NIGERIA ELECTION AFTERMATH: FURTHER SUGGESTIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABUJA 001012

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DOE FOR CAROLYN GAY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/21/2017
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL KDEM NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA ELECTION AFTERMATH: FURTHER SUGGESTIONS
FOR A WAY FORWARD

REF: ABUJA 911

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Classified By: Ambassador John Campbell for reasons 1.4. (b) & (d).


1. (C) As both international and domestic observers
reported, the April elections took place in a political
environment of manipulation, bribery, intimidation and
outright fraud. Independent observers (including IRI and
NDI) have been clear in their assessments of the shortcomings
of the elections and have pointed out the difficulties in
reforming a process without reform-minded politicians at the
helm. Some regime insiders fail to understand the statements
that have been issued so far by the USG and HMG-- or pretend
they do. They choose to read our statements, perhaps in a
self-serving manner, as endorsements of the outcome of the
electoral process.


2. (C) The USG engaged the GON on electoral reforms after
the 1999 elections, and USAID programs focused on
strengthening INEC and civil society. Again in 2003, after
the disappointment of an election appreciably worse than that
of 1999, we engaged and funded Nigeria's electoral efforts
with at least $15 million in support for INEC and civil
society. In 2007, the USG should back our funding of reform
initiatives with a clear political message underscoring the
importance of achieving real progress. Without a clear,
coordinated political message, the GON will again feel no
pressure to truly implement changes and instead will likely
continue merely to talk of reform.


3. (C) Since the April electoral period, Nigeria remains
tense. Sporadic demonstrations and election-related violence
have continued and the stern warnings of the Nigerian Police
Force (NPF) threatening violence against demonstrators
contribute to an increased sense of insecurity. Niger Delta
security has deteriorated significantly, with at least two
bombings of oil facilities, 5 kidnappings of U.S. citizens,
and numerous community confrontations in the past three
weeks. The attack on the Bayelsa State House the evening
before the Presidential Election followed several weeks later
followed by the destruction of Bayelsa Governor and
Vice-President-elect Goodluck Jonathan's house in his home
state, allegedly by members of his own ethnic group, and
continued threats of more attacks by militants in the area
have lowered expectations of any quick solution. The threat
of military action, with its potential for more human rights
abuses and for increasing the tensions in the area, is real.


4. (C) The electoral tribunals identified by the
international community as the means to correct the worst of
the electoral excesses have been slow to start and confusion
remains over the procedures they will follow. It is too
early to tell if the tribunals will be able to function
independently. Still, the mood throughout the country is
that something is needed to correct the electoral
malpractices, and civil society and the political opposition
are calling for demonstrations and protests to overturn many
elections. It is likely that the election tribunals will
overturn some results and possible that a few successful
challenges could create the environment for further changes.


5. (C) Faced with this situation, the USG could embrace a
series of actions to set the tone for addressing the
widespread disaffection with the electoral process, and
democracy in general, which continues to grow in the
aftermath of the April election.

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USG's Long Term Interests
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6. (C) First and foremost among USG interests in Nigeria
must be stability. According to the CIA World Factbook,
Nigeria has generated over 250,000 internally displaced
persons (IDPs) in recent years and, thousands more have died
in political, economic and inter-communal violence. The
trend is going in the wrong direction. In response, we
should devote our efforts to addressing the root causes of
the political instability in an effort to prevent a
humanitarian crisis. We should build on USG anti-corruption

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support to date and put verifiable economic progress that
benefits Nigerians at the forefront.


7. (C) The stability of the Niger Delta and the continued
production of oil are key interests of the USG. While the
Obasanjo government has paid lip service to the development
of the Niger Delta, concrete action has not followed, and a
resulting lack of trust impedes effective action in future.
The engineers of the underdevelopment of this energy-rich
region of Nigeria are still in power and have no incentive to
change. Without representation in government, the insurgency
in the Niger Delta will continue to disrupt oil production
and could spread to neighboring regions. The USG should make
every effort to support legitimate leadership and serious
developmental initiatives, but should not hide its skepticism
when programs announced (but usually never implemented) are
less than credible.


