Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07ABUJA2428
2007-11-21 16:56:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Abuja
Cable title:  

ABUJA SCENESETTER FOR AMB. YATES AND VICE ADMIRAL

Tags:  PGOV PMIL KPKO NI 
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VZCZCXRO2746
PP RUEHPA
DE RUEHUJA #2428/01 3251656
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 211656Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY ABUJA
TO RHMFISS/DET STUTTGART FOBE VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUEHOS/AMCONSUL LAGOS 8309
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1495
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 002428 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/21/2017
TAGS: PGOV PMIL KPKO NI
SUBJECT: ABUJA SCENESETTER FOR AMB. YATES AND VICE ADMIRAL
MOELLER

Classified By: Charge d'affaires Lisa Piascik for reasons 1.4. (b & d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 002428

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/21/2017
TAGS: PGOV PMIL KPKO NI
SUBJECT: ABUJA SCENESETTER FOR AMB. YATES AND VICE ADMIRAL
MOELLER

Classified By: Charge d'affaires Lisa Piascik for reasons 1.4. (b & d).


1. (C) U.S. Mission Nigeria warmly welcomes your November
27-29 visit to Abuja. Your visit comes at a pivotal time in
West Africa's engagement with Africom. Popular and official
misunderstanding of the Africom concept, regional pride, and
colonial baggage have made Nigeria and other regional
capitals reluctant to give the idea their support. Press
coverage is almost uniformly negative; however, most
Nigerian resistance to Africom is based on flawed information
as to its fundamental purpose and make-up. We believe this
can be overcome through a combination of public education,
diplomacy, and special attention paid to African
sensitivities, though this will not be easy. Nigeria's
leadership role within the Economic Community of West African
States (ECOWAS) and the continent as a whole make it key to
gaining greater region-wide support for the new command. We
believe your visit will increase Nigeria's, and thus the
region's, understanding of the Africom mission and
appreciation of the importance of Africom to Africa's future.

NIGERIAN ATTITUDES ON AFRICOM
--------------


2. (C) Since taking office May 29, President Umaru Musa
Yar'Adua has been largely silent concerning Africom. On
November 19, however, his government announced its formal
opposition to any element of Africom being based in Nigeria
or West Africa. In addition, during her November 12-13 visit
to Abuja, GON officials pressured Liberian President Ellen
Johnson Sirleaf not to negotiate with the USG concerning a
possible Africom presence in Liberia. Press reporting of
GON, NGO, and public opinion has been overwhelmingly negative
and points to an underlying misunderstanding of Africom's
mission and structure. For example, Foreign Minister Ojo
Maduekwe has declared publicly that "American troops are not
welcome on African soil." Other commonly voiced complaints
include fears of recolonization, a U.S. grab of Niger Delta
oil facilities, and a Cold War with China, with Africa as the
battleground. Privately, those GON officials who understand
the concept better have been generally supportive of Africom,

and it was hoped that the Airlie House Conference would help
persuade them to support Africom publicly as well. However,
according to ECOWAS Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace
and Security Mahamane Toure, the Airlie House information
went no further than the invitees, as "information in Africa
cannot travel from the bottom up -- you have to appeal
directly to political leaders and heads of state."

NIGERIA -- A REGIONAL LEADER
--------------


3. (C) Nigerians are proud of the nation's leadership role
in international and regional peacekeeping operations.
Nigerian peacekeepers are currently in Sudan, and the GON
expects to have its contribution to the African Union Mission
in Somalia (AMISOM) deployed in the next few months. This
deployment, however, comes at a time when Nigerian military
leaders are concerned that resources and troops are already
stretched thin due to domestic and international
requirements. Despite their leadership in peacekeeping on
the continent, the Nigerian military remains underfunded and
is in critical need of training, equipment and additional
personnel to meet its international obligations. ACOTA has
been active in training Darfur-bound soldiers, and we are
pressing the GON to accept ACOTA training for the AMISOM
contingent as well.


4. (C) Nigeria is host to the Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS),and currently plays a strong
leadership role in the formation of its policies. ECOWAS is
primarily an organization formed to create regional economic
cohesion which sees historic West African instability as a
major obstacle to economic growth. With strong U.S.,
Canadian, and European support, the organization is in the
process of forming a rapid-reaction military force, the
ECOWAS Stand-by Force (ESF). This will be comprised of nearly
2800 troops from ECOWAS' 15 member nations organized into two
brigades, of which Nigerian troops and hardware will form the
backbone of the Eastern Brigade. The ESF is supposed to be
deployment-ready by 2010 and is conducting numerous training,
logistics, and command exercises to meet that deadline; most

ABUJA 00002428 002 OF 002


observers, however, believe that this is an unrealistic goal.

SECURITY ISSUES
--------------

5. (C) Violence in the Niger Delta appears to be escalating
after several months' lull. Unrest and kidnappings of
foreigners subsided substantially in the first months of the
Yar'Adua administration, but there have been renewed
incidents of violence targeted at western oil facilities in
the last month. In addition, militants have escalated their
attacks against the hapless Nigerian Navy, killing sailors
and stealing equipment and boats. Nigeria is the West's
partner in the Gulf of Guinea Energy Security Strategy
dialogue process; however, its inability to control the
violence within the Delta is a black mark on its leadership.
The GON has been generally unresponsive to our offers on
illegal arms trafficking and efforts to improve coastal
security in the Gulf of Guinea. With more than US$3 billion
invested in Nigeria (mostly in the oil industry),the U.S.
has an obvious interest in a solution to the security
problems in the Delta. The situation was further complicated
by the November 12 attack on a Cameroonian military post in
the Bakassi peninsula, in which 20 gendarmes died. While the
identity of the assailants and their motive for attack are
still unknown, some observers believe this could have been an
attempt by militants to widen the conflict.

GAINING NIGERIAN SUPPORT FOR AFRICOM
--------------

6. (C) We believe that much of the Nigerian resistance to
Africom can be overcome by reminding the GON of the value
that Africom adds to USG humanitarian, counterterrorism, and
training efforts in Africa, and reassuring them that Africom
will not erode Nigerian sovereignty in any way. Nigerian
officials, publicly and privately, have expressed frustration
that their political and military leaders were not brought
into the discussion during Africom's early planning stages.
Always protocol conscious, the mere fact that senior command
leadership is visiting Abuja will go a long way toward
soothing offended sensibilities. Embassy Abuja's Public
Affairs Section is planning a press event, which will be a
good opportunity to publicly express USG acknowledgment of
and appreciation for Nigeria's leadership role in African
affairs, especially peacekeeping. While at this stage it is
unlikely that the GON will publicly reverse its stated
opposition to any West Africa-based Africom element, we
believe that your visit will mitigate the influence of some
of the continent's more strident Africom opponents, and may
ensure a more helpful behind-the-scenes role by the GON as
Africom progresses toward full operational status.
PIASCIK