Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07ABUDHABI1595
2007-09-25 05:36:00
SECRET
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Cable title:  

IRAQ AND IRAN KEY TOPICS IN MBZ MEETING WITH

Tags:  PREL PTER PARM MOPS MARR IR IZ LE AE 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO6606
PP RUEHDE RUEHDIR
DE RUEHAD #1595/01 2680536
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 250536Z SEP 07
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9760
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 0382
RUEHLB/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 0607
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ABU DHABI 001595 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

CENTCOM FOR ADMIRAL FALLON
STATE FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ARP, PM/FO
DOD/OSD FOR A/S LONG, DAS KIMMITT, KELSO, QUINN, ANDERSON
CENTCOM ALSO FOR MAJ GEN FINDLEY, REYES, RODRIGUEZ
NSC FOR NRAMCHAND, EABRAMS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/25/2017
TAGS: PREL PTER PARM MOPS MARR IR IZ LE AE
SUBJECT: IRAQ AND IRAN KEY TOPICS IN MBZ MEETING WITH
ADMIRAL WILLIAM J. FALLON

REFS: A) ABU DHABI 1566, B) ABU DHABI 1479

Classified by CDA Martin Quinn, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ABU DHABI 001595

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

CENTCOM FOR ADMIRAL FALLON
STATE FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ARP, PM/FO
DOD/OSD FOR A/S LONG, DAS KIMMITT, KELSO, QUINN, ANDERSON
CENTCOM ALSO FOR MAJ GEN FINDLEY, REYES, RODRIGUEZ
NSC FOR NRAMCHAND, EABRAMS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/25/2017
TAGS: PREL PTER PARM MOPS MARR IR IZ LE AE
SUBJECT: IRAQ AND IRAN KEY TOPICS IN MBZ MEETING WITH
ADMIRAL WILLIAM J. FALLON

REFS: A) ABU DHABI 1566, B) ABU DHABI 1479

Classified by CDA Martin Quinn, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (S) Summary: In a lengthy September 17 conversation,
Admiral William J. Fallon, USCENTCOM Commander, and Sheikh
Mohammed bin Zayed (MbZ),Abu Dhabi Crown Prince and Deputy
Supreme Commander of the UAE Armed Forces discussed the Iraq
security situation and the necessity for Government of Iraq
political progress to sustain recent positive trends. MbZ
argued for caution against the long-term threat of extremist
views and advocated moderate dialogue among Arab audiences.
On Iran, MbZ offered an insightful assessment of the complex
relationship with Iran, highlighted the missile threat and
asked about the lease of Patriot systems while UAE
procurement requests were under development. He said Iran's
goals in the nuclear arena were likely irreversible, that UAE
defenses should be arrayed against the threat, and that he
worried about the influx of Iranian influence (people and
investments) in the region. He did not anticipate an
effectively coordinated GCC front against Iran. The UAE is
committed to helping Lebanon restore its former calm, he
stated, partly through recent security assistance. End
summary.

Iraq: positive trends
--------------


2. (S) Admiral Fallon reviewed regional security with MbZ in
a September 17 meeting that was conducted before and after a
late Ramadan dinner in Abu Dhabi (the dinner was attended by
about 200 local guests). MbZ inquired first about the
situation in Iraq, which the Admiral characterized as
constantly changing along generally positive trend lines.
With some emphasis on his recent visit to Anbar Province, the

Admiral said violence is down in Iraq, more Sunni are
entering the security forces, Anbar is a safer place to move
around, Sheikh Sattar's followers have declared their
continued opposition to al-Qaeda, tribal alliances seem to be
holding, there are visible signs of rebuilding in Ramadi and
Falluja, and the fruits of reconciliation are evident in the
receipt by Anbar authorities of $70 million from the central
government. Shi'a tribes are looking at the Anbar model,
meeting together with Sunni tribal leaders, and separating
themselves somewhat from Jeish al-Mahdi (JAM),he added. MbZ
asked whether the USG had to press al-Maliki into giving the
$70 million to Sunni-dominant Anbar, to which Admiral Fallon
explained the U.S. did encourage them to do this


