Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07ABUJA1508
2007-07-13 12:54:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Abuja
Cable title:  

NIGERIAN PEACEKEEPING INITIATIVES PARALYZED BY

Tags:  MARR MASS PINR PREL NI 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO2023
PP RUEHPA
DE RUEHUJA #1508/01 1941254
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 131254Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY ABUJA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0247
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUEHWR/AMEMBASSY WARSAW 0442
RUEHCD/AMCONSUL CIUDAD JUAREZ 0443
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/CDR USTRANSCOM SCOTT AFB IL
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/COMSOCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 001508 

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/13/2017
TAGS: MARR MASS PINR PREL NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIAN PEACEKEEPING INITIATIVES PARALYZED BY
GOVERNMENT INERTIA

REF: A. A: ABUJA 01320

B. B: ABUJA 01265

ABUJA 00001508 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: Ambassador John Campbell for Reasons 1.4 (b and d).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 001508

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/13/2017
TAGS: MARR MASS PINR PREL NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIAN PEACEKEEPING INITIATIVES PARALYZED BY
GOVERNMENT INERTIA

REF: A. A: ABUJA 01320

B. B: ABUJA 01265

ABUJA 00001508 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: Ambassador John Campbell for Reasons 1.4 (b and d).


1. (S//NF) SUMMARY: There has been little progress in recent
months within the Government of Nigeria (GON) to expand its
peacekeeping role in Darfur and Somalia under the African
Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) and African Union Mission to
Somalia (AMISOM). The GON has been without ministerial
leadership since late May and civil service Permanent
Secretaries leading ministries in the interim are reluctant

SIPDIS
to make decisions on their behalf. Furthermore, Yar'adua and
his advisers appear ill-equipped to pick up the slack.
Accordingly, this dearth of effective centralized
decision-making capacity within the GON is likely to continue
to delay GON cooperation on international peacekeeping
missions. END SUMMARY.

--------------
Nigerian Military Stalled on Peacekeeping
--------------


2. (C//NF) There has been little progress in recent months
within the GON to expand its peacekeeping role in Darfur and
Somalia. As of mid-July, the Nigerian battalion designated
for deployment in Somalia, the last battalion in the training
pipeline, still needed extensive ground and peace keeping
operations training. Nigerian Chief of Defense Staff (CDS)
General Azazi described the unit as "on stand-by" but as
having significant deficiencies (reftel A).


3. (C//NF) The Nigerian military lacks the equipment to
independently deploy troops to Darfur and Somalia. The
Nigerian Navy owns two blue-water vessels, one of which is
not operational due to lack of spare parts. The Nigerian Air
Force owns nine C-130 aircraft but eight are in various
states of disrepair and cannot fly. Its one functional C-130
has no props and undergoing periodic depot maintenance (PDM)
in France, which may take as much as six months to complete.
As of mid-July, the Nigerian Air Force was considering
selling three non-functional C-130s to a private buyer,

proceeds from which may allow it to purchase functional
aircraft. The GON relied on the UK for assistance in recent
deployments to the peacekeeping theater and requested
approximately USD 1 million from the UK to fund
transportation to Somalia for the battalion, but did not
provide an expected deployment date. The GON also considered
deploying troops using Nigerian commercial air carriers.


4. (C//NF) DATT reports that the Nigerian army has requested
training under the Africa Contingency Operations Training and
Assistance (ACOTA) program for six battalions during calendar
year 2008 - 4 for peacekeeping operations in Sudan, 1 for
Somalia, and 1 as stand-by for Somalia. Under this schedule,
a fully-trained peacekeeping battalion would be available for
deployment during third-quarter 2008 at the earliest.
However, the Nigerian army's ACOTA training record for 2006
is not encouraging and keeping to this schedule may prove
difficult. In 2006 the first battalion to undergo ACOTA
training had its commander replaced immediately after
completing training. The second battalion arrived late and
unprepared for training. Three company commanders failed to
report and the battalion had insufficient ammunition to
conduct live-fire training exercises. The third battalion
also arrived late and was undermanned and lacked sufficient
weapons or vehicles to progress beyond individual skills
training exercises. (COMMENT: At this time we doubt
Nigeria's designated AMISOM battalion can maintain
self-sufficiency for the six months required by the African
Union (AU) and have no indication as to when it is scheduled
to deploy to Somalia.)


5. (C//NF) Regarding domestic Nigerian peacekeeping
operations, the Nigerian Joint Task Force (JTF) in the Niger
Delta is fractured along service lines, with the army, navy,
and air force engaging in separate operations. DATT reports
the new JTF commander is still assessing this situation and
has not yet taken action to harmonize services under his

ABUJA 00001508 002.2 OF 002


command. One oil company security representative also noted
the JTF's effectiveness is hindered by endemic corruption and
JTF complicity in illegal oil bunkering.

--------------
Centralized Decision-Making Absent
--------------


6. (C//NF) Although unable to hide glaring deficiencies, the
army says it is ready to deploy peacekeeping troops but has
received no "political direction" to do so. Likewise, the
police remain largely directionless under an acting Inspector
General (IGP) who is preoccupied with reorganizing the force
and addressing allegations of corruption at all levels. Both
the military and police are also likely to experience
wholesale retirements in the near future.


7. (C//NF) The GON has been without ministerial leadership
since late May and civil service Permanent Secretaries
leading ministries in the interim are reluctant to make
decisions on their behalf. With no ministers in place, both
senior military and civilian career personnel are becoming
increasingly frustrated. The Nigerian Senate is slowly
confirming ministerial candidates, and protracted
negotiations and petitions over ministerial and senior
executive positions and their portfolios threaten to slow the
process even further.


8. (S//NF) In the absence of ministerial leadership,
Yar'adua and his advisers appear ill-equipped to pick up the
slack. While the Yar'adua administration appears to be
making the right noises on a variety of public policy issues,
its capacity to implement policy remains lacking. According
to a well-placed source within the Presidential villa,
Secretary to the Government of the Federation Babagana

SIPDIS
Kingibe is stymied as his memos and recommendations are
piling on the President's desk. The same source claimed that
Yar'adua is aloof. He "retires at 4:00pm" and does not work
after afternoon prayers, possibly due to poor health.

--------------
Strategy/Recommendation
--------------


9. (S//NF) With no ministers in place and civil service
leadership reluctant to act, it is virtually impossible to
engage the GON on these issues at this time. We also assess
that additional high-level USG pressure on the GON to honor
its AMIS and AMISOM commitments would be ineffective because
Yar'adua's fledgling administration is already struggling to
meet its myriad public policy demands. A/S Frazer raised
Nigeria's commitment to AU peacekeeping missions with
President Yar'adua during their May 29 meeting, and Yar'adua
pledged to review the issue (reftel B). However, a dearth of
effective centralized decision-making capacity within the GON
is likely to continue to delay GON cooperation on
international peacekeeping missions.


10. (C//NF) We will continue to engage the Nigerian
military, as appropriate, to reiterate USG offers for
materiel support for peacekeeping and training missions. The
US military is currently coordinating plans with EUCOM for a
joint training operation with the Nigerian military.
However, the Nigerian military continues to delay in
identifying specific materiel deficiencies that the USG may
be able to meet (reftel A).
CAMPBELL