UAE APPRECIATES AMBASSADOR CROCKER'S ENGAGEMENT ON

S E C R E T ABU DHABI 001854

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/05/2017
TAGS: PREL PTER PARM MOPS IR IZ AE
SUBJECT: UAE APPRECIATES AMBASSADOR CROCKER'S ENGAGEMENT ON
IRAQ

Classified by Ambassador Michele Sison, reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d).

Summary
--------------


1. (S) Ambassador Crocker met November 1 with UAE Foreign
Minister Abdullah bin Zayed (AbZ) and Deputy Prime Minister
Hamdan bin Zayed al-Nahyan. Both expressed appreciation for
USG engagement on Iraq and the Ambassador's visit to consult
with them. Crocker told the UAE leaders he had come not only
to talk but to listen. He delivered a direct message about
the expanded space created for political progress in light of
security gains in Iraq, called on the UAE and its Arab
colleagues to help reinforce the Arab identity of Iraq with
deeper engagement of both Shia and Sunni, and urged the
return of a UAE ambassador to Baghdad. Both AbZ and Hamdan
cited the dangers of Iranian influence and said they had
little trust or faith in the Maliki government. AbZ blamed
poor Iraqi coordination for lack of progress on a Maliki
visit or a new UAE embassy in Iraq. He said the UAE would be
disinclined to move on debt relief with the current Iraqi
government. Crocker told them it was important to look
beyond individuals. This was a time when the future of Iraq
was being shaped -- for better or worse -- for a long time to
come. It was important that the Arab countries be there, not
only to shore up Iraq's Arab affiliation and counter Iranian
influence, but also to help speed the process of
reconciliation and prevent Iraq from again becoming a
long-term threat to the region or a source of instability.
End summary.

The Challenge of Deepening UAEG-GoI Engagement
-------------- -


2. (S) Ambassador Crocker met November 1 with UAE Foreign
Minister Abdullah bin Zayed (AbZ) and Deputy Prime Minister
Hamdan bin Zayed al-Nahyan. Both expressed appreciation for
USG engagement on Iraq and the Ambassador's visit, adding
that they hoped it would be an ongoing process. Crocker
welcomed that prospect, and told the UAE leaders he had come
not only to talk but to listen. AbZ said the UAE wants to
help in Iraq but feared its attempts to assist are often
misunderstood, as was the UAE's request that PM al-Maliki
find a non-weekend date for a proposed recent visit. The GoI
had not responded when asked to propose alternative dates.
DPM Hamdan said the UAE leadership had tasked him to contact
Maliki personally to clear the air and deliver an invitation
to visit. Maliki, however, would not take the call, and
Hamdan was referred to the PM's office director. "So as far
as we are concerned this is their problem," he said. "We
have no trust or faith in this person." AbZ also said the
UAEG had tried for months to coordinate a suitable location
for opening an embassy in Baghdad. A site near the Iraqi MFA
shown to a UAE survey team in August was unsuitable for "many
reasons" (to include security),and AbZ was concerned that
the GoI was not following up on the UAEG's request to offer
alternatives. However, both Hamdan and Abdullah confirmed
that the UAE would be willing to send an ambassador to Iraq
if a suitable International Zone location can be identified
and security concerns addressed.


3. (S) Crocker stressed the importance of Arab engagement
with the GoI and said the USG was prepared to help in any way
it could in reestablishing a UAE diplomatic presence. AbZ
bluntly said the UAEG would not look into debt relief with
the current government, until it was more convinced that the
government was prepared to deliver services equally to all of
its citizens. Crocker stressed that debt relief is not about
PM al-Maliki, but about helping build government institutions
that can work on behalf of the entire nation.


