DEPUTY SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH NIGERIAN NATIONAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ABUJA 002450

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DOE FOR CAROLYN GAY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/13/2017
TAGS: PREL PTER PINR MASS EPET KPKO KCRIM NI
SUBJECT: DEPUTY SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH NIGERIAN NATIONAL
SECURITY ADVISER MUKHTAR

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Lisa Piascik for reasons 1.4.(b & d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Nigerian National Security Advisor Mukhtar
welcomed Deputy Secretary Negroponte's November 12 visit as
USG recognition of Nigeria's importance and the Yar'Adua
government's efforts to correct problems associated with the
April 2007 elections. Mukhtar described the GoN's efforts to
bring peace to the Niger Delta. He acknowledged corruption
and past failures by all levels of government in the region,
but also blamed oil companies and the international
community, citing oil bunkering, weapons smuggling, and money
laundering as key problems which needed to be addressed
before the situation could improve significantly. Mukhtar
requested USG and international community assistance with
technical equipment and enhanced intelligence sharing to help
detect oil theft and weapons smuggling by international arms
dealers, and asked that countries stop allowing stolen funds
to enter their banking systems. The Director General of the
Nigerian State Security Service (SSS) discussed recent
arrests of Islamic militants in the North, noting the
militants had been trained in terrorist camps in Algeria and
Mali, and were planning attacks on unspecified foreign
targets in Nigeria. END SUMMARY.

U.S.-NIGERIAN RELATIONS
--------------

2. (C) Mukhtar thanked the Deputy Secretary for his visit,
noting that he and President Yar'Adua considered it an
affirmation of U.S. belief that Nigeria played an important
role in Africa and the region. He said the visit indicated
that the USG believed the GON was taking steps to address
problems related to the difficult and controversial April
2007 elections. Mukhtar outlined numerous historical and
cultural challenges Nigeria faced in implementing democracy
and asked for USG understanding when formulating responses to
less-than-perfect elections. The Deputy Secretary affirmed
the USG's understanding of Nigeria's importance, and stressed
that it was in the U.S. interest to have a strong
relationship with Nigeria. The Deputy Secretary highlighted
his recent visit to Darfur, and his meeting with the Nigerian
commander of the United Nations force there to illustrate
Nigeria's critical role in Africa.

NIGER DELTA
--------------

3. (C) The Deputy Secretary asked for Mukhtar's views on the
Niger Delta, noting that he had briefed President Bush on the
region several times when he was Director of National
Intelligence. Mukhtar acknowledged that residents of the
Delta had legitimate grievances, and that previous Nigerian
federal and state governments had neglected the region,
allowing environmental degradation and corruption to continue
over long periods of time. He also blamed international oil
companies for contributing to the current situation by
entering into memoranda of agreement (MOAs) with local
communities, which often exacerbated conflict, particularly
between those communities that were, and the majority who
were not, benefiting from oil company largesse. In
addition, he maintained that oil companies often did not
honor their agreements, which increased resentment among the
unemployed and uneducated local youths. He noted that
state-level politicians, including several prominent
governors, had compounded the problem by funding and arming
local "cult" groups (Note: the term refers to armed gangs.
End note),turning them into personal militias for political
support during elections, and then disavowing them after
elections were over. Such groups then began engaging in
criminal activities such as oil bunkering, hostage taking,
and weapons smuggling.

OBASANJO's EFFORTS TO ADDRESS DELTA GRIEVANCES
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4. (C) Mukhtar said former President Obasanjo had instituted
a series of Niger Delta consultative commissions during the
last two years of his administration. All governors and
select members of Delta communities were invited and
encouraged to make their views and grievances known to the
federal government. Obasanjo had adopted a carrot and stick
approach, attempting to enforce laws while injecting
significant funding into newly established federal entities
like the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) to address

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development needs in the region. Mukhtar acknowledged that
progress in the region did not reflect the massive amounts of
funding provided to local and state governments, which
clearly indicated that significant corruption, waste, and
misuse of funds had occurred over the years. As a result,
youths in the region had lost faith in traditional
institutions, and community leadership had collapsed, leading
to alienation and increased criminal activity.

PRESIDENT YAR'ADUA'S STRATEGY
--------------

5. (C) Mukhtar said that President Yar'Adua had made the
Niger Delta one of his top priorities, and had directed Vice
President Goodluck Jonathan, a native of the region, to open
direct channels of communication with all concerned parties.
As a result, some militant leaders had recently expressed a
desire to lay down their arms and enter into peace talks with
the government, though he cautioned that full peace remained
a distant goal, as the Delta remained a "money-spinning
machine" for any group with a gun. In Mukhtar's opinion, too
many people in the region have strayed from their original,
legitimate efforts at peaceful dissent, and instead had now
resorted to criminal activities. During recent discussions
with militant leaders, the GON made clear that it considered
hostage-taking to be a terrorist act, and warned them they
would face arrest and legal action if engaged in it. Mukhtar
added that the GON had indeed arrested and initiated legal
action against a number of militants involved in hostage
taking. He also noted that the GON had recently hosted a
meeting of selected Delta elders in Abuja, and that group had
subsequently called on youths in the region to abandon
violence. The GON was thus attempting to revive community
leadership by identifying leaders who could be supported.
Mukhtar acknowledged that the GON was fully aware of the
unemployment, environmental, and political issues in the
Delta, and was taking deliberate and serious steps to address
them.

