Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07ADDISABABA1234
2007-04-20 13:27:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Addis Ababa
Cable title:  

SOMALIA: TFG PRESIDENT YUSUF HIGHLIGHTS ROLE OF

Tags:  PREL PGOV MOPS KPKO SO ET DJ QA EG IR 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO2050
OO RUEHDE RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHDS #1234/01 1101327
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 201327Z APR 07
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5765
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNSOM/SOMALIA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 001234 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF AND AF/E
LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHER
CJTF-HOA FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/20/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS KPKO SO ET DJ QA EG IR
SUBJECT: SOMALIA: TFG PRESIDENT YUSUF HIGHLIGHTS ROLE OF
REGIONAL STATES


Classified By: ERIC WONG, DEPUTY POL-ECON COUNSELOR. REASON: 1.4 (D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 001234

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF AND AF/E
LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHER
CJTF-HOA FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/20/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS KPKO SO ET DJ QA EG IR
SUBJECT: SOMALIA: TFG PRESIDENT YUSUF HIGHLIGHTS ROLE OF
REGIONAL STATES


Classified By: ERIC WONG, DEPUTY POL-ECON COUNSELOR. REASON: 1.4 (D).


1. (C) SUMMARY. In an April 20 meeting with Ambassador,
visiting Transitional Federal Government of Somalia (TFG)
President Abdullahi Yusuf said the security situation in
Somalia was improving, but that Council of Islamic Court
(CIC) remnants in Mogadishu continued to provoke the TFG.
While the TFG had been forced to "fight back," Yusuf affirmed
the TFG's commitment to holding national reconciliation
talks, and said the TFG and Ethiopia continued negotiations
with Somali political, religious, and civil society leaders.
Referring to Ethiopian FM Seyoum's upcoming trip to
Washington, Yusuf said FM Seyoum represented TFG as well as
Ethiopian interests, and appealed for the USG to help
Ethiopia defray the costs of military expenditures on behalf
of the TFG in Somalia. Highlighting Eritrea's destabilizing
role, Yusuf said CIC fighters had used Iranian anti-aircraft
weapons from Eritrea to shoot down AMISOM and other aircraft,
and noted that released CIC "moderates" had joined other
hard-liners in Asmara. Yusuf complained of support from
Qatar and Egypt for opponents to the TFG, and said Italy was
responsible for blocking EU support for Somalia. As
instructed by Embassy Nairobi, Ambassador delivered three
points on outreach to other clans, avoiding war in Mogadishu,
and support of humanitarian aid flows. Yusuf replied the TFG
was "doing what we promised," referring to pledges made to AF
A/S Frazer during her visit to Baidoa. END SUMMARY.


2. (U) Ambassador, accompanied by PAO and deputy pol-econ
counselor (note-taker),met April 20 with visiting TFG
President Abdullahi Yusuf and his Chief of Staff Abdirizak
Adam Hassan. PAO contact Ahmed Ibrahim, an Addis Ababa-based
Somali (Dir/Isaaq) businessman with close contacts to Yusuf,

accompanied President Yusuf.

-------------- --------------
INTER-SOMALI NEGOTIATIONS CONTINUE... AS DOES FIGHTING
-------------- --------------


3. (C) President Yusuf said the security situation in Somalia
was improving, but that CIC remnants in Mogadishu continued
to provoke the TFG, citing an April 19 mortar attack that had
killed one individual at the presidential villa. To avoid
civilian casualties, the TFG had sought to separate these CIC
fighters from the general population, but had been forced to
"fight back" following attacks on the TFG's civilian and
military headquarters. Pledging that "these terrorists will
be liquidated from the capital," Yusuf asserted that removing
the CIC from Mogadishu would pacify Somalia. Some 4-5 Somali
CIC leaders were part of Al-Qaida, Yusuf said, highlighting
al-Itihaad al-Islamiya (AIAI) leader Hassan Abdullah Hersi
al-Turki and Adan Hashi Ayro, who he said was "assassinating
intellectuals" in Somalia. Recent international media
reports critical of U.S. and Ethiopian support only
encouraged these terrorists, he said. Asked about TFG
Ambassador Farah's April 11 public statement that 200
additional foreign fighters had been captured in Somalia,
Yusuf said all captured foreigners had already been turned
over to Ethiopia; if more were captured in the future, they
too would be transferred to Ethiopia.


4. (C) While such "troublemakers" sought to derail
negotiations, joint TFG-Ethiopian talks with Somali
political, religious, and civil society leaders continued.
Yusuf denied that the TFG opposed specific clans or
sub-clans, such as the Hawiye or Hawiye/Habr-Gedir/Ayr.
Asked whether these talks were conducted by the GOE or the
TFG, Yusuf replied, "We are together, of course; we are
allies."


5. (C) President Yusuf noted that USG pressure had led to the
release of CIC Executive Committee Chairman Sheikh Sharif
Sheikh Ahmed and his travel to Yemen. However, following
complaints from human rights groups that Sharif and others
were being "held in captivity," Yemen had been compelled to
allow Sharif to depart. While the USG had considered Sharif
a moderate, Yusuf said, Sharif was now in Asmara, as was CIC
foreign secretary Ibrahim Addow, an Amcit whose cousin was a
former Somali ambassador to the U.S. Hassan noted that
"so-called moderates" were actually more hard-line than

ADDIS ABAB 00001234 002 OF 003


others.


