DEMOCRATIC REFORM STRATEGY FOR THE UAE: ENGAGEMENT

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ABU DHABI 001154

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ARP, NEA/PI, NEA/PPD
ALSO FOR R, S/P, DRL, AND ECA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/11/2017
TAGS: KDEM KMPI PGOV ELAB PHUM KPAO AE
SUBJECT: DEMOCRATIC REFORM STRATEGY FOR THE UAE: ENGAGEMENT
WITH THE "RULING BARGAIN"

REF: A. 05 ABU DHABI 2173


B. ABU DHABI 1016

C. ABU DHABI 949

D. ABU DHABI 1018

E. ABU DHABI 1127

F. ABU DHABI 1096

Classified By: Classified by Ambassador Michele J. Sison
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: This message updates the Mission's first
Democracy Strategy dated May 2005 (Ref A). Despite progress
made over the last two years in the area of democratic reform
)- including the country's first limited election of half of
the advisory Federal National Council (FNC) -) the UAE
leadership remains dynastic. According to the UAE
Constitution, the ruling Supreme Council is composed strictly
of the hereditary rulers of each of the seven emirates, who
then select the UAE president from among their own members;
both presidents in UAE's history have been rulers of Abu
Dhabi. The FNC remains a consultative body without the
ability to initiate or veto legislation. The closed nature
of the government is not limited to the federal level; the
UAE has no popularly elected representatives or local
governments, no political parties, and no labor unions. The
policy-level operations of government remain somewhat opaque
although there is an increasing effort to increase
transparency in the functioning of some government ministries
and agencies. No formal methods have been established for
public participation. Nonetheless, the UAEG and its
principal rulers enjoy a high degree of political legitimacy
among UAE citizens due in part to (A) informal political
participation such as the "open majlis" in the ruler's court
of each of the seven emirates and to (B) successful long-term
policies that have distributed the country's significant oil
wealth in support of education, social welfare, and
employment opportunities for UAE citizens.


2. (C) Summary continued: The U.S. should continue to
encourage a UAE reform strategy based around four essential
pillars of democracy: (1) political participation, (2) an
active and independent press, (3) government transparency,
and (4) an independent judiciary. Advancing reform in the
UAE requires a two-fold approach: quiet but frank diplomacy
pressing senior leadership to allow greater public
participation, and a bottom-up strategy to instill a "culture
of democracy" that helps citizens understand, value, and
prepare to participate in a more open and democratic system.
End summary.

Overview
--------------


3. (C) The UAEG relies on a consensus-based decision-making
process through the co-existence of traditional and modern
forms of government. All laws must be unanimously approved
by the Supreme Council which is composed of the rulers of
each of the seven emirates. Informal mechanisms such as the
"open majlis" that allow nationals to voice opinions and seek
redress have historically provided direct access to the
country's rulers and a degree of government responsiveness to
its citizens. Senior UAE leaders often cite demographic
challenges as a reason that greater democratic reform has not
occurred; UAE citizens constitute less than 20 percent of the
population, while guest workers -- primarily from South Asia
and the Arab world -- constitute the majority of the resident
population.


4. (C) The UAE's overall prosperity and the commitment of the
Emirate of Abu Dhabi to use its sizeable wealth to satisfy
the needs of UAE's small citizenry constitute the "Ruling
Bargain" and partially explain the absence of significant
popular pressure for political reform. However, as the UAE
population continues to grow and becomes an increasingly
modern society, these traditional mechanisms are becoming
less effective. Although senior UAE leaders appear to be
disposed to the idea of greater political participation,
their primary concern remains political stability. They
perceive long-term economic prosperity to rely heavily on the
perception by foreigners of the UAE as a safe place to do
business. The leadership have stated in private
conversations that they will not jeopardize the security
environment for so-called democratic gains, citing in
particular a perceived "security threat" related to trade
unions or political participation by the sizable expatriate
worker population.


5. (S) Operational power at both the federal and

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emirate-level is concentrated in the hands of only a few
Emirati families; the two most important of which are the
ruling families of Abu Dhabi (Al-Nahyan) and Dubai
(Al-Maktoum). UAE President Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed is an
Al-Nahyan, and is only the second president in the country's
35-year history -- the first being his father, Sheikh Zayed
bin Sultan Al-Nahyan (1918-2004). Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed
Al-Nahyan (MbZ) is the Crown Prince of oil-rich Abu Dhabi
Emirate and Deputy Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces; his
full brother, Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al-Nahyan (AbZ),is
Minister of Foreign Affairs. Another brother, Sheikh Hazza
bin Zayed Al-Nahyan, is the UAE's National Security Advisor
and Director of State Security while Sheikh Saif bin Zayed al
Nahyan, a half-brother, is Minister of Interior. Another MbZ
full brother, Sheikh Hamdan bin Zayed Al-Nahyan (HbZ),is
Deputy Prime Minister and until early 2006 Minister of State
for Foreign Affairs. Meanwhile, Mohammed bin Rashid
Al-Maktoum (MbR) is the Vice President, Prime Minister, Ruler
of Dubai, and titular Minister of Defense. MbR, in his
capacity as Ruler of Dubai, maintains personal control
(working through a select group of trusted deputies) over
Dubai's booming economic sector. In this regard, MbR
maintains significant leverage within the federal structure,
although Dubai continues to receive petrodollar subsidies
from Abu Dhabi along with the five other smaller emirates.
Any democratic reform strategy would be absolutely dependent
on the consent of President Khalifa, MbZ, and MbR.

