Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07ABUJA911
2007-05-10 16:26:00
SECRET
Embassy Abuja
Cable title:  

NIGERIA: SUGGESTIONS ON FUTURE POLICY

Tags:  PGOV KDEM NI ELECTIONS 
pdf how-to read a cable
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FM AMEMBASSY ABUJA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9464
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUEHWR/AMEMBASSY WARSAW 0320
RUEHCD/AMCONSUL CIUDAD JUAREZ 0316
RUEHOS/AMCONSUL LAGOS 6816
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ABUJA 000911 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DOE FOR CAROLYN GAY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/09/2017
TAGS: PGOV KDEM NI ELECTIONS
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: SUGGESTIONS ON FUTURE POLICY

ABUJA 00000911 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: Ambassador John Campbell for reasons 1.4 (b) & (d).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ABUJA 000911

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DOE FOR CAROLYN GAY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/09/2017
TAGS: PGOV KDEM NI ELECTIONS
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: SUGGESTIONS ON FUTURE POLICY

ABUJA 00000911 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: Ambassador John Campbell for reasons 1.4 (b) & (d).


1. (S) Summary: In the aftermath of Nigeria's deeply flawed
2007 elections, we need to consider how best to engage with
the future Yar'adua government. Post suggests that the USG
should reaffirm its commitment to electoral reform in
Nigeria, publicly support the electoral tribunals and other
judicial means of electoral dispute resolution, and pursue a
quiet style of engagement with the Nigerian government,
perhaps until after the electoral tribunals have completed
their work. End summary.

--------------
BACKGROUND
--------------


2. (S) A consortium of civil society, organized labor and
opposition parties has thus far failed to mount massive
public protests over the April 14 and April 21 elections,
despite strong rhetoric condemning their conduct and
demanding new polls. Instead, the failure of the 2007
elections has led to accelerated violence in the Delta.
There have been two audacious and tactically sophisticated
attacks on the Chevron offshore facilities and a nearly
identical attack on AGIP, all of which resulting in the
seizure of expatriate hostages by militants. Oil pipelines
are being cut on an almost daily basis. Nigeria's oil output
may be down some 750,000 bpd due to the unrest. The
hostage-takers have said that their demands are strictly
political: to embarrass the outgoing and incoming government.
A spokesman for MEND promisted to release the Chevron
hostages on May 30 "if there is no effort to negotiate or pay
ransom." The latter point is made, apparently, to underscore
the "political" as opposed to "mercenary" aspect of the
operation. Meanwhile, the Nigerian public appears apathetic
and disillusioned with the political process, but also
powerless to do anything about it. The military is certainly
watching closely, but there is little sign of active coup
plotting.


3. (C) The Ambssador has delivered the message in the
Department's April 27 public statement about the
unsatisfactory nature of the elections, the need to pursue
redress of electoral grievances in the court system, and the
unacceptability of violence to Governor Yar'Adua, Governor

Saraki, Minister of the Federal Capital Territory El Rufai,
Minister of State for Aviation Femi Fani Kayode, Presidential
Political Advisor Osuntokun, and opposition leader General
Buhari. The Mission has delivered the same message to
Senator Ben Obi, Atiku Abubakar's running-mate. (Atiku has
not yet returned to Nigeria.)


4. (C) Yar'Adua professed himself "delighted" with our April
27 statement when he met with the Ambassador, and affirmed
the need to reform the elections process from top to bottom.
All of the Mission's interlocutors claim to abhor violence
and pledge to seek redress for electoral wrongs through the
courts. Most do not even try to defend what is widely seen
as an indefensible election, and instead say that though the
election was rigged, the good news is that on May 29 one
civilian will succeed another, and the presidency will revert
to the North, meeting a fundamental demand of that region,s
establishment. Buhari says his party will go to court, but
he will not; he also is taking no leading role that we can
see in mobilizing civil society. In short, as of right now,
opposition to the elections is happening either through the
courts or by violence in the Delta; there is no peaceful,
mass movement calling for new elections, though one may
subsequently appear. And our government interlocutors are by
and large telling us everything they know we want to hear.

