MIXED PICTURE FROM ACTIVISTS ON UAE ANTI-TIP

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABU DHABI 001539

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR G/TIP, INL, DRL, NEA/RA, NEA/ARP, L/DL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/13/2017
TAGS: PREL PHUM KCRM ELAB UN AE
SUBJECT: MIXED PICTURE FROM ACTIVISTS ON UAE ANTI-TIP
EFFORTS


Classified by CDA Martin Quinn, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: Recent conversations with Ansar Burney
(head of a Pakistani trust who focuses on the camel jockey
issue in the UAE) and Sharla Musabih (who runs a shelter for
abused women in Dubai),highlight the complex nature of the
TIP problem in the UAE, as well as positive yet limited
official efforts to combat trafficking. Both activists
acknowledge that much remains to be done to identify the true
scope of the problem, heighten awareness in public and
official circles, strengthen the legislative framework to
combat trafficking, and assist victims. At the same time,
both acknowledge that the UAEG is taking measured steps in
the right direction. Musabih is in fact joining hands with
Dubai officials to pursue her goals, hoping to press for
progress by teaming up with some of the very officials whose
approach she seeks to change. End summary.

Ansar Burney: How many jockeys were there anyway?
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2. (C) On August 14, Burney reviewed with the Charge and
PolChief his involvement in the camel jockey issue and said
the repatriation of 1,077 children and the provision of $9
million to UNICEF for their resettlement and education were
positive steps but not the ultimate solution. He claimed the
drama is somewhat more complex and tragic. He suggested that
children are still "used" in the camel industry, including in
races held away from the public eye. He went so far as to
suggest that senior sheikhs are never seen viewing camel
races with robot jockeys because they "were enjoying the
misery" of a human cargo bouncing along on animals.


3. (C) Recalling that the UAE Minister of Interior (MoI) had
once estimated the number of young camel jockeys in the UAE
at "2 to 3 thousand," Burney said his own estimates had been
over 5,000 (virtually all non-UAE nationals). The
repatriation of 1,077 is therefore helpful but far from
sufficient. Burney added that many of those repatriated had
simply returned to dismal economic circumstances and were
prone to influence by extremist Islamic thought through the
madrassas in Pakistan -- to which some of the returned boys
had been farmed out. He called for stronger oversight of
post-repatriation education assistance (implying that funds
were either misused by the families or not disbursed).


4. (C) Note: The Pakistani Community Welfare Attache told
PolOff September 5 that he estimates possibly 1,000 young
foreign boys still involved in the camel-raising industry,
although not necessarily as jockeys. He echoed concerns that
funds dispersed to repatriated jockeys needed careful
oversight; he was convinced that funds were indeed
distributed as promised, but not necessarily spent in the
best interests of the boys. End note.

Questioning UAE sincerity
--------------


5. (C) Burney said a 2005 HBO documentary on the plight of
the camel jockeys (in which he featured prominently) had
attracted the attention of Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammed
bin Zayed (MbZ),who had along with MoI Sheikh Seif bin Zayed
requested Burney's help to combat the menace. Shelters
subsequently established at Zayed Military City housed
approximately 300 rescued jockeys at one point, he said,
although accountability was poor and some boys left the
facility without a trace (presumably, in Burney's view,
returned to influential sheikhs who had protested the boys'
rescue from their camel camps). UNICEF played a key role in
the sheltering and repatriation, said Burney, but had limited
influence over the comings and goings of the boys. In spite
of MbZ's apparent personal (and genuine) desire to rid the
nation of this menace, Burney assessed that overall the UAE
was taking limited actions and then only due to pressure from
the USG and from him, and "not to please God."


6. (C) Referring to his own public support in late 2006 of
the UAE in a recent court case against Dubai Ruler and UAE
VP/Prime Minister Mohammed bin Rashid al-Maktoum and his
brother (and Finance Minister) Sheikh Hamdan bin Rashid (a
case dismissed for lack of jurisdiction in July 2007),Burney
said senior UAE officials "seemed sincere" in enlisting his
aid. He submitted positive letters about UAEG progress in
addressing the problem, and withheld for the time being more
"evidence" against them. Once the case was dismissed,
however, he claimed the UAE quickly lost interest in
cooperation. The UAE had been,ready to "purchase" his help
with promises of tackling the problem, he said, but were not

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in fact looking to "help the children."


7. (C) Elaborating on what "evidence" he might deploy in
exposing the problem in the future, Burney said he had
assisted a French media team in documenting ongoing abuses,
yet held that film in reserve so as not to antagonize the
UAEG until the timing seemed most useful. He spoke of the
harsh punishments given to boys who did not wake up early and
work hard, and the "almost daily" occurrence of boys falling
from camels. He said boys were still being raced on camels
in multiple emirates of the UAE, and that his team most
recently witnessed a child in a race about six months ago.

Balancing rhetoric and reality
--------------


8. (C) Lamenting the disparity between official
pronouncements and harsh reality in source countries, Burney
said for example that the Government of Bangladesh claimed
repatriation was going well when in fact the repatriated
children were "miserable." He said some boys unfortunately
preferred the UAE to life in their home countries. (Note:
Burney is from Pakistan and reportedly visits Bangladesh and
Mauritania, but has been unable to obtain a visa to explore
post-repatriation circumstances in Sudan. He noted that in
spite of limited access to UAE officials and data, he never
had trouble entering the UAE. End note.)