6. (C) As instructed by Embassy Nairobi, Ambassador delivered
three points on outreach to other clans, avoiding war in
Mogadishu, and support of humanitarian aid flows. Ambassador
underscored the need for the TFG to promote reconciliation
and outreach to all clans, eliminate fighting, and facilitate
the delivery of humanitarian assistance, noting that he was
reiterating points addressed in recent correspondence from
Embassy Nairobi to President Yusuf. While some activities
required long-term focus, the international community had
expectations of quick progress. Yusuf replied that lack of
security in Mogadishu, the talks' anticipated venue, had
required a two-month postponement, but affirmed that national
reconciliation talks would occur. Yusuf added that the TFG
was "doing what we promised," referring to pledges made to AF
A/S Frazer during her visit to Baidoa.

-------------- ---
TRAIN AND EQUIP TFG FORCES, AND SUPPORT ETHIOPIA
-------------- ---


7. (C) Referring to Ethiopian FM Seyoum's upcoming April 23
trip to Washington, President Yusuf said "when he goes to
Washington, you can consider that he represents Somalia too."
Yusuf appealed for the USG to help Ethiopia defray the costs
of military expenditures on behalf of the TFG in Somalia. As
both Somalia and the United States were fighting terrorism,
the TFG ultimately sought USG assistance to train and equip
Somali security forces, so Somalia could have its own
capacity. In the meantime, however, it was essential to
support Ethiopia and the African Union Mission in Somalia
(AMISOM): U.S. military and logistical support for Ethiopia
"will be good for us," Yusuf said.

-------------- --------------
IRANIAN WEAPONS, VIA ERITREA, USED AGAINST TFG AND AMISOM
-------------- --------------


8. (C) Addressing the role of other regional actors,
President Yusuf said the TFG had evidence (correspondence
between CIC Shura Chairman Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys and
Iran) that Iranian-origin anti-aircraft weaponry, delivered
via Eritrea, had been used by anti-TFG forces in Somalia to
shoot down a helicopter as well as a Belarussian AMISOM cargo
plane. Used by Iran and other Arab countries (particularly
Egypt) as a proxy, Eritrea was providing training for
terrorists and "actively meddling" in Somalia, Yusuf said.
Eritrea had also shown "some cooperation with Somaliland" in
delivering arms and supplies to anti-TFG forces, which
otherwise would have been cut off. Like Qatar, Asmara hosted
numerous dissidents who sought to destabilize Somalia.
President Isaias was destabilizing the entire region, Yusuf
said, citing Eritrean engagement with insurgents in Djibouti,
Ethiopia, Darfur, eastern Sudan, and now Somalia.


9. (C) Hassan criticized Djiboutian President Guelleh for
"vacillating" between supporting and opposing the TFG.
President Yusuf noted that Guelleh had been "helpful" to the
TFG until the CIC had taken over Mogadishu. At the January
2007 AU Summit in Addis Ababa, Guelleh had spoken out in
support of Ethiopian intervention, but within the last 3-4
days, he had called for Ethiopian forces to leave Somalia.
Yusuf agreed that Guelleh was likely swayed by commercial
interests, reaping revenue from sources ranging from Somalia
to Iran.

--------------
ARAB STATES (AND ITALY) WORKING AGAINST TFG
--------------


10. (C) Hassan observed the irony of three pro-U.S. Arab
states--Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt--opposing the TFG.
Egypt and Saudi Arabia were combating terrorism domestically,
but did not understand that the TFG was doing the same.
Hassan appealed for the USG to protest to Egyptian
authorities; as for Saudi Arabia, Saudi individuals, but not
the government, supported the CIC. Yusuf noted that Qatar
had not responded to the TFG's appeal not to host a meeting
of anti-TFG dissidents, and was instead providing opponents

ADDIS ABAB 00001234 003 OF 003


of the TFG with cash and vehicles.


11. (C) Addressing recent reports that the European
Commission was concerned about alleged war crimes committed
by Ethiopian and TFG forces, Yusuf underscored that as the
former colonial power in southern Somalia, Italy was leading
EC opposition to assisting the TFG. Germany did not share
Italy's views, and France was preoccupied with domestic
elections. The TFG would send delegations to Brussels, Saudi
Arabia, and throughout Africa, to garner support, Yusuf said,
as terrorism was the enemy of every country. Stopping the
fight against terrorism was "criminal," he concluded.


12. (C) COMMENT: President Yusuf's observation that USG
assistance to the Ethiopian military will benefit the TFG,
and his assessment of the destabilizing role of regional
actors such as Eritrea and Djibouti, reflects the common
security interests shared by Ethiopia and the TFG. While
Ethiopia has actively engaged in consultations with Hawiye
and Hawiye/Habr-Gedir/Ayr representatives, Yusuf avoided
highlighting any clan or sub-clan in his remarks. The
assertion that CIC elements in Mogadishu are receiving
Iranian weaponry from Eritrea suggests that the portrayal of
Somali instability as a primarily intra-clan conflict
neglects the significant regional and strategic interests
that contribute to make Mogadishu a flashpoint for continued
violence. END COMMENT.
YAMAMOTO