Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07ABUJA1155
2007-06-07 13:22:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Abuja
Cable title:  

NIGERIA: LABOR LEADERS EXPLAIN POST-ELECTION

Tags:  ELAB PGOV PREL KDEM NI 
pdf how-to read a cable
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ZNY CCCCC ZZH
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FM AMEMBASSY ABUJA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9777
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUEHWR/AMEMBASSY WARSAW 0353
RUEHCD/AMCONSUL CIUDAD JUAREZ 0354
RUEHOS/AMCONSUL LAGOS 7059
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHC/DEPT OF LABOR WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 001155 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR DRL, AF/W
DOL FOR SUDHA DALEY
DOE FOR CAROLYN GAY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/06/2017
TAGS: ELAB PGOV PREL KDEM NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: LABOR LEADERS EXPLAIN POST-ELECTION
ACTIONS

REF: ABUJA 1091

ABUJA 00001155 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: Deputy Political Counselor Heather Merritt for reasons 1
.4. (b & d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 001155

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR DRL, AF/W
DOL FOR SUDHA DALEY
DOE FOR CAROLYN GAY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/06/2017
TAGS: ELAB PGOV PREL KDEM NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: LABOR LEADERS EXPLAIN POST-ELECTION
ACTIONS

REF: ABUJA 1091

ABUJA 00001155 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: Deputy Political Counselor Heather Merritt for reasons 1
.4. (b & d).


1. (C) SUMMARY. President of the Nigeria Labour Congress
(NLC) Adulwaheed Ibrahim Omar and President of the Trade
Union Congress (TUC) Peter Esele told Poloff they had made a
conscious decision not to call their union members into the
street following the April elections. The labor leaders
sought to avoid "anarchy," which could have provided Obasanjo
with reason to declare a state of emergency and postpone the
transition. The labor leaders believe they did their part to
keep the peace and what they want from Yar'adua in return is
to be heard. The 14-day ultimatum is a shot over Yar'adua's
bow and, according to Omar, the length of the strike will
depend on the engagement of the GON in the coming days.
Esele indicated the crux of the problem is a lack of
consultation with labor. The two said they expect a
favorable working relationship with Yar'adua himself, though
they are concerned about the influence of those around him.
They have not been able to meet with Yar'adua since the
elections. END SUMMARY.


2. (SBU) Poloff met with Nigeria Labor Congress (NLC)
President Adulwaheed Ibrahim Omar, Trade Union Congress (TUC)
President Peter Esele and NLC Parliamentary Liaison Officer
Benson Upah on June 6 to talk about the elections, the 14-day
ultimatum, and prospects for working with the new
administration.

LABOR'S REACTION TO THE APRIL ELECTIONS
--------------


3. (C) Omar and Esele told Poloff the two met immediately
after the failed elections and made a conscious decision to
keep the peace. They decided against calling for a strike
that would bring people into the street, indicating they felt
the outcome would be anarchy, which could provide Obasanjo
with reason to declare a state of emergency and postpone the
transition. The labor leaders viewed the possibility of a
non-elected interim government as no better than a

coup-installed military government. The result, according
the Esele, is still a non-elected government that has no
legitimacy and no reason to answer to the people. That said,
they were both quick to point out that Yar'adua also has a
crisis of legitimacy on his hands -- all the more reason,
according to Esele, that he needs to listen to what labor has
to say. Omar told Poloff the leaders believe strongly that
labor "is not an opposition to the government, but a check on
the government." He pointed out that labor's situation is
very different than that of civil society because labor has
to maintain a relationship with the government in order to
serve its constituents.


4. (C) Omar told Poloff the NLC and TUC teamed up for the May
Day celebration and kept a tight reign on the events in order
to ensure that they could keep they day peaceful and
labor-focused. The May 28-29 sit-at-home strike (reftel) was
also planned as a way to vent frustration, but keep people at
home (i.e., not on the streets). (NOTE: Esele told Poloff
Obasanjo called him at 4 am on May 25, telling him to call
off the strike. Esele ignored the request.)

THE 14-DAY ULTIMATUM
--------------


5. (C) Omar described their plan in the post-election period
as "checkmating" Yar'adua. Omar and Esele told Poloff they
did what they could to promote peace after the elections.
What they want from Yar'adua in return is engagement and
dialog. Esele commented that "its too early in the day (for
Yar'adua) to pick a fight with labor, especially given the
legitimacy questions."


6. (SBU) On May 31, the two organizations issued a 14-day
ultimatum to the GON calling for four specific actions: (1)

ABUJA 00001155 002.2 OF 002


rescind the fuel price increase announced by Obasanjo on May
26 from 65 to 75 Naira per liter, (2) rescind the recent VAT
increase from five to ten percent, (3) reverse the sale of
the Port Harcourt and Kaduna refineries and (4) implement the
15 percent salary hike for public servants in effect from
January 2007. The ultimatum indicates the NLC and TUC are
prepared to call for an indefinite national strike if their
demands are not met.


7. (C) Omar told Poloff that in actuality the duration of a
strike would depend entirely on the level of engagement from
the GON. What they are after in this case is not fulfillment
of all four demands. Rather, they are seeking dialog and
consultation. Omar said the he and Esele are prepared to be
flexible and that privatization of the refineries (for
example) is not necessarily a bad thing. Even a reduction of
the workforce at the refineries would not be uncalled for, he
admitted. What labor wants, however, is consultation and a
procedure that ensures payments of wage arrears and severance
packages.


8. (SBU) The two labor leaders reported they have had no
contact with the GON since the inauguration. In fact, Omar
said the ultimatum had become necessary because they had
received no response to their joint letter sent to Yar'adua
following the inauguration. According to Omar, they had
waited three days for a response and then, when none arrived,
issued the ultimatum. (NOTE: Yar'adua's administration has
yet to acknowledge receipt of the letter.) Omar and Esele
were both optimistic that the GON would respond to their
ultimatum, though they noted that in true Nigerian style, it
would be only at the last possible moment.


9. (C) COMMENT. The lack of contact with the GON is not a
good sign and in the end the 14-day ultimatum may be the
victim of bad timing. With no new Labor Minister yet
appointed and the Permanent Secretary "forcibly retired" in
late May, there is no one at the Ministry of Labour to
mediate the negotiations and it seems likely that labor may
have to live up to their threat to strike. END COMMENT.

LOOKING BACK, LOOKING FORWARD
--------------


10. (C) Omar and Esele were both optimistic about the
Yar'adua presidency, though they expressed concern about the
influence those close to Yar'adua may have. The criticized
the Obasanjo administration, saying that Obasanjo had
promoted a pure form of cronyism concerned only with amassing
wealth. They told Poloff they believe Yar'adua will take
action against corruption and be a supporter of labor. The
crux of the labor problem now, according to Esele, is lack of
consultation. Both agreed they expect a change under
Yar'adua's leadership.
CAMPBELL