ETHIOPIA'S PLANS AND INTENTIONS FOR ERITREA

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 07 ADDIS ABABA 001275

SIPDIS

NOFORN
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DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/E, AND INR/AA
LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHER
CJTF-HOA FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/24/2032
TAGS: PINR PREL PINS PBTS ET ER XW
SUBJECT: ETHIOPIA'S PLANS AND INTENTIONS FOR ERITREA
(C-AL7-00598)

REF: A. STATE 47555 (NOTAL)


B. ASMARA 386 (NOTAL)

Classified By: AMBASSADOR DONALD YAMAMOTO. REASON: 1.4 (B) AND (D).


1. (U) Post responses are provided per ref A.


A. (S/NF) WHAT ARE ETHIOPIA'S PLANS AND INTENTIONS FOR
DEALING WITH ERITREAN PRESIDENT ISAIAS AND THE BORDER IMPASSE?

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PERCEPTIONS OF ERITREA
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2. (S/NF) Prime Minister Meles and the hard-core elements of
the ruling Tigrayan People's Liberation Front (TPLF) view
Eritrea as a state in collapse whose population, if supported
by the outside and encouraged by open internal dissension,
would revolt against Isaias. The Prime Minister and his
cabinet view going to war with the people of Eritrea as a
waste of limited resources that would achieve very little.
At this time, Meles opposes any war with Eritrea as a futile
effort with little benefits, distracting Ethiopia from more
pressing issues: Somalia and Sudan.


3. (S/NF) Dealing with President Isaias and the border
impasse are two distinct yet interrelated problems. Further,
how Ethiopia and its leadership view Isaias and Eritrea, two
separate issues, also influences how they will deal with
Isaias specifically and Eritrea generally. Perceptions by
Meles and his leadership, whether correct or not, have become
more emotional and more firmly negative toward Isaias, and
have shaped the approach, whether wise and logical or not,
that Ethiopia is taking towards Isaias.

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PERCEPTIONS OF ISAIAS
--------------


4. (S/NF) President Isaias is viewed by Meles and his
government as an extremely dangerous, hostile, and evil
individual whose sole goal is to make Eritrea the dominant
power in the Horn of Africa and to promote Isaias' role as
paramount leader in the region. Ethiopia stands in the way
of Isaias' desire for dominance in the region. Meles and the
TPLF leaders believe Isaias has no "death wish" but that
Isaias' self preservation does not merely mean survival, but
forcing others to make sacrifices, from enduring great
economic hardship to even the pain of death, to ensure
Eritrea's continued existence and eventual elevation of
Isaias as primus inter paris leader in the region. Meles and
others firmly believe that Isaias knows that he lacks the
military might to confront Ethiopia directly. Isaias'
strategy, Meles believes, is to attack Ethiopia by expanding
the battlefield to include destabilizing Somalia and using
Sudan to conduct attacks on western Ethiopia (e.g.,
Gambella); increasing tensions between Djibouti and Ethiopia
over use of the port of Djibouti, the main lifeline for
landlocked Ethiopia's access to the Red Sea; training
anti-Ethiopian rebels; supporting internal political
divisions in Ethiopia; planning terrorist attacks on public
areas and assassinations of Ethiopian leaders; and keeping
the international community off-balance to minimize criticism
and sanctions of Eritrea. In our conversations with Isaias
over the years, he has made it clear that any future conflict
with Ethiopia would be "war by other means" and not a direct
military battle of "interior lines" of both forces.

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DEALING WITH ISAIAS
--------------


5. (S/NF) Meles and his leadership believe that dealing with
Isaias directly or indirectly is dangerous and detracts from
more pressing and immediate challenges. For Meles and his
leadership, Ethiopia's national strategic interests lie in
stabilizing Somalia, eliminating extremist threats, and
establishing a government in Mogadishu that has wide clan
support and is closely aligned with Addis Ababa. The other

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threat is Sudan. As Meles deeply fears that an unstable
Sudan potentially poses a greater threat to Ethiopia's
security and to regional stability, he looks to the
international community to stabilize Sudan. Between these
two pressing and dangerous situations is Isaias. Isaias
hosts 30 different opposition groups, and his more effective
management of groups opposed to Ethiopia, in contrast to
Ethiopia's clumsy and ineffective efforts to support groups
antagonistic to Isaias, underscores Isaias' potential to add
to regional instability. Historically, Meles' approach was
to carefully keep Isaias in a "box" by strengthening
Ethiopian forces along the border, neutralizing Eritrea's
influence in Somalia, and increasing Eritrea's isolation in
the international community.


