Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07ADDISABABA1309
2007-04-27 12:24:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Addis Ababa
Cable title:  

ETHIOPIA: SCENESETTER FOR VISIT OF USARCENT

Tags:  PREL PGOV EAID MASS KDEM ET ER SO 
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VZCZCXRO9362
PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHDS #1309/01 1171224
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 271224Z APR 07
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5882
INFO RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 ADDIS ABABA 001309 

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF AND AF/E
LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHER
CJTF-HOA AND USCCENTCOM FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/26/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV EAID MASS KDEM ET ER SO
SUBJECT: ETHIOPIA: SCENESETTER FOR VISIT OF USARCENT
COMMANDER LG WHITCOMB

REF: ADDIS ABABA 977 (NOTAL)

Classified By: AMBASSADOR DONALD YAMAMOTO. REASON: 1.4 (B) AND (D).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 ADDIS ABABA 001309

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF AND AF/E
LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHER
CJTF-HOA AND USCCENTCOM FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/26/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV EAID MASS KDEM ET ER SO
SUBJECT: ETHIOPIA: SCENESETTER FOR VISIT OF USARCENT
COMMANDER LG WHITCOMB

REF: ADDIS ABABA 977 (NOTAL)

Classified By: AMBASSADOR DONALD YAMAMOTO. REASON: 1.4 (B) AND (D).


1. (C) SUMMARY. U.S. engagement with Ethiopia focuses on the
objectives of bolstering democratic institutions and
processes and the protection of human rights; enhancing
regional security and fighting terrorism; and supporting
economic reform and development, breaking the cycle of food
insecurity and dependence on humanitarian assistance. The
GOE has made a commitment to liberalize Ethiopia's economy,
push forward democratic reforms, and cooperate with us on a
variety of initiatives. Ethiopia is our most strategic
partner in Africa in combating terrorism and promoting
regional stability. The USG and Ethiopia have formed a
strong partnership in eliminating extremism in Somalia and
re-establishing a central government for the first time in 16
years. Your visit will afford a valuable opportunity to
reinforce our bilateral cooperation. Our Mission has 150
direct hires and long-term contractors, and an additional 200
temporary staff assisting Ethiopia with pursuing our common
security goals in Somalia. END SUMMARY.

--------------
DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS
--------------


2. (U) May 2005 Elections: The campaign period prior to the
May 2005 elections was the most fair and open in Ethiopia's
history, and the opposition received significantly more
popular support in the election than ever before: winning
control of the Addis Ababa city administration, as well over
170 seats in the 547-seat parliament, up from 12 seats
previously. While some international observers, such as the
European Union, noted electoral irregularities, observers
from the Carter Center concluded that the majority of the
votes were cast in favor of the ruling Ethiopian People's

Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) coalition. Arguing
that the elections were stolen, however, leaders from the
Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD, the largest
opposition party) initially refused to take their seats, even
though other opposition parties decided to join the
Parliament and Regional Councils. Around 90 of the CUD's MPs
eventually later decided to take their seats in Parliament as
well, bringing the total opposition presence there to around

150.


3. (U) Political Crackdown: After boycotting elective
office, CUD leaders in October 2005 organized a civil
disobedience campaign that turned violent when confronted by
security forces. During demonstrations in June and November
2005, security forces opened fire on protesters killing 193
and injuring 763. The government arrested most of the CUD
leadership who refused to take their seats, closed a host of
opposition-oriented newspapers, and detained over 30,000
civilians incommunicado and without charge for two months.
All but a few hundred were eventually released. Authorities
charged 111 opposition leaders, journalists, and civil
society leaders, including CUD Chairman Hailu Shawel and
several U.S. citizen employees of Voice of America, with
capital crimes, ranging from treason and genocide to
"outrages against the Constitution." The Government later
dropped charges against the U.S. citizens, and dropped
treason and genocide charges against all defendants.
However, as of April 2007, approximately 50 of these
defendants remained in detention facing trial on other
capital charges.


4. (C) Evidence presented to date in the ongoing trial of
these political detainees, which is attended regularly by
U.S. Embassy officials, has failed to convince most
observers. The United States has continued to urge the
Ethiopian Government to drop the charges against these
individuals as the continuing trial represents a major
impediment to an inclusive process of democratization. The
USG has supported mediation efforts by Ethiopian elders to
broker the release of the CUD and other detainees in return
for their taking responsibility for seeking to overthrow the
GOE. No resolution has yet been achieved, but talks continue.