Strategies for Reform
--------------


6. (C) The U.S. should encourage the leadership (Abu Dhabi's
Al Nahyan and Dubai's Al Maktoum ruling families) to
introduce representative government/elections and engage with
and support the nascent civil society groups working toward
this goal. We should focus our efforts and programming funds
in support of the four essential pillars of (1) increased
political participation, (2) development of an active and
independent press, and (3) support of government transparency
and (4) an independent judiciary. With the exception of
increased political participation, these strategies appear to
pose little direct threat to the security environment as
described by senior UAE leaders, and may have more immediate
potential.


7. (C) Advancing reform in the UAE requires a two-fold
approach: quiet but frank diplomacy encouraging senior
leadership to allow greater public participation, and a
bottom-up strategy of instilling democratic culture and
preparing members of the populace to understand, value, and
participate in a more open democratic system. For reform to
succeed in this country, it must be seen as a home-grown
phenomenon. Close identification with the United States may
undermine rather than advance reforms; Minister of State for
Federal National Council Affairs Anwar Gargash specifically
said that U.S. Government or NGO technical assistance would
not be sought or accepted in the run-up to the 2006 FNC
elections, as it would "undermine" the process in the eyes of
the public. Programming that targets professional
development of the press and judiciary may be particularly
effective.

Goal: Increased Political Participation
--------------


8. (C) Each emirate is semi-autonomous and is governed by a
hereditary leader. The laws and courts of each emirate are
established by the rulers of the emirate and are loosely
coordinated with federal practices. Some emirates maintain
their own police forces and immigration services; Ras
al-Khaimah and Dubai have totally separate court systems,
while the other five emirates adhere to a somewhat unified
federal courts structure. All natural resources, and the
funds derived thereof, are owned by the respective emirate
government and not by the UAE. Significant changes that
affect power structures or control over revenues are unlikely
to occur. The best opportunities for introducing democratic
ideals, principles, and practices is at the grass-roots level
where there is little perceived threat to existing power
structures or revenue streams. The most obvious targets are
the establishment of popularly elected municipal councils,
the expansion of student councils at universities, and the
creation of active parent-teacher associations. These targets
would introduce democratic principles while allowing a large
number of Emiratis to gain valuable experience in engaging in
public policy making processes, and raising a generation of
citizens with an expectation that they can participate in
government in a way that affects them directly. Efforts to

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"instill" civic participation material in the UAE school
curriculum as a part of ongoing education reform are already
underway. Abu Dhabi established a municipality for the
Western Emirates as a way of giving local nationals some
control over local spending, but has also established
management control over many development projects in the
poorer northern emirates -- rather than funneling cash to the
rulers and relying on them to implement projects.


9. (S) One traditional path to political parties, as seen in
the West, comes as an outgrowth from labor unions. Given the
fact that an overwhelming majority of the UAE population --
and labor market -- are foreign nationals, and the fact that
UAE leaders have repeatedly stated that labor unions are an
issue of "national security", this path is largely closed to
reform efforts in the UAE. Another path to political parties
that is common to this region is as an outgrowth of
professional associations, NGOs, and religious networks. The
UAE government has already allowed the creation of
"professional organizations" which now need to be expanded
and empowered. These professional organizations provide an
opportunity for the U.S. to push for small reforms and
empowerment of a group that is largely Emirati in composition
and that the UAEG does not perceive as a significant threat
to the stability of established power structures. For
example, on June 13, 2007, two hundred and twenty (220)
Emirati women graduated from a two-year UNIFEM-UAE General
Women's Union "Enhancing the Role of Women Parliamentarians"
program, including nine female FNC members (Ref B). Over
time, empowered professional organizations could provide the
foundation for true labor organizations and eventually for
political parties.


10. (S) The UAE has also permitted the establishment of one
civil society organization that functions like an independent
NGO: The UAE Human Rights Association. Supporting the
creation and strengthening of NGOs in the UAE would also
expand Emirati experiences of civic and political engagement
and activism.


