Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07ABUDHABI964
2007-06-11 11:46:00
SECRET
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Cable title:  

ABU DHABI CROWN PRINCE TALKS IRAN/IRAQ WITH USNAVCENT

Tags:  MOPS MCAP KNNP PTER IR IZ AE 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO1347
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK
DE RUEHAD #0964/01 1621146
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 111146Z JUN 07
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9107
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHRMDAB/US COMUSNAVCENT
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ABU DHABI 000964 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/ARP, NEA/RA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 6/11/2017
TAGS: MOPS MCAP KNNP PTER IR IZ AE
SUBJECT: ABU DHABI CROWN PRINCE TALKS IRAN/IRAQ WITH USNAVCENT
COMMANDER VICE ADMIRAL COSGRIFF

Classified by Ambassador Michele Sison, reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ABU DHABI 000964

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/ARP, NEA/RA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 6/11/2017
TAGS: MOPS MCAP KNNP PTER IR IZ AE
SUBJECT: ABU DHABI CROWN PRINCE TALKS IRAN/IRAQ WITH USNAVCENT
COMMANDER VICE ADMIRAL COSGRIFF

Classified by Ambassador Michele Sison, reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).


1. (S) Summary. Abu Dhabi Crown Prince and Deputy Supreme Commander
of the UAE Armed Forces Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan (MbZ) met with
Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command/U.S. Fifth Fleet Vice
Admiral Kevin J. Cosgriff in Abu Dhabi on June 6. MbZ stressed the
need for communication and planning in face of growing Iranian
aggression, and sought information from Cosgriff about Iranian
capabilities. MbZ warned the Admiral not to underestimate Iranian
patience, stating that Iran's goal is clear even though the Iranians
try to keep international attention and focus elsewhere.


2. (S) Summary cont.: Shifting to Iraq, MbZ said that the UAE would
support Maliki, not because they believe in him, but because the U.S.
and UAE are allies (MbZ added "how can we trust someone running
policy whose payroll comes from Iran?") MbZ then repeated an earlier
recommendation that the U.S. get out of the cities in Iraq and focus
on border security or face losing more soldiers. MbZ stated that
Iraq needs a strong leader who can hold the country together for five
years and that the U.S. needs to be very careful in who in Iraq they
take advice from, as the "real war" is yet to come. End Summary.

--------------
Iran
--------------

3. (C) MbZ queried Vice Admiral Cosgriff at the opening of the
evening meeting for thirty minutes regarding U.S. Naval operations in
the Gulf and Iranian activities and capabilities. MbZ was
particularly interested in knowing how far the Iranians were from
having the cascade facilities to produce weapons grade plutonium and
the capabilities of Iranian submarines. Cosgriff admitted to being
no expert on this subject but believed that Iran is still some years
away from having a sufficient cascade. He added that the Iranian
navy is struggling to even maintain their current fleet. MbZ asked
how Iran was able to keep its F-14 fighters flying 28 years after the

U.S. cut off support for the aircraft. Cosgriff replied that Iran is
only able to maintain its air force by cannibalizing existing
aircraft to keep others operational. MbZ stated that his greatest
worry is Qot how much we know about Iran, but how much we don't
know." Cosgriff agreed with this observation.


4. (C) Responding to the Admiral's reassurances about Iranian
capabilities, MbZ warned that any culture that is patient and focused
enough to spend years working on a single carpet, is capable of
waiting years and even decades to achieve even greater goals. Iran's
goal is clear, he declared -- a new Greater Persian Empire wielding
the influence of a nuclear weapon. MbZ postulated that many of
Iran's activities in the broader region are conducted through
surrogates such as Hizballah and are meant to keep international
focus and attention in Lebanon and Palestine and away from where the
real danger lies in Tehran. MbZ complained that the UAE, as a small
country caught in a region of big players, is not part of the
decision making process that most directly impacts their welfare.
"We all know what the Iranians are doing, we all know how they are
likely to react to various actions, but yet we are still not
cooperating."

--------------
Iraq
--------------

5. (C) MbZ told the Admiral that the U.S. is not fighting just the
Shi'a influence in Iraq, but everyone including the Sunnis,
Baathists, etc. Even as a Sunni himself, he said, he would not trust
the Iraqi Sunnis any more than he can trust Maliki. "How can you
trust someone running policy whose payroll comes from Iran?" Mbz
asked. He then added that the UAE would support Maliki, not because
they trust him, but because the UAE and U.S are allies and the U.S.
has chosen to back him. In response to Ambassador's question, MbZ
said that the UAE has extended an invitation to Maliki for an
official visit, but that he has not yet accepted. MbZ offered that
he is gathering information through unofficial channels that Maliki
wanted to know "what was in it for him" if he visited, before he
accepts an invitation. (Note: On May 13, Maliki Chief of Staff Dr.
Tarik Najem Abdullah visited Abu Dhabi and met with UAE State
Security Director Sheikh Hazza bin Zayed, MbZ's brother, in MbZ's
absence -- MbZ was enroute to Washington. Najem was told that Maliki
was welcome to visit Abu Dhabi whenever he wished, according to UAEG
sources. End Note.)


6. (C) Cosgriff asked where MbZ thought Iraq was headed, to which MbZ
replied with a story about tribal vengeance. "Iraq is a bigger issue
than just tribal vengeance," MbZ began, "but the violence is just as
intractable." MbZ said the decision to hold elections is proving
disastrous and that what the country really needs is a strong leader
who can hold the country together through a rough period of reform.
"If they kill each other, so be it . . . you can't stop it, but don't
get caught up in it," he said. One area the U.S needs to be careful
in though, MbZ offered, is the relationships that you choose to

ABU DHABI 00000964 002 OF 002


engage in. Stating that the image of the U.S. throughout the Middle
East is heavily influenced by relationships they pursue, MbZ warned
that "if you have a relationship with someone like Chalabi -- you
will be judged by that relationship."


7. (C) Wondering if the U.S. administration is getting accurate
information in Iraq, MbZ told the Admiral that there are people in
the Iraqi government that he would "not trust to take his dog out."
MbZ suggested that the U.S. needs to get out of fighting in the Iraqi
cities and focus more on border security before we "lose too many
young men." He warned, "You are not fighting the real war today --
the real war is still coming."


8. (C) Following up on a meeting earlier in the day with UAE Chief of
Staff General Hamad Thani Al-Rumeithy, Vice Admiral Cosgriff
described the Coalition's shared goals of regional maritime security
and global stability. Vice Admiral Cosgriff described benefits of
Coalition membership including operational information and
intelligence sharing, planning and operational/tactical procedure
insights, and participation in patrols/exercises in the Gulf.
Cosgriff noted that USNAVCENT and the Coalition would welcome UAE
formally joining the Coalition.


9. (U) The meeting was attended by Abu Dhabi Crown Prince and Deputy
Supreme Commander of the UAE Armed Forces Mohammed bin Zayed Al
Nahyan; UAE Armed Forces Chief of Staff Lt. General Hamad Mohammed
Thani Al-Rumeithy; Commander of Special Operations Major General Juma
Al-Bawardi Al-Falasi; Director of Military Intelligence and Security
Brigadier Essa Al-Mazrouei; and Director of International Relations
for the Crown Prince's Court Yousef Al-Otaiba. The Vice Admiral was
accompanied by Ambassador, USLO Chief, Embassy Naval Attache, PolOff,
and Vice Admiral's staff aide.


10. (U) Vice Admiral Cosgriff has cleared this message.

SISON