KEEPING THE FOCUS ON FREEDOM -- UAE DEMOCRATIC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ABU DHABI 001869

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/FO/ NEA/ ARP, NEA/PI, NEA/PPD
ALSO FOR R, S/P, DRL, AND ECA
TUNIS FOR MEPI

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/08/2017
TAGS: PREL KDEM KMPI PGOV ELAB PHUM KPAO AE
SUBJECT: KEEPING THE FOCUS ON FREEDOM -- UAE DEMOCRATIC

REFORM UPDATE

REFS:
A) ABU DHABI 949
B) ABU DHABI 1016
C) ABU DHABI 1018
D) ABU DHABI 1096
E) ABU DHABI 1127
F) ABU DHABI 1154
G) ABU DHABI 1458
H) ABU DHABI 1567
I) ABU DHABI 1688
J) 05 ABU DHABI 2173
K) STATE 130991

Classified by Ambassador Michele J. Sison, reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d).


1. (C) Summary: This message reflects priorities in the
U.S. Mission to the UAE's Democracy Strategy, originally
designed in 2005 (ref J) and substantially updated in July,
2007 (ref F). It is designed to guide the practical
application of resources, both programmatic and diplomatic,
in pursuing overall goals related to freedom and political
openness in the UAE. Without repeating the "benchmark"
format already established (with ref F as our most recent
articulation of benchmarks),this message will follow a more
open "brainstorming" format in listing the types of
programmatic and diplomatic angles the USG might pursue in
pressing a traditional society toward our stated goal of an
increasingly participatory system. The most effective reform
is obviously home-grown, yet encouragement from the USG can
influence the focus and pace of UAE reform efforts. This
cable addresses the four-fold agenda set forth previously: 1)
Political Participation, 2) Development of an Active and
Independent Press, 3) Government Transparency, and 4)
Judicial Independence. End summary.

Political Participation
--------------


2. (C) Our ongoing benchmarks of encouraging municipality
elections, additional elected student councils, and UAE
legislation granting greater autonomy to professional
organizations remain important, but have seen little progress
to date. On the electoral front, the UAE chose to begin with
partial Federal National Council (FNC) elections held in
December, 2006 (ref I),and we were able to assist with
training for female parliamentarians involved in that
election. We also continue to press for greater space for
civil society by engaging with individuals and organizations
potentially influential in Emirati society (ref H) but who
need greater expressive latitude in which to share their
ideas. The cumulative effect of our efforts can help open up
the political landscape over time.


3. (C) Our efforts on the horizon should focus on:

--- encouraging the UAEG to consider a more robust role for
the FNC;
--- encouraging FNC members to push the envelope somewhat in
asserting their consultative and oversight functions;
--- building capacity in municipality and FNC-related
institutions and individuals through training in
communications skills and organizational effectiveness
(including by expressing USG support for proposed NDI efforts
in this arena);
--- engaging with FNC topical committees to encourage deeper
investigation of societal issues and impress upon them their
role as gatekeepers of public policy interests in their
fields of expertise;
--- continuing to encourage municipality elections;
--- continuing to encourage more elected student councils;
--- continuing to press the UAEG to offer greater political
space for professional associations, NGO's, academics, and
civil society in general;
--- offering training and capacity-building support for those
few NGO's that do exist;
--- pressing the UAEG to reconsider its habit of blacklisting
(as "Muslim brothers") activists who counter official views;
--- expanding the NGO world by convincing more (potentially
vocal) citizens of the utility of an active civil society;
--- continuing to note the merits of labor unions to a
skeptical UAEG which does not want to empower foreign
nationals politically (it speaks of "functional rights" as
opposed to "political rights" for workers and views labor as
a national security issue);
--- supporting UAE efforts to instill an ethic of civic

ABU DHABI 00001869 002 OF 004


participation through the school curriculum;
--- and, encouraging the UAE to learn from the lessons of the
limited FNC elections to ensure technically sound
preparations for future elections.

