SOMALIA: DEPUTY FM TEKEDA DISCUSSES ETHIOPIA'S ROLE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ADDIS ABABA 001017

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF AND AF/E
LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHER
CJTF-HOA FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/05/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS KPKO SO ET
SUBJECT: SOMALIA: DEPUTY FM TEKEDA DISCUSSES ETHIOPIA'S ROLE

REF: A. FRAZER-AMB TELCON 4/04/07


B. ASMARA 316 (NOTAL)

C. NAIROBI 1526 (NOTAL)

D. NAIROBI 1464 (NOTAL)

E. NAIROBI 1456 (NOTAL) AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: AMBASSADOR DONALD YAMAMOTO. REASON: 1.4 (B) AND (D).


1. (S/NF) SUMMARY. Ambassador met State Minister of Foreign
Affairs Dr. Tekeda Alemu, Ethiopia's point person on Somalia
negotiations, on April 4 to review Ethiopia's approach to the
Hawiye clan and reconciliation, and later with National
Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) chief Getachew.
Tekeda stated that the Ethiopians were negotiating directly
with the Hawiye to contain and neutralize extremist elements,
and that Ethiopian troops (ENDF) partially succeeded in
"cleaning up" some Hawiye-held areas in north Mogadishu and
the airport. ENDF reinforcements came from the Baidoa area.
Somalia's Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was important
in the process, but Tekeda cautioned that while PM Ghedi had
not played a helpful role, it was not the time to change
personalities in the TFG. Waiting until the national
reconciliation conference would be a better venue for
changing the government. Tekeda and Getachew, in separate
meetings, raised the problem of the heavy cost of the Somali
conflict, and the need for the ENDF to leave quickly. They
realize that an abrupt departure would only allow extremists
to return to Mogadishu, and lead to a possible breakdown in
clan discussions. Furthermore, African Union Mission in
Somalia (AMISOM) and TFG troops are not ready to handle
stabilization efforts in Mogadishu. But without assistance,
the ENDF will need to depart. Tekeda requested U.S. support
for allowing Ethiopia to join the International Contact
Group, because of Ethiopia's work providing support to AMISOM
and the TFG, as well as force protection at the air- and
seaports. Finally, Getachew noted that a visit to Somalia by
a U.S. official would send a very positive message and
reassure the Somali people of U.S. commitment to Somalia,s
future. END SUMMARY.

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NORTH MOGADISHU: TENSE BUT SOME SUCCESS AGAINST EXTREMISTS
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2. (S/NF) Minister Tekeda said Ethiopia was in direct contact
with Hawiye clan elders and was hopeful that progress was
being made in containing extremist elements. The ceasefire
was holding, though sporadic fighting continued. Tekeda said
the ENDF was hopeful that heavy fighting would not resume.
During this ceasefire, it would be important for the Hawiye
clan to ensure that the extremists did not rearm and resume
fighting. While senior extremist leaders had fled or were in
hiding, Tekeda noted that many of the extremists' supporters
and field commanders had been neutralized or captured, making
another round of fighting difficult for extremist elements
and those opposed to the ENDF/TFG. One success was the
dramatic reduction and, in some instances, elimination of
shelling from the Villa Somalia area, making the airport and
Ethiopian/TFG positions more secure. Tekeda went into some
detail of the fierce fighting with small ENDF units fighting
building-to-building. Surprisingly, there had not been "as
much" hand-to-hand combat as anticipated, but extensive
shooting and shelling had occurred, resulting in heavy
casualties on all sides. He did not specify ENDF casualties,
and denied that any ENDF had been captured by extremists.


3. (S/NF) Asked about the need for the TFG to be a part of
the negotiations, Tekeda said this was important. But for
the TFG specifically, President Abdullahi Yusuf and Prime
Minister Ali Mohammed Ghedi needed to address a comprehensive
list of problems, including land and property ownership
disputes, reaching out to clan elders, and handling extremist
elements in Mogadishu. Tekeda added that the talks with the
Hawiye were productive.

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FUTURE OF TFG/EXTREMISTS OPERATING IN NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES
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4. (S/NF) Tekeda cautioned that while Prime Minister Ghedi

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was unhelpful in the reconciliation process, it was not the
time to change personalities. The focus should not be on
"correcting" TFG leadership roles, but on maintaining a clear
eye on neutralizing extremists; this was the main mission.
Changing Ghedi would only make the work of the TFG more
difficult. It was better to wait until the reconciliation
conference in May, and let the Somalis make their decision.
Tekeda added that whether Ghedi had their full support or
not, Ghedi was an Abgaal; replacing him now could undercut
the TFG and alienate the Abgaal. Tekeda echoed the
statements of Prime Minister Meles to us in earlier meetings
that any action, no matter the good intention, could have
unintended consequences. Reaching out to one clan may
alienate another, changing a person could offend a clan. In
this state of tension, when focus should be on making the
reconciliation conference a success, Tekeda underscored the
need to reach out to and remain in communication with all
clans.

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SOMALIA: COST WILL ULTIMATELY FORCE THE ENDF OUT
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5. (S/NF) Tekeda and Getachew in separate meetings raised the
cost of the conflict for Ethiopia. Foreign exchange reserves
had been depleted as a result of the conflict. The ENDF had
withdrawn two-thirds of its force, and had reinforced its
Mogadishu operations from troops in Baidoa. While the ENDF
would not depart suddenly, Tekeda said the ENDF would need to
depart soon, because of the cost. They fully realize that a
precipitous departure would only invite the extremists back
to Mogadishu, or create a breakdown in talks with the clans.
AMISOM troops and the TFG were yet not strong enough to
stabilize Mogadishu and bring order, they said.

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INVITE ETHIOPIA TO THE CONTACT GROUP MEETING
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6. (S/NF) Tekeda asked for U.S. assistance to join the
U.S.-led International Contact Group. The Arab League were
members, and Egypt and Yemen would join. He said Ethiopia
did not oppose Egypt or Yemen, but strongly felt that
Ethiopia should also be a part of the discussions.
Ethiopia's heavy involvement in Somalia--supporting AMISOM
troops and the TFG, providing force protection at the air-
and seaports, as well as providing assistance to the
reconciliation conference--earned it a seat at the table.
Ethiopia had paid a heavy burden, in terms of ENDF lives and
financial drain on its budget. Tekeda said Foreign Minister
Seyoum was sending a letter of request to the USG.

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USG OFFICIAL SHOULD VISIT SOMALIA
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7. (S/NF) In a separate meeting, Getachew noted that a visit
by a U.S. official to Somalia would send a positive message
to the people of Somalia, reassuring them of U.S. support.
He left the issue of timing to the U.S. and other senior
Ethiopian officials. The ENDF would provide intelligence and
support.


8. (S/NF) COMMENT. Ambassador will meet Foreign Minister
Seyoum next week, and has also been called in by Prime
Minister Meles for a meeting next week to clarify U.S. policy
towards Eritrea. We will continue to coordinate with Embassy
Nairobi on the Ethiopian role in Somalia. The cost of the
war has become a major challenge for Ethiopia. If their
continued presence in support of AMISOM and the TFG is
helpful, the ENDF will expect support and some financial
assistance. But a perception that their role is unproductive
will force the ENDF to leave quickly. We will need to assess
the consequences of their departure, or whether we should
encourage their continued presence, albeit more low-key, in
Somalia. END COMMENT.
YAMAMOTO