3. (S) Discontent in the U.S. regarding developments in Iraq
stems partly from a perception that the Iraqi government
could take control of the situation if it chose to do so, the
Admiral noted, adding that the Iraqi people were enjoying
increasing freedom to choose. Grass-roots pressures are
building on the leaders in Baghdad to take more decisive
action to calm the security situation; the need for better
governance and less corruption is increasingly clear. Saddam
had, unfortunately, made the country so dependent that it
could not feed itself, yet with food being distributed and
oil flowing, some senior politicians now recognize that
people might seek alternatives to the Central Government if
it does not reach out to the provinces. The "forcing
mechanism" of grass roots pressure is beginning to bear
fruit. The Admiral cited al-Maliki's quick reaction to
unrest in Karbala in an effort to prevent a localized problem
from becoming larger -- MbZ asked pointedly if the PM would
have a similar reaction to unrest in a non-Shi'a part of Iraq.


4. (S) MbZ acknowledged positive trend lines in Iraqi
security which will require time and patience to solidify.
He looked forward to further improvement by next spring,
calling for greater assistance to the Iraqi people and
tighter control over JAM to show Iraq a good alternative to
Iranian dominance.

Moderate dialogue to defeat extremism
--------------


5. (S) The Crown Prince cautioned that a "second tier" of

ABU DHABI 00001595 002 OF 003


al-Qaeda, beneath the level of the violent leadership, was
recruiting followers to an extremist "Muslim brother"
ideology. These people have influence in the mosques and
schools, do well in free elections, and administer charities
that cement relationships in the community. Stating that
Iraqi VP Tariq al-Hashemi is a "Muslim brother," MbZ
suggested the USG monitor the group's influence over the long
term.


6. (C) MbZ characterized the content of a lecture which his
dinner guests had received that evening from visiting former
White House counter-terrorism official Richard Clark. Clark
had cautioned the UAE to be on alert for an al-Qaeda that can
strike at any place or time; one must prepare for the worst.
The majority of Arabs do not support al-Qaeda, said MbZ,
although support fluctuates by city and country. MbZ said it
is important to get diverse audiences together to discuss
issues (as he had done in the evening lecture) and to
emphasize the value of moderate dialogue. He said Ramadan is
a "super busy" time for him, during which such lectures were
one of the benefits of the season. (Note: MbZ hosted former
Iraqi PM Ayad Allawi at a similar event later the same week.
End note.)

Iran: preparing UAE defenses
--------------


7. (S) Turning to the threat from Iran, MbZ asked if the UAE
could lease air defense systems (PAC-3) in conjunction with
the lengthy and cumbersome purchase process. Admiral Fallon
said the mood in Congress appeared favorable for approval of
requested arms transfers, but that existing air defense
batteries were committed elsewhere. MbZ appreciated the USG
pledge to separate UAE arms transfers from Congressional
discussion of Saudi requests to avoid a "difficult situation"
if Saudi programs are delayed in the approval process. He
noted how UAE hopes of acquiring stinger missiles in the
1980's (to protect oil platforms) had been derailed by Qatari
purchases of stingers from the Taliban. He did not want UAE
defense needs to be collateral damage to a neighbor's
indiscretions again.