9. (C) Comment: Ansar Burney has a strident message to
share, and an interest in expanding the role (and funding) of
his trust (Ansar Burney Trust International in Karachi),
making him one of the loudest voices to decry the status of
camel jockeys -- and that not always consistently, as seen in
his temporary support of the UAE in fighting a court case in
the U.S. when it seemed to his advantage. We have heard
others in the Pakistani community express skepticism about
his sincerity, viewing him as a "self promoter." His
statements are conveniently exaggerated at times. That said,
he was instrumental in pressing for steps heretofore
implemented and we should encourage him to continue the quest
for more complete solutions. End comment.


10. (SBU) An August 23 article in the semi-official Arabic
daily al-Ittihad highlighted a senior Pakistani official's
praise of the UAE for the rehabilitation and repatriation of
650 former camel jockeys. The Pakistani MFA Director General
gave his strong endorsement of UAE efforts in the article,
which openly referred to "human smuggling" as the cause of
the jockeys' plight. (Comment: Such straightforward jargon
is rare in addressing TIP-related issues in the official
press and suggests a growing acknowledgment of trafficking as
a national issue. Manifestations of the UAE desire to
address -- or at least be seen as serious in addressing --
TIP include the formation of a National Committee for
Combating Human Trafficking; MoI-coordinated training
seminars September 2-3 for police, criminal investigative
division officers, immigration officials, and public
prosecutors which reportedly explored ways to rehabilitate
victims; the desire to host a UN conference which led to
extensive preparation last fall, before the idea for a March
2007 conference was scrubbed partially for logistical
reasons; and creation of the Dubai Foundation on Women and
Children discussed below. End comment.)


11. (C) The Pakistani Embassy has expressed general
satisfaction to PolChief on camel jockey repatriation, while
acknowledging that a thousand or so may still be present in
the UAE. The Community Welfare Attache said September 5 that
he had recently repatriated six jockeys completely unrelated
to the UNICEF program. Additionally, we have learned from a
local UN office of a tender issued by the UAEG for bids on a
data base to link five countries involved in the camel jockey
issue (presumably to better track the post-repatriation
status of former jockeys),suggesting ongoing UAEG interest
in ensuring that resettlement is implemented carefully.

A cautious yet hopeful voice in Dubai
--------------


12. (C) Sharla Musabih, an AmCit activist in Dubai who
manages the City of Hope shelter for victims of abuse and
trafficking, told PolOffs August 22 that officialdom was
"investing in her" to improve its record on human rights.
After what she calls "years of abuse and harassment," the
Dubai authorities claim to understand the need for shelters
like hers. Juma al-Mansouri of the Dubai Executive Office
had invited her to merge her operations with an expanded
"semi-government" initiative. Demanding that any cooperation

ABU DHABI 00001539 003 OF 003


be on her terms, she eventually agreed to work together --
reportedly crossing off names of potential board members for
the new "Dubai Foundation on Women and Children" according to
her sense of who might truly be helpful. The Foundation met
September 5 for the first time.


13. (C) Expressing her cautious yet "excited" expectations
of the new arrangement, Musabih said in late August that her
aggressive and outspoken approach would continue as she
cajoled police, prosecutors, and political figures to take a
stronger stance in helping the disadvantaged. She sought to
build up trust among official players to help the Foundation
(which she still prefers to associate with the name "City of
Hope" to build on her previous efforts) as it seeks to
enhance Dubai's (and by extension the UAE's) expertise in
identifying and assisting victims while prosecuting
traffickers.


14. (C) Musabih also hoped that official sanction for her
activities would help "validate" the efforts of other groups
and individuals quietly engaged in similar work. By helping
others step into the public eye without fear of official
censure (admittedly a long-term and cautious process),she
was hopeful that funding sources would increase along with
public awareness of the magnitude of the problem. As for her
own funding, she said she never gave a second thought to
money, as the 50 to 80 thousand dirhams needed monthly to run
the City of Hope (roughly 14 to 20 thousand USD) always
seemed to be available. Whatever the challenges of fund
raising thus far, financing will likely be made easier in the
future by official support from Dubai authorities. Pressed
on whether the government's interest in her work is genuine
or merely cosmetic, Musabih insisted that "they are getting
it" and she anticipated a productive (if sometimes
uncomfortably frank) relationship.


15. (SBU) Comment: The multi-faceted TIP dilemma has the
attention of UAE authorities, who need ongoing pressure to
pursue anti-TIP efforts in a systematic and enduring way. As
post seeks to sort out the many voices involved and press the
federal government (and emirate-level leaders) to step up its
own action, we see potential partnerships between activists
and officials particularly promising, as those active on the
ground have data and context relevant to helping define
effective pressure points. They can also speak out more
comfortably in the media to intensify the pressure. This
approach can be complementary to USG programs and TIP
reports. End comment.


16. (U) This is a joint Abu Dhabi / Dubai cable.
QUINN