Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07ABUJA1545
2007-07-20 06:21:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Abuja
Cable title:  

NIGERIA: AMBASSADOR'S END OF TOUR OBSERVATIONS

Tags:  PGOV NI 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO7818
PP RUEHPA
DE RUEHUJA #1545/01 2010621
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 200621Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY ABUJA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0301
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHWR/AMEMBASSY WARSAW PRIORITY 0455
RUEHCD/AMCONSUL CIUDAD JUAREZ PRIORITY 0456
RUEHOS/AMCONSUL LAGOS PRIORITY 7435
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABUJA 001545 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DOE FOR CAROLYN GAY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/18/2017
TAGS: PGOV NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: AMBASSADOR'S END OF TOUR OBSERVATIONS

ABUJA 00001545 001.2 OF 003


Classified by Ambassador Campbell for Reasons 1.4 b. and d.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABUJA 001545

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DOE FOR CAROLYN GAY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/18/2017
TAGS: PGOV NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: AMBASSADOR'S END OF TOUR OBSERVATIONS

ABUJA 00001545 001.2 OF 003


Classified by Ambassador Campbell for Reasons 1.4 b. and d.


1. (C) Summary: In Africa, Nigeria has been indispensable to the
U.S. It supplies a growing percentage of our oil and gas, is the
site of our second largest investment on the continent (albeit almost
solely in oil and gas),and, with up to one-quarter of the population
of sub-Saharan Africa, it has the heft to partner with us on multiple
regional and international issues. The non-official links are also
close and most Nigerians remain pro-American. Nevertheless, Islamic
radicalism is present in the impoverished North, and militant
activity in the Delta directly threatens U.S. strategic interests.
There follows end-of-tour observations about where the Yar'Adua
administration may be headed and how we may continue to encourage
Nigeria's political and economic evolution so that it can better
shoulder responsibilities congruent with its size, wealth and
potential. End Summary.


2. (U) Nigeria was cobbled together by the British out of disparate
tribes and cultures only a century ago. The Macmillan government
made a conscious decision not to divide the country into smaller,
more "rational" states at independence in 1960. Since then, the
"Nigeria experiment" (as the elites like to call it) -- the vision of
a huge nation of numerous tribes and religions united by democracy,
pursuit of economic development, governance according to the rule of
law and playing a major role on the world stage - has been embraced
as the national aspiration and as a focus for a common identity.
Though democracy as the national ideal has persisted through coups,
civil war, and military rule, commitment to its implementation by the
political classes has been variable and incomplete. Much of the
population is probably poorer now than it was at independence,
despite riches from oil and gas; conventionally this sorry state is
ascribed to economic mismanagement and military rule. But, Nigeria
has also seen its population expand faster than its non-petrochemical
resources, despite its heavy disease burden and one of the shortest
average life spans in the world outside war zones.


3. (C) Since the end of military rule in 1998, Nigeria has had

three elections, each less credible than its predecessor. In the run
up to the 2007 elections, all the major political parties violated
their internal rules and procedures, and there was little or no
pretense of a broad based political process leading to the selection
of party nominees. President Obasanjo selected Umaru Yar'Adua and
Goodluck Jonathan as the ruling Peoples Democratic Party (PDP)
presidential and vice presidential candidates without much
consultation, and he persuaded or coerced rival aspirants to
withdraw. Bribery, intimidation and violence were widespread
throughout the nominating and campaigning process, involving all the
parties. Actual voter turnout, as opposed to International National
Elections Commission (INEC) reports, was abysmal, and in too many
places there was little relationship between votes cast and results
announced by INEC.


4. (U) In the aftermath, Nigeria looks to be well on its way to
becoming a one-party state, though without any integrated party
political principles, platform or charismatic leader, and with
ex-President Obasanjo the party leader for life. (The formal title
is Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the PDP.) The extent to
which the ex-President will withdraw from active exercise of power
under his successor, President Yar'Adua, remains an open question.