6. (S/NF) But now, Meles sees that this approach must be
modified to include more vocal criticism of Eritrea as a
"rogue state" sponsoring terrorism and seeking to destabilize
the region. The Foreign Ministry has pressed the
international community to openly criticize Eritrea, and
wants to introduce UN Security Council resolutions and
African Union Peace and Security Council (PSC) communiques
condemning Eritrea as a state sponsor of terrorism. Further,
Meles has elevated Eritrean opposition groups in Ethiopia,
designating GOE State Ministers, rather than office
directors, to deal with them. Meles is also carefully
working the Sanaa Forum and IGAD to increase pressure and
isolation of Eritrea: Eritrea's recent decision to suspend
participation in IGAD followed an April 13 IGAD Ministerial
communique endorsing Ethiopian actions in Somalia as "fully
consistent" with the region's goals. Meles has commented to
us that he is in a "bind". He does not want, nor can he
afford, to go to war with Eritrea, because it will divert
resources from the more important goal of stabilizing Somalia
for now and perhaps Sudan down the road. For now, Ethiopia
will not go to war with Isaias and will not take any
extraordinary measures to neutralize him, but expects the
international community to pressure Isaias on his
destabilizing activities. We have assured Meles that we
recognize Eritrea's unhelpful activities, but that Meles
should focus on our mutually shared efforts in Somalia:
providing force protection for AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)
troops, support for Somalia's Transitional Federal Government
(TFG),and security at the airport and seaport and for the
upcoming national reconciliation conference.

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BORDER IMPASSE
--------------


7. (S/NF) Despite occasional public statements to the
contrary, Meles and other GOE principals do not want the UN
Mission in Ethiopian and Eritrea (UNMEE) to go away, because
it serves as a useful tripwire, and its departure would
eliminate the last remnant of international community
commitment to avert war. Further, Meles views UNMEE as an
important element, if not necessarily an effective mechanism,
in tracking Eritrea's encroachment into the Temporary
Security Zone (TSZ) and serving as a challenge to Isaias who
has imposed numerous restrictions on UNMEE. Both the current
UNMEE Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General
(SRSG) and his predecessor have consistently hailed Ethiopian
cooperation with UNMEE, and the GOE's relative transparency
in declaring Ethiopian troop movements. Meles will maintain
a sizable force along the border but primarily in defensive
positions ready to repel Eritrean aggression. Meles believes
that resolution of the border conflict depends on addressing
the fundamental issues that divide both countries. Even
acceptance of a demarcated border would not end the dispute;
Meles believes that Isaias would only find another issue to
antagonize Ethiopia. Meles will continue to seek
international support for normalization talks, pointing to
the support by the Witnesses to the Algiers Agreement of 12
December 2000 (i.e., Algeria, the AU, EU, the United States,
and the UN; see S/2006/126 of February 2006) as a critical
condition to ensure the peaceful resolution of the border
dispute.


B. (S/NF) WHO ARE PRIME MINISTER MELES' MOST INFLUENTIAL

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ADVISORS AND WHAT ARE THEY TELLING HIM REGARDING THE BORDER?


8. (S/NF) After the assassination of his security chief,
Kinfe, and the 2001 firing of the CHOD, Lieutenant General
Gebretsadkhan Gebretensae, there are few who have the
intellectual depth to stand up to Meles' keen insights into
problems. Meles seeks advice from a wide variety of people
with divergent views, even antagonistic to his own, in order
to ensure that he fully understands all sides. He does not
want to be isolated or confined to one single approach.
Meles does not stand on protocol and readily invites visitors
to meet with him even after our Embassy would not normally
make such a request.


