER
CJTF-HOA FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/17/2017
TAGS: PREL MOPS KPKO SO ET
SUBJECT: SOMALIA: ETHIOPIAN STATE MINISTER TEKEDA DISCUSSES
HAWIYE ENGAGEMENT WITH SPECIAL ENVOY-DESIGNATE YATES

REF: A. ADDIS ABABA 1500

B. ADDIS ABABA 1457

C. ADDIS ABABA 1349

Classified By: ERIC WONG, DEPUTY POL-ECON COUNSELOR. REASON: 1.4 (B) A
ND (D).


1. (C) SUMMARY. In a follow-up to May 11 consultations with
AF DAS Swan, State Minister for Foreign Affairs Tekeda
presented a GOE non-paper on May 15 to visiting Ambassador
John Yates and Ambassador, expressing Ethiopia's shared
concerns about the need for Transitional Federal Government
of Somalia (TFG) President Abdullahi Yusuf to address
concerns of the Hawiye clan. Tekeda highlighted property
rights, particularly the disposition of Somali government
buildings currently occupied by the Hawiye, as a key
political challenge. Engagement of the Somali diaspora, as
well as expediting the deployment of AU peacekeeping forces
to allow Ethiopia's military withdrawal, were other
priorities, according to Tekeda. GOE officials highlighted
ongoing political activities by Hawiye sub-clans, including
meetings among Murosade and Duduble elders, and noted that
President Yusuf had met recently with the Suleiman sub-clan.
Tekeda reiterated criticism of the role Egypt and the EU
sought to play in Somalia, attributing Egyptian actions to
tensions with Ethiopia over Nile water resources. END
SUMMARY.


2. (C) On May 15, visiting Counselor for Somali Affairs Amb.
John Yates, Ambassador, and deputy pol-econ counselor
(note-taker) met with Ethiopia's State Minister for Foreign
Affairs Takeda Alemu and Acting Chief of the Minister's
Cabinet Abdeta Dribssa to follow up on May 11 consultations
led by AF DAS Jim Swan (ref B). Minister Tekeda presented a
GOE non-paper (forwarded to AF/E and Embassy Nairobi) which
he said provided a general roadmap for approaching Yusuf
about enhancing political accommodation of the Hawiye clan.
Tekeda stressed that Yusuf and other TFG leaders needed to
address this challenge as soon as possible, "while they are
still in the driver's seat," as "the status quo, no matter
the veneer of the current relative stability, cannot be
sustained." As highlighted in its non-paper, the GOE
believed that no TFG official except Yusuf should be immune
from replacement. There should be "no sacred cows" except
President Yusuf, Tekeda said; all TFG officials should be "at
the mercy" of the deliberations of the upcoming National
Reconciliation Conference (NRC). Tekeda reiterated that the
TFG had to address all grievances and be guided by the
principle of "winning friends." Immediate action by the TFG,
prior to the convening of the NRC, was imperative.


3. (C) Minister Tekeda cautioned, however, that even as
Ethiopia and the U.S. sought to exert maximum pressure on the
TFG, one needed to be wary of undermining the TFG. Noting
that the GOE had been "brutally frank" in its consultations
with the TFG in Addis Ababa and Mogadishu, Tekeda recommended
that the U.S.-GOE approach Yusuf privately, in order to avoid
both "grandstanding" and inadvertently assisting parties
seeking to undermine the TFG. Tekeda highlighted Eritrea's
support for the Council of Islamic Courts (CIC) as "totally
outrageous and unacceptable," but noted that other countries
were engaged in activities "less spectacular but equally
damaging."


4. (C) Tekeda noted that Foreign Minister Seyoum had met
earlier with both Hawiye/Habr-Gedir/Ayr leaders in Mogadishu,
and with Yusuf prior to traveling in April to Washington. FM
Seyoum intended to meet Yusuf again as soon as possible at a
venue to be determined, Tekeda said. Amb. Yates responded
that meeting in Mogadishu would be difficult for the USG.
Yates underscored Somalia's need for a political solution
within the next two to three weeks, to avoid having
al-Shabaab elements reorganize. Unless the Hawiye Leadership
Council was able to demonstrate its ability to deliver to
Hawiye constituents, the council risking fracturing, Yates
said.

-------------- --------------
PRIORITIES: PROPERTY RIGHTS, DIASPORA, ETHIOPIAN WITHDRAWAL
-------------- --------------

ADDIS ABAB 00001531 002 OF 003




5. (C) Tekeda highlighted the primacy of addressing Hawiye
grievances about property rights, which had motivated much of
the fighting in Mogadishu by the CIC's al-Shabaab. The
disposition of government buildings, including ministries now
physically occupied by the Hawiye, was a key concern. It was
also critical to incorporate the Somali diaspora, to
demonstrate the TFG was a Somali government, not one
dominated solely by the Darod/Majerteen. Finally, Tekeda
stressed that the Ethiopian military needed to withdraw from
Somalia as soon as possible. Aluding to the GOE's own
extensive contacts with Hawiye leaders, Tekeda attributed
Ethiopia's military success in Somalia to political outreach.
Ethiopia's withdrawal would help encourage the return of
diaspora, but a small hard-line "vitriolic" minority would
always remain opposed to the TFG and Ethiopian engagement.
Referring to foreign fighters from Europe and other countries
who had been captured in Somalia, Tekeda noted the irony of
CIC combatants coming from democratic countries and "creating
havoc" in the Horn of Africa.


