Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07ABUDHABI158
2007-02-01 13:42:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Cable title:  

SCENE-SETTER FOR THE VISIT OF U/S FORE TO THE UAE

Tags:  PREL PGOV ETTC IR MASS AE 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO5244
RR RUEHDE
DE RUEHAD #0158/01 0321342
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 011342Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8159
INFO RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 6798
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ABU DHABI 000158 

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR U/S FORE FROM THE AMBASSADOR AND CONSUL GENERAL
DEPT FOR NEA/SCA/EX (ALFORD, KACZMAREK),M/SA (OFFUT)
DEPT FOR DS/IP/NEA (LAAS),NEA/ARP

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL PGOV ETTC IR MASS AE
SUBJECT: SCENE-SETTER FOR THE VISIT OF U/S FORE TO THE UAE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ABU DHABI 000158

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR U/S FORE FROM THE AMBASSADOR AND CONSUL GENERAL
DEPT FOR NEA/SCA/EX (ALFORD, KACZMAREK),M/SA (OFFUT)
DEPT FOR DS/IP/NEA (LAAS),NEA/ARP

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL PGOV ETTC IR MASS AE
SUBJECT: SCENE-SETTER FOR THE VISIT OF U/S FORE TO THE UAE


1. (SBU) U/S Fore, Mission UAE warmly welcomes you and looks
forward to your February 13-14 visit to Dubai. Your meeting
with Vice President, Prime Minister and Dubai Ruler Mohammed
bin Rashid Al-Maktoum (MbR) will allow us to make progress on
our new consulate compound (NCC) project and request more
robust security assistance for our current ConGen, as well as
to discuss other bilateral issues. With increasing staff and
security vulnerability, moving up the start date on
construction of the NCC is post,s top security and
management priority. Your meeting with the Dubai Chamber of
Commerce and Industry, and subsequent press interviews, are
excellent outreach opportunities to review, among other
issues, the US Open Door/Secure Borders policy and our desire
to increase business and people-to-people linkages between
the US and the region. At the Dubai School of
Government(DSG)-) a relatively new institution unique in the
region -) you will have an opportunity for professional
outreach to peers eager for creative pubic policy thinking,
and to provide DSG administrators and program managers
insight into US public policy innovations like the Diplomatic
Readiness Initiative. We know the government, and MbR, are
keen to enhance the professionalism and efficiency of the
UAE's public sector. The Mission's ELO and LES staff, who
you will be meeting live and by DVC, are also excited by the
opportunity to exchange thoughts and concerns.

Background of Bilateral Ties
--------------


2. (SBU) The UAE is a close ally and an important partner
intent on cooperating with us to create a stable economic,
political, and security environment in the Middle East, in
particular throughout the Gulf region. One of the world's
wealthiest countries on a per capita basis, the UAE has
adopted progressive economic policies that have strengthened
its position as a regional hub for trade, transportation,
investment and tourism, thus contributing to regional

economic stability. Dubai, with far less oil wealth than its
sister and to some extent rival emirate Abu Dhabi, has led
this innovative approach and has become a model for private
sector-led development that is being copied in other Gulf
states. However, a highly traditional governmental structure
underlies the economic and development innovation throughout
the country, with political and economic power concentrated
in the hands of royal families in each of the seven emirates.
We are engaging the UAE on ways to create a more effective
civil society network that could lead to a more open
political system.

Centralized Power Structure
--------------


3. (SBU) The composition of federal and emirate-level
governing bodies is generally derived from only a few Emirati
families; the two most important are the ruling families of
Abu Dhabi (Al-Nahyan) and Dubai (Al-Maktoum). Mohammed bin
Rashid Al-Maktoum (MbR) is the Vice President, Prime
Minister, Minister of Defense and Ruler of Dubai. MbR, in
his capacity as Ruler of Dubai, maintains personal control
(working through a select group of trusted deputies) over the
bulk of Dubai's booming economic sector. These deputies act
much like CEOs for Dubai's large parastatal enterprises,
competing with each other as much as with outside competition.