9. (S/NF) Meles is an avid reader, with books and reading
materials throughout his private home. He is deeply
inquisitive and constantly asks questions, verifying
information with a variety of sources. He has even called
the Ambassador in for private discussions on politics in the
U.S. Meles is also very interested in knowing people, who
they are, their background, and how they came to have certain
ideas and views. But of importance is that Meles constantly
challenges set views and policy ideas. The most revealing
insight into his flexibility and ability to change positions
was his November 2006 conversation with General Abizaid.
General Abizaid spoke of lessons learned in Iraq and the
importance of understanding your advisors and what goals were
to be achieved. He dissuaded Meles from targeting only
"technicals" as a waste of time and resources with little
benefit, and said that a comprehensive approach was
necessary. That conversation, and Meles' own propensity to
think differently, influenced Meles' approach to Somalia
during the initial stages of the conflict, and also the
approach in trying to stabilize Somalia. An avid scholar of
history, he looked at how other leaders faced challenges and
how they responded to crises of faith as well as security
threats. Interestingly, Isaias shares some of Meles' traits
(the same inquisitiveness),though perhaps not the
flexibility of thought that Meles so keenly possesses.


10. (S/NF) While National Intelligence and Security Service
(NISS) chief Getachew and CHOD Lieutenant General Samora
Yonus (General Tsadkhan's successor) formally head Ethiopia's
security services and military respectively, they are not
believed to be among PM Meles' closest advisors. Currently,
Meles' main advisors include: TPLF founding member Seyoum
Mesfin, who has served as Foreign Minister since 1991; Public
Relations Advisor (with rank of Minister) BEREKET Simon (AKA
Mebratu Gebrehiwot),a founder of the Amhara National
Democratic Movement (ANDM),the ethnic Amhara wing of the
ruling Ethiopia People's Revolutionary Democratic Front
(EPRDF),who also serves as EPRDF spokesman; and a number of
other TPLF/EPRDF members. But Meles is changing and moving
to new people. TPLF founding member Sebhat Nega's (AKA
Woldeselassie Nega) influence may be waning, while
London-based businessman Abdul Aldish's may be rising. The
old TPLF standard-bearers have argued that Meles stopped too
soon and should have gone to Asmara. Meles still believes
that would have been disastrous in terms of international
criticism and also the prospect of being bogged down in a
long guerrilla war with Eritrea. The new faces in the EPRDF
and TPLF leadership are technocrats with a vision for a new
prosperous Ethiopia, e.g., Health Minister Tewodros Adhanom.
For these advisors, the border is a distraction, drawing
energy and resources away from more important ventures.
Ultimately, however, Meles heeds his own counsel.


C. (S/NF) TO WHAT EXTENT HAS THE RECENT SUCCESS IN SOMALIA
INFLUENCED THE DECISION TO RENEW CONFLICT WITH ERITREA?


11. (S/NF) It is in the Ethiopian character to never dwell on
limited or temporary tactical military successes on the
battlefield. Rather, it is the final result which will
determine success. Citing Ethiopia's large ethnic Somali
population, shared contiguous border with Somalia, and a
delicate balance within Ethiopia between Orthodox
Christianity and Muslim ascendancy, Meles and the leadership
view stabilizing Somalia as a "critical" national security
interest but a work still in progress. The operation is

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expensive, has cost many lives, and the prospect of failure
increases the longer Ethiopian troops remain in Somalia and
the longer it takes the TFG to stabilize Mogadishu, the
center of gravity in the conflict in Somalia. Meles has
always made it clear that Ethiopia, the TFG, and the
international community have no more than six months to make
a significant impact on Somalia's future stability. If they
do not get the "formula" correct now, the prospect for
insurgent battles in Mogadishu, and for Somalia becoming an
even greater base for foreign extremists and homegrown
terrorists, will make Somalia even more destabilized and that
much harder to correct.


