NIGERIA: GOVT. PRACTICES - INFO COLLECTION,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ABUJA 002320

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF/W, S/CT MCKUNE
DEPT PASS TO NCTC, DHS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/31/2017
TAGS: KVPR PTER PREL PGOV PINR CVIS ASEC KHLS SNAR
NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: GOVT. PRACTICES - INFO COLLECTION,
SCREENING & SHARING

REF: SECSTATE 133921

Classified By: Political Counselor Walter Pflaumer for reasons 1.4. (b
& d).


1. (C) Below are responses to reftel information request on
GON information collecting, screening and sharing.


A. Watchlisting

(C) The government of Nigeria (GON) maintains a watchlist
which consists of binders with names and photographs of
individuals of interest, coded by threat (terrorist,
criminal, etc.) It is purportedly on hand at all border
crossing posts and updated regularly. The watchlist is
maintained by the Department of State Services (DSS),more
popularly known as the State Security Service (SSS) or
"Triple S." (Note: The Department, and particularly its
higher echelons, PolOff was told, typically refers to itself
as the DSS, while outsiders call it the SSS. END NOTE.)

(C) To put matters into perspective, the Nigerian Police
Force does not even have a database of its own members, let
alone a sophisticated, networked, electronic criminal or
watchlist database. Officials at the Economic and Financial
Crimes Commission and police have admitted to INL Off that no
criminal database in fact exists within the country. The
Inspector General of Police has asked for USG help in
developing a personnel database. (COMMENT: Given that
political violence in Nigeria occasionally results in the
torching of police stations, we wonder how many paper records
remain. END COMMENT)



B. Traveler Information Collection


(C) The Nigerian Immigration Service (NIS) collects Passenger
Name Record (PNR) data on incoming passengers for commercial
flights and vessels. The information is archived by the
Interior Ministry, though not electronically. Passengers are
screened by NIS officials as well as by DSS agents at each
border control post. The GON maintains that it shares and
coordinates watchlist information with neighboring countries.
Given limited technical infrastructure and financial
resources, advance passenger information systems are not in
place.


C. Border Control and Screening:

(C) Given the lack of technical infrastructure, including a
reliable power supply, travelers are not screened or tracked
electronically. Rather they are manually screened and
physically tracked, if deemed necessary or appropriate.
Hotels do report guests to the police and DSS, which has the
capability to track both foreigners and Nigerian citizens of
interest. COMMENT: A GON official pointed out to PolOff that
the DSS had become very adept and practiced at monitoring
dissidents and journalists during the Abacha regime. END
COMMENT.

(C) In principle, no entrants are simply "waived through"
without proper credentials, but officials of various agencies
admitted that the practice is not uncommon at border
crossings in remote areas by members of like ethnic groups.
No one would hazard a guess as to what percentage of border
crossings are unrecorded, though porous borders are a problem
Nigeria shares with most other Sub-Saharan African nations.
All GON officials expressed an interest in any assistance -
technical, financial, or otherwise - and training the USG
might consider providing. (COMMENT: PolOff recently sat in on
USG sponsored training on "Interdicting Terrorist Activities"
for staff of the various Nigerian security agencies, held at
the Office of the Nigerian National Security Adviser. The
course was very well received, and generated a lot of
goodwill and contacts for future collaborations. END COMMENT)

(C) Government border control officials do have the authority
to question, detain and deny entry to individuals who present
themselves at points of entry (POEs). Supposedly, each border
post has agents of not only the NIS, but also DSS and the

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National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA).

(C) According to the Office of the National Security Adviser
(ONSA),information sharing within the Nigerian government
functions reasonably well, though INL Off maintains he has
seen little evidence of information sharing at all. The DSS
in particular is reputed to share the least.


D. Biometric Collection

(C) On July 27, 2007 the GON introduced e-passports which
contain a data chip, produced in accordance with the
parameters and safety procedures of the International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO). The new e-passports include
biometric data in the form of fingerprints and digital
photographs embedded electronically. The new system, to be
phased in over three years, will allow for the development of
an electronic database of 20-30 million records, according to
an official in the Customs and Immigration section of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). The Interior Ministry
currently has cumulative paper records of 5 million passports
issued. (COMMENT: Even with widespread poverty, this number
seems remarkably low for the number of passports ever/ever
issued in a country of more than 140 million people. END
COMMENT) The new database, which is in the process of being
compiled from new passport applications, will help eliminate
problems of double acquisition of passports, substitution and
identity theft. Currently there is no plan to computerize the
old records, as old passports will phase out over the next
three years. By the end of 2010, all Nigerian passports will
be e-passports, and the old ones will be invalid.
Fingerprints for the new passports are taken flat, not
rolled. As of November 1, post has been unable to determine
whether they are NIST, INT-I, EFTS, UK1 or RTID compliant.
Will update in septel.