ADDIS ABAB 00001309 002 OF 005




5. (C) Moving Forward: Despite the trial, the U.S. and other
donors continue to facilitate an ongoing process of political
dialogue between the ruling party and opposition leaders of
the Coalition for Unity and Democracy Party (CUDP),the
United Ethiopian Democratic Forces (UEDF) party, and the
Oromo Federal Democratic Movement (OFDM) party, who have
taken their seats in Parliament. Party representatives,
supported by comparative studies funded by the U.S. and other
donors, have already revised Parliamentary rules of procedure
to make them better reflect international standards and to
accommodate a multi-party political environment. The
dialogue also reached agreement on many aspects of the
reorganization of the National Electoral Board. The U.S.
strategy since last year has been to work closely with the
opposition and government alike to strengthen the democratic
process. Apart from nurturing talks on institutional reform,
another challenge is convincing the EPRDF to reduce
harassment of opposition party activists in rural areas and
allow opposition offices to reopen. Progress on these issues
will be critical to successful local elections, currently
scheduled for late-2007.

--------------
REGIONAL STABILITY AND SECURITY
--------------


6. (U) In the wake of Ethiopia's successful military
intervention in Somalia in December 2006, Somalis are in a
position to rebuild their nation after 16 years as a "failed
state". Ethiopia launched the offensive after the extremist
Council of Islamic Courts (CIC) declared jihad against
Ethiopia and attacked Somalia's internationally- recognized
Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in the central Somali
town of Baidoa. The Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF)
soundly defeated the CIC and forced its members to flee their
base in Mogadishu. However, intense fighting against
remaining insurgents continues in Mogadishu.


7. (U) The USG has pledged USD 40 million in assistance to
the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and other
Somalia reconstruction efforts. The GOE has also been active
in urging the TFG to pursue broad-based national
reconciliation in Somalia to weaken support for the nascent
CIC-led insurgency and to consolidate TFG administration
throughout Somalia. A national reconciliation conference is
expected to be held in Mogadishu in June 2007, after having
been postponed from April.


8. (S/NF) The U.S. and Ethiopian Governments cooperated
closely in pursuing high-value targets (HVTs) from the East
Africa cell of Al-Qaida who fled toward the Kenyan border
following the collapse of their CIC protectors. Al-Qaida
operatives included some individuals who participated in the
1998 bombings of U.S. Embassies in Tanzania and Kenya. USG
public statements acknowledging attacks on HVTs in Somalia by
U.S. AC-130 gunships subsequently created some friction with
the GOE, however. The GOE told the USG that the news of the
attacks jeopardized the participation of other African
nations in AMISOM. The U.S. suspended strikes against the
HVTs, and, shortly thereafter, several countries announced
contributions to the force at the January 2007 African Union
Summit in Addis, including two battalions from the Uganda.
Nigeria and Burundi are also expected to contribute to the
force, and other countries are still evaluating
participation.


9. (U) Ethiopia-Eritrea: The Ethiopia-Eritrea war of
1998-2000 cost over 100,000 lives and ended in the Algiers
Peace Agreement, which established a 25km demilitarized
Temporary Security Zone (TSZ) in Eritrea; established a UN
peacekeeping operation (UNMEE) to monitor the TSZ, and an
independent Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC) to
render final and binding delimitation and demarcation
decisions laying out the legal border.


10. (C) Despite a border delimitation decision rendered in
April 2002, the parties have failed to allow demarcation.
Ethiopia has accepted the EEBC's border delimitation

ADDIS ABAB 00001309 003 OF 005


decision, but insists on dialogue with Eritrea about the
consequences of dividing villages and other issues before
allowing for demarcation. Eritrea insists on full
demarcation before considering dialogue. Intensive U.S.
diplomatic efforts in 2006 to break the impasse ultimately
failed. As physical demarcation of the border has not been
possible, the EEBC recently declared that it has "demarcated"
the border by coordinates, and has given both Ethiopia and
Eritrea until November 2007 to accept its decision.


11. (U) Since October 2005, Eritrea has restricted the
movement of UNMEE, including banning all aerial operations,
which has precluded UNMEE from adequately monitoring much of
the 600-mile border. Eritrea has also expelled UN
peacekeepers and military observers from Western countries;
USG MILOBs assigned to UNMEE currently serve on the Ethiopian
side of the border. In October 2006, Eritrea sent 1,500
troops and 15 tanks into the previously demilitarized TSZ in
the southwest.

--------------
COUNTER-INSURGENCY AND MIL-MIL COOPERATION
--------------


12. (C) Domestic Insurgencies: Insurgent activity in
Ethiopia has increased since the civil disturbances following
the May 2005 elections. The Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and
Ogadeni National Liberation Front (ONLF) respectively are
Oromo (40 percent of the Ethiopian population) and Somali (6
percent) nationalist movements which have taken up arms
against the Ethiopian government in response to perceived
ethnic marginalization. Both organizations are receiving
assistance from the Eritrean government as another front in
Eritrea's proxy war with Ethiopia. Over the past two years,
the OLF has dramatically stepped up civil disobedience
campaigns among students and has successfully infiltrated the
Ethiopian military; several Oromo senior military officers
and hundreds of soldiers have defected to the OLF.