12. (S/NF) Tactical military successes in December 2006 and
January 2007 in Somalia may have forced some Eritrean
"advisors" out of Somalia, it has not stopped Eritrea's
efforts to continue to destabilize Somalia. The presence of
former Council of Islamic Court (CIC) members in Asmara, and
Isaias' support and hosting of conferences of groups opposed
to Ethiopia and the TFG, is a direct threat to stability in
Somalia. Further, while angered by the Eritrean "advisors"
who helped prepare CIC extremists for conflict with Ethiopia,
the Ethiopians are equally disappointed with the Kenyans, who
the Ethiopians believe allowed the fleeing Eritrean military
advisors to return to Asmara. Eritrea continues to be a
negative factor in Somalia, but Meles's approach is to
neutralize Eritrean influence, not to prepare for direct
conflict with Eritrea. He still expects the international
community to share the same goals of stability in Somalia,
and to believe that Eritrea is a threat to this end state.
Severe international criticism and cutting off Eritrea from
the outside remains Meles' current approach to Eritrea.


D. (S/NF) TO WHAT EXTENT HAS THE RECENT INCREASE IN ETHNIC
INSURGENT ACTIVITY NEAR THE BORDER INFLUENCED THE DECISION
TO RENEW CONFLICT WITH ERITREA?


13. (S/NF) Ethnic insurgent conflict has increased,
particularly in Ethiopia's Somali (Ogaden) and Oromiya
regions, which host the two main rebel groups, the Ogaden
National Liberation Front (ONLF) and the Oromo Liberation
Front (OLF). The GOE has been reportedly ruthless in
rounding up suspected supporters and fighters for these
groups, which has increased the tensions in these two areas.
Eritrea's support in providing military training and advice
has only fueled growing dissension between these groups and
the central government. While not viewed as controlling or
directing these groups, Eritrea's influence is significant.
Eritrea's demonstrated activities supporting the ONLF and OLF
is not, however, enough to trigger war plans against Eritrea
by Ethiopia. The approach by the GOE has been sharp and at
times brutal, in neutralizing anti-GOE elements as the best
way to minimize Eritrea's influence.


14. (S/NF) Our efforts to promote a comprehensive approach of
assistance and development have so far fallen on deaf ears.
Should tensions and conflict in Oromiya and Ogaden increase,
and if the GOE does not heed international approaches for
more engagement, there is the possibility of increasing blame
on Eritrea for Ethiopia's failed policy approach to these two
areas. But we doubt that this would be sufficient to launch
any attack on Eritrea. Ethiopia's problem remains one of
manpower and the inability to commit troops and resources to
multiple battlefronts. Somalia and internal dissent in
Ethiopia remain the focus for Meles. Another war over the
border would be impossible to handle.


E. (S/NF) TO WHAT EXTENT WILL ETHIOPIA LOOK TO THE U.S. FOR
INTELLIGENCE, MILITARY, FINANCIAL, AND OTHER SUPPORT BEFORE A
NEW CONFLICT?


15. (S/NF) If war were imminent with Eritrea, Ethiopia would
not/not look to the U.S. for assistance, primarily because
the U.S. is far too slow and has yet to fulfill normal
promises made to the GOE in response to simple requests such
as C-130 repair (seven years and still counting). Further,
the U.S. would not support any preparation by Ethiopia or
Eritrea for conflict. The primary source for Ethiopia would
be the same countries that helped Ethiopia in the last

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conflict with Eritrea: the Chinese can provide guns and
jeeps, the Israelis maintenance necessary, and Russia and
Ukraine would likely provide pilots and spare parts. Due to
their competitive pricing, North Korea can also be expected
to provide materiel to Ethiopia. The Ethiopian National
Defense Force (ENDF) is currently using unmanned aerial
vehicles (UAVs) of Israeli origin. But Ethiopia and Eritrea
have used the past seven years to restock their military
supplies and reposition troops, rendering any international
arms embargo useless.


16. (S/NF) Ethiopia does, however, want U.S. intelligence on
positioning of Eritrean forces along the border, an early
warning of imminent Eritrean attack, as well as information
on the extent of Eritrean support for the OLF and ONLF, and
activities in Somalia. They would also want information on
Eritrean operatives or elements supported by Eritrea planning
terrorist attacks in Addis or in other areas of Ethiopia.
Ethiopia would likely seek USG satellite imagery on Eritrea,
as it did on Somalia.