(C) According to the Comptroller-General of the NIS, Mr.
Chukwurah Joseph Udeh, the objective of the new documents,
besides enhanced security, is to restore the dignity of the
Nigerian passport and end the abuse and embarrassment of
Nigerians, who have been subjected to ridicule and challenge
at POEs abroad. Udeh has also said that the Federal Executive
Council approved the deployment of 147 gates, capable of
electronically capturing biometric data contained on the
chips embedded in the e-passports, to all POEs across the
country. In addition to its four international airports in
Lagos, Abuja, Port Harcourt (currently closed) and Kano,
Nigeria has 2 principal seaports in Lagos and Port Harcourt
and 22 official land crossings. Staff in the Office of the
National Security Adviser have assured PolOff that they
intend to share the public key for reading biometric passport
data with the USG and other governments.

(C) Since the biometric systems are in the process of being
instituted and installed, the GON is unaware of any
countermeasures to circumvent the checkpoints. An issue of
concern for the GON, however, is the ability of the gates to
function adequately at remote land crossings, where reliable
power sources may not be available. Such advanced technology
is of little use without power. Some POEs apparently have
neither telephone land lines, nor even reliable mobile
telecom coverage, which restricts officers' ability to confer
with local DSS offices regarding suspicious individuals,
resolve questions pertaining to the watchlist, and respond
accordingly.


E. Passports

(C) Further to the information above on the new e-passport
system, standard procedure has been to replace lost passports
with full validity (five years) passports that in no way
differ from other passports issued. GON has no special
procedures for "habitual" losers of passports, as they have
not previously been able to determine who such individuals
might be, given the lack of an electronic database.

(C) Post's Consular Section reports few incidents of
fraudulent passports, given that it has been relatively easy
to get a "real" Nigerian passport with fraudulent supporting
documents. Fraudulent visas, to demonstrate prior travel to,
and return from, developed countries, are detected, however.

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In such instances, the Consular Section sends the passports
involved to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) which
records the names for future reference. It is unclear if any
subsequent action is taken at the MFA.

(C) Of note, the GON issues a free, temporary travel
document, a special "hajj passport," to low income
individuals from rural areas to participate in the pilgrimage
to Mecca. (COMMENT Given that these documents lack
technological safeguards, one might expect a higher level of
fraud, though such documents are only valid for travel to
Saudi Arabia. Hence, said documents would pose more of a
potential threat to Saudi Arabia, than to our interests. END
COMMENT)


F. Fraud Detection

(C) Past Nigerian efforts at fraud detection have been
limited. Occasionally incidents of fraud have involved
prominent officials. (Note: Recently a group of 50
Nigerians, including the Deputy Minority Whip of the House of
Representatives and other parliamentarians, were refused
entry to Saudi Arabia upon arrival for the hajj and deported
because their Saudi visas were found to be fraudulent. The
politicians involved maintained that the fraud was
perpetrated by an unscrupulous travel agency. END NOTE.)


G. Privacy and Data Security

(C) Theoretically individuals have the right to request
access (or sue to get access) to sensitive data about
themselves held by Nigerian government agencies, but in
practice it is quite difficult. Often the government of
Nigeria will determine that such information is a matter of
national security, and the inquiry will then die. There are
privacy laws on the books for protecting access to sensitive
personal data which apply to all civil servants. In the
future, access to the e-passport database should be easier.


H. Immigration Data Bases

(C) As discussed above, there have previously been no
electronic databases. Institution of the e-passport marks
the advent of the electronic immigration database. Even as
the new system matures and gains more electronic records,
access to it at all POEs remains highly doubtful, given
Nigeria's lack of an integrated computer infrastructure
network, not to mention problems with the country's power
supply.


I. Watchlist and Information Sharing

See A. and B.


J. Biometrics

See D.


K. Identifying Appropriate Partners

(C) In January 2005, an anti-terrorism bill approved by the
Cabinet was sent to the National Assembly, where it remains.
It defines terrorism as "any action that may seriously damage
a country or international organization, unduly compel a
government or an international organization to perform or
abstain from performing an action or seriously intimidate or
destablize a population." The bill specifically excludes
from the definition of terrorism the disruption by protesters
of private or government business. COMMENT: For additional
perspective, Nigeria, with its many and occasionally attacked
oil platforms, has yet to ratify the 1988 UN Protocol for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed
Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf. Domestic
concerns and Delta politics work against the codification of
who or what constitutes a terrorist or terrorist act.

(C) Based on the past history of Nigeria's security services,
particularly their activities during the time of military
rule, we believe that there likely are political dissidents
included in DSS watchlists. During the Abacha regime, files
were kept not only on terrorists, but on individuals engaged

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in what was broadly defined as "action against the
government," journalists, "fundamentalists" (typically with
connections to Iran or Pakistan),and even evangelical
missionaries. The likely inclusion of such individuals on
watchlists for purely political reasons would pose problems
for U.S. cooperation.

(C) Although Nigeria's judicial system has made significant
strides in the past year in asserting its independence, it
remains subject to corruption, influence and political
manipulation. Post believes that at present the judiciary is
not capable of providing adequate safeguards for the
non-disclosure and protection of information. With continued
movement toward judicial independence and a seemingly strong
commitment to the rule of law from the current Yar'Adua
Administration, the situation may improve in the coming
years, at which time a fresh assessment of the situation will
be warranted. END COMMENT.
PIASCIK