13. (U) In May 2006, the OLF, ONLF, and the Ethiopian
People's Patriotic Front (EPPF) joined together with Diaspora
members of the CUD political opposition party to establish a
unified Alliance for Freedom and Democracy (AFD) calling for
a national conference to bring democracy to Ethiopia.
Despite the AFD's professed support for the constitution its
pledge of peace, member parties continue their armed struggle
against the government. The ONLF has claimed responsibility
for an April 2007 attack on a Chinese oil exploration
installation near Jijiga, in Ethiopia's Somali Region.
Approximately 200 insurgents attacked the site, killing 9
Chinese workers and nearly 80 local residents, and killing or
injuring an unknown number of Ethiopian troops guarding the
facility.


14. (C) CJTF-HOA: U.S. Central Command's Combined Joint Task
Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA),based in Djibouti, began
humanitarian work in Ethiopia's Ogaden in 2005, focusing on
water projects, clinics, and school construction for
Ethiopia's under-served ethnic-Somali population. In
mid-2006, however, the GOE asked CJTF-HOA to leave the Ogaden
region as it launched a large-scale assault on the ONLF. To
date, CJTF-HOA has not yet been allowed to resume
humanitarian and civil affairs activities in the region, but
it is working in the northern Somali Region (near Dire Dawa)
as well as the Afar Region (bordering Eritrea),and continues
to conduct military-to-military training.


15. (S/NF) In a March 2007 meeting with CJTF-HOA Commander
Admiral Hart (reftel),CHOD Lieutenant General Samora Yonus
identified Ethiopia's military priorities:
-- Air mobility is critical as a result of the conflict in
Somalia; Ethiopia requires USG assistance to repair two C-130
aircraft and provide additional cargo planes.
-- To promote the ENDF's professionalization, USG assistance
is needed for the newly established command and staff college
in Addis Ababa.
-- Samora requested that the USG close CJTF-HOA operating
bases in Bilate and Hurso, and possibly relocate to Dire Dawa
or Jijiga, so that they would not be co-located on ENDF bases.

ADDIS ABAB 00001309 004 OF 005




16. (U) IMET: Ethiopia receives IMET funds.
-- In FY05, Ethiopia received USD 514,000 and used it for
Professional Military Education (PME),to include Naval
Postgraduate School (NPS),Command and General Staff College
(CGSC),and USAF Squadron Officer's School. Ethiopia also
used FY05 funds for intelligence training, counter-terrorism
training, logistics courses, and English Language Training
(ELT) labs.
-- In FY06, Ethiopia received USD 589,000 and used it for
additional ELTs, CGSC, intelligence training, and military
law courses.
-- In FY07, ET received USD 650,000 and used it for two
students at CGSC, Air Command and Staff College, and
additional ELT support. In FY07, Ethiopia also received one
slot at the National Defense University funded by
counter-terrorism funds separate from IMET.
--Ethiopia is projected to receive USD 650,000 in FY08.


17. (U) FMF: Since FY03, Ethiopia has received USD 20.735
million in military assistance funds. The majority, roughly
two-thirds, has come from FMF, while the remainder came from
the East Africa Counter Terrorism Initiative (EACTI). Since
FY03, Ethiopia has used this money to buy equipment for its
counter-terrorism unit USD 800,000 to support the Ethiopian
Defense Command and Staff College (EDCSC) USD 2.1 million),
to support CJTF-HOA training at Hurso and Bilate USD 1
million),to 16 HMMWVs USD 1.8 million),to buy 300 tactical
VHF radios USD 5.5 million) and C-130 spare parts USD 2.4
million). Based upon the most recent FMF audit, Ethiopia has
USD 2.7 million in uncommitted FMF funds. In FY08, Ethiopia
is projected to receive USD 800,000 in FMF. It is hoped this
will be offset by FY07 and FY08 Section 1206 monies.


18. (U) EDCSC: The EDCSC began development in 2005, with the
assistance of the USG, using EACTI funds on an FMF case.
Classes started in the summer of 2006. The course is modeled
on the U.S. Army CGSC, incorporating air and ground
operations, and is currently taught by six USG contractors.
Support was promised by Addis Ababa DATT Office through 2010,
when ENDF would be capable of self-support. However, due to
increasing FMF budgets, contractor support will not be
feasible in the future. Courses of action are being
developed to utilize quality of contract instructors. All
contract instructors are retired U.S. Army and USAF officers,
with senior PME teaching experience. The ENDF's main concern
is that they lack current operational experience to
adequately teach the course material.


