SCENE SETTER FOR GENERAL PETRAEUS' OCTOBER VISIT TO UAE

S E C R E T ABU DHABI 001699

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

BAGHDAD FOR GENERAL PETRAEUS
STATE FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ARP, PM/FO
DOD/OSD FOR A/S LONG, DAS KIMMITT, KELSO, QUINN, ANDERSON
CENTCOM ALSO FOR MAJ GEN FINDLEY, REYES, RODRIGUEZ
NSC FOR NRAMCHAND, EABRAMS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/10/2017
TAGS: PREL PTER PARM MOPS MARR IR IZ AF LE AE
SUBJECT: SCENE SETTER FOR GENERAL PETRAEUS' OCTOBER VISIT TO UAE

REF: A) STATE 140269 (COALITION CONFERENCE)
B) ABU DHABI 1595 (ADMIRAL FALLON
WITH MBZ)
C) SECDEF 31828 (AUGUST 2 VISIT)

Classified by Ambassador Michele Sison, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (S) General Petraeus: Embassy Abu Dhabi and Consulate General
Dubai welcome your visit to the UAE, where we look forward to
supporting your media appearances and meetings with senior Emirati
officials. Our most valuable senior interlocutor on defense issues
and regional security is Abu Dhabi Crown Prince and Deputy Supreme
Commander of the UAE Armed Forces Mohammed bin Zayed (MbZ) al-Nahyan,
with whom a meeting has been requested for October 20 in Abu Dhabi.
I should have some time to brief you on prior conversations with MbZ
before we enter that meeting. MbZ has a personal background in the
UAE Air Force (a Sandhurst graduate, he is a qualified helicopter
pilot) and has frequently engaged senior U.S. officials on issues
related to Iraq -- a key topic when he met with officials at the
White House and the Pentagon in May. He appreciated Admiral Fallon's
appraisal of the situation in Iraq when they met in Abu Dhabi
September 17 and will welcome your views on the current status and
anticipated security progress in the foreseeable future. You might
remind him of your invitation to have a senior Emirati official join
the MNF-I Coalition Conference in Bahrain October 29-31 (ref A).
Iran is also very much on MbZ's mind; we offer below our perspectives
on Iraq and Iran as seen through the prism of our relationship with
the UAE, in addition to UAE views of other regional hotspots.


2. (C) We have also requested, but are less confident we will be
offered, a meeting with Mohammed bin Rashid (MbR) al-Maktoum, Prime
Minister and Vice President of the UAE and Ruler of Dubai. MbR (also
a Sandhurst graduate) is the nominal Minister of Defense but is not
involved in the practical management of UAE defense issues and has
not generally engaged visitors on UAE regional policies. (Note: LTG

R. Steven Whitcomb, ARCENT Commander, will have visited the UAE Land
Forces Commander and possibly the UAE Chief of Staff the day prior to
your visit, but will not have met MbZ or MbR. End note.)

Iraq
--------------


3. (S) The UAE has offered some political and economic support for
Iraq and identifies Iraqi stability as a regional priority;
nonetheless, the UAE's (all-Sunni) leadership has over the past
several months exhibited a hardened attitude toward Prime Minister
al-Maliki, perceiving him as incapable of moving beyond sectarian
bias to lead a unified Iraq. The UAE has in the past favored former
Prime Minister Ayad Allawi (who visits Abu Dhabi often) and has
stalled on its commitment to relieve Iraqi debt (of $3.5 billion) in
order to avoid al-Maliki claiming credit. The UAE has expressed
concern over the continued failure of the al-Maliki government to
significantly improve overall security in the country. While clearly
skeptical of al-Maliki's leadership, MbZ also told SecDef on August 2
that Iraq had not followed up on signals that the UAE would receive
an al-Maliki visit -- albeit with a rather cautious welcome mat (ref
C).


4. (S) As part of the UAE's cautious engagement on Iraq-related
issues, Abu Dhabi recently offered assistance to Iraqi refugees in
Syria ($10 million),hosted (after some hesitation) the first large
Iraq Compact conference in September 2006, continues to support broad
coalition goals in Iraq, and continues to look at options for
re-opening its diplomatic mission in Baghdad (closed since the May
2006 kidnapping of a UAE diplomat). The UAE sent a team to Baghdad
in August to explore options for re-opening its Embassy; you may wish
to inquire with MbZ about the current status of UAEG thinking.


