Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07ABUDHABI1273
2007-07-30 10:16:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Cable title:  

UAE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR HAZZA DISCUSSES

Tags:  KPAL MASS MARR PTER IS IR AE 
pdf how-to read a cable
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OO RUEHDE RUEHDIR
DE RUEHAD #1273/01 2111016
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 301016Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9454
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 1207
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 0562
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 0227
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI IMMEDIATE 7204
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/FBI WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ABU DHABI 001273 

SIPDIS

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SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/ARP AND NEA/IPA
CAIRO PLEASE PASS TO A/S WELCH AND U/S BURNS
NSC FOR EABRAMS AND NRAMCHAND

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/30/2017
TAGS: KPAL MASS MARR PTER IS IR AE
SUBJECT: UAE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR HAZZA DISCUSSES
PALESTINIAN ASSISTANCE WITH USSC DAYTON

REF: A. ABU DHABI 765 (NOTAL)

B. ABU DHABI 593 (NOTAL)

ABU DHABI 00001273 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 (b & d).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ABU DHABI 001273

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/ARP AND NEA/IPA
CAIRO PLEASE PASS TO A/S WELCH AND U/S BURNS
NSC FOR EABRAMS AND NRAMCHAND

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/30/2017
TAGS: KPAL MASS MARR PTER IS IR AE
SUBJECT: UAE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR HAZZA DISCUSSES
PALESTINIAN ASSISTANCE WITH USSC DAYTON

REF: A. ABU DHABI 765 (NOTAL)

B. ABU DHABI 593 (NOTAL)

ABU DHABI 00001273 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 (b & d).


1. (S/NF) Summary: On July 29, UAE National Security Advisor
Sheikh Hazza and USSC LtG Dayton discussed efforts to support
the Palestinian Authority. USSC Dayton urged the UAE to
coordinate its security assistance efforts with the USG and
stated that he would be coordinating Palestinian security
issues closely with Quartet Special Envoy Blair, but also
noted carefully that the USSC would not be working for Blair,
but with Blair, in the area of Palestinian institution
building. He asked Hazza to approach the Saudis to determine
their interest in restarting the Arab Quartet, which Hazza
promised to consider. Dayton briefed Hazza on a suggested
USD 120 million package of support for capacity building for
the Palestinian security forces. Hazza complained about the
role Qatar played in financing Hamas and urged the USG to
make these concerns clear to Qatar. He noted that Hamas'
successful coup in Gaza was a "failure" but not a "surprise."
Ambassador also asked Hazza whether the FBI could bring in a
team to reexamine information related to the September 11
attacks. Hazza welcomed the visit. End Summary


2. (C) Attending the meeting were UAE National Security
Advisor and Director of State Security Directorate(SSD)
Sheikh Hazza bin Zayed Al-Nahyan; BG Hamad Mubarak Al-Shamsi,
SSD Director of Research and Analysis; Major Sultan Saeed
Mohammed Saleh Al-Shamsi, SSD Director of Foreign Relations;
Ambassador; USSC LtG Keith Dayton; USSC Chief of Operations
Col Steve Harris; Acting PolMil Chief; and Econchief.

Need to coordinate efforts
--------------


3. (S) During their two-hour lunch meeting, USSC Dayton

briefed Hazza on changes in the Palestinian territories since
the Hamas victory. He explained that the USG's policy was to
ensure the survival of the Fayyad government. Dayton
emphasized that security assistance needed to go through
Palestinian Minister of Interior Al-Yahyah. USSC Dayton
further explained that he would be coordinating his efforts
closely with Quartet Special Envoy Tony Blair, who had the
POTUS' strong support. (Note: Blair met the UAE leadership
in Abu Dhabi on July 25. End Note.) Dayton thanked the UAE
for its generous assistance to the Palestinian people and to
the Palestinian Authority(PA),but also asked the UAEG to
coordinate its assistance with the USSC. He added that
President Abbas continued to request weapons and equipment,
but in his judgment, what the Palestinian Security Forces
needed was capacity building, not more weapons. Sheikh Hazza
reiterated the UAEG's support for President Abbas and for PM
Fayyad and the strong UAEG commitment to working closely with
the U.S. He did not, however, specifically commit to prior
coordination of its assistance to the PA. (Note: Ambassador
had learned earlier in the day from MFA sources that the UAE
was in the process of responding to Abbas' request for
security forces communications equipment, vehicles, and arms
(NFI). None of the items had been coordinated through USSC.
End note.)


4. (S) Dayton explained that the USG plan for its USD 80
million contribution would be institution-building for the
National Security Forces (NSF) and the Presidential Guard.
U.S. assistance would focus on training officers and basic
staff training. In addition it would target the creation of
a new NSF battalion (the first of seven) to support the
Palestinian police. Dayton passed a request for $120 million
in UAE assistance: $16 million for training two NSF-police
support units in Jordan; $14 million for equipment; and $90
million for Palestinian Authority Security Forces in Jericho
($15 million to enhance current facilities, and $75 million
to build a new Palestinian Training Center).

Talking to the Saudis about the Arab Quartet
--------------


5. (S) Dayton noted that the Arab Quartet (the intel chiefs
of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, and UAE) had not met since

ABU DHABI 00001273 002.2 OF 003


October 2006. He said that Washington had asked whether the
UAEG would approach the Saudis to encourage them to
reinvigorate the Arab Quartet; the Saudis were key to any
effort to support Fayyad and a chance for peace. Hazza
promised to consider the request to approach the Saudis and
to provide a response to the Ambassador.