19. (U) C-130s: In 1996, the USG donated four C-130B
aircraft to Ethiopia. The first two were refurbished an
delivered in 1998. While the second two aircraft were being
overhauled, Ethiopia went to war with Eritrea, and, as a
result, the second set of planes was diverted to other
countries. Ethiopia signed an USD 11 million FMS case for
spare parts support, which they paid for with a combination
of FMF and national funds. Since 2002, Ethiopia has not
received any additional maintenance or technical support from
the USG, and, as a result, one of the aircraft fell into
disrepair and has not flown since 2002. In January 2007, a
technical team evaluated the entire ENDF C-130 program and
found excellent maintenance capabilities but a critical lack
of spare parts and maintenance equipment. The team estimates
that approximately USD 13-17 million is required to provide
all necessary parts, equipment, and training, to support the
aircraft for the next two years. This includes all necessary
work to make the second C-130B airworthy. In 2006, state-run
Ethiopian Airlines donated two Lockheed L-100-30s to the
ENDF. Both aircraft are in excellent condition, but only one
is currently flying. The second aircraft requires an
inspection to be performed by Ethiopian Airlines. All
proposed USG-assisted maintenance and supply programs will
support both types of aircraft.

--------------
ECONOMIC OVERVIEW
--------------


20. (U) Ethiopia remains one of the poorest countries in the

ADDIS ABAB 00001309 005 OF 005


world with a per capita GDP of roughly USD 100 While the
private sector is expanding, the state remains heavily
involved in most economic sectors, and parastatals and
party-affiliated companies continue to dominate trade and
industry, hampering full and free competition. In addition,
increasingly frequent cycles of drought, high population
growth, and inefficient agricultural markets all act as drags
on Ethiopia's economic development. Agriculture contributes
42 percent to the GDP and employs 80 percent of Ethiopia's 77
million people. Nearly all agricultural production is
rain-fed and small-scale, and thus vulnerable to drought.
Economic policies have been improving as the Ethiopian
government gradually sheds its Marxist past. The Government
recently submitted a long-delayed Memorandum of Foreign Trade
Regime (MFTR),an important step forward in the process of
WTO accession. According to World Bank data, GDP growth in
2005 was 8.7 percent. Greater economic liberalization,
including in key sectors such as telecommunications and
finance, and further reduction of population growth will be
critical to reducing poverty and increasing food security,
however.

--------------
DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE
--------------


21. (U) In collaboration with donors, the Ethiopian
government in January 2007 published its 2006-2010 "Plan for
Accelerated and Sustainable Development to End Poverty"
(PASDEP). PASDEP will also have a significant governance
component. In addition to continuing poverty reduction
strategies in areas such as human development, rural
development, capacity building, and food security, the new
development plan will increase commercialized agriculture,
promote greater private sector participation in the economy,
scale-up efforts to achieve the Millennium Development Goals,
and enhance decentralization of governance. Ethiopia has
increased primary education to over 70 percent coverage over
the last decade and has also adopted more effective policies
to promote family planning and combat HIV/AIDS.


22. (SBU) The United States provides both developmental and
humanitarian assistance to Ethiopia, though we do not provide
any direct budget support to the government. In FY2006, the
USG provided USD 150 million in food aid; roughly USD 80
million for health, education, and governance projects; as
well as USG120 million through the President's Emergency Plan
for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR). A major objective is to help the
Ethiopian government and people increase sources of rural
income through a "productive safety net" program so that they
will be less vulnerable to drought, disease, and famine. In
2006, USAID developed a new initiative meant to protect the
livelihoods of pastoralists in the Southern and Somali
regions. As a result of post-election events in Ethiopia,
donors providing direct budget support (including the World
Bank, European Commission, UK, and Canada) agreed to suspend
direct budget support. These funds have been reprogrammed
through a new program, the Protection of Basic Services
grant, which includes more targeted, tightly monitored aid at
the regional and district levels. The re-initiation of donor
support, including a USD600 million World Bank program, has
been a tremendous relief to the Ethiopian government and has
eased some of the financial crunch it was facing.


23. (SBU) The United States is coordinating closely with
other donors to strengthen democratic institutions such as
Parliament, the National Electoral Board of Ethiopia, the
media, and civil society, and to create political "space"
through dialogue among various actors and groups. Current
U.S. resources for this purpose total approximately USD10
million. Restoring public confidence in institutions and
dialogue will be essential to deepening democracy and
maintaining peace and stability at the heart of the Horn of
Africa.
YAMAMOTO