UAE MOVING FORWARD ON GSD; DEFINING THE AGENDA

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ABU DHABI 000458

SIPDIS

NOFORN

STATE FOR NEA/ARP, NEA/FO-DAS GRAY; PM ACTING A/S MULL
DOD FOR OSD PDAS MARY BETH LONG
CENTCOM FOR MAJ GEN FINDLEY
NSC FOR N. RAMCHAND, M. DORAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/18/2017
TAGS: PREL PTER PARM MOPS MASS KNNP IR AE
SUBJECT: UAE MOVING FORWARD ON GSD; DEFINING THE AGENDA

REFS:
A) 06 ABU DHABI 3835 (GSD SCENE-SETTER)
B) 06 ABU DHABI 4077, 4078, 4079 (OCT. GSD REPORTING)
C) 06 ABU DHABI 4302 (GSD AT JMC FOLLOW-UP)
D) ABU DHABI 145 (MbZ W/GEN. ABIZAID)
E) ABU DHABI 304 (MbZ MEETS SOCOM GEN. BROWN)
F) ABU DHABI 187 (MbZ TALKS IRAN W/ CSAF GEN. MOSELY)
G) USDAO ABU DHABI IIR 6 931 0021 07

Classified by Ambassador Michele J. Sison, reasons 1.4 (B)
and (D).


1. (C) Summary: Following the October 19, 2006 Gulf Security
Dialogue session held in Abu Dhabi, Embassy has identified
and clarified key areas of potential cooperation with the
UAEG, particularly vis-a-vis the "existential threat" the UAE
perceives from Iran. Future GSD discussions with the UAE
will be closely tied to ongoing talks on the UAE-US Bilateral
Air Defense Initiative (BADI),which proposes a combination
of passive defense (Shared Early Warning),active defense
(Patriot, HAWK, Short Range Air Defense (SHORAD) and future
upper tier systems like Theater High Altitude Air Defense
(THAAAD)) and establishing a "Common Air Picture", LINK
11/16, along with CENTRIXS interoperability. There have been
ongoing technical discussions on Shared Early Warning and Air
and Missile defense--most recently March 6-7. Abu Dhabi
Crown Prince and Deputy Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces
Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed (MbZ) was briefed by defense
contractors in February on THAAD/PAC-3/Shared Early Warning
systems and stated that he wants a complete missile defense
system by summer 2009. MbZ has also repeatedly inquired
about progress on Predator B. End Summary.


2. (C) Background: The U.S. enjoys a strong defense
cooperation relationship with the UAE, and the Gulf Security
Dialogue (GSD) provides an opportunity to further deepen that
relationship. With GSD discussions taking place against a
background of rising international concern over Iranian
nuclear ambitions, the critical need for enhanced UAE-US
cooperation has become more clear and urgent to UAE
officials. The upcoming GSD discussions in Washington will
build on prior exchanges including the June 2006 Joint
Military Commission (JMC) in Washington, the November 2006
JMC (working group meetings) in Abu Dhabi, and the October
2006 GSD also held in Abu Dhabi.


3. (S) Future GSD discussions should highlight to the UAE the
importance of "interoperability" with the U.S. and GCC allies
in designing, procuring and implementing a credible air and
missile defense system -- which naturally raises the
questions of integrated Shared Early Warning (SEW) systems,
layered defense capabilities, and possible acquisitions such
as the PAC-3 Patriot missile (lower tier) and THAAD (future
upper tier). The Emiratis have historically expressed
skepticism about GCC coordination on an integrated GCC
missile defense.


4. (S/NF) While the Emiratis understand our arguments about
interoperability in discussing key air defense systems, they
have not been convinced enough to pursue a purchase. At
USCENTCOM's direction, and with Directorate of Military
Intelligence (DMI) permission, U.S. Army missile defense
experts traveled to the UAE in early 2006 to conduct an air
defense assessment. Previously, potential Patriot
emplacement locations in the UAE were focused against the
Iraqi threat. The surveys, completed April 19, 2006,
identified six new Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3)
emplacement locations to deter the Iranian missile threat.
They would protect much of the metropolitan areas of Abu
Dhabi, Dubai and Fujairah from an Iranian threat axis,
including key nodes such as Al Dhafra Air Base, Al Bateen Air
Base, Minhad Air Base, Fujairah Airport, Jebel Ali Port, and
Fujairah Port. End Background.

