UAE SCENE SETTER FOR GENERAL WHITCOMB

S E C R E T ABU DHABI 001700

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

ARCENT FOR LT GEN WHITCOMB
STATE FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ARP, PM/FO
DOD/OSD FOR A/S LONG, DAS KIMMITT, KELSO, QUINN, ANDERSON
CENTCOM ALSO FOR MAJ GEN FINDLEY, REYES, RODRIGUEZ
NSC FOR NRAMCHAND, EABRAMS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/10/2017
TAGS: PREL PTER PARM MOPS MARR IR IZ AF LE AE
SUBJECT: UAE SCENE SETTER FOR GENERAL WHITCOMB

REF: A) ABU DHABI 1595 (ADMIRAL FALLON WITH MBZ)
B) SECDEF 31828 (AUGUST 2 VISIT)

Classified by Ambassador Michele Sison, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (S) General Whitcomb: Embassy Abu Dhabi welcomes you for what we
understand will be your final visit to the UAE in your current
capacity. As you are aware, deepening ties with the UAE is all about
relationships, and we appreciate the effort you have made to keep
your UAE counterparts engaged on U.S. goals and operations in the
region. Your meetings during this visit will help forge even
stronger ties. You will present the Order of St. Barbers to Land
Forces Commander Staff MG Ali Mohammed Subeih al-Kaabi and discuss
with him recent, current and future engagement opportunities with
ARCENT such as the Aviation Seminar, Artillery Seminar, Land Forces
Component Commander conference, etc. Your potential meeting with the
UAE Chief of Defense, Staff LTG Hamad Mohammed Thani al-Rumaithy,
will be an opportunity to encourage ever-deepening engagement with
the UAE Land Forces.

UAE Cooperation
--------------


2. (S) The U.S. enjoys strong defense cooperation with the UAE,
working together in key aspects of the war on terror; the UAE has
Special Operations troops on the ground in Afghanistan and has been a
source of security assistance for Lebanon and the Palestinian
Authority, in addition to assisting virtually every trouble spot in
the region in need of reconstruction support. The nation provides
critical basing and over-flight for U.S. reconnaissance and refueling
assets, extensive naval logistics support, and the Navy's liberty
port of choice in the region (425 ships annually). We suggest that
you thank your UAE interlocutors for their strong support for the
U.S. Air Force and Navy in the UAE and encourage continued
partnership in Afghanistan and elsewhere in the region. A few
quantitative measures of bilateral cooperation include:

--- 1,600 USAF personnel at Al Dhafra Air Base;
--- a vigorous training schedule at the Gulf Air
Warfare Center at Al Dhafra;
--- the F-16 Block 60 program;
--- approximately 425 port visits last year;
--- over 24,000 US military overflights/landings in
2006;
--- more than 150,000 U.S. servicemen and women
enjoying liberty annually in the UAE; and
--- 180 UAE Special Operations forces currently serving with the
Coalition in Afghanistan;
--- 150 conventional ground forces with South African built armored
personnel carriers are planned to deploy in support of OEF, to
work directly with Canadian forces.


3. (S) These contributions are significant in scope but also
enduring in their continuity over a number of years. The ports of
Jebel Ali and Fujairah are vital to U.S. Navy interdiction
operations, re-supply and sustainment, and combat support efforts
across the region. Jebel Ali in Dubai has hosted more port visits
for each of the past three years than any other port outside the
United States. In expressing appreciation for this outstanding
partnership, you might also emphasize with GHQ officials that the
evolving nature of military requirements mandates an ongoing focus on
joint planning, coordination, and strategic interoperability.


4. (S) In spite of differences on status of forces issues and the
use of passports/visas versus military IDs/orders for UAE entry and
exit, overall mil-to-mil cooperation with the UAE has been excellent,
with consistently reliable support at Jebel Ali and Fujairah ports
and at Al Dhafra Air Base. We recently moved routine military cargo
flight operations from UAE civil airports in the northern Emirates to
the Minhad air station, in accordance with a UAE request. The
request enhances force protection considerations but comes with a
one-time cost of approximately $4.5 million. Minhad is generally
better positioned geographically to support CENTCOM needs. In very
limited circumstances when a C-5 is required to land at Fujairah, the
UAE has granted all requested clearances.

Iraq
--------------


5. (S) While the UAE has offered some political and economic support
for Iraq and identifies Iraqi stability as a regional priority, the
UAE's (all-Sunni) leadership has over the past several months
exhibited a hardened attitude toward Prime Minister al-Maliki,
perceiving him as beholden to Iran and incapable of moving beyond
sectarian bias to lead a unified Iraq. The UAE has in the past
favored former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi and has stalled on its
commitment to relieve Iraqi debt (of $3.5 billion) in order to avoid
al-Maliki claiming credit. The UAE has expressed concern over the
continued violence and chaos in and around Baghdad as well as the
failure of the al-Maliki government to improve overall security in
the country.