5. (C) Nevertheless, during President Obasanjo's eight-year
administration, military in style in so many ways, a democratic
culture did continue to develop, if by fits and starts. Three
elections, no matter how bad they were, seem to have established the
principle that regimes in Nigeria change through at least the
pretence of elections rather than by military coup and May 29 marked
Nigeria's first transition from one civilian president to another.
Defeat of President Obasanjo's Third Term aspirations confirmed the
maxim that there are no Nigerian presidents for life, even if it
remains to be seen whether there will be a ruling party leader for
life.


6. (C) The 2007 presidential transition endorsed the principle of
alternation between a Northern and Southern Presidency, probably
enhancing political stability. The judiciary showed the potential,
if not always the reality, of independence from the executive,
especially at its upper reaches. That trend has been strengthened
since President Yar'Adua's inauguration by the Supreme Court's ruling
in favor of Peter Obi in Anambra state against the wishes of
Obasanjo's circle, and by the President ordering the ruling
PRIORITYly to be enforced. A year earlier, in May 2006, the National
Assembly asserted its prerogatives and blocked President Obasanjo's

ABUJA 00001545 002.2 OF 003


efforts to amend the constitution so that he could run for a third
term. At the Villa, the conduct of business by President Obasanjo
acquired a certain orderly patina congruent with playing by the
rules. There were weekly cabinet meetings that discussed real issues
in place of the secret deliberations of the Armed Forces Ruling
Council. Though gender relations in Nigeria are more problematic
than appearances suggest, President Obasanjo appointed more women to
more powerful government positions than any of his predecessors. And
there was significant growth in official transparency, the
publication of the Federal government's monthly financial allocation
to each of the states being but one example. (However, we cannot
confirm that the amount the Federal government says it disburses is
actually received by the states, not least because of the lack of
transparency in Nigeria's fiscal arrangements.)


7. (C) President Yar'Adua's personal political direction remains
unclear. He is Nigeria's first university graduate head of state and
the first civilian in more than twenty years (leaving aside the brief
Shonekan interregnum). There are seeming contradictions in his
background and makeup. He is a Muslim who has never visited the U.S.
and was the second state governor to institute Sharia law. But, as a
young man, he showed Marxist proclivities despite his Northern
grandee origins, and he was not a political ally of his brother, the
venerated Shehu Yar'Adua. In Katsina, he demonstrated a stubborn,
remote, passive bent and the word on the street is that his
cooperation with the deputy governor and the state legislature was
poor. Yet, especially by the usual standards of Nigerian political
life, he is free of the odor of corruption. He personally is rich, as
he revealed when he made public his assets, the first Nigerian chief
of state to do so. He has not demonstrated overweening ambition and
there is credible evidence that President Obasanjo forced the
presidency on him. He continues to be surrounded by many of those
prominent in the previous administration. The heads of the various
security services and the military remain the former President's
picks. He has yet to put his personal stamp on the new government.
That may change soon as cabinet positions are filled.


8. (C) On the other hand, President Yar'Adua's inaugural address
acknowledged the shortcomings of the elections that brought him to
power, and he pledged to continue his predecessor's reform agenda. He
has stated that improved relations between the Executive and the
National Assembly is a priority, and that he will present to it for
endorsement his plan to address the festering situation in the Niger
Delta. He is free of personal bombast. By ordering the PRIORITY
implementation of the Supreme Court's ruling in favor of Peter Obi he
demonstrated active support for the rule of law. (His predecessor
ignored Supreme Court rulings he did not like.) His personal style
in approaching the first challenge to his administration, a general
strike provoked by fuel price increases and other measures introduced
by President Obasanjo in his last days in office, demonstrated a
willingness to work with his opponents as well as his friends. In
short, there is the possibility that President Yar'Adua himself may
have a greater disposition toward the rule of law than his
predecessor and the political networks that brought him to power. If
over the next few months there is convincing evidence that this is
so, we may need to distinguish more sharply between Yar'Adua the
person and the system that placed him in the presidency, yet over
which he has demonstrated to date little control.