Development of an Active and Independent Press
-------------- -


4. (SBU) Limited action has been taken by the UAEG toward
promulgating revisions to the Press and Publications Law
currently under review (and prepared with assistance from
U.S. specialists). However, UAE Vice President and Prime
Minister (and Ruler of Dubai) Mohammed bin Rashid announced
September 25 that journalists should not be imprisoned
because of what they write, adding that passage of the
revisions should be accelerated. Foreign Minister Abdullah
bin Zayed (former Information Minister) made similar
comments. Media contacts viewed the announcement as a
significant step forward that may boost prospects for passage
of the revisions, but not as an invitation to unfettered
press freedom. Other penalties would remain in force (e.g.,
monetary damages) and the press will continue to exercise
caution. The announcement came in the midst of an ongoing
court case involving two journalists who raised questions
about the legal and financial ethics of a socially-prominent
individual. The Court of First Instance ruled that they had
committed defamation and sentenced them to two months
imprisonment. That decision was under appeal when the
September 25 announcement was made.


5. (C) Although the UAEG does not actively censor the press,
other than forbidding direct criticism of the ruling
families, insulting Islam, and other limited categories of
expression, there is heavy self-censorship among journalists.
Like much of the UAE work force most journalists (though not
all columnists and editors) are expatriate foreign nationals
on term contracts and effectively subject to deportation if
their contracts are not renewed. Programming that targets
the creation of a more professional press corps such as
training in English language, direct interviewing techniques,
and investigative reporting, has and will continue to foster
confidence in reporters' abilities and should result in a
press that is more prepared to pursue independent stories
instead of relying heavily on wire services and official
statements. The value of such training is high, as reporters
can thereby exploit the opportunity to test the boundaries of
free expression with greater professionalism (Prime Minister
Mohammed bin Rashid's statements that "the press is free"
should be seen as an invitation by qualified reporters).
Training value will further expand as reporters are
eventually permitted to use these skills to report more
objectively -- hopefully with fewer red lines in the future.
The U.S. should support activities that strengthen the
independence, competence, and civil society profile of the
already recognized UAE Journalists Association. We should
also continue to work with the recently-established $10
billion Mohammed bin Rashid Foundation, headquartered in
Dubai, which seeks to improve education, including journalism
training, throughout the Muslim world. Additionally, we can
encourage strategic alliances with prominent U.S. non-profit
organizations such as Teach for America, the Aspen Institute,
and the Gates Foundation.


6. (C) Our efforts on the horizon should focus on:

--- pressing for passage of revisions to the press law
recommended by the UAEJA;
--- engaging the press in training programs that enhance
analytic and investigative skills in particular;
--- highlighting the importance of source credibility and
careful fact-checking;
--- training for better English skills which can be a
particularly vital research and investigative skill;
--- raising the value of freedom of expression with senior
UAEG officials regularly (particularly with Foreign Minister
Abdullah bin Zayed, who is also head of the National Media
Committee);
--- reminding UAEG officials of the helpful role of Dubai
Media City;
--- programming USG visitors for press events in Dubai Media
City and throughout the UAE;
--- pressing for media outlets in Dubai Media City to be
given more latitude in reporting on UAE issues;
--- engaging academics about the role of the press;
--- encouraging the development of spokespersons within the
UAEG who have credible media skills and welcome interaction

ABU DHABI 00001869 003 OF 004


with the press;
--- encouraging the press to branch beyond the "safe" wire
stories distributed by the official news agency WAM;
--- and, highlighting openness as a source of long-term
stability to a leadership class more disposed to top-down
control.

Government Transparency
--------------


7. (C) There is significant overlap between the need for
transparency and public participation. In addition to
encouraging popularly elected national, municipal, and
student councils, the U.S. should encourage open -- including
online -- discourse within those bodies and between those
bodies and the public. The same can be said for governmental
bodies not popularly elected. Abu Dhabi Emirate's
Consultative Council posts its agenda and allows the public
to submit comments online, and may be open to training and
technical assistance from the Embassy. Similar practices
should be encouraged in all emirates, the Federal National
Council, and among ministries that generate legislation or
administer public services. As a critical first step, the
UAE should be encouraged to publish (in Arabic and English
due to its large expatriate population) laws and regulations
online as soon as they are promulgated. As a necessary
second step, we should encourage efforts by federal
ministries to solicit public comments on draft legislation,
as the Ministry of Labor recently did with its draft labor
law. Currently, decision makers communicate with select
stakeholders on draft legislation, but usually on a
confidential basis.

