Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07ADDISABABA1079
2007-04-11 08:02:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Addis Ababa
Cable title:  

SOMALIA: TFG REACHES OUT TO HAWIYE, BUT PLANS FOR

Tags:  PREL PGOV MOPS EAID KDEM ET SO QA CA 
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VZCZCXRO0887
PP RUEHDE RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHDS #1079/01 1010802
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 110802Z APR 07
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5539
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNSOM/SOMALIA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHDO/AMEMBASSY DOHA PRIORITY 0176
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 2361
RUEHMT/AMCONSUL MONTREAL PRIORITY 0233
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 001079 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF AND AF/E
LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHER
CJTF-HOA FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/11/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS EAID KDEM ET SO QA CA
SUBJECT: SOMALIA: TFG REACHES OUT TO HAWIYE, BUT PLANS FOR
RENEWED FIGHTING


Classified By: ERIC WONG, ACTING POL-ECON COUNSELOR. REASON: 1.4 (D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 001079

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF AND AF/E
LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHER
CJTF-HOA FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/11/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS EAID KDEM ET SO QA CA
SUBJECT: SOMALIA: TFG REACHES OUT TO HAWIYE, BUT PLANS FOR
RENEWED FIGHTING


Classified By: ERIC WONG, ACTING POL-ECON COUNSELOR. REASON: 1.4 (D).


1. (C) SUMMARY. Somalia's Ambassador to Ethiopia and PermRep
to the African Union, Abdulkarim Farah, disputed reports of
inter-clan tensions between the Darood (President Abdullahi
Yusuf's clan) and Hawiye who control Mogadishu, asserting
they were exaggerated by disenchanted Hawiye/Habr-Gedir/Ayr
sub-clan members and by al-Shabaab hard-liners from the
ousted Council of Islamic Courts (CIC). Farah cited various
high-level Hawiye appointees, including himself, and noted
that the Mudulood (representing a coalition of Hawiye/Abgaal,
Hawiye/Hawadle, and other clans) had recently declared the
Hawiye's "unified position" in support of the TFG. Farah
reported improved security in Mogadishu, following the
"liberation" of former "no-go" areas by 10,000 TFG troops
supported by Ethiopia. Commenting on EU concerns about war
crimes allegedly committed in Somalia by Ethiopian and TFG
troops, Farah underscored that the TFG was targeting foreign
fighters, not the Somali people. Discussions were now
underway on the handover of remaining militants and
extremists, including CIC leader Adan Hashi Ayro and
"seriously wounded" CIC security chief Sheikh Yusuf Mohamed
Siad Indho-Adde. Farah appealed for USG assistance in
providing the TFG with a television broadcasting capability,
to counter anti-TFG propaganda; and for funding to hold a
conference in Addis Ababa for expatriate Somali
intellectuals. Farah reported that Canadian FM MacKay had
said that unless Canada were allowed to join the
International Contact Group on Somalia, it would not provide
donor assistance to Somalia. Farah also urged that the USG
protest Qatar's recent hosting of meetings of TFG opponents.
Farah later speculated that the TFG would prepare for renewed

conflict with the Hawiye/Habr-Gedir/Ayr sub-clan, in order to
clean out remaining extremists in northern Mogadishu. END
SUMMARY.