11. (C) Political Participation Benchmarks for 2008:

-- At least one municipality announces elections for a
popularly elected governing council.

-- A second popularly elected student council is formed at an
institution of higher education.

-- The Ministry of Social Affairs proposes legislation
granting greater power and autonomy to professional
organizations.

Goal: Development of an Active and Independent Press
-------------- --------------


12. (C) A cornerstone of any open and free society is an
active and free press. Although the UAE government does not
actively censor the press other than forbidding direct
criticism of the ruling families, there is heavy
self-censorship among both journalists and editors. Like
much of the workforce, most journalists (though not all
columnists and editors) are expatriate foreign nationals on
term contracts and effectively subject to deportation if
their contracts are not renewed. Programming that targets
the creation of a more professional press corps such as
training in English language, direct interviewing techniques,
and investigative reporting, will foster confidence in their
abilities and result in a press that is more prepared to
pursue independent stories instead of relying heavily on wire
services and official statements. Building on the tactics
outlined in paragraph 9 (above) the U.S. should support
activities that strengthen the independence, competence, and
civil society profile of the already recognized UAE
Journalists Association. The U.S. should also work with the
recently-ensconced $10 billion Mohammed bin Rashid
Foundation, which seeks to improve education, including
journalism training, throughout the Muslim world. A variety
of programs should be targeted towards influencing the slowly
increasing number of editors, columnists and op-ed writers
who are UAE nationals (often academics) and although not
subject to deportation are subject to other forms of
government pressure.


13. (C) The U.S. should continue to press for adoption of a
robust press freedoms law. Among other problems, current UAE
law denotes "defamation" as a criminal offense rather than a
civil infraction. In February 2006, the UAE Journalists
Association completed draft freedom of the press legislation

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modeled largely after U.S. press rights, and prepared with
the assistance of MEPI-funded experts from the U.S. This
draft was submitted to the UAE government, but no action has
taken place; the Ministry of Information was dissolved in
February 2006 and replaced by a semi-independent National
Media Council. It is not clear which government entity
currently holds action on the proposed freedom of the press
law.



14. (C) Press Benchmarks for 2008:

-- The proposed Press Freedoms Law is enacted.

Goal: Transparency/Judicial Independence
--------------


15. (C) Transparency is based on the idea of the public
knowing how decisions are made. There is significant overlap
between the need for transparency and public participation.
In addition to encouraging popularly elected municipal
councils and student councils, the U.S. should encourage
public -- perhaps online -- discourse within those bodies, as
well as bodies that are not popularly elected. Abu Dhabi
Emirate's National Consultative Council already posts its
agenda online and allows for the public to submit comments
online, and has actively sought out training and technical
assistance from the Embassy and is clearly open to U.S.
programming opportunities. Similar practices should be
encouraged in all emirates, the Federal National Council, and
among ministries that generate legislation. As a first step,
the UAE should be encouraged to publish (in Arabic and
English) its relevant laws and regulations online as soon as
they are promulgated. As a necessary second step, we should
encourage efforts by federal ministries to solicit public
comments on draft legislation, such as the Ministry of Labor
recently did with its draft labor law amendments. Currently,
the UAE or the individual emirates communicate with select
stakeholders on draft legislation, but only on a confidential
basis.


16. (C) In many instances, ministries have expressed a
willingness to share information with the Embassy but have
been either unable to or have been prohibited from doing so.
The issuance of sovereign bond ratings for Abu Dhabi Emirate
(Ref C) is likely to produce greater transparency on economic
information-sharing than has traditionally been the case.
The U.S. should pursue opportunities to highlight technical
training and expertise in the creation of modernized record
keeping within federal ministries, municipal bodies, and
emirate administrations. Political will is often wasted if
capabilities to follow through are lacking.


17. (C) Similar to the challenges facing the press corps and
the labor market as a whole, the UAE Judiciary is largely
made up of foreign nationals -) Egyptians, Sudanese,
Yemenis, Mauritanians, Syrians -- who are working on
fixed-term contracts. As a result, judges are unlikely to
pursue any action that will generate displeasure with the
ruling bodies that oversee the renewal of their contracts.
The U.S. should press for better training for local UAE
national judges, a system of tenure for judges, or perhaps
some form of professional association that will give judges a
stronger sense of independence in making their judgments.


18. (C) Transparency/Judicial Independence Benchmarks for
2008:

-- The UAEG publishes all legislation in both Arabic and
English online at the same time that laws are published in
the Official Gazette. In a June 24 meeting with the UAE
Ministry of Justice under secretary, Emboffs were told that
in the near future the UAE will publish on a website all laws
in both languages. (Ref F)

-- An official UAEG body solicits public comment on draft
legislation.

SISON