5. (S) Note: Concern has been expressed by the Coalition about the
use by terrorists of the UAE's abandoned Embassy compound; Coalition
Forces captured the "security chief" of the compound, Abu Shinan, and
continue to hold him due to his connections with Sunni insurgent
groups. The UAE has expressed concern over his potential release to
Iraqi forces, fearing his execution. The Iraqi Government (National
Security Advisor Muwaffaq al-Rubaie) reportedly discussed a possible
raid on the compound with UAE Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed
(AbZ, MbZ's younger brother) in late June. The UAE tells us that it
agreed with al-Rubaie that only the UAE should lead a raid on its
diplomatic compound -- with Iraqi and/or Coalition Forces coming in
behind. MbZ's staff told us in September that the UAE had tried to
arrange the timing of such an operation but gained no traction with
the Iraqis. The UAE has not tried to coordinate such an operation
directly with us. End note.


6. (S) Meanwhile, the UAE has been engaged in regional efforts to
facilitate reconciliation between Sunni and Shi'a forces, including
by hosting various factions in Abu Dhabi. The UAEG has frequently
expressed alarm regarding Iranian influence in Iraq, and has made
attempts to reach out to moderate Shi'a to encourage their engagement
in the Iraqi political process independently of Iran. The UAE values
and seeks reassurance of continued close consultation on U.S. plans
and strategy involving Iraq (and Iran). Your visit will be a helpful
reminder to MbZ that we value regional coordination. MbZ will
certainly be interested in your thoughts subsequent to your reports
to Congress in September.


7. (S) The UAE's direct consultations with Baghdad are not always
positive. During Iraqi National Security Advisor al-Rubaie's late
June visit the UAE leadership apparently sensed that al-Rubaie took
the attitude that current UAE outreach actions in Iraq were hostile
and indirectly justified Iranian counter-influence. Al-Rubaie
reportedly focused his efforts on urging the Emiratis not to support
the Iraqi Sunnis. VP Adel abd al-Mahdi visited Dubai for an
investment conference in early September, but it was unclear whether
he held substantive meetings with Emirati officials. Other Iraqi
politicians travel through the Emirates periodically and Dubai plays
host to various conferences on economic issues which senior Iraqi
delegations attend. Nonetheless, senior level GoI engagement is
limited. Ayad Allawi is likely the most frequent high profile Iraqi
visitor, and clearly the most welcome among the UAE leadership.

Iran
--------------


8. (S) MbZ reiterated to SecDef in August and Admiral Fallon in
September that Iran is the UAE's most serious and long-term threat, a
theme we hear repeated often in UAE defense circles (but not a theme
we hear from the more business-oriented leadership of Dubai). MbZ
will likely be skeptical of attempts at dialogue by Iran, and he is
eager to establish a defensive architecture against Iranian missiles
(we are processing a number of missile-defense related FMS cases).
Nonetheless, the leadership has also told us that they are not in a
position to sacrifice $16 billion in annual trade with Iran, while
realizing that this same neighbor and major trading partner is also a
potential menace to the UAE. It is worth recalling that the May
10-12 visit of Vice President Cheney to the UAE was immediately
followed by a one-night stopover by Iranian President Ahmadinejad,
who was given a red carpet welcome and delivered a defiant anti-U.S.
speech at a Dubai sports arena during his stay.


9. (S) Iran is the large neighbor that will not go away, so the UAE
feels a need to engage (particularly on the economic side and
especially in Dubai) with a potential foe in this rough and
unforgiving neighborhood. While assisting our regional military
mission (see paragraphs 13-14 below),the UAE leadership has
consistently pursued a cautious, non-confrontational public posture
towards Iran. In the past the UAE has been hesitant to participate
in certain military exercises designed to show a strong defensive
front against Iran. The UAE did, however, send observers to Leading
Edge 07 in October 2006 in the Gulf, which had a Proliferation
Security Initiative theme. The decision to host Eagle Resolve 2008,
with a Theater Air and Missile Defense theme, is another
forward-leaning step. The UAE sees Iran as an adversary to prepare
defenses against, yet it considers economic engagement one of those
defenses.


10. (S) Your recent comment to reporters that Iran, through the
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Qods Force, is providing Iraqi
insurgents with advanced weaponry to kill U.S. soldiers in Iraq
generated prominent attention in UAE media as well as discussion
among local interlocutors. Anything you wish to share on this and
related matters concerning Iran -- especially Iran's role in Iraq --
with the UAE leadership will be received with great interest.

Elsewhere in the region
--------------


11. (S) AFGHANISTAN: While the UAE has contributed up to 250
Special Operations troops to the Coalition effort in Afghanistan for
four years, it has not yet publicly acknowledged this participation.
One of MbZ's oft-stated interests in sending Emirati Special Ops
troops to Afghanistan is to get his military forces "bloodied" and
battle-hardened so they may effectively confront imported or domestic
extremism when called upon to do so back home. The UAE pursues
Afghanistan reconstruction aid with an emphasis on road networks,
mosques, medical facilities and schools and has made efforts at
political mediation between Pakistan and Afghanistan. It has
helpfully offered the Afghan Army training, Mi-17 helicopters, and
runway renovations.


12. (S) LEBANON: The UAE provides significant humanitarian and
security assistance to Lebanon; the UAE has been at the forefront of
reconstruction efforts, continuing a longstanding de-mining
operation, and contributing resources for school construction and
hospitals. UAE Air Force C-130s and helicopters have been used in
relief efforts. The UAE has also provided UAE-manufactured small
arms to the LAF. The UAE seeks to strengthen the Siniora government,
having delivered over $300 million in assistance to Lebanon this
year, while also seeking limited engagement with Syria (to include a
mid-July visit by UAE President Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan
and a donation of $10 million towards the support of Iraqi refugees
and $100 million to build a hospital in Syria).


13. (S) PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY: The UAE would like to see tangible
progress on the Middle East Roadmap, rejects the Hamas agenda, and
continues to support the Palestinian people through more than $400
million in housing and humanitarian assistance since 2000. MbZ and
his brothers, Foreign Minister Abdullah and National Security
Advisor/State Security Director Hazza, are in close contact with
President Mahmoud Abbas and Prime Minister Salam Fayyad. As the
result of the May 2007 visit of USSC General Dayton, the UAE
transferred $80 million to the Palestinian president.

UAE Cooperation
--------------


14. (S) The U.S. enjoys strong defense cooperation with the UAE,
working together in key aspects of the war on terror. In addition to
supplying Special Operations troops on the ground in Afghanistan, the
UAE has been a source of security assistance for Lebanon and the
Palestinian Authority, and has assisted virtually every trouble spot
in the region in need of reconstruction support. The Emirates
provide critical basing and over-flight for U.S. reconnaissance and
refueling assets, extensive naval logistics support, and the Navy's
liberty port of choice in the region (425 ships annually). We
suggest you thank MbZ for his strong support for the U.S. Air Force
and Navy in the UAE and encourage continued partnership. A few
quantitative measures of bilateral cooperation include:

--- 1,600 USAF personnel (380th Air Expeditionary
Wing) at Al Dhafra Air Base;
--- a vigorous training schedule at the Gulf Air
Warfare Center at Al Dhafra;
--- the F-16 Block 60 program;
--- approximately 425 port visits last year;
--- over 24,000 US military overflights/landings in
2006;
--- more than 150,000 U.S. servicemen and women
enjoying liberty annually in the UAE; and
--- 180 UAE Special Operations forces currently serving with the
Coalition in Afghanistan;
--- 150 conventional ground forces with South African built armored
personnel carriers are planned to deploy in support of OEF, to
work directly with Canadian forces.


15. (S) These contributions are significant in scope but also
enduring in their continuity over a number of years. The ports of
Jebel Ali and Fujairah are vital to U.S. Navy interdiction
operations, re-supply and sustainment, and combat support efforts
across the region. Jebel Ali in Dubai has hosted more port visits
for each of the past three years than any other port outside the
United States. In expressing appreciation for this outstanding
partnership, we also like to remind the UAE that the evolving nature
of military requirements mandates an ongoing focus on joint planning,
coordination, and strategic interoperability.

SISON