6. (S) Meanwhile, the UAE has been engaged in regional efforts to
facilitate reconciliation between Sunni and Shi'a forces. The UAEG
has frequently expressed alarm regarding Iranian influence in Iraq,
and has made attempts to reach out to moderate Shi'a to encourage
their engagement in the Iraqi political process independently of
Iran. The UAE values and seeks reassurance of continued close
consultation on U.S. plans and strategy involving Iraq (and Iran).
As for its direct consultations with Baghdad, Iraqi National Security
Adviser Muwaffaq al-Rubaie was in Abu Dhabi in late June, a visit
during which the UAE leadership apparently sensed that al-Rubaie took
the attitude that current UAE outreach actions in Iraq were hostile
and indirectly justified Iranian counter-influence. Al-Rubaie
reportedly focused his efforts on urging the Emiratis not to support
the Iraqi Sunnis. The UAE sent a team to Baghdad in August to
explore options for re-opening its Embassy. The UAE has not
maintained diplomatic staff in Baghdad since the May 2006 kidnapping
of one of its diplomats.

Iran
--------------


7. (S) Senior UAE officials often stress that Iran is the country's
most serious and long-term threat, a theme we hear repeated often in
UAE defense circles (but not a theme we hear from the more
business-oriented leadership of Dubai). The UAE defense leadership,
headed by Abu Dhabi Crown Prince and Deputy Supreme Commander of the
UAE Armed Forces Mohammed bin Zayed (MbZ),is eager to establish a
defensive architecture against Iranian missiles and has submitted a
number of FMS requests in that regard (see paragraphs 11-12).
Nonetheless, the UAE leadership has also told us they are not in a
position to sacrifice $16 billion in annual trade with Iran, while
realizing that this same neighbor and major trading partner is also a
potential threat to the UAE. It is worth recalling that the May
10-12 visit of Vice President Cheney to the UAE was immediately
followed by a one-night stopover by Iranian President Ahmadinejad,
who was given a red carpet welcome and delivered a defiant anti-U.S.
speech at a Dubai sports arena during his stay.


8. (S) Iran is the large neighbor that will not go away, so the UAE
feels a need to engage (particularly on the economic side and
especially in Dubai) with a potential foe in this rough and
unforgiving neighborhood. While assisting our mission in the region,
the UAE leadership has consistently pursued a cautious,
non-confrontational public posture towards Iran. In the past the UAE
has been hesitant to participate in certain military exercises
designed to show a strong defensive front against Iran. The UAE did,
however, send observers to Leading Edge 07 in October 2006 in the
Gulf, which had a Proliferation Security Initiative theme. The
decision to host Eagle Resolve 2008, with a Theater Air and Missile
Defense theme, should be seen as a praiseworthy step. Iran is an
adversary to prepare defenses against, which the UAE is doing, yet it
considers economic engagement one of those defenses.

Afghanistan
--------------


9. (S) While the UAE has contributed up to 250 Special Operations
troops to the Coalition effort in Afghanistan, it has not yet
publicly acknowledged this participation. The UAE pursues
Afghanistan reconstruction aid with an emphasis on road networks,
mosques, medical facilities and schools and has made efforts at
political mediation between Pakistan and Afghanistan. In January
2007 LTG Eikenberry escorted Afghan Armed Forces Chief of Staff
General Bismillah Mohammadi Khan to Abu Dhabi in a bid to deepen
direct engagement between the UAE and Afghanistan. The UAE Armed
Forces Chief of Staff declared himself willing to help in any way
possible, including training Afghan troops. UAE subsequently
disbursed another $30 million in general assistance and is renovating
two runways in Afghanistan for military use. During the June visit
of Afghan Defense Minister Wardak to Abu Dhabi, MbZ agreed to donate
ten Mi-17 helicopters to Kabul. One of MbZ's oft-stated interests in
sending Emirati Special Ops troops to Afghanistan is to get his
military forces "bloodied" and battle-hardened so they may
effectively confront imported or domestic extremism when called upon
to do so back home. The UAE contribution in Afghanistan warrants our
frequent expressions of appreciation.

Elsewhere in the region
--------------


10. (S) The UAE provides significant humanitarian and security
assistance to Lebanon; on August 2 MbZ spoke with SecDef at some
length about the need to bolster Lebanon's ability to stand against
Syrian influence. The UAE has been at the forefront of
reconstruction efforts, continuing a longstanding de-mining
operation, and contributing resources for school construction and
hospitals. UAE Air Force C-130s and helicopters have been used in
relief efforts. The UAE has also provided UAE-manufactured pistols
(Caracal) and ammunition to the LAF. Earlier in the summer the UAE
Foreign Minister had a conversation with Lebanese PM Siniora on a
proposal for a Muslim force for Lebanon (under UN mandate). The UAE
seeks to strengthen the Siniora government, having delivered $300
million in assistance to Lebanon this year, while also seeking
limited engagement with Syria (to include a mid-July visit by UAE
President Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan and a donation of $10
million towards the support of Iraqi refugees and $100 million to
build a hospital in Syria).