BUNKERING, SMUGGLING, MONEY LAUNDERING: NEED FOR ASSISTANCE
-------------- --------------

6. (C) Mukhtar noted that some aspects of the Niger Delta
conflict extend well beyond Nigeria's shores and the GON's
control, necessitating assistance from the international
community. Weapons smuggling and oil bunkering (stealing)
are critical problems which need to be addressed, before the
larger problems of the region can be solved. According to
Mukhtar, the Nigerian navy is incapable of patrolling the
entire Nigerian coast to detect and disrupt bunkering and
smuggling. Both activities are closely linked, as stolen oil
is often exchanged for weapons. These activities draw
significant amounts of external money into the region, and
involve the same international cartels. He also maintained
that the GON lacked the capacity to police all of their
pipelines, and needed the ability to monitor them for illegal
taps. The GON is unable to control international weapons
dealers who often operate with impunity, smuggling
foreign-made weapons into the Delta. Mukhtar cited as an
example the well-known international weapons dealer Victor
Bout, and claimed that Delta militant leader Henry Okah
(currently detained in Angola) is closely associated with
Bout.


7. (C) In an aside, Mukhtar opined that if the Angolans were
to hand Okah over to Nigeria for prosecution, militant groups
in the Delta would make his release a condition for peace.
At the same time, he envisioned international criticism of
Nigeria for detaining Okah, should he be remanded to Nigeria.
Mukhtar added that Okah had been involved in plans to
overthrow the government of Equatorial Guinea, and was
fomenting secessionist sentiment in the Delta. He complained
that the international community has done little to stop
known traffickers such as Bout, and asked for increased
attention to and support for addressing the problem from the
USG and international community.

MONEY LAUNDERING
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8. (C) Mukhtar complained that while Nigerians are often
criticized for being corrupt, other countries abetted
larcenous individuals by welcoming their stolen funds. He
claimed that some countries' economies were fully dependent

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on "dirty money," and accused their governments of openly
welcoming it. Thus, Mukhtar requested more of a commitment
from the international community to identify and stop the
flow of funds from bunkerers and weapons smugglers.

FOREIGN ASSISTANCE AND MULTILATERAL COOPERATION
-------------- --

9. (C) Mukhtar noted the following areas where the GON needed
USG and international community assistance: enhanced
intelligence sharing on, and actions against, weapons
traffickers like Victor Bout; "high-tech" equipment to detect
and interdict weapons deliveries and oil smuggling in
Nigerian territorial waters; technical assistance with
equipment which allows the timely and precise detection of
taps on oil pipelines -- before the oil is stolen; tracing
the origins of weapons smuggled into the delta by
international traffickers and later seized by Nigerian
authorities.


10. (C) The Charge said the USG has been working with the GON
and other partners through the Gulf of Guinea Energy Security
Strategy (GGESS) to provide sensors and other equipment to
assist in the detection of illegal activity along the
Nigerian coastline and in the Delta. The Deputy Secretary
mentioned that the USG would be happy to trace serial numbers
of confiscated weapons to determine origin, an offer that had
been made previously within the GGESS context. The Deputy
Secretary expressed his understanding of, and concern about,

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oil bunkering and weapons smuggling, and requested that
Mukhtar allow him time to consult with colleagues in
Washington and examine ways to increase the U.S. level of
participation in the GGESS.

TERRORISM
--------------

11. (C) The Deputy Secretary also solicited Mukhtar's views
on terrorism, noting the GON's recent success in disrupting
extremist activities in the north. Mukhtar deferred to the
Director General of the SSS, who reported that the GON had
arrested 11 Nigerian Islamic militants in mid October and
"several more" earlier this month. The militants had been
establishing a network of cells in northern Nigeria and
planned to attack unspecified foreign targets, which he
surmised included embassies, personnel, and other "foreign
interests." The captured militants were said to have not yet
revealed to the SSS their specific targets. Several other
militants were said to have confirmed under interrogation
that they had received training in camps in Mali and Algeria,
and were in contact with Salafist Group for Preaching and
Combat (French acronym, GSPC) elements in both countries.
The SSS also claimed to have a list of 11 Nigerians currently
undergoing training in camps in Algeria and/or Mali, for
which militants had provided details on their locations. One
group arrested had fertilizer, explosives, and AK-47 assault
rifles. Several of the detained militants were said to have
been involved in uprisings in northern Nigeria in 2003 and
2005, and to have been in possession of weapons used in those
incidents. The SSS is currently searching for a weapons
cache buried by the group in 2005.


12. (C) The Director General added that the SSS has
information that the militants had been expecting
unidentified Pakistanis to arrive in Nigeria to assist them,
but that the SSS was not yet able to identify or locate the
Pakistanis. The SSS was said to have five separate teams
deployed in northern Nigeria, who are still looking for two
key individuals associated with the group. The SSS was keen
to note that it is taking time to ensure that the
investigations and arrests are handled with proper care.
Lastly, the Director General noted that the GON planned to
charge the militants as early as the next couple of weeks.
In response to a question from the Deputy Secretary about
whether northern Nigeria was a fertile breeding ground for Al
Qaida, Mukhtar responded that no, the type of Islam practiced
in northern Nigeria was not open to fanaticism of the kind
seen in other countries.


13. (SBU) Participants:

U.S.
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Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte
Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Jendayi Frazer
U.S. Charge d'Affaires Lisa Piascik
Special Assistant to the Deputy Secretary Gustavo Delgado
Special Assistant to the Deputy Secretary Edward Wittenstein
Regional Affairs Office Chief Kevin Ward

Nigeria
--------------
National Security Advisor Major-General (Ret.) Abdullahi
Sarki Mukhtar Director General of the State Security Service
(SSS) Afakriya Gadzama Representative of the National
Intelligence Agency (NIA)
General Mukhtar's Military Assistant
Director for Internal Affairs of the National Security Adviser
Director for External Affairs of the National Security Adviser

14.(SBU) D Staff has cleared this cable.
PIASCIK