--------------
HAWIYE OPPOSITION TO TFG EXAGGERATED
--------------


2. (C) Ambassador and deputy pol-econ counselor (note-taker)
met April 10 with Abdulkarim Farah, the Transitional Federal
Government of Somalia's (TFG) Ambassador to Ethiopia and
PermRep to the African Union. Ambassador underscored the
importance of the TFG continuing political outreach to other
clans. Questioned about ongoing negotiations between the
Ethiopian government and Hawiye clan representatives from
Somalia, Farah disputed reports of current inter-clan tension
between the Darood and the Hawiye who controlled areas in
Mogadishu. Farah observed that the Mudulood (representing a
coalition of Hawiye/Abgaal, Hawiye/Hawadle, and other clans)
had recently declared the Hawiye's "unified position" in
support of the TFG. Only members of the Hawiye/Habr-Gedir/
Ayr, and al-Shabaab hard-liners from the ousted CIC, played
up Darood-Hawiye tensions, he said. While some Ayr were
moderates, Ayr who sought to derail stability in Somalia held
real estate seized from others, and reaped profits from
trafficking through Somalia's uncontrolled borders. Those
who claimed to speak on behalf of disenchanted Hawiye were
only Ayr sub-clan members. Farah refuted the notion that the
TFG did not include Hawiye, observing that he, as well as the
TFG ambassadors in Nairobi and New York, were all Hawiye.
The Hawiye were represented in parliament, and nine TFG
ministers were Hawiye, including Prime Minister Ghedi and the
interior minister. The Hawiye not only supported the TFG but
also welcomed the USG's renewed engagement with Somalia,
Farah said.


3. (C) Asserting that PM Ghedi now enjoyed support from
Hawiye, Farah said the Hawiye/Abgaal sub-clan would not
accept his ouster. Thus, unless the reconciliation
commission led by Ali Mahdi specifically recommended
leadership changes in the TFG, neither PM Ghedi nor President
Yusuf should be replaced until the TFG mandate ended in 2009,
Farah said.

--------------

ADDIS ABAB 00001079 002 OF 003


TFG TARGETS FOREIGN FIGHTERS, NOT SOMALIS
--------------


4. (C) Farah reported improved security in Mogadishu. Hawiye
elders' "very positive" support for the TFG could be seen in
the recent cessation of violence (e.g., targeted
assassinations, attacks on convoys) in Mogadishu over the
last 10 days, Farah said. Some 10,000 TFG troops, along with
Ethiopian forces (ENDF),had "liberated" several areas from
the al-Shabaab that had been "no-go" 15-20 days earlier (such
as Balad junction, the stadium, and the pasta factory).
Rocket attacks from these areas had now ceased. Farah
acknowledged that the TFG troops were primarily Darood, as
the Hawiye had not previously supported the TFG.


5. (C) Commenting on reports of EU concerns about alleged war
crimes committed in Somalia by Ethiopian and TFG troops,
Farah questioned why international human rights monitors had
failed to note the abuses committed earlier by the CIC. The
TFG was defending its country against foreign fighters, not
abusing civilians, he said. Violence in Mogadishu had
derived from the high concentration of foreign fighters who
supported the CIC, Farah explained. Hundreds of foreign
fighters had remained in Mogadishu during the Ethiopians'
December 2006 advance, incorrectly believing that the ENDF
would stop at Baidoa and not enter Mogadishu. Defeated CIC
remnants (e.g., from Kismayo) soon converged in Mogadishu as
well. To avoid military engagement in Mogadishu, elders had
handed over areas to TFG control, at the request of President
Yusuf and PM Ghedi. One could enter Mogadishu only from the
north or the south, however, and now al-Shabaab and foreign
fighters remained in northern Mogadishu; the TFG targeted
them, not the Somali people. While PM Ghedi had warned
civilians to leave, there had been some collateral damage,
which the TFG regretted.

--------------
TERRORISTS "WILL BE BROUGHT TO JUSTICE"
--------------


6. (C) Discussions were now underway on the handover of
remaining militants and extremists, including CIC leader Adan
Hashi Ayro and CIC security chief Sheikh Yusuf Mohamed Siad
Indho-Adde, who had been seriously wounded, Farah said.
Renewed fighting could erupt if those remaining refused to
surrender to the TFG. Amb. Farah questioned why the USG had
advocated the release of CIC Executive Committee Chairman
Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, who had been among the last
remaining CIC leaders maintaining his public call for jihad
against the United States and the West. On the other hand,
Farah noted that President Yusuf had pledged immunity for
ex-CIC members, if Somalia obtained peace.