F. (S/NF) TO WHAT EXTENT ARE THE ETHIOPIANS CONCERNED ABOUT
INTERNATIONAL CRITICISM IF THEY INITIATIVE HOSTILITIES WITH
ERITREA AND HOW DOES THAT INFLUENCE THE WAR DECISION?


17. (S/NF) As underscored by Ethiopia's current intervention
in Somalia, international criticism (e.g., EU allegations of
suspected war crimes) will not sway Ethiopia's plans if Meles
assesses there is sufficient support in alternate
international fora or among key allies/donors. Ultimately,
Meles will do what he wants. It would be extremely important
for the U.S. to take the lead in unifying the Witnesses in
sending a consistent and very strong message that war is
unacceptable. No country can convey any different message.
More important, unlike the previous conflict, no country can
either provide support to, or undercut any arms embargo on,
both countries during a conflict. Those countries whose
nationals support either country must stand firmly and
vocally in opposing any assistance and should take action,
even if it proves to be ineffective, to prosecute their
nationals for violating the arms embargo. At the same time,
we need to be clear to Ethiopia that it plays an important
role in promoting regional peace and stability and that the
international community supports Ethiopia. Criticism without
expression of Ethiopia's value would only antagonize the
Meles government. For Eritrea, as well, the message of hope
for a more prosperous future for its people must also be
conveyed. Finally, the most compelling action we can take is
to cut off the money from the diaspora to both countries.
While probably ineffective in the short term and almost
impossible to implement, it would send a powerful message to
both countries that the consequence of war is financial
disaster. Meles and his government, as well as President
Isaias, clearly understand this point. During discussions,
the cutting off of diaspora funding was raised as one
consequence of renewed conflict. Isaias was furious and
Yemane Gebreab conveyed to us privately that this action
would be tantamount to a declaration of war. Since this hit
such a raw nerve, it was never mentioned again by the U.S.


G. (S/NF) TO WHAT EXTENT WILL ECONOMIC FACTORS INFLUENCE THE
DECISION TO GO TO WAR WITH ERITREA AND WHAT ARE THEY?


18. (S/NF) Eritrea alone could not inflict any economic
reasons for Ethiopia renewing conflict with Eritrea. Given
Eritrea's growing economic isolation, Ethiopian officials
assess that maintaining the status quo favors Ethiopia in the
long term. There must be two parallel and corresponding
conditions for Ethiopia to go to war for economic reasons.
First, as the eighth-lowest ranked country in the world,
according to the UN Human Development Index, Ethiopia remains
largely dependent on foreign donor assistance. Should the
U.S. and other donors decide to cut off or severely limit
assistance to Ethiopia specifically to punish Ethiopia on the
border and show that we clearly favor Eritrea, then Ethiopia
would reevaluate its relations with the outside world.
Second, international action alone, however, is not enough
for Ethiopia to go to war. What would be essential in
conjunction with any international action against Ethiopia

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would be Eritrean action to cut off Ethiopia's lifeline to
the Red Sea, the port of Djibouti. Losing port access is one
of landlocked Ethiopia's redlines. In actuality, making
Djibouti close operations to Ethiopia would require support
from the international community and would signal a clear
intent to isolate and sanction Ethiopia, and to hurt Ethiopia
economically. However, if Ethiopia assessed that Eritrea
were responsible, then this could trigger conflict.


H. (S/NF) HOW WILL THE ERITREA ETHIOPIA BORDER COMMISSION
(EEBC) DECISION TO REMOTELY DEMARCATE THE BORDER IN NOVEMBER
2007 CHANGE THE ETHIOPIAN DECISION TO GO TO WAR?


19. (S/NF) Like Eritrea, Ethiopia rejects the EEBC's
authority to demarcate the border by coordinates. Should the
EEBC decision be finalized but with no further action, this
would not precipitate renewed conflict with Eritrea.
However, should the international community determine that
the border is demarcated, and then impose sanctions and
economic restrictions specifically and primarily targeted
against Ethiopia without discussion or any effort to bring
both parties together, then Ethiopia would reevaluate its
position. If Eritrea then proceeds to move troops towards
Badme by force, with the consent or non-opposition of the
international community, then conflict would commence
immediately.