9. (C) The challenge for us is to support those in Nigeria working
toward democracy conducted according to the rule of law and an open
economy conducive to economic development while at the same time
partnering with the Yar'Adua government on areas of mutual interest,
despite its winning power through flawed elections. While engaging
with the Yar'Adua government, it will serve our long-term interests
to be identified strongly with the pro-democratic, pro-free market
elements in Nigerian society, whether to be found in the ruling party
or in the opposition.


10. (C) As for President Yar'Adua himself, we should do all that we
can to encourage him to support the rule of law and democratic
institutions - especially since that appears to be his bent. We
should continue to encourage him to put his own stamp on his
administration. He understands that the credibility of his
government is questioned by many Nigerians, and he wants U.S.
approval, not least to buttress his position at home. That approval
should be forthcoming in response to the positive steps he takes with
respect to election reform at home and fulfillment of Nigeria's
commitments in other parts of Africa, especially Darfur and Somalia.
Given his pro-democracy/rule of law signals and the importance of
Nigeria in Darfur and Somalia, it is probably ripe for a low-key,
presidential meeting, perhaps in conjunction with President

ABUJA 00001545 003.2 OF 003


Yar'Adua's visit to New York for the UNGA.


11. (C) Our engagement with the National Assembly, the courts and
various economic, health and education ministries should continue and
be intensified. The National Assembly and the increasingly
independent judiciary are in many ways driving the development of a
democratic culture and look to us for assistance in capacity
building. Cabinet departments are foci for our humanitarian
assistance ranging from PEPFAR to girl-child education, and for
economic development in sectors ranging from cassava to fish to bird
flu. They also involve implementing partners drawn from civil society
and are important to building at the grass-roots a long-term
bilateral relationship. PEPFAR has been a resounding success for
U.S. programs and policy in partnership with Nigerian officialdom and
civil society, with the HIV/AIDS prevalence rate not increasing and
possibly actually declining, raising the possibility that Nigeria may
avoid the disease cataclysms of southern Africa. Indeed, his
unswerving support for PEPFAR and his efforts to de-stigmatize
victims of HIV/AIDS may be judged by history to be President
Obasanjo's greatest domestic achievement. PEPFAR must continue as a
U.S. priority in Nigeria.


12. (C) Similarly, we should continue to move ahead with building
the military-to-military relationship, with a particular emphasis on
U.S. provision of training opportunities. It is in our own interest
that the Nigerian military be more professional with a better
understanding of its role in a civilian, democratic polity. And a
better trained, better equipped military are essential if Nigeria is
to play the regional peacekeeping role that its size and political
importance dictates. The current uniformed military leadership may be
less suspicious of U.S. military intentions than its predecessors; it
remains to be seen whether a future Minister of Defense in the
Yar'Adua government will be a player; under Obasanjo, the Minister
was a cipher. While there are likely to be new opportunities, we must
proceed with caution, not least because of Northern, Islamic
sensitivities.


13. (C) The states are now supposed to receive about half of
Nigeria's petroleum revenue. Despite these putative riches, many or
most are woefully undeveloped in governance and the state and local
elections in 2007 were often as bad as the national ones. Our
assistance to state assemblies and to lower courts should continue to
discriminate between those where we can make a difference and those
where our intervention is premature.


14. (C) And our Muslim outreach efforts should not flag. Islam in
Nigeria is in flux, not least because of the rapid expansion of
Christianity. Given the close identification of evangelical and
Pentecostal Christianity with the U.S. here, it is imperative that we
continue to strengthen our ties with Nigerian Muslims through a
variety of exchange programs and maintenance of such ongoing public
affairs initiatives as the American Corners. If the North sees
President Yar'Adua as genuinely independent of the former President,
then a growing official relationship would compliment Muslim
outreach. If, however, the North turns against President Yar'Adua as
an Obasanjo cats-paw, then our influence in the North is likely to
decline as we partner with the Nigerian government on regional or
continental issues.
CAMPBELL