1. (S/NF) On February 20, Econchief met with Mnistry of
Interior Major Mohammed Al-Kitbie, Coodinator for the UAE's
Counterproliferation Task frce, to discuss reftel demarche.
Al-Kitbie askedrhetorically whether the USG really thought
the AEG would transfer its sensitive military technoloy to
Iran, given the security concerns that the AE had with that
country. He added that Econchie could ask "any Emirati on
the street, not even he people in the Ministry of Interior
of Defense" whether they thought this was a likely scenario
and that the universal answer would be no. He noed that the
UAE shared our concerns about Iran an did not want to see
the Iranians get WMD or senitive dual use goods. Al-Kitbie
also stated tha the UAEG had signed a non-transfer and
end-use ertificate and would not violate those terms. As
matter of policy, he stated, the UAEG would not iolate any
country's end-use agreement. In any ase, he said that he
would ensure appropriate UAG officials in the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs ad the UAE military were also aware of the
informtion.



2. (S/NF) Comment: Al-Kitbie's response cofirms our view
that the UAEG is not likely to trnsfer its military
technology to Iran, which it iews as its primary potential
strategic threat. Although the UAE is a major transshipment
point, the UAEG itself has been scrupulous about abiding by
its end-use obligations. It has been the UAE's private
sector -- rather than government-owned entities -- that has
pose diversion risks. End Comment.



3. (C) Note: AlKitbie also works for BG Abdul Aziz
Al-Sharify, he Director of Preventive Security for the
Minisry of Interior, and the Vice Chair of the UAE's ne
Commodity Control Committee, which will have ovesight
responsibility for the UAE's export control procedures. BG
Al-Sharafy deputized Al-Kitbie for the meeting. End Note.
SISON