Defense Cooperation
--------------

5. (S) During the 14 November, 2006 JMC working group
meetings, USCENTCOM presented a BADI overview to senior UAE
military officials. The presentation highlighted BADI's
combination of passive defense (Shared Early Warning),active
defense (Patriot, HAWK, and SHORAD) and the establishing of a
shared/common air picture (LINK 11/16). Staff Major General
Mohammed Sowaidan expressed interest in obtaining more
information on Surface Launched ) Advanced Medium Range Air
to Air Missile (SL-AMRAAM) in addition to BADI. During the
same working group meetings, DMI noted UAE,s support for GSD
and its shared concerns over Iran to highlight its desire for
a closer intelligence relationship with the US, including
expanded access to US intelligence products and training (ref
G).


6. (S) At the UAE-US Air Defense Working Group meeting on
January 14, the UAEG requested USLO assistance in arranging
classified technical briefings from USG/Contractors on EAD,
PAC-3, MEADS and THAAD. A Shared Early Warning (SEW) system
via CENTRIXS dissemination was outlined by USLO.
Subsequently the UAEG submitted a letter of request (LOR) to
USLO in Feb 2007 for the purchase/installation of CENTRIXS
throughout the UAE Armed forces and have also expressed their
intent to submit a Letter of Intent (LOI) for a SEW site
survey and follow on Letter of Request (LOR) for SEW once the
requirements have been determined by the site survey. The
UAEG requested a classified Patriot PAC-3 configuration and
THADD briefing during a follow-on meeting tentatively
scheduled for April along w/a potential visit to Ft. Bliss in
El Paso TX at some date TBD to receive familiarization
w/lower tier BADI assets.

Patriots and Shared Early Warning
--------------

7. (S) On February 1, CSAF Gen. Moseley met with MbZ
immediately following a Raytheon/Lockheed Martin briefing to
MbZ on the ongoing development of THAAD/PAC-3 and shared
early warning systems (Ref F). Speaking of a time frame for
the first time, MbZ stated that he wants a complete missile
defense system by summer 2009. MbZ expressed particular
interest in the possibility of mounting PAC-3 on Littoral
Combat Ships (LCS). After learning that PAC-3 cannot yet be
mounted on a seagoing platform, MbZ was pleased to note that
SL-AMRAAM has already tested successfully on a wide variety
of platforms and could be ship-based. Sheikh (Staff Colonel)
Ahmed bin Tahnoon A-Nahyan, advisor to MbZ on critical
infrastructure protection, took particular note of this fact
and asked about upgrading/extending their existing
Hawk/AMRAAM assets. When Raytheon/Lockheed briefers noted
the 32km limit of unelevated radar, MbZ stated that the UAE
had identified a location at an elevation of 6,000 feet on
the UAE's northern border that he would like the contractors
to come back and look at as a possible location for an early
warning radar system. (Ref. F)

8.(S) During technical discussions on Shared Early Warning
and Air and Missile Defense March 6-7, the UAE provided a
critical asset list to assist CENTCOM in preparing the
classified Patriot PAC-3 and THAAD briefings. The UAE was
provided a SEW demonstration and expressed intent to request
SEW. Additionally, tactical level talks were conducted with
members of the UAE HAWK Air Defense Brigade and USCENTCOM
missile defense representatives. (Comment: The Embassy's US
Liaison Office (USLO) feels the release and presentation of
the classified Patriot PAC-3 and THAAD briefings ASAP is
crucial to maintaining momentum for the UAE considering an
U.S. interoperable Air and Missile Defense system. End
Comment.)

UAE worries over Iranian "backlash"
--------------

9. (S) Comment: MbZ has expressed concern about Iranian
nuclear aspirations but also about the growing Iranian
influence not only in Iraq but throughout the region.
Although MbZ's rhetoric is replete with calls to be tough on
Iran, i.e., stop Iran "by all means possible" and "deal with
Iran sooner rather than later" (refs D and F),the UAEG is
clearly nervous about any US actions that could upset their
much larger and militarily superior neighbor, and has often
expressed trepidation over the prospect of being caught in
the middle between the US and Iran. Posturing aside, Emirati
leadership obviously fears consequences for the UAE, in terms
of a potential "backlash" from Iran, as a possible result of
any US-Iran or Israel-Iran military dust-up in which the UAE
could be even tangentially associated or implicated.

10 (S) Comment cont.: MbZ's recurrent requests for Predator B
should be placed in the context of the UAE's current defense
capabilities. The UAEG already has an advanced platform for
delivering a significant bomb payload in the F-16 Block 60s
and a Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) is in the final
stages of completion for the High Mobility Artillery Rocket
System (HIMARS). The capabilities of Predator B, although
significantly less than the Block 60 F-16s, does represent a
capability for border patrol and tactical engagement and
MbZ's repeated call for it indicates that Predator B is not
only an issue of intelligence and tactical engagement, but is
also becoming an issue of trust in our defense cooperation
relationship. End Comment.
SISON