Hamas supporters outspent Abbas supporters
--------------


6. (S) General Dayton noted that, despite widespread pledges
of support to President Abbas' government, the UAE was one of
the few countries actually to deliver on its pledges. In
fact, he noted the chief provider of funding for PM Fayyad's
government currently was Israel, which was providing the tax
receipts that it had withheld. Unfortunately, Dayton
emphasized, Hamas had received much more support in terms of
both money and training than Abbas had. Hamas had received
at least USD 150 million from Iran and USD 400 million from
Qatar, as well as training and equipment.


7. (S/NF) Sheikh Hazza commented that the problem was that
supporters of Abbas had tried to balance Hamas, not destroy
it. Hamas' supporters were more aggressive. He welcomed the
visit of Quartet Special Envoy Blair to the region, noting
that he highlighted the need for the U.S., EU, and GCC all to
increase their support to Abbas/Fayyad. He argued that
Qatar, Iran, and Syria were the three key pillars of support
for Hamas. Syria provided support "on the ground," Iran
provided training and assistance, and Qatar provided
financing. He said he had first met Mohammed Dahlan in March
2006, before he became security chief and when he was just a
parliamentarian. Dahlan had visited the UAE before visiting
Qatar and Hazza remembered warning Dahlan to "be careful" in
Qatar, as the Qataris supported Hamas. Dahlan called him
after his visit to Qatar to reconfirm this view.


8. (S/NF) Hazza asked whether the three countries (Iran,
Syria, and Qatar) had prior knowledge of the Gaza coup. He
argued that the USG needed to send a strong message to Qatar
that the country needed to decide which side it was on.
Qatar's support for Hamas might improve its relations with
the Iranians, but was destabilizing the region and made it
difficult for Abbas to succeed. Hazza strongly urged the
U.S. to make its displeasure clear to Qatar, but to keep the
UAE's name out of the discussion. "Our relations are good,"
he said but the two countries do not agree on this policy.
Ambassador asked whether Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammed bin
Zayed (MbZ) had raised any of these issues during his July 26
visit to Doha. Hazza simply said he had not yet had the
opportunity to speak with his older brother. (Note: MbZ
aide Yousef Al-Otaiba told Ambassador, later that evening,
that the Doha trip had been a "fraternal visit" focused on
energy and economic discussions. End Note.)

Gaza a "failure" but not a "surprise"
--------------


9. (S) Dayton reminded Hazza that he had warned that Hamas
would try a coup in Gaza if promised international support
for Abbas did not materialize. He stressed that the reason
the PA had lost was not due to lack of weapons, but due to a
lack of leadership and organization on the part of the PA
forces. There was no logistics system and no support for the
NSF fighting Hamas. The Palestinians, he stated, were going
through a "who lost Gaza?" exercise. Hazza agreed that
Hamas' coup was not a surprise to either the UAEG or the USG,
and it did not represent Dahlan's failure alone but a failure
for the international community.


10. (S) Hazza commented that Dahlan's strategy in Gaza had
been focused on the short-term need to contain Hamas. He
argued that a longer-term capacity building program wouldn't
have had time to work, though he thought a "two-track"
approach might have been possible. Hazza argued that
President Abbas never exercised political leadership in
response to the Hamas coup. He didn't say anything when
Hamas attacked the NSF. The only thing he did finally was to
call on both sides to stop fighting, which equalized both
parties. USSC Dayton told Hazza that the NSF Commander on

ABU DHABI 00001273 003.2 OF 003


the ground had asked USSC to urge Abbas to order the
Presidential Guard (which was never attacked) to reinforce
the NSF. The Presidential Guard never acted and now its
commander has been charged with treason.

Looking to the Future
--------------


11. (S) Sheikh Hazza and USSC Dayton discussed the future of
the Abbas/Fayyad government. Hazza said he thought that
Hamas did not have much popular support in Gaza but "ruled by
the gun." He asked, however, whether USSC Dayton thought
Hamas could replicate its successful coup in the West Bank.
USSC Dayton noted that although he did not think a Hamas coup
in the West Bank was imminent or likely to be successful, the
international community needed to seize the opportunity to
support the Abbas/Fayyad government. It provides the last
good hope for peace and a stable two-state solution.


12. (S) BG Al-Shamsi expressed concern that Israel might
decide to talk to Hamas, which would be harmful to Abbas'
efforts to exert leadership. Dayton stated that he thought
it unlikely that the Israelis would open talks with Hamas,
though they were committed to preventing a humanitarian
catastrophe in Gaza. He also stated that the USG had no
interest in talking to Hamas.


13. (S) BG Al-Shamsi asked whether the efforts to support the
Palestinian Authority would succeed absent successful reform
of Fatah, arguing that Fatah was not seriously looking at
reform. Dayton suggested that Fatah was addressing it, but
was not making progress. He noted that one reason people had
supported Mohammed Dahlan and were considering supporting
Marwan Barghouti was that they didn't represent the "old
guard." He added that the impressive thing about the new
Minister of Interior Al-Yahya was that he was bringing in
younger Palestinian officers as he re-established the
Ministry of Interior.

FBI Request for Assistance
--------------


14. (S) Ambassador turned the discussion briefly to an FBI
request for assistance. She noted the close cooperation
between SSD and the FBI in identifying possible
co-conspirators in the September 11 attacks and explained
that the FBI was identifying and collecting evidence with
regard to five individuals: Khalid Shaykh Mohammed, Ramzi
Mohammad Abdullah Binalshibh, Ali Abd Al-Aziz Ali, Mustafa
Ahmed Al-Hawsawi, and Muhammad Mani Ahmed Al-Qahtani. The
FBI, she noted, would like to bring in a team. Hazza
welcomed further cooperation.


15. (U) USSC Dayton has cleared this message.
SISON