Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07ABUDHABI1286
2007-08-01 09:09:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Cable title:  

POTENTIAL ARMS SALES: STRENGTHENING UAE DEFENSIVE

Tags:  PARM PTER MOPS MASS KNNP IR AE 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO7773
OO RUEHDE RUEHDIR
DE RUEHAD #1286/01 2130909
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 010909Z AUG 07
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9468
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ABU DHABI 001286 

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

STATE FPR NEA/FO DAS GRAY
NEA/ARP TREUTER, ABAGWELL
PM/FO AA/S MULL, PM/RSAT RROBINSON;
T A/S ROOD;
P HMUSTAFA;
DOD FOR OSD PDAS MARY BETH LONG, DAS KIMMITT
CENTCOM FOR MAJ GEN FINDLEY
NSC FOR NRAMCHAND, MDORAN, EABRAMS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/01/2017
TAGS: PARM PTER MOPS MASS KNNP IR AE
SUBJECT: POTENTIAL ARMS SALES: STRENGTHENING UAE DEFENSIVE
CAPABILITIES

REF: ABU DHABI 1161

Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ABU DHABI 001286

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

STATE FPR NEA/FO DAS GRAY
NEA/ARP TREUTER, ABAGWELL
PM/FO AA/S MULL, PM/RSAT RROBINSON;
T A/S ROOD;
P HMUSTAFA;
DOD FOR OSD PDAS MARY BETH LONG, DAS KIMMITT
CENTCOM FOR MAJ GEN FINDLEY
NSC FOR NRAMCHAND, MDORAN, EABRAMS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/01/2017
TAGS: PARM PTER MOPS MASS KNNP IR AE
SUBJECT: POTENTIAL ARMS SALES: STRENGTHENING UAE DEFENSIVE
CAPABILITIES

REF: ABU DHABI 1161

Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (S) Summary. On July 31 Ambassador met with DCM, USLO
Chief, and DATT to review UAE top priorities for upcoming
potential military sales under the framework of the Gulf
Security Dialogue (GSD). We discussed which of the proposed
systems would be most feasible both to enhance UAE capacity
for self defense and also to increase interoperability with
U.S. systems in responding to threats to regional stability.
While the acquisition priorities voiced by the UAEG
(paragraph 2) do not exactly match Post's review of the most
realistically achievable FMS package (paragraph 3),the UAE
has expressed interest in purchasing all/all the systems on
Post's list, including strong interest in our top priority,
the sale of 12 Patriot PAC3/GEM-T batteries valued at $5.5
billion. End Summary.


2. (S/NF) At the present time, the UAE has expressed interest
in purchasing the following potentially offensive and
defensive weapons systems (in estimated order of UAE
priority):

a) Armed Predator B (we note MTCR issues);

b) THAAD/ER-THAAD (est. case value $1.5-3.9 billion),and
investment in the development of ER-THAAD (investment amounts
as high as $1 billion have been mentioned);

c) SLAMRAAM (to upgrade/replace HAWK missiles) (est. case
value $400-700 million);

d) Patriot PAC3/GEM-T (est. case value $5.5 billion);

e) AVENGER/STINGER missiles vehicle/ship (mounted) (est. case
value $200-300 million);

f) Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) E2-C Hawkeye
(lease of 3 aircraft for 5 years as an interim fix until
AEW&C platform delivered)(est. case value $150-200 million);

g) AEW&C platform (Boeing "Wedgetail" or Northrop-Grumman
E2-D "Hawkeye") (est. case value $1.5-2.0 billion for
aircraft plus a 20 year follow on support contract est. at $1
billion);

h) Maritime surveillance aircraft (est. case value $100-200
million); and

i) Command and control upgrades (SEW, CENTRIX, LINK 11/16,
GCCS-M) (est. case value depends on which platforms LINK
11/16 are integrated on, such as F-16 block 60s, AEW&C, etc.).


3. (S/NF) Post believes that a more realistic, suitable and
achievable priority order listing would focus on improved air
and missile defense, including shared and interoperable early
warning systems. These systems, specifically tailored
towards enhancing UAE defensive capabilities, would be (in
Post's priority order):

a) Patriot PAC3/GEM-T;

b) SLAMRAAM;

c) AEW&C E2-C Hawkeye (lease of 3 aircraft for 5 years as an
interim fix until AEW&C platform delivered);

d) THAAD/ER-THAAD;

e) AEW&C platform (Boeing "Wedgetail" or Northrop-Grumman
E2-D "Hawkeye"); and

f) C2 and early warning (SEW, CENTRIX, LINK 16 release in
specific, etc.).


4. (S/NF) The UAEG has made clear that it would like to have

ABU DHABI 00001286 002 OF 002


the Patriot PAC3 and SLAMRAAM systems in place by summer 2009
(reftel). This timetable is overly optimistic. We, and our
defense contractor contacts, believe this to be unachievable
until summer 2010 (for SLAMRAAM) and 2011 (for Patriot PAC3)
at the earliest. The UAE is still eager to obtain an
overarching Air and Missile Defense system as soon as
possible, along with numerous other supporting items to
include the C2 systems mentioned.


5. (S) Although the FMS process ensures a "total package
approach," post believes both FMS and DCS (where permitted)
options and/or a hybrid option are all viable alternatives
for military hardware and training. In addition, for all FMS
equipment cases, the USG should be prepared to present a plan
for support/follow-on support cases, as well as
logistical/transportation cases and training cases (to
include English language training estimated at several
hundred thousand dollars for as many as 1000 UAE personnel)
-- vital to the success of any sales program.


6. (S) Comment: Post offers above assessment in order to
provide Department, DoD, and NSC a concise overview of what
the UAE leadership has in mind for its military/security
needs in the context of our regional security conversations
with Gulf states over the next several weeks. This message
should be read in conjunction with "Scenesetter for Visit to
UAE by U/S Burns and U/S Levey" (septel). End Comment.

SISON