Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07ABUDHABI979
2007-06-14 11:21:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Cable title:  

ABU DHABI CROWN PRINCE REACHES OUT ON CT PLANNING

Tags:  PTER ASEC AE 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO5063
PP RUEHDE
DE RUEHAD #0979/01 1651121
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 141121Z JUN 07
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9120
INFO RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 7110
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABU DHABI 000979 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR S/CT, NEA/ARP, NEA/RA, DS/NEA/IP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/29/2017
TAGS: PTER ASEC AE
SUBJECT: ABU DHABI CROWN PRINCE REACHES OUT ON CT PLANNING

Classified by Ambassador Michele Sison, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABU DHABI 000979

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR S/CT, NEA/ARP, NEA/RA, DS/NEA/IP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/29/2017
TAGS: PTER ASEC AE
SUBJECT: ABU DHABI CROWN PRINCE REACHES OUT ON CT PLANNING

Classified by Ambassador Michele Sison, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary. Senior advisors to Mohamed bin Zayed al Nahyan
(MbZ),Abu Dhabi Crown Prince and Deputy Supreme Commander of the
Armed Forces, met with Embassy representatives on two recent
occasions to seek information related to USG capability and response
to a terrorist incident in the UAE in general and to a hostage-rescue
event specifically. Embassy participants underscored USG reliance on
UAE first-responsiveness and USG willingness to provide formal
training/assistance if requested. We have identified limitations
inherent in UAE response capabilities, including concerns about
interoperability between the emirates of Abu Dhabi and Dubai. End
Summary.


2. (C) On May 28 AmCit Jack McGuinness, senior military advisor to
Mohammed bin Zayed (MbZ),and Australian Terry O'Farrel, Operations
Officer for the UAE Special Operations Command, met with the
Ambassador, RSO and DAO to seek information about Embassy
offices/forces responsible for a U.S. response to a hostage rescue or
other terrorist event in the UAE. McGuinness and O'Farrel explained
that MbZ had asked them to poll several Embassies in this regard.
They did not indicate that there was any specific reason behind the
UAE's concern at this time.


3. (C) Embassy representatives responded that in all
terrorist-related incidents, the USG would rely first and foremost on
host nation authorities to respond appropriately to the event itself
and to work with the Embassy in respect to the safety and security of
any U.S. citizens involved. We also indicated that, should the UAE
desire crisis management assistance, the USG would certainly try to
be receptive to any formal request from the host nation including
requests for training. During the meeting McGuinness and O'Farrel
noted that Dubai in particular provides a target-rich environment for
a terrorist event and that the Emirates of Abu Dhabi and Dubai may
have a difficult time coordinating a response to the event, given the
degree of independence exercised between the law enforcement and
security entities of the two Emirates. The Ambassador suggested a

follow-up discussion with the USLO and DATT offices, the RSO offices
(here and Dubai),and other selected offices within the Embassy.


4. (C) On June 7 McGuinness returned to the Embassy and met with the
Acting DCM (CONS),DAO, RSO/Abu Dhabi, USLO, ECON and RSO/Dubai. He
advised that he had reported back to MbZ on his first round meetings
with other Embassies. He said the UAEG was completely wrong in their
blanket assumptions that Embassies would be able to respond
immediately to terrorist incidents with assets or assistance from
outside the UAE, given distances involved from Australia, the U.S.,
or Europe.


5. (C) From the discussion it appears that MbZ recognizes that
Embassies expect the UAEG to fulfill their responsibility to act as
first-responders. Because his office is currently the center of
gravity within the UAE for coordinating a response and resolving any
conflict within competing response entities, it appears that MbZ is
pushing forward the development of a National Crisis and Emergency
Management Center to help the UAE get a handle on who will have what
responsibilities in a crisis, rather than relying solely on the
Sheikh's guidance and decision. Raytheon has been awarded a contract
for this Center, with a 3-man executive team to drive the first phase
of its development.


6. (C) Several Embassy representatives offered their perspective on
UAE response capability and stressed the need for the UAE to figure
out a way to decentralize its decision-making and give operational
and tactical authority to those dealing directly with the crisis. We
assume that this information will be passed back to MbZ to be
considered as part of a new "doctrine" that the UAE (and specifically
MbZ) will need to develop in order to meet their crisis management
objectives.

Dubai and Interoperability Between Emirates
--------------


7. (C) Embassy participants and McGuinness agreed that Dubai is a
target-rich environment for terrorism; it has been mentioned in
several statements allegedly from Al Qaida. From our perspective,
and perhaps from MbZ's, there is concern about interoperability and
cooperation issues between the authorities of the two emirates.

McGuinness noted that the UAE chain of command very quickly goes to
Abu Dhabi Crown Prince MbZ to make decisions in response to a crisis,
including refereeing between competing governmental entities, if
necessary. This may work in Abu Dhabi where the Crown Prince holds
sway and in five of the other Emirates where Abu Dhabi can
effectively influence decisions. However, the Crown Prince cannot
make decisions about crisis response in Dubai, although ConGen Dubai
believes it is likely that in any national-level crisis (such as the
taking of official U.S. hostages) Dubai Ruler Mohammed bin Rashid al
Maktoum (MbR) would coordinate any reaction with MbZ and federal
senior officials.


ABU DHABI 00000979 002 OF 002


Dubai has its own force (Dubai police SWAT) for such contingencies
and that force does not work with, or integrate into, the Ministry of
Interior (MOI) or Special Operations Command (SOC) forces. Its chain
of command feeds to the Ruler, MbR.

Dubai appears to be planning to manage a terrorist incident alone,
independent of assistance from the central government. McGuinness
concurred with that assessment and noted that the issue of
interoperability/independence would have to be solved "between the
two Mohameds" (MbZ and MbR).

Hostage Situations
--------------


8. (C) From the two discussions, it appears that the Crown Prince's
office may be particularly concerned about hostage scenarios,
especially highly sensitive targets such as schools frequented by
expatriates. McGuinness and O'Farrel see the need to do preparatory
work and the value of security surveys, but are having difficulty
getting this action underway, partially because the Special
Operations Command is currently heavily engaged with training for and
deployments to Afghanistan and does not have the personnel available
to conduct the surveys. McGuinness said that "MbZ is looking for
smart ideas" for approaches. When asked why they were particularly
concerned about this now, he simply said "intelligence information"
without further elaboration and mentioned Al Qaeda statements about
unIslamic activities in Dubai.

USG Training
--------------


9. (C) Embassy representatives spoke at length about the various
kinds of ATA and other training offered in the past and USG
willingness to try to provide whatever the UAE might put to good use.
Post's RSO advised McGuinness of a recently-accepted July DS/ATA
training and its potential applicability to current concern about
security measures related to soft targets.


10. (C) Comment: We will remain in touch with MbZ's office for
further discussion as well as with the Raytheon contractors for the
National Crisis and Emergency Centers and keep the Department
appraised accordingly. End Comment.

SISON