ConGen Security and New Building Status
--------------


4. (SBU) ConGen Dubai is the largest post in the NEA region
located in commercial space; Dubai's staff will reach 129
this Summer. Despite wide-ranging, ongoing efforts by the
Mission (including placement of jersey barriers and the
provision of extra police coverage) and good cooperation from
the Dubai government, ConGen physical and technical security
remains wholly inadequate in almost all aspects. This
vulnerability will continue to increase along with the post's
size and growing public profile, the latter largely a result
of the presence of the Iran Regional Presence Office. The
Mission's absolute top management and security priority is
moving the ConGen to a secure, stand-alone structure with
proper setback as soon as possible. The government of Dubai
granted a seven-acre-plus site in the diplomatic quarter for
the express purpose of constructing a new US Consulate
General. We are confident that the Government of Dubai, which
badly wants a new US facility here, will facilitate its
construction. According to the current OBO long-range
building plan, the NCC construction is scheduled to start in
FY-2010 with a completion date of 2013. This is simply too
long to leave a staff of 129 or more in vulnerable

ABU DHABI 00000158 002 OF 003


facilities. We propose that the construction start date be
moved forward to 2007, and the ConGen move as soon as
possible to an interim facility with a secure perimeter and
setback. Dubai will be sending a cable reviewing our
security situation with more specific proposals.

Consular Affairs
--------------


5. (SBU) In FY 2006, Dubai processed approximately 36,000 NIV
applications. It is the major adjudicating post for Iranian
NIV applications (45 percent of its NIV workload involves
Iranian applicants) and it provides services to an estimated
17,000 resident American citizens in Dubai and the Northern
Emirates. According to the Dubai Board of Tourism, over
200,000 US citizens transit and/or visit Dubai annually. As
a result of military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan,
thousands of US military personnel and Department of Defense
civilians and contractors either transit Dubai to other
locations or visit for rest and recreation. Dubai remains
the number-one overseas liberty port -- hosting 77,000
service-men and women annually.

Defense Cooperation
--------------


6. (SBU) The UAE's contribution to U.S. defense interests in
the region has been extensive and enduring. The ports of
Jebel Ali and Fujairah are vital to U.S. Navy interdiction
operations, re-supply and sustainment, and combat support
efforts across the region*Dubai's large and impressive Jebel
Ali port is the number one port outside of the US for US
warship visits (492 in 2006),and has been for the last three
years; it hosts a sizable permanent USO operation.

Iraq
--------------


7. (SBU) The UAE offers political support for Iraq but is
careful not to get out in front of the GCC and Arab League,
having hosted a July visit by Iraqi PM Maliki and the
September 10 Iraq Compact Preparatory Group meeting. However
the UAE has no diplomatic staff at its embassy in Baghdad and
UAE officials avoid travel there (particularly since the
April 2006 attacks on its mission and kidnapping of the
Deputy Charge d'Affaires in May). The UAE is engaged in
regional efforts to facilitate reconciliation between Sunni
and Shi'a forces.

Iran
--------------


8. (SBU) The UAE's political relations with Iran are strained
over Iran's 35-year occupation of three disputed islands in
the Gulf, Iran's nuclear aspirations, and Iran's support for
Shi'a factions in Iraq. The UAE has been careful to adopt a
non-confrontational stance to avoid jeopardizing its
substantial trade and business interests with Iran. The UAEG
has no export control law, in spite of long-standing U.S.
urging. Given the targeted nature of UNSCR 1737 on Iran, the
direct impact on the UAE is likely to be minor. UAE officials
have expressed concern on several occasions to US officials
about the US decision to open an Iran-focused office in
Dubai. Their comments, however, have expressed a desire for
less publicity and have not included a request to close the
office.

Lebanon
--------------


9. (SBU) The UAE was very active throughout 2006 in providing
humanitarian and security assistance to Lebanon. Significant
donations of supplies transited the UAE "air bridge"
established for that purpose. In the post-conflict phase,
the UAE has been at the forefront of reconstruction efforts,
continuing a long-standing de-mining effort and contributing
resources for school construction, hospitals, humanitarian
meals, etc.

Reform Agenda
--------------


10. (SBU) The UAEG's continued commitment (and ability) to
use its sizeable wealth to satisfy the needs of its small
citizenry constitutes the "ruling bargain" and explains the
absence to date of significant pressure from the indigenous
-- albeit minority )- UAE national population for change.
Our democratic reform strategy aims to encourage the ruling

ABU DHABI 00000158 003 OF 003


families to introduce fully-representative
government/elections. In December 2006, for the first time
in the country's history, a designated group of six thousand
"electors" selected one-half of the 40-member Federal
National Council (FNC),an advisory body with no real
legislative power. The electors were directly appointed by
the rulers of each emirate, and could only vote for one of
the other electors. To the surprise of many, only one woman
was elected to the FNC; several emirate rulers have
subsequently named other women among their appointees to the
remaining half of the FNC. We are advocating progress toward
an open and independent operating environment for civil
society, a free and independent media, and greater
transparency and public participation in legislative and
regulatory processes. The UAE has neither public elections
nor political parties and does not recognize rights of
association or authorize trade unions.
SISON