6. (C) Tekeda chastised the paucity of African troop
contributing countries (TCC) willing to deploy forces in
support of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM),
noting that Ethiopia had contributed peacekeepers to both
Liberia and Burundi even though neither was in Ethiopia's
subregion. Any African TCC with capacity should contribute
to AMISOM, he said.

--------------
POLITICAL FOCUS MUST BE ON HAWIYE SUB-CLANS
--------------


7. (C) The problem of political accommodation now needed to
be addressed at the level of sub-clans, Tekeda said. Even
within TFG President Yusuf's Darod clan, building support
among the Darod/Merehan sub-clan was critical, or else
"Kismayo could explode," Tekeda warned. Tekeda observed that
U.S. references to "Hawiye" did not reflect the complexity of
the situation in Mogadishu, as sub-clans of the Hawiye were
now politically engaged with the TFG. Amb. Yates agreed that
some Hawiye/Habr-Gedir/Ayr leaders looked forward to working
on a political solution for Somalia.


8. (C) Chef de Cabinet Abdeta asserted that there were few
grievances about power-sharing among Hawiye/Abgal (with the
exception of the sub-clan of a Council of Islamic Courts
financier),who generally viewed the TFG as a partner. Other
Hawiye sub-clans, however, sought to assert legitimate
property rights over property gained illegitimately. Thus,
grievances by the Hawiye/Habr-Gedir/Ayr,
Hawiye/Habr-Gedir/Suleiman, and Hawiye/Murosade were seen by
many Somalis as claims for new rights by "outsiders," Abdeta
said. On the other hand, some Hawiye sub-clans viewed
Yusuf's statements as provocative. Yusuf faced the challenge
of maintaining support among his own constituency, while
addressing Hawiye sub-clan grievances without encouraging
spoilers. According to Abdeta, daily sitreps from Ethiopian
officials in Somalia showed that "force is no longer in
play," and that the political process was now key. Despite
attempted looting of WHO facilities the previous day, the
general situation in Somalia had improved.


9. (C) Abdeta reported that several Hawiye sub-clans had
recently held separate meetings to consolidate sub-clan
positions in anticipation of further talks with the TFG:
-- Some 70 representatives of the Hawiye/Habr-Gedir/Suleiman
sub-clan (including government ministers, MPs, elders, and
intellectuals) had met recently with President Yusuf and
argued for greater political representation within the TFG.
The Suleiman had nevertheless declared that they recognized
the TFG as the legitimate government of Somalia, and pledged
to surrender arms and militia.
-- Some 60 members of Mohamed Afrah Qanyare's Hawiye/Murosade
sub-clan had held an internal meeting to identify issues to
be presented to Yusuf upon his return this week from Uganda.
-- Similarly, the Hawiye/Duduble sub-clan were expected to
conclude an internal meeting on May 15. Discussion topics
included disavowing any responsibility for attacks that
occurred during the May 14 visit of UN U/SYG for Humanitarian

ADDIS ABAB 00001531 003 OF 003


Affairs Holmes, and protesting the TFG's detention of Duduble
sub-clan members suspected of involvement in the attacks.

--------------
DISTRUST OF SAUDI ARABIA, EGYPT, EU
--------------


10. (C) While better to engage than isolate Egypt, Tekeda
observed "their hearts will never be with us fully." It
should have been in Egypt's interest to stop hard-core CIC
elements, but tensions with Ethiopia over Nile water
resources prevailed. "What they tell us is not consonant
with they tell others," he added. As 85 per cent of the
Nile's water came from Ethiopia, Egypt sought "to keep
Ethiopia off-balance," fearing that as Ethiopia developed
economically, Ethiopia would require more water resources.
Nevertheless, Tekeda said, Ethiopia sought a "win-win"
relationship with Egypt, as it ultimately did not want to
undermine President Mubarak.


11. (C) Tekeda expressed optimism that it was easier to
engage Saudi Arabia, which sought to play a more pro-active
role in Somalia, but cautioned that one could not rule out
the threat of Wahhabist influence. Similarly, support from
the European Union was key (e.g., maintaining the EU's
financial support of the TFG parliament),but "personal
grandstanding" by EC Development Commissioner Louis Michel
had been damaging.


12. (C) COMMENT. This was the second of three meetings (refs
A-B) since May 11 with State Minister Tekeda to discuss a
joint GOE-U.S. approach to TFG President Yusuf. The GOE's
May 15 non-paper (forwarded to AF/E and Embassy Nairobi) does
not propose specific language to present to Yusuf, but echoes
Minister Tekeda's observations outlined above and reflects
that the GOE shares U.S. concerns that immediate steps must
be taken by the TFG to improve political engagement of Hawiye
sub-clans, in advance of the National Reconciliation
Conference in June. END COMMENT.


13. (U) Embassy Nairobi cleared this cable.
YAMAMOTO