4. (S) Noting that the GoI had been unpleasant about
six-party talks (involving Egypt, Turkey, Jordan, UAE, Saudi
Arabia, and Kuwait); AbZ wondered about the merits of
inviting Iraq to present its case to the forum directly.
Crocker cautioned that the meetings of the group of six,
combined with the relative lack of Arab diplomatic contact,
contribute to GoI fears of Arab plotting against the current
order. He said Iraq should be included in a "group of seven"
if the forum was to continue at all. AbZ balked at that, but
said a "six plus one" format might offer the GoI a platform
to make its case, if a credible Iraqi participant could be
found -- not the likes of Muwafaq al-Rubai, who had heard
many positive messages in his June visit to the UAE but did
not convey any of it to his government, according to AbZ.
Crocker said it might be best to just not convene the group
of six until a GoI role could be thoughtfully considered. On
a related issue, Crocker told Hamdan and Abdullah that the

GCC might wish to consider a strategic discussion, at its
December 3 summit in Doha, about the role of the organization
in the security of the region, and in particular its future
relationship with Iraq.


5. (S) Hamdan asked Crocker if he had a message for the
president, Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed. Crocker said the
message was that we value greatly our relations with the UAE.
Iraq is a huge challenge for both of us. It involves Iran,
but it also involves the future of the region. We appreciate
very much the thoughts of Abdullah and Hamdan. We have an
opportunity now that we didn't have six months ago. We need
to consider how to use this opportunity so that Iraq does not
again become a threat to the region or a source of
instability. It is important for Iraq's Arab neighbors to
support and reinforce Iraq's Arab identity. The US can't do
this, we have a lot of responsibilities, but Iraq's Arab
identity can only be supported effectively by the Arabs.


6. (S) Crocker said some of the Iraqi government's actions,
and Maliki's actions, may well seem unreasonable. He knew
very well the ups and downs of dealing with the Iraqi
leadership; he did it every day. But it was important to
remember that this response was born of fear, including the
fear of Arab intentions. A more active Arab role can reduce
those fears and help speed the process of reconciliation. We
need to look beyond Maliki or other individuals. Prime
ministers come and go. We need to work together, and with
the GOI, to improve Iraqi government capabilities, build
institutions, and deliver services. What we do now will
affect the course of events for the next 15-20 years. For
our part, we expect that Maliki will continue to reach out,
as he has with the citizens of Anbar province, in Baghdad,
and with Salah al-Din province. We will continue to
encourage this.

7. (S) Hamdan responded that his father, former UAE ruler
Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan al-Nahyan, had instructed before his
death that it was essential that the Arab countries stand by
Iraq at this moment in history. The UAE was pushing others
in the GCC in this direction, and working with Egypt, Jordan
and Turkey (not Syria, he said, because there was no trust
there.) This was because if what happens in Iraq spills
over, it could affect them all. So it was essential to
strengthen our coordination, eliminate the militias and
al-Qaeda, and bring together the Sunnis, Shia and Kurds.
This was the only solution, and Iraq could not be neglected.
Iran was a clear and present danger. He noted that Sheikh
Zayed had strong, historical ties to many tribal leaders --
Sunni and Shia, as well as Kurds -- relations different from
the tribal connections of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. The UAE
could exert some influence with those tribal leaders, if that
would be useful.

Reconciling Tensions Within and Around Iraq
--------------


8. (S) AbZ questioned both the yardstick used to identify
candidates for de-Ba'athification and U.S. commitment to
reform, offering the "Arab impression" that the USG was more
interested in hydrocarbons legislation than reconciliation.
Crocker countered that USG interest in a hydrocarbons law is
not about oil, but about reconciliation, and that in fact USG
urging on de-Ba'athification reform would hopefully lead to
passage of a new law soon. Both legislative priorities are
important due to their implications for national
reconciliation. Citing escalation of Turkey-Kurdish tension
as a concern, AbZ said it is not the right time for a
referendum on Kirkuk. Crocker said the USG has cautioned
Turkey not to succumb to PKK provocation and has encouraged
the KRG to do more against the PKK.