--------------
A WAY FORWARD
--------------


5. (C) Though the 2007 elections failed, other, more
encouraging, aspects of Nigeria's democratic development
remain, especially the growing independence of the judiciary
and greater assertiveness by the incumbent National Assembly.
Nigeria remains an indispensable U.S. partner on a host of
regional and continental issues and is one of our major

ABUJA 00000911 002.2 OF 003


suppliers of imported petro-chemicals. Our goal of a
democratic Nigeria governed by the rule of law remains as
valid as ever, despite the 2007 elections fiasco. Continued
engagement with the Nigerian government is a necessity. But,
so, too, is continued engagement with Nigerian civil society
and the opposition, both of which are likely to be
disappointed with what they regard as our hitherto muted
response to the failed elections.


6. (S) One of the key elements of our policy towards Nigeria
must be to express our displeasure with the conduct of the
2007 elections. Treating the April polls as simply
business-as-usual will only breed more of the same in the
future. Already, the election tribunals and upcoming local
government elections are shaping up to be less than
satisfactory. The USG should consider downplaying our
participation in inaugural events. Instead of a high-level
Washington delegation, the U.S. representative at the
inauguration could be the Ambassador in Abuja. By minimizing
our participation, we could send the message that the
election was not acceptable and that we expect serious
improvements.


7. (S) There is also the question of how to deal with
Nigeria at the G-8 meeting in Germany in early June, about a
week after the inauguration. Mission reccomends that any
dealings with President Yar'Adua at this event should be
carefully managed to minimize his personal importance while
highlighting Nigeria's quest for transparency as the key to
U.S.-Nigerian relations.


8. (S) Another possibility for expressing our displeasure
would be to delay any other high-level travel between Abuja
and Washington until after the election tribunals and courts
have decided pending challenges to the April polls. While we
might modify that stance or make exceptions as required if
the process drags on, the initial message would again
reinforce our seriousness about support for the work of the
courts and the need to hold genuine elections.

--------------
OTHER MESSAGES
--------------


9. (S) We must continue to meet with other political
figures (including Nnamani, Atiku and Buhari) and civil
society and pass them the same message as above: that
election-rigging is unacceptable, that we expect improved
electoral conduct in 2011, and that the work of the courts
and that National Assembly is vitally important and must
continue. In addition, we should urge all parties to resolve
grievances using the court system and the rule of law and
discourage violence.


10. (S) Post recommends that we continue to engage the
Nigerian military at the highest levels and that we repeat
the message publicly and privately that a coup is
unacceptable. In specific instances where the military
behaved unacceptably during the election, we should take
appropriate actions as required under our human rights
vetting procedures and other applicable regulations.


11. (S) In 2004, President Bush signed Presidential
Proclamation 7750, which creates a visa ineligibility for
persons engaged in or benefitting from corruption and members
of their immediate families. Section 1, Part C of the
proclamation makes ineligible public officials "whose
interference with the judicial, electoral, or other public
processes" has had serious adverse affect on the interests of
the United States. Targeted use of the 7750 process and the
section 212(f) grounds for visa refusal may generate positive
publicity for the USG and show those Nigerians unhappy with
the conduct of the election that the U.S. is "doing
something". The 7750 process could allow us to hold
individually accountable some of those who most egregiously
interfered with the election. What would have impact here is
the public reference to our ability to use the 7750 process -
not the number of people who actually lose their visas. Post
is compiling information about many of the elections
officials at the state level as well as some of the more
egregious riggers from the April process. Pursuing these

ABUJA 00000911 003.2 OF 003


cases - especially among working level staff - could send a
strong message to the public and to Nigerian elites.

CAMPBELL