8. (C) Halting corruption is a necessity if Nigeria is to
move towards responsible governance. Stealing the nation
through an election is not a good start on this path. The
Nigerian leadership's commitment to anti-corruption efforts
is in serious doubt, at least among many Nigerians, who say
the once-lauded Economic and Financial Crimes Commission
(EFCC) has run off its tracks. The actual conviction rate of
the organization is small, and many Nigerians think it has
been transformed into a political tool to intimidate
opponents of the PDP party leadership. The USG should work
to put the EFCC back on track to operate independently in its
attack on corruption throughout the economic system. The
Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC) should also
be reinvigorated to pursue political corruption as it was
originally intended. The independence of these organizations
and the judiciary is vital to any efforts to put Nigerian on
the path to serious reform.


9. (C) The USG should continue to be intensely interested in
economic transparency. A thriving Nigerian economy would
open a potential 140-million-person market to U.S.
investment. While Obasanjo and his administration have
talked of economic transparency, the end result has been less
than impressive. The continuing diversion of state funds to
private individuals and the preferential sale of assets to
regime insiders must stop before any serious investor outside
the energy sector will consider Nigeria. For Nigerians to
take part in a global economy, opportunity must be available
to all, not just the elite who happen to be in power.
Nigeria's commitment to invest in education, health care and
other social services should also be examined, not just the
official pronouncements but also through the impact of such
spending on the ground. These investments should be
transparently beneficial to Nigerians as well as the
international community.


10. (C) The USG's interest is in developing democracy
globally. While the USG had hoped that a free and fair
election in Nigeria would set the example for other nations,
Nigeria's blatantly rigged process provides a very different
example. Secretary Rice recently said that the alternative
to "well-governed, democratic states" is "failed states or
authoritarian regimes." The USG has a strong interest in
preventing either of these outcomes in Nigeria. We need to
ensure that our actions here provide the right message to
other nations around the world contemplating a similar
electoral process.

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A SUGGESTED WAY FORWARD
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11. (C) The following are concrete, specific suggestions of
actions the USG could take to prevent Nigeria's continued
descent into political failure. They follow on the points
made in reftel.

-- The USG should deliver strong, unequivocal messages, both
publicly and privately, that we disapprove of the autocratic
tactics used to install the next administration. These
messages should be reinforced with strong support for civil
society and the electoral tribunals and encouragement to

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aggrieved political parties to challenge the electoral
charade through every legal means, recognizing that these
likely will include public and peaceful demonstrations and
strikes. The USG should encourage efforts by the Nigerian
polity to reform itself. Small statements and clear moral
support for democrats can pay outsized dividends if Nigerians
believe we will stand by our commitment to transparency,
democracy, and the rule of law.

-- Most high-level official visits should wait until the
credibility of the electoral tribunal process has been
ascertained. It is possible that the elections will be
overturned, and there is the risk of alienating a new, more
democratic government. The USG should still be able to
pursue discrete goals through normal government-to-government
channels and a Yar'Adua government will likely seek
opportunities to engage, if for no other reason than to shore
up its legitimacy domestically and internationally.

-- The USG should push for INEC to be overhauled at the
earliest possible moment. The reforms should provide for its
credible independence, along with officially recognized
oversight and monitoring roles for reputable civil society
organizations. It is readily apparent that a great longing
for truly representative democracy exists among Nigerians.
If Nigeria's efforts at resolving the current political
impasse produce a solution, the USG should encourage and
influence these efforts at a more democratic system. Any
Nigerian solution has a greater chance at ensuring future
stability than either the chaotic and confrontational future
of the current system or a solution imposed from abroad.

-- All involved with the rigging of the 2007 elections
should be banned from travel to the U.S. Presidential
Proclamation 7750 is the perfect tool for this effort; it
creates a visa ineligibility for corrupt public officials,
which explicitly includes any public official who interferes
in judicial and electoral processes. This visa ban should
not be limited only to the "politically safe" working-level
officials, but should include those, even at the highest
levels, who have been credibly observed to have participated
in the rigging of elections. Along with this, the USG should
redouble its efforts at isolating corrupt politicians, both
past and present, through similar efforts. Anything less
runs the risk of signaling that winners can still profit
while their minions pay the political price for electoral
corruption.

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COMMENT
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12. (C) Many indicators make it clear that Nigeria is
troubled. As Nigeria's friend, the USG must be honest and
supportive and must also ensure that Nigeria recognizes its
problems to begin addressing them. Nigeria's future and USG
interests are too important to be left to wishful thinking.
Rather the growth of Nigeria, and perhaps its survival as
well, require serious, coordinated efforts to resolve the
accretion of political enmity from the past decades.
CAMPBELL