9. (S) The Foreign Minister said VP Tariq al-Hashemi is
linked to the Muslim Brothers and is not trusted in the UAE,
Saudi Arabia, Egypt, or Jordan, "even if they say otherwise."
He questioned whether a secular Sunni leader might emerge.
Crocker replied that VP al-Hashemi might at most be called
Muslim Brother lite, with emphasis on the lite. Anbari
sheikhs were showing some leadership potential, said Crocker.
Recalling his early assessments of fear as a key factor in
Iraqi politics, Crocker noted that the Shia fear the past and
the possible return of a Sunni Ba'athist regime, the Sunni
fear the future and the loss of influence, and the Kurds fear
elements of the past and the future. Deeper Arab engagement
could ease these fears and increase prospects for
reconciliation.

Reinforcing Iraq's Arab Identity -- Countering Iran
-------------- --------------


10. (S) Acknowledging some progress on security and
humanitarian issues, AbZ nonetheless said the UAEG continued
to believe that Iran has the means to make life harder for
Iraq and the U.S. if it so chooses. He queried what the
results might be if the Iraqi Shia were polled about the
Iranian nuclear program and the ongoing dispute between
Tehran and the West; he assumed we would find few friends in
the Iraqi Shia community on that issue. Crocker, on the
other hand, suggested that most Iraqis did not want a nuclear
neighbor, nor a military confrontation between the U.S. and
Iran. Iran does not have the ability to impose solutions,
but can do much to damage and disrupt, said Crocker. AbZ
asked who Iran used to carry out operations within Iraq, to
which Crocker noted that even elements of the Saddam Feddayin
had signed up to lend their thuggish services to JAM and
Iran, just as they had for Saddam. Iran's Quds Force had
also infiltrated Lebanese Hizballah elements to train JAM
forces -- clearly fighting in Iraq as part of a broad
regional strategy.


11. (S) Asked about the utility of Arab engagement with
Moqtada al-Sadr (purportedly to give him an alternative to
Iran),Crocker suggested the Arabs engage PM Maliki first and
expand their efforts from that point. In the long run,
pulling the originally anti-West and anti-Persian al-Sadr
movement away from Iran and back to its Arab Iraqi roots
would be a positive development. As for Ammar al-Hakim, AbZ
referred to the presumed heir of ISCI as so corrupt he had
become known as "Uday Hakim," linking him to Uday Saddam
Hussein, the former dictator's twisted heir.

Humanitarian support
--------------


12. (C) Also head of the UAE Red Crescent Society, Hamdan
stressed that the UAE had been active in assisting Iraq --
citing the Zayed Hospital in Baghdad and a water purification
plant as examples. The UAE would not neglect Iraq's needs,
he said, adding that the UAE Red Crescent has given
considerable support to projects in Anbar, Mosul, Baghdad,
and Basra. The Red Crescent would also like to consider a
joint project in Iraq with the International Committee for
the Red Cross, according to Hamdan.

Keeping al-Qaeda on the Defensive
--------------


13. (S) Crocker stated that while al-Qaeda had been hurt in
Iraq and was on the defensive, it had proven its resilience
and it was premature to consider it defeated. At the same
time, it was worth nothing that Iraq had been the first Arab
country where al-Qaeda had gained a foothold, and it had lost
the gains it had made because it had lost the people. AbZ
picked up on this, emphasizing that al-Qaeda was increasingly
seen in the Arab world as barbaric, inhumane, and un-Islamic.
He said he wished this was acknowledged more in the Arab
world, but the organization had lost many supporters by its
behavior in Iraq and its leaders now realized they had made a
strategic mistake, not only in Iraq but in the Arab world.
Crocker said he hoped the UAE and other Arab leaders would
find a way to expand on that message, because it was a
striking rebuke when people not only turn on al-Qaeda, but
are willing to pay with their lives for the decision.


14. (C) Crocker said the return of foreign fighters to their
home countries from Iraq was a region-wide threat and the
best way to prevent this was to keep them from going in the
first place. He understood there had been comparatively few
Emiratis among the foreign fighters detained, but said we
would be grateful for anything the UAE could do with Syria.
Abdullah said he thought Syria was changing. Crocker said
there had been some signs, but it was still a problem.


15. (U) Ambassador Crocker approved this message.
SISON