SIPDIS


8. (C) The issuance of sovereign bond ratings for Abu Dhabi
Emirate is likely to produce greater transparency on economic
information-sharing than has traditionally been the case.
Making statistics available to the public is not the only
goal -- ensuring the accuracy of data is required to make
transparency meaningful. The U.S. should highlight the need
for technical training and expertise in the maintenance of
modernized record keeping systems and more accurate
statistical analysis within federal ministries, municipal
bodies, and emirate administrations.


9. (C) Our efforts on the horizon should focus on:

--- encouraging higher quality record keeping in UAE
ministries, including through issue-specific training
opportunities;
--- drawing attention to the need for more credible
statistics (on population, for example) rather than relying
on broad estimates;
--- encouraging the UAE public, even through small programs
that reach a limited audience, to seek out public information
and hold the government accountable;
--- pressing for publication of all new laws (eventually
including all existing laws) on easily-accessible formats in
Arabic and English, preferably on the Internet;
--- encouraging participants in USG-funded programs to seek
greater access to government information;
--- encouraging public interest in deliberations of the
Federal National Council and other administrative bodies;
--- reminding senior UAEG leaders of their obligation to
offer transparent information to the public;
--- commending the UAEG for the open method of soliciting
comments on the labor law, and encourage thoughtful review of
comments submitted;
--- seeking expansion of the concept of Internet comment
solicitation on draft legislation;
--- and, encouraging development of a Freedom of Information
regime to aid the public and press in accessing official data.

Judicial Independence
--------------


10. (C) Each of the seven UAE emirates is semi-autonomous
and governed by a hereditary ruler. The laws and courts of
each emirate are established by those rulers and are loosely
coordinated with federal practices. Some emirates maintain
their own police forces and immigration services; Abu Dhabi,
Dubai, and Ras al-Khaimah have separate court systems, while
the other four emirates adhere to a unified federal court
structure. The UAE judiciary is largely comprised of foreign
nationals (Egyptians and Sudanese foremost among them),who
are working on fixed-term contracts and are less likely to
make rulings that might antagonize their hosts --

ABU DHABI 00001869 004 OF 004


particularly the ruling sheikhs. The U.S. should continue to
press for enhanced training for UAE national judges, a system
of tenure for judges, and perhaps stronger bar associations
to give judges a greater sense of professional independence
in making their judgments.


11. (C) Our efforts on the horizon should focus on:

--- matching legislative openness (new laws on the Internet)
with judicial accountability by putting the essence of
rulings in the public domain in a similarly user-friendly
format;
--- encouraging consultants working with the UAEG or its
constituent emirates to highlight for their employers the
benefits of judicial independence and even-handedness,
particularly in attracting more foreign investments;
--- offering ongoing training courses in the U.S. for UAE
judges;
--- building trust in judges by noting their key role in
society;
--- pursuing a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) with the
UAE to enhance bilateral cooperation and instill a greater
sense of judicial accountability on an international level;
--- encouraging the expanson of opportunities for female
participation in he judicial system to (among other reasons
why this is inherently important) improve the ratio of
Emirati nationals available for service as judges;
--- promoting exchanges that enhance law school programs in
the UAE and the region;
--- promoting linkages between UAE training programs and U.S.
law schools;
--- and, reminding the UAE leadership through word and deed
that the USG values the rule of law as a foundation of modern
civilization.


12. (C) Comment: As the UAE moves rapidly forward in an era
of high prosperity, it is ecoming somewhat more open,
tolerant, and willin to address issues that define its
international reputation. The UAE leadership is clearly not
interested in competition for authority to rule, and domestic
pressure for political change is weak. Nonetheless, the
leadership seeks to balance societal pressures (domestic and
foreign) to ensure stability and some anticipate eventual
demands for greater public participation, enhanced government
transparency, a freer press, and a more independent
judiciary. Post seeks to focus programming and engagement to
encourage irreversible steps in the general directions noted
in this message. End comment.
SISON