11. (S) The UAE would like to see tangible progress on the Middle
East Roadmap, rejects the Hamas agenda, and continues to support the
Palestinian people through more than $400 million in housing and
humanitarian assistance since 2000. MbZ and his brothers, Foreign
Minister Abdullah and National Security Advisor/State Security
Director Hazza, are in close contact with President Mahmoud Abbas and
Prime Minister Salam Fayyad. As the result of the May 2007 visit of
USSC General Dayton, the UAE transferred $80 million to the
Palestinian president.

Weapons packages -- high UAE expectations
--------------


12. (S) The UAE has committed billions to current and anticipated
Foreign Military Sales cases, in addition to over $8.5 billion in
direct commercial sales in the Block 60 F-16 program, one of the
premier security assistance portfolios in the region. At the
invitation of the Pentagon and State Department to deepen the
security relationship by cooperating on an integrated missile defense
shield, the UAE has recently submitted Letters of Request on the
Patriot (nine PAC-3/GEM-T batteries),Surface Launched Advanced
Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile (SL-AMRAAM, eight fire units),and
Theater High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) system (3 fire units),for
an estimated total value of $13 to 20 billion. It is now incumbent
upon the USG to make good on our offer of enhanced engagement by
pressing for expeditious Congressional notification this fall
(pressing at every opportunity for favorable results in any
congressional review of the weapons package). The UAE will see our
posture as a critical measure of USG willingness to truly stand by
the UAE in a contingency involving Iran.


13. (S) The UAE recently signed the High Mobility Artillery Rocket
System (HIMARS) Letter of Offer and Acceptance for a counter battery,
a case valued at $597M. Both Boeing and Northrop-Grumman have
provided Requests for Information on an Airborne Early Warning and
Control aircraft later this year. The UAE has also submitted a
Letter of Request for purchase of three E2-C Hawkeye AEW&C aircraft
as an interim solution until delivery of a more permanent AEW&C
platform. (Note: That decision is expected in mid-2008. End note.)
The UAE has also made a request to buy 40 UH-60 Blackhawk
helicopters for its Special Operations Command. They have already
signed the Letter of Offer and Acceptance for 26 Blackhawks, plus a
training package, a case valued at $807M. They have also purchased
10 Blackhawks via Direct Commercial Sales from Sikorsky. The UAE is
upgrading its AH-64 Apache helicopters to the "D" (LONGBOW) model and
has requested 1300 Hellfire missiles with the expectation of a
request for an additional 1200 missiles. Three separate Letters of
Request for additional weapons for their F-16s have been received,
valued at over $800M. (The current UAE portfolio of active cases
handled by USLO stands at 44 cases, valued at just over $4 billion
with another $1.56 billion in cases under development, most of which
are expected to be signed by the end of the calendar year. These
figures do not include the $13-20 billion for the missile defense
requests or $1-3 billion estimated for the AEW&C platform.)


14. (S) One challenge facing the UAE is its shortage of trained
personnel to operate many of the requested systems. With a total
population of approximately 800,000 Emirati nationals, of which
roughly half are women, and only half of the males are adults, the
pool from which recruits are sought for the UAE Armed Forces is
relatively small. While the profession of arms and police work are
traditional and respected occupations in the UAE, the more affluent
families tend to view service in the armed forces as less attractive
than private sector work. Identifying sufficient personnel to
maintain complex defense systems presents an ongoing challenge. The
UAE faces a huge challenge with English language training for
military personnel, particularly in support areas. In addition,
Third Party Transfer issues prohibit third country nationals from
performing many of these vital but more menial tasks. It has been
rumored that the UAE Land Forces have requested an increase in
overall strength in order to help address the staffing issue. It
would be worthwhile to attempt to draw out MG Ali al-Kaabi on this
issue during the course of your conversation. Congratulating the UAE
on its signing of the HIMARs LoA and the on-track upgrade of their
Apaches to the Longbow version is also recommended.

Keeping the relationship strong
--------------


15. (S) The UAE's reliable and enduring support for mutual military
interests in the region creates both a sense of momentum in the
relationship and high expectations on the part of our hosts. The UAE
leadership is always looking for senior USG endorsement of our
partnership in the form of ongoing consultations on U.S. intentions
in the region (particularly Iraq and Iran, but also Afghanistan and
Lebanon). The UAE will also be interested in an honest sense of the
congressional mood in terms of weapons sales in the region (keeping
in mind that the UAE seeks congressional notification, which appears
to be on track, of its systems this fall and notification to be
handled separately from any other nation, GCC or otherwise). An
expression of genuine appreciation for the UAE role in the region is
also recommended.

SISON