OIL COMPANY REPRESENTATIVE TALKS HOSTAGES, DELTA,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 001368

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DOE FOR CAROLYN GAY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/26/2017
TAGS: PGOV PINR ENRG NI
SUBJECT: OIL COMPANY REPRESENTATIVE TALKS HOSTAGES, DELTA,
AND SAO TOME

REF: A. LAGOS 00415 AND PREVIOUS


B. LAGOS 00422

C. ABUJA 01172

ABUJA 00001368 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: Political Counselor Russell J. Hanks for Reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Emboffs on June 8 met with a representative
of Chevron Nigeria Ltd. (CNL) to discuss the events leading
up to the June 2 release of six CNL employees kidnapped on
May 1 in Bayelsa State. The representative indicated Bayelsa
State officials leaned heavily on CNL for supplies and
logistical support and suggested that ransom payments by
State officials had become a routine practice. He personally
believed a military solution would be necessary to resolve
the Delta conflict and envisioned a role for the State to pay
or find opportunities for unemployed youths as a way to keep
future militants at bay. The representative privately
reiterated CNL's "wait-and-see" position on the Nigeria-Sao
Tome Joint Development Zone (JDZ). END SUMMARY.

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State Government, Kidnappers Have Outstretched Hands
-------------- --------------


2. (C) Emboffs on June 8 met with Chevron Nigeria Ltd. (CNL)
Representative Mansur Aliyu (Protect) to discuss the events
leading up to the June 2 release of six CNL employees
kidnapped on May 1 in Bayelsa State (reftel A). Aliyu
offered details relating to the hostage negotiations between
the Bayelsa State government and kidnappers noting that
Bayelsa State officials leaned heavily on CNL for supplies
and logistical support throughout the negotiations. Bayelsa
State officials asked CNL to supply medication and food to
pass on to the hostages, which CNL refused citing this was
the State's responsibility. Officials also requested the use
of CNL's helicopter to deliver these supplies, which CNL also
refused on grounds that the kidnappers would be likely to
assault the helicopter and take its crew hostage.


3. (C) Aliyu told Emboffs that on June 2, Bayelsa State
Governor Timipreye Silva personally secured the release of
the CNL hostages, including Amcit John Stapleton (reftel A),
and collected them with the use of CNL's helicopter. Aliyu
also alleged that the Bayelsa State government had paid the
kidnappers the "usual amount" (NFI) for the hostages'
release, suggesting that this had become a routine practice
in Bayelsa State hostage negotiations. He was very clear
that the Bayelsa State government paid this ransom from State
funds and that CNL was not involved in the ransom payment.


4. (C) Aliyu was critical of the supposedly widespread
practice in which State Governments and companies paid
ransoms to kidnappers. As an example, he cited the June 1
kidnapping of ten Indian nationals from the Indorama Eleme
Petrochemical housing compound in Rivers State (reftel B).
Aliyu indicated the company had paid the kidnappers N40
million (about USD 31,000),but that the kidnappers would not
release the hostages until the company paid the balance of
their N150 million (about USD 118,000) ransom demand. (Note:
The ten Indian hostages were released on June 17.)

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A Peace Tax and A Military Solution
--------------


5. (C) Aliyu thought insecurity in the Niger Delta was
compounded when militants and/or criminal gangs imposed an
implicit tax on construction companies operating in the
region. This "tax" made necessary infrastructure projects
unprofitable. He posited the States could encourage these
projects by either shouldering this "tax" by paying-off
youths or providing them employment opportunities. Even
though this probably would open the door for ghost workers
and other types of corruption, he described this potential
practice as "padding contracts for peace."


6. (C) Aliyu believed the only credible way to address

ABUJA 00001368 002.2 OF 002


Delta insecurity would be to use force. However, he thought
President Yar'adua's decision to give key executive and
security posts, such as the Vice President and the Chief of
Defense Staff to Ijaws was a "blunder" and would complicate
their ability to address insecurity in their home region, the
Niger Delta.


7. (C) COMMENT: While Aliyu advocated the use of force and
payoffs to assuage Niger Delta militancy and criminality,
these opinions reflected his personal views. Oil companies
could see a backlash from militants and local communities in
the face of widespread military action in the Niger Delta and
would discourage these moves to avoid being seen as complicit
with any military excesses.


8. (C) COMMENT (Continued): Aliyu's comment that having
Ijaw's in high level government posts would hamstring their
ability to objectively address Niger Delta insecurity and
development downplays the potential benefit of high level
representation from the South-South in garnering local
support and advocating the region's issues at the federal
level. However, as Aliyu alludes, their acceptability among
many Niger Delta communities is likely to depend on their
ability to engage the region's minority ethnic groups and
mobilize the political will to address the Delta's myriad
security and development challenges.

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Joint Development Zone
--------------


9. (SBU) Aliyu also discussed CNL's operations in the
Nigeria-Sao Tome Joint Development Zone (JDZ),indicating it
had suspended operations in the JDZ after announcing its
Obo-1 exploration well did not contain commercial quantities
of hydrocarbons (reftel C). Aliyu reiterated CNL's position
that CNL had not written-off the JDZ and was waiting to see
what companies find in other JDZ concession blocks before
resuming exploration drilling. He was skeptical that
companies would find significant commercial quantities in
other blocks and said CNL assessed Block 1, where the Obo-1
well is located, had the best prospects of the JDZ concession
blocks.
CAMPBELL