20. (S/NF) The EEBC decision potentially holds the greatest
threat to pushing the parties to renewed conflict. It goes
against their original guidance on physical demarcation, and
on discussion and agreement with the parties to bring both
sides to discuss and mutually agree on the placement of the
pillars. It also ignores the informal private discussions
with the EEBC by the Witnesses on measures to avoid conflict
and promote the parties dealing directly with each other on
areas of contention. In the rush by the EEBC to finalize the
demarcation by any means and conclude the EEBC's work, they
may be inadvertently sowing the seeds of dissension and
potential renewed conflict.


21. (S/NF) The international community, specifically the
Witnesses, must carefully coordinate a consistent and
unequivocal position with the U.N. Security Council and the
EEBC, that is conveyed clearly and unambiguously to the
parties themselves. Non-action by the international
community or the sending of a vague message could potentially
increase tensions and have the unintended consequence of
pushing one or both parties towards conflict. The Witnesses
should be meeting on the EEBC decision immediately, if we are
serious about eliminating any potential for war. Our message
should also be consistent with the last Witnesses meeting
chaired by Assistant Secretary Frazer in February 2006, and
with the U.S. negotiated approach on normalization talks to
eliminate tensions.


I. (S/NF) HOW WILL MELES PREPARE THE ETHIOPIAN PUBLIC AND THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY FOR WAR?


22. (S/NF) Prime Minister Meles would have an extremely
difficult time gaining popular support and preparing the
Ethiopia public for war. Few want renewed conflict, and most
view the past war as a conflict by Tigray and the Meles
government, not of the Ethiopian people. While the conflict
in Somalia is a strategic issue, renewed conflict with
Eritrea is seen as a personal issue between two leaders
trying to settle private scores. Despite the dominance of
state-run media, mere rhetoric on the threat from Eritrea
would have little effect in swaying the vast majority of the
Ethiopian population. There would need to be a multiple
series of actions by Eritrea to incite general support for
renewed conflict: e.g., assassination of leaders in Addis
Ababa, terrorist attacks against the general Ethiopian
population, and a limited and specific military attack by
Eritrea against Ethiopia along the border. No one action is
sufficient to renew total conflict by Ethiopia against
Eritrea, except to respond to "total" war by Eritrea.


23. (S/NF) Preparations for conflict would likely include
large-scale mobilization of reserves, and deployment of key

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military units, such as the Agazi (special forces) commandos.
On the economic front, measures could include introduction
of rationing on consumer products and/or fuel, the imposition
of special surtaxes, and raising the price of
state-controlled commodities.


24. (S/NF) Should Ethiopia determine that Eritrea poses a
clear and imminent threat, Meles and his government would
want international support prior to any conflict (and
especially domestic support). As it did prior to intervening
in December 2006 in Somalia, Ethiopia would likely seek
support in international fora, such as IGAD and the African
Union, where it holds a prominent seat as one of 15 members
of the AU Peace and Security Council, and is able to
galvanize support from throughout the continent. Further,
Ethiopia would begin to signal not only hostile anti-Eritrean
rhetoric but also, more important, messages that conflict is
likely. (The current rhetoric by Ethiopia against Eritrea is
troubling, but thus far we have been consistent in our
approach that such rhetoric is unhelpful.) In such a
scenario, it would be extremely important for the
international community to be unified and to express to both
sides a consistent and strong message that conflict would not
be tolerated. In 2001 in our resumption of discussions with
both parties over the border, we delivered strong messages of
the consequences of renewed conflict, intentional or
unintentional. Both parties understood clearly what our
message was, and that the witnesses stood firmly behind the
U.S. The problem now, is that we hold very little leverage
over Eritrea, they do not listen to us, and even the benefits
of not going to war (debt relief and reconstruction funds)
may not be important to Isaias. For Ethiopia, our message in
2001 still holds sway over this government.
YAMAMOTO