7. (C) Amb. Farah observed that the TFG would not rely on
either Ethiopian or AU peacekeeping forces to target
remaining CIC fighters in Somalia, as the TFG feared doing so
might backfire and build public support for such hard-liners.
Nor would the TFG use its current military forces, which
were now majority-Darood, to pursue CIC remnants; instead,
the TFG would seek to empower its security forces through
diversity. Nevertheless, Farah said, ultimately, the TFG
would guarantee that terrorists such as al-Itihaad
al-Islamiya (AIAI) leader Hassan Abdullah Hersi al-Turki
"will be brought to justice."

-------------- --------------
REQUESTS FOR USG ASSISTANCE WITH PUBLIC DIPLOMACY
-------------- --------------


8. (C) Farah appealed for USG assistance in providing the TFG
with a television broadcasting capability, stating that he
had previously made the request in meetings with USG
officials. Farah underscored the need to counter anti-TFG
propaganda, especially as the TFG's ministry of information
comprised only the minister and his deputy. While AF A/S
Frazer had pledged that USG assistance to Somalia would
increase from USD 40 million to 100 million, the TFG required

ADDIS ABAB 00001079 003 OF 003


visible assistance immediately, he said. Ambassador noted
that VOA Somali programming would increase from one-half to 2
hours, and invited Farah to collaborate further on providing
input for printed public diplomacy materials that could be
produced by the Embassy for distribution in Somalia.


9. (U) To promote further engagement by Somali intellectuals
and the Somali diaspora, Farah requested financial assistance
from the USG or other donors to hold a 2-3 day conference in
Addis Ababa for expatriate Somali intellectuals. The
conference would aim to overcome Somali prejudice against
Ethiopia, convince Somali diaspora to return to Mogadishu,
and reverse the "brain drain" from Somalia. The
intellectuals' conference would immediately precede the May
15-16 reconciliation conference, which would be held in
Mogadishu, "security permitting." Farah said he had
discussed holding the conference under African Union auspices
with both AU Peace and Security Commissioner Said Djinnit and
AU Commission Deputy Chairperson Patrick Mazimhaka, but that
funds were needed. Participants would include Somalis from
the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Kenya, as well as
American academics.

-------------- -
CANADA SHOULD JOIN INTERNATIONAL CONTACT GROUP
-------------- -


10. (C) Hailing USG support for the TFG, Amb. Farah said
Somalia relied more on the United States than any other
country, and offered the following comments on TFG relations
with other external actors:
-- Farah recommended that Canada be allowed to join the
International Contact Group on Somalia, noting that Canadian
FM Peter MacKay had informed him that without joining, Canada
would not provide funds for Somalia. As contact group
members were all friends of Somalia, Canada should be allowed
to join, Farah said.
-- Addressing TFG relations with Arab League members, Farah
said that while the League had pledged USD 26 million to
Somalia in 2005, only Algeria had paid its share. The TFG
had close relations with Yemen, as Yemen had previously
provided military hardware to President Yusuf. Following a
recent visit by Farah to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia now backed the
TFG. By providing Arabic-language instructors, Egypt had
long-standing cultural ties with Somalia. However, political
tensions with Egypt stemmed from 1998, when President Yusuf
and another Darood general chose to depart a Cairo conference
of Somali clans in order to travel to Addis Ababa for
consultations with Ethiopia.
-- Farah urged that the USG protest Qatar's recent hosting of
meetings of TFG opponents based in Asmara, which had included
Somali-American participants.


11. (C) COMMENT: Amb. Farah later speculated that the TFG
would prepare for renewed conflict with the Hawiye/
Habr-Gedir/Ayr sub-clan, in order to clean out remaining
extremists in northern Mogadishu. Farah's assertion that
violence in Mogadishu derives from its high concentration of
foreign fighters follows an April 9 announcement by
Ethiopia's foreign ministry that "suspected international
terrorists have been and are still being captured by the
joint forces" of the TFG and Ethiopia, and that those
released from Ethiopian custody include fighters from
Tanzania, Sudan, the UAE, Denmark, and Sweden. Post supports
providing the TFG with assistance to bolster its public
diplomacy efforts, and urges that the Department review
whether resources are available to meet the TFG's specific
requests (paragraphs 8-9). END COMMENT.
YAMAMOTO