8. (S) MbZ said he felt it was a matter of time before
Tehran had nuclear weapons. Iran may indeed already have
them, he opined, stating that he had no proof to that effect
but that he worried about being unprepared; "we can deal
with" UAE defensive needs if given some years to prepare.
He reiterated that the UAE does not "want to be caught by
surprise." Iran is determined, has much of the required
technology, and may be close to its nuclear goals. He did
not think the regime in Iran could amend its ways and
demonstrate "good" international behavior as an alternative
to its current course. He worried that Iran might put the
West in a "catch 22" by playing on the nerves of a European
country that might "blink" (and strike at Iran). He said the
UAE had a limited role in either convincing Iran to shift its
course or in convincing the West not to strike (and thus
provoke) Iran. Such a scenario would force the UAE to
respond, however, and it must plan for the "day after." He
said many of his UAE compatriots were less concerned about an
unpredictable neighbor which MbZ worried about considerably.


9. (S) The Admiral cited how North Korea had shifted its
stance from confrontation to a calm approach when faced with
economic pressure, a tack the USG sought to replicate with
Iran. Changing behavior will require a combination of forces
to build on internal pressures already obvious in Iran. A
unified GCC stance would add significant pressure on Iran,
emphasized Fallon, particularly if economic pressure were
brought to bear in a concerted manner. MbZ said he had been
impressed with the North Korean example at first, yet when he
analyzed parallels to Iran he found three particularly vexing
differences: 1) Iran has a history of Empire and desire for
hegemony, 2) Iran is one of the five largest oil producers,
and 3) Iran is in a much more complex neighborhood in which
many corrupt nations suffer from fragile leadership. (Note:
The UAE announced the establishment of diplomatic relations
with North Korea, in a document signed by their respective UN
perm reps in New York, the following day. See Ref A. End

ABU DHABI 00001595 003 OF 003


note.)


10. (S) MbZ said the UAE tried to control the "legal and
illegal" flows of Iranians into the UAE, partly by
restricting the number of visas issued per month (which he
said was difficult in light of the magnitude of Iranian
investment in the Emirates). UAE intelligence agencies
advise the leadership not to act against Iranian "sleeper"
cells in the UAE "without a request from an ally like the
U.S." By leaving identified cells in place the UAEG can at
least monitor them; if you remove them, "two more" are
created as replacements. The UAEG is aware of some
individuals, some companies, and "some visitors from
California" working on behalf of Iran. It does not claim to
know them all and worries that it does not know enough about
Iranian investment funds in the GCC and elsewhere. He said
UAE authorities knew of funds on the scale of $10 billion
that are managed on behalf of the Iranian regime by local GCC
citizens who don't stand out due to their citizenship. He
assessed that there were "seven or eight" such funds in the
GCC, most managed by Shi'a loyal to Iran (with one or two
helpful Sunni in the mix). A GCC citizen investing locally
can avoid scrutiny that would accrue if funds were invested
in Switzerland or New York, he said.


11. (S) MbZ said it was important to make a stand against
Iran;. However, he did not anticipate a coordinated approach
from the GCC. How does one convince the Qatari leadership
to cooperate, for example, when it "sneaks" $40 million
through Egypt to Hamas and sponsors al-Jazeera broadcasts?
In spite of the high threat that Iran poses to the GCC,
leadership is lacking to stand together against that threat,
suggested the Crown Prince.

Lebanon: Security cooperation
--------------


12. (C) Lebanon is a country that deserves to be stable,
said MbZ, and all partners must "do our homework" to help
return Beirut to the "good old days." The current leadership
is made up of puppets controlled by outside forces, he
analyzed. He was frustrated that Lebanon does not spend more
to defend itself from Hizballah rather than letting Hizballah
claim to be its defender. MbZ promised to share a list of
UAE contributions to Lebanon.


13. (SBU) Note: The Prince's staff subsequently passed
PolOff an accounting of UAE aid to Lebanon since 2000. The
total figure for 2007 was $62 million, with 2006 tallied at
$85 million. The aggregate total since 2000 was nearly $200
million, divided between assistance from the Department of
Finance, the Red Crescent, the Zayed Charitable Foundation,
and the UAE Armed Forces (with the entire armed forces
contribution of $57 million listed as having been donated in
2007). End note.


14. (U) Admiral